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BRITISH GOVERNMENT
1914-1953

G. H. L. Le MAY

Former Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford
Professor of Local Government and Public Administrations
in the University of the Witwatersr and, Johannesburg

BRITISH GOVERNMENT

I 9 I 4 - 1 953

Select Documents

METHUEN & CO. LTD, LONDON

36 Essex Street , Strand; WC2

First published in 195 $

CATALOGUE NO. 5697 U

Printed and bound in Great Britain by
The Camelot Press Ltd., London and Southampton

MY MOTHER AND FATHER

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many friends and colleagues have, directly and indirectly, helped me
in preparing this book. In particular, I should like to thank Mr. D. N.
Chester, Professor S. E. Finer, Mr. R. B. McCallum, Mr. H. G.
Nicholas, Professor W. A. Robson, Professor K. B. Smellie, and Mr.
E. T. Williams, all of whom gave me their criticisms of my synopsis.
Mr. Nicholas, and Messrs. Macmillan & Co., Ltd., gave me permission
to print an extract from The General Election of iggo. Sir David Keir
allowed me to see the table of contents of the fourth edition of Keir and
Lawson, Cases in Constitutional Law. The extracts from official papers
are printed with the permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s
Stationery Office. Mr. Peter Wait, of the firm of Methuen, Erst
suggested that I should begin this work; and I owe him a deep debt of
gratitude, not only for his assistance in collecting material, but for his
genial patience. My secretary, Miss Jenifer Nicolson, has given me
valuable help in preparing the index.

Above all, I must thank Mr. Asa Briggs. Most of my ideas on the
process of government were formulated in discussions with him, first as
his pupil and later as his colleague, during the five years which I spent
in the University of Oxford.

JOHANNESBURG.

November , 195^.

The most distinctive indication of the change of outlook of the government
of this country in recent times has been its growing preoccupation, irrespective
of party, with the management of the life of the people. A study of the Statute
Book will show how profoundly the conception of the function of government
has altered. Parliament finds itself increasingly engaged in legislation which
has for its conscious aim the regulation of the day-to-day affairs of the com-
munity and now intervenes in matters formerly thought to be entirely outside
its scope.

Report of the Macmillan Committee

on Finance and Industry , 1931.

INTRODUCTION

The problems of an editor of contemporary documents are similar,
in many ways, to those of the contemporary historian. There is, for
instance, too much evidence of one kind, and not enough of another.
Trends which seem to be dominant, and developments which seem to
be critical, in the distorted perspective of the recent past, may well be
those which will, in the event, prove minor or insignificant. Documents
— especially official papers, which form the greater part of this collec-
tion — are by no means a complete record. “We may find many things
in rowles,” Whitelocke wrote in his diary, “but we knowe not with what
passion and what earnestness it was done.’ 5 But where the contemporary
historian, by his own knowledge, and by his interpretation of personal
motives, may fill in those gaps where the records are silent, the editor
must leave the documents to speak, so far as they can, for themselves.

These documents have been presented with the minimum of
explanatory matter. I agree with the views of Mr. Costin and Mr.
Steven Watson of those who have “attempted to write the constitutional
history of two hundred and fifty years in some century — or score — of
breathless gages, and attached it to the front of the selections by way of
guide or precis of what is to follow. ”1 This is not a supplement to a
constitutional history of contemporary Britain, but an attempt to
collect materials which may prove helpful when such a history comes to
be written. “Most historians of British responsible government have
attufied their story to the theme of liberty,” Sir Keith Hancock has
written. “It might with equal appropriateness be attuned to the theme
of efficiency . . .” 1 2 I have frried, in making my selection, to keep this
luminous phrase in mind : and the reader will find, therefore, extracts
bearing on the way in which the civil service, in particular, does its
business. * % * -

There is also a good deal of descriptive matter. It has seemed to me
that, in passing judgement on developments in government, we have
been using, as a mental standard, a model which has long been
obsolete. It is, no doubt, a stimulating mental exercise to compare the
conventions of the constitution to-day with those of Lord Palmerston’s
time, and to conclude, therefore, that we have moved deplorably far
from the classical practice of representative democracy; but it adds
little to &n understanding of the process of government. The theory of
British government has never quite kept pace with the practice; but
the gap betweep them, it may be argued, has seldom ^>een quite so

1 W. C. Costin and J. Steven Watson, The Law and Working of the Constitution fevols.
London, 1952), p. vii.

2 W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing, British War Economy (London, 1 9^), p. 88.

Introduction

wide as it is to-day. The first task, in closing that gap, is to know how the
machinery of government actually works; and this collection, it is
hoped, will be some contribution to that knowledge.

Although the area and intensity of government action have grown,
over the past few generations, the State (if this word may be used
loosely to refer to that body which has the final power to make and
enforce decisions) has become, at the same time, increasingly remote
from the citizen in whose name it claims to function, and increasingly
obscure in its inner workings. It may be argued that the two centres of
effective power lie in the caucus of the party for the time being in
power, on one hand; and somewhere between the political executive
(which is linked to the party) and the permanent executive of senior
civil servants, on the other. The development of a strict party discipline,
the provisions of the Official Secrets Acts, and the extensions of the
doctrine of Cabinet secrecy , 1 are making it increasingly difficult for
those not in the inner circles of knowledge to do more than speculate
on how decisions are, in fact, taken. Nevertheless, a study of such
working parts of the machinery of government which are exposed has a
definite value if it helps to produce that “intuitive understanding of how
things do not happen”, which Sir Lewis Namier has called “the
crowning attainment of historical study.”

Some working parts, however, are not exposed at all. It is not yet
possible, for example, to publish official papers showing iif detail how
Britain was directed from the centre during the Second World War.
It is difficult to show the significance, at the present day, of such officials
as, for instance, the Secretary of the Cabinet. War and preparation,
for war have influenced both the structure of government ani the
technique of administration; they have also left their mark upon the
administrative habit of mind. It is too earijV, still, to say which of these
influences will be the most lasting.

1 This has recently been extended to strange lengths. It is necessary, for instance, for
those who wish to read those volumes of the Gladstone Papers in the British Museum
in'" which Mr. Gladstone’s notes of Cabinet meetings are preserved, to obtain official
permission.

CONTENTS

Page

Acknowledgements vii

Introduction ix

Section L STATUTES

Official Secrets Act, 1911 3

Trade Union Act, 19x3 5

Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act, 1914 8

Representation of the People Act, 1918 10

Re-election of Ministers Act, 1919 14

Ministry of Health Act, 1919 15

Police Act, 1919. • 19

Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act, 1919 21

Emergency Powers Act, 1920 24

Official Se^ets Act, 1920 25

Rating and Valuation Act, 1925 29

Boards of Guardians (Default) Act, 1926 31.

Local Government (County Borough and* Adjustments) Act,

1926 32

Roman Catholic Relief Act^ 1926 33

Royal and Parliamentary Titles Act, 1927 35

Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1927 35

* *

Audit (Local Authorities) Act, 1927 40 ;

Representation of the People (Equal Franchise) Act, 1928 41

Local Government Act, 1929 43

Housing Act, 1930 53

Import Duties Act, 1932 54

Local Government Act, 1933 58

His Majesty’s Declaration of Abdication Act, 1936 68

Public Order A#t, 1936 69

Ministers of the Crown Act, 1937 74

Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 19^8 79

Contents

xii

Page

Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939 80

Official Secrets Act, 1939 86

Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1940 87

Education Act, 1944 87

Supplies and Services (Transitional Powers) Act, 1945 89

Ministers of the Crown (Transfer of Functions) Act, 1946 94

Statutory Instruments Act, 1946 97

Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1946 102

Coal Industry Nationalisation Act, 1946 102

National Health Service Act, 1 946 1 1 1

Crown Proceedings Act, 1947 115

Supplies and Services (Extended Purposes) Act, 1947 120

Local Government Act, 1 948 * 122

National Assistance Act, 1948 128

Representation of the People Act, 1948 135

Gas Act, 1948 144

Parliament Act, 1949 145

Regency Act, 1953 146

Section II. PARLIAMENT

Reform of the Second Chamber, 1918 151

Letter from Viscount Bryce to the Prime Minister.

The Dissolution of Parliament, 1923 155

- JC"

; Legislation and Parliamentary Time, 1930 156

Speech of Colonel Ashley, explaining why a shortage of parlia-
mentary time rationed the amount of legislation which could
be allocated to each Department.

The Working of the House of Commons, 1931 156

Evidence before the Select Committee on Procedure on Public
Business.

A Member and His Trade Union, 1931 168

The Speaker’s announcement of the resignation of the Chairman
of W ay and Means .

Alloca&on^of Time, 1935 169

Kir. Baldwin’s announcement on the time to be allocated to the
committee stage of the Government of India Bill.

Contents

xiii

Page

Procedure on Money Resolutions, 1937-8 169

Mr. Chamberlain’s statement.

Delegated Legislation, 1937-50 171

(A) Speech by Mr. Dingle Foot, 27th January 1937.

(B) Speeches by Mr. Molson, Mr. Silverman and Mr. Herbert
Morrison, 17th May 1944.

(D) Specimen Report from the Select Committee on Statutory
Instruments, 1950.

(E) Report from the Select Committee on Delegated Legislation;

27th October 1953

The Leader of the Opposition, 1937 183

Personal statement by Mr. Attlee.

The Dissolution of Parliament, 1 944 1 85

Statement by Mr. Churchill on the royal prerogative of
dissolution.

Committees of the House of Commons, 1945 186

Statement by Mr. Herbert Morrison on waste of time in
committees.

Parliamentary Control of Nationalised Industries 187

(A) Report of proceedings in Standing Committee on the
Transport Bill, 1947.

(B) Report on proceedings in Standing Committee on the

Electricity Bill, 1947. •

* (C) Speech by Mr. Herbert Morrison in the Commons on 4th
December 1947.

(D) Speaker’s ruling of gth June 1948.

(E) Debate of 25th October 195c.

(F) and (G) Reports from the Select Committee on Nationalised
Industries, 1952 and 1953.

The Working of the House of Commons, 1946 202

Third Report from the Select Committee on Procedure.

The House of Lords in Separate Session, 1947 212

Proceedings of 13th August and 9th September: speeches by the
Marquess of Salisbury, Viscount Jowitt and Viscount Hall.

Parliamentary Privilege and Party Meetings, 1947 215

Report from the Committee of Privileges on the Allighan
case.

Powers of the Hfuse of Lords, 1 948 m 218

Debate of 27th January 1948, on the Second Reading of the
Parliament Bill : speeches by Viscount Addison and the M£*qu£?s
of Salisbury.

Bbg

XIV

Contents

Page

Reform of the House of Lords, 1 948 219

The Functions of Parliament, 1951 223

Mr. Harold Macmillan’s catalogue of functions.

Section III. THE EXECUTIVE

Experts and Ministers on the War Council, 1915 227

Report from the Dardanelles Commission.

The War Cabinet, 1917 229

The Unreformed Cabinet 232

Speech by Lord Curzon in the House of Lords, 19th June 1918.

The Machinery of Government, 1918 233

Report of the Haldane Committee.

Co-ordination of Defence Forces, 1923 238*

Recommendations of the National and Imperial Defence
Committee.

The Public Corporation, 1925 240

Report of the Broadcasting Committee.

The Reputation of the Civil Servant, 1928 241

Report of the Committee investigating the Gregory case.

The Legislative and Judicial Powers of the Executive, 1929-32 242

(i) Evidence given before the Donoughmore Committee;
Memoranda by the Ministry of Health.

(ii) The Report of the Committee.

Treasury Control and the Civil Service, 1931 265

Report of the Tomlin Commission.

Local Government Expenditure, 1932 c 267

Report of the Committee on Local Expenditure.

The. Headship of the Civil Service, 1942 269

* Statement by Viscount Simon, in August 1942.

The Civil Service, 1943 275

^Speech of Mr. W. J. Brown in the Commons, 28th January 1943.

Civil Service Organisation and Methods 277

Fifth Report from Select Committee on Estimates.

Weaknesses in Local Government, 1947 283

Report of the Local Government Boundary Commission for 1(^47.

The Machinery of Planning, 1947 286

Speech^ of Sir Stafford Cripps in the House of Commons, 10th
Marcia 1947.

The (%il Service and Politics, 1949 288

Report of the Masterman Committee.

Contents

Page

The Power of the Cabinet, 1950 293

House of Lords debate on 17th May 1950.

Cabinet Papers, 1951 296

Statement by Mr. Churchill on the use of Cabinet papers.

Treasury Control, 1951 296

Fourth Report of Committee of Public Accounts, 1950-51.

Political Activities of Civil Servants, 1953 302

White Paper of March 1953.

Section IV. JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

Local Government Board v. Arlidge, 1914 309

^Roberts v. Hopwood and Others, 1924 315

The King v. Minister of Health, ex parte Yaffe, 1930 320

Duncan v. Jones, 1935 • 327

Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson and Another, 1941 329

Point of Ayr Collieries, Ltd. v. Lloyd George, 1943 333

Re Hurle-H(^bbs, 1944 334

Blackpool Corporation v. Locker, 1947 338

Franklin and Others v. Minister of Town and Country Planning,

1947 . 34i

R. v. Tfronoh Is lines, Ltd., and Others, 1952 347

Section V. THE PARTIES AND THE ELECTORATE

The Constitution of the Labour Party, 1918 ^353 %

The Conservative Party and the Coalition, 1922 357 *

Speeches by Mr. Austen Chamberlain and Mr. Bonar Law at
the Carlton Club, October 1922.

Conference on Electoral Reform, 1929-30 361

Letter from Viscount Ullswater to the Prime Minister.

Parliamentary Representation, 1931 364

Speech by Lord Hugh Cecil, House of Commons, 16th March
1931-

Proportional Representation, 1933 « 366

Speeches by Mr. Attlee and Mr. Isaac Foot in the House of
Commons, 6th December 1933.

The National Council of J^abour, 1941 3^8

XVI

Contents

Page

The Electoral System, 1944 370

Report of the Speaker’s Conference on electoral reform.

Standing Orders of the Parliamentary Labour Party, 1945 373

The Conservative Party, 1949 374

Report of the Maxwell Fyfe Committee.

The Constitution and Standing Orders of the Labour Party, 1950 379

Party Field Forces, 1950 392

Extract from Mr. H. G. Nicholas, The General Election of 1950.

Standing Orders of the Parliamentary Labour Party, 1952 395 '

The National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations 396
Rules adopted 1947, including 1953 amendments.

Index 4x1*'

CTION I

OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT, 1911
1 and 2 Geo. 5, c. 28

An Act to re-enact the Official Secrets Act , i88g, with Amendments .

\_ 22 nd August 19 n.]

1. — (i) If any person for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or
interests of the State —

( a ) approaches or is in the neighbourhood of, or enters any prohibited
place within the meaning of this Act; or

( b ) makes any sketch, plan, model, or note which is calculated to be
or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an
enemy; or

(c) obtains or communicates to any other person any sketch, plan,
model, article, or note, or other document or information which
is calculated to be or might be 6r is intended to be directly or
indirectly useful to an enemy;

he shall be guilty of felony, and shall be liable to penal servitude
for any term not less than three years and not exceeding seven
years.

(2) On a prosecution under this section, it shall not be necessary to
show that the accused person was guilty of any particular act tending
to show a purpose prejudicial io the safety ^>r interests of the State,
and, Notwithstanding that no such act is proved against him, he may
be convicted if, from the circumstances of the case, or his conduct, or
his known character as proved, it appears that his purpose was a pur-
pose prejudicial to the safety or imerests of the State; and if any sketch,
plan, model, article, note, document, or information relating to or
used in any prohibited place within the meaning of this Act, or any-
thing in such a place, is made, obtained, or communicated by any
person other than a person acting under lawful authority, it shall be
deemed to have been made, obtained, or communicated for a purpose
prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State unless the contrary is
proved.

2. — (1) If any person having in his possession or control any sketch,
plan, model, article, note, document, or information which relates to
or is used* in a prohibited place or anything in such a place, or which
has been made or obtained in contravention of this Act, or which
has been entrust^, in confidence to him by any person folding office
under His Majesty or which he has obtained owing to his positiQji as a
person who holds or has held office under His Majesty, or as ^person
who holds or has held a contract made on behalf of His Majesty, or as

Statutes

a person who is or has been employed under a person who holds or
has held such an office or contract, —

(a) communicates the sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or
information to any person, other than a person to whom he is
authorised to communicate it, or a person to whom it is in the
interest of the State his duty to communicate it, or

(b) retains the sketch, plan, model, article, note, or document in his
possession or control v/hen he has no right to retain it or when it
is contrary to his duty to retain it:

that person shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.

(2) If any person receives any sketch, plan, model, article, note,
document, or information, knowing, or having reasonable ground to
believe, at the time when he receives it, that the sketch, plan, model,
article, note, document, or information is communicated to him in*-
contravention of this Act, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour,
unless he proves that the communication to him of the sketch, plan,
model, article, note, document,^ or information was contrary to his
desire.

(3) A person guilty of a misdemeanour under this section shall be
liable to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not
exceeding two years, or to a fine, or to both imprisonment and a fine.

[§ 3. Definition of “prohibited place”.]

4 . Any person who attempts to commit any offence under this Act,
or incites, or counsels, f or attempts to procure another person to
commit an offence under this Act, shall be guilty of felony o4 of a
misdemeanour according as the offence in question is felony or mis-
demeanour, and on conviction shall be liable to the same punishment,
and to be proceeded against in the same manner, as if he had com-
mitted the offence. . . .

7T If any person knowingly harbours any person whom he knows,
or has reasonable grounds for supposing, to be a person who is about
to commit or who has committed an offence under this Act, or know-
ingly permits to meet or assemble in any premises in his occupation or
under his control any such persons, or if any person having harboured
any such person, or permitted to meet or assemble in any premises
in his occupation or under his control any such persons, wilfully refuses
to disclose to a superintendent of police any information which it is in
his power to give in relation to any such person he shall be guilty of
a misdemeanour and liable to imprisonment with or without hard
labour for £ term not exceeding one year, or to ^ fine, or to both
imprijpnnjfnt and a fine.

8 . A prosecution for an offence under this Act shall not be instituted
excepffby or with the consent of the Attorr*ey- General. . . .

Official Secrets Act , igu 5

9 . — (1) If a justice of the peace is satisfied by information on oath
that there is reasonable ground for suspecting that an offence under
this Act has been or is about to be committed, he may grant a search
warrant authorising any constable named therein to enter at any time
any premises or place named in the warrant, if necessary, by force,
and to search the premises or place and every person found therein,
and to seize any sketch, plan, model, article, note, or document, or
anything of a like nature or anything which is evidence of an offence
under this Act having been or being about to be committed, which he
may find on the premises or place or on any such person, and with
regard to or in connexion with which he has reasonable ground for
suspecting that an offence under this Act has been or is about to be
committed.

(2) Where it appears to a superintendent of police that the case is
fcOne of great emergency and that in the interest of the State immediate
action is necessary, he may by a written order under his hand give to
any constable the like authority as may be given by the warrant of a
justice under this section. ...

13 . — (1) This Act may be cited as the Official Secrets Act, 19 1 1.

(2) The Official Secrets Act, 1839, is hereby repealed.

TRADE UNION ACT, 1913
* 2 and 3 Geo. 5 , c. 30

An Act to amend the Lavs with respect to the objects and powers of Trade
Unions .

[yth March 19/3.]

1 . — (1) The fact that a combination has under its constitution
objects or powers other than statutory objects within the meaning of
this Act shall not prevent the combination being a trade union for the
purposes of the Trade Union Acts, 1871-1906, so long as the com-
bination is a trade union as defined by this Act, and, subject to the
provisions of this Act as to the furtherance of political objects, any
such trade union shall have power to apply the funds of the union for
any lawful objects or purposes for the time being authorised under its
constitution.

(2) For the purposes of this Act, the expression “statutory objects”
means the object* mentioned in section sixteen of the T rade Union
Act Amendment Act, 1876, namely, the regulation of th% relations
between workmen and masters, or between workmen and workmen,
or between masters and masters, or the imposing of restrictive conditions

6 Statutes

on the conduct of any trade or business, and also the provision of
benefits to members.

2 . — (i) The expression “trade union 55 for the purpose of the Trade
Union Acts, 1871 to 1906, and this Act, means any combination,
whether temporary or permanent, the principal objects of which are
under its constitution statutory objects :

Provided that any combination which is for the time being registered
as a trade union shall be deemed to be a trade union as defined by
this Act so long as it continues to be so registered.

(2) The Registrar of Friendly Societies shall not register any com-
bination as a trade union unless in his opinion, having regard to the
constitution of the combination, the principal objects of the combina-
tion are statutory objects, and may withdraw the certificate of regis-
tration of any such registered trade union if the constitution of the
union has been altered in such a manner that, in his opinion, the^
principal objects of the union are no longer statutory objects, or if in
his opinion the principal objects for which the union is actually carried
on are not statutory objects.

[(3) Unregistered trade unions may apply to the Registrar for a certificate.]

[(4) Appeal to the High Court against the Registrar’s refusal to register a
union.]

(5) A certificate of the Registrar that a trade union is a r trade union
within the meaning of this Act shall, so long as it is in force, be con-
clusive for all purposes.

3 . — (1) The funds of a trade union shall not be applied, either
directly or in conjunction with any other trade union, association, or
body, or otherwise indirectly, in the furtherance of the political
objects to which this section applies (without prejudice to the further-
ance of any other political objects), unless the furtherance of those
objects has been approved as an object of the union by a resolution

.for tire time being in force passed on a ballot of the members of the
union taken in accordance with this Act for the purpose by a majority
of the members voting; and where such a resolution is in force, unless,
rules, t-to be approved, whether the union is registered or not, by the
Registrar of Friendly Societies, are in force providing —

(a) that any payments in the furtherance of those objects are to be
made out of a separate fund (in this Act referred to as the political
fund of the union) , and for the exemption in accordance with this
Act of any member of the union from any obligation to contribute
to such a fund if he gives notice in accordance with this Act that
he objecTs to contribute; and

(b) tbed a*member who is exempt from the obligation to contribute
to the political fund of the union shall not be excluded from any
benefits of the union, or placed in any*respect either directly or

Trade Union Act , 1913 7

indirectly under any disability or at any disadvantage as compared
with other members of the union (except in relation to the control
or management of the political fund) by reason of his being so
exempt, and that contribution to the political fund of the union
shall not be made a condition for admission to the union.

(2) If any member of a trade union alleges that he is aggrieved by
a breach of any rule made in pursuance of this section, he may com-
plain to the Registrar of Friendly Societies, and the Registrar of
Friendly Societies, after giving the complainant and any representative
of the union an opportunity of being heard, may, if he considers that
such a breach has been committed, make such order for remedying
the breach as he thinks just under the circumstances; and any such
order of the Registrar shall be binding and conclusive on all parties
without appeal and shall not be removable into any court of law or
restrainable by injunction, and on being recorded in the county court,
may be enforced as if it had been an order of the county court. In the
application of this provision to Scotland the sheriff’s court shall be
substituted for the county court, and “interdict 55 shall be substituted
for “injunction. 55

(3) The political objects to which this section applies are the expendi-
ture of money —

•

( a ) on the payment of any expenses incurred either directly or in-
directly by a candidate or prospective candidate, for election to
Parliament or to any public office, before, during, or after the
election in connexion with his candidature or election; or

(b) on the holding of any meeting or the distribution of any literature
or documents in support of any such candidate or prospective
candidate; or

(d) in connexion with the registration of electors or the selection of a *
candidate for Parliament or any public office; or

(e) on the holding of political meetings of any kind, or on the distribu-
tion of political literature or political documents of any kind,
unless the main purpose of the meetings or of the distribution
of the literature or documents is the furtherance of statutory
objects within the meaning of this Act.

The ex*pression “public office 55 in this section means the office of
member of any county, county borough, district, or parish council, or
board of guardians, or of any public body who have power to raise
money, either directly or indirectly, by means of a rate. * *

(4) A resolution under this section approving political objects as an
object of the union shall take effect as if it were a rule of the uniyn and

Statutes

may be rescinded in the same manner and subject to the same provi-
sions as such a rule. . . .

4. — (i) A ballot for the purposes of this Act shall be taken in accord-
ance with rules of the union to be approved ... by the Registrar of
Friendly Societies. . . .

5, — (i) A member of a trade union may at any time give notice . . .
that he objects to contribute to the political fund of the union. . . .

(2) On giving notice in accordance with this Act of his objection to
contribute, a member of the union shall be exempt, so long as his
notice is not withdrawn, from contributing to the political fund of the
union as from the first day of January next after the notice is given . . .

[§§ 6 (methods of exemption), 7 (definition of the Registrar of Friendly
Societies), 8 (short title), and schedule omitted.]

DEFENCE OF THE REALM CONSOLIDATION ACT, 1914

5 Geo. 5, c. 8

An Act to consolidate and amend the Defence of the Realm Acts .

[27th November 1914.]

1 . — (1) His Majesty in Council has power during the continuance
of the present war to issue regulations for securing the public safety
and the defence of the realm, and as to the powers and duties for that
purpose of the Admiralty and Army Council and of the members of
His Majesty’s forces and other persons acting in his behalf; and may
by such regulations authorise the trial by r courts-martial, or in the case
of minor offences by courts of summary jurisdiction, and punishment
of persons committing offences against the regulations and in particular
against any of the provisions of such regulations designed —

(a) to prevent persons communicating with the enemy or obtaining
information for that purpose or any purpose calculated to jeopar-
dise the success of the operations of any of His Majesty’s forces or
the forces of his allies or to assist the enemy; or

(b) to secure the safety of His Majesty’s forces and ships and the
safety of any means of communication and of railways, ports, and
harbours; or

(c) to prevent the spread of false reports or reports likely to r cause dis-
affection to His Majesty or to interfere with the success of His
Majesty^s forces by land or sea or to prejudice His Majesty’s rela-
tions vdth foreign powers; or

(d) to Secure the navigation of vessels in accordance with directions
gi^en by or under the authority of the Admiralty; or

Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act , 1914 9

(< e ) otherwise to prevent assistance being given to the enemy or the
successful prosecution of the war being endangered.

(2) Any such regulations may provide for the suspension of any
restrictions on the acquisition or user of land, or the exercise of the
power of making byelaws, or any other power under the Defence Acts,
1842 to 1875, or the Military Lands Acts, 1891 to 1903, and any such
regulations or any orders made thereunder affecting the pilotage of
vessels may supersede any enactment, order, charter, byelaw, regula-
tion or provision as to pilotage.

(3) It shall be lawful for the Admiralty or Army Council —

[a) to require that there shall be placed at their disposal the whole or
any part of the output of any factory or workshop in which arms,
ammunition, or warlike stores or equipment, or any articles
required for the production thereof, are manufactured;

(b) to take possession of and use for the purpose of His Majesty’s
naval or military service any such factory or workshop or any
plant thereof;

and regulations under this Act may be made accordingly.

(4) For the purpose of the trial of a person for an offence under the
regulations by court-martial and the punishment thereof, the person
may be proceeded against and dealt with as if he were a person
subject to military law and had on active service committed an
offence under section five of the Army Act:

Provided that where it is proved that the offence is committed with
the intention of assisting the enemy a person convicted of such an
offencb by a court-martial shall be liable to suffer death.

(5) For the purpose of the trial of a person for an offence under the
regulations by a court of sulmmary jurisdiction and the punishment
thereof, the offence shall be deemed to have been committed either at
the place in which the same actually was committed or in any place
in which the offender may be, and the maximum penalty which may
be inflicted shall be imprisonment with or without hard labour for a
term of six months or a fine of one hundred pounds, or both such
imprisonment and fine; section seventeen of the Summary Jurisdiction
Act, 1879, shall not apply to charges of offences against the regulations,
but any person aggrieved by a conviction of a court of summary
jurisdiction may appeal in England to a court of quarter sessions, and
in Scotland under and in terms of the Summary Jurisdiction (Scotland)
Acts, and m Ireland in manner provided by the Summary Jurisdiction
(Ireland) Acts.

(6) The regulations may authorise a court-martial or court of
summary jurisdiction, in addition to any other punishment^ to a>rder
the forfeiture of any goods in respect of which an offence against the
regulations has been committed.

i o Statutes

2 . — (i) This Act may be cited as the Defence of the Realm Con-
solidation Act, 1914.

(2) The Defence of the Realm Act, 1914, and the Defence of the
Realm (No. 2) Act, 1914, are hereby repealed, but nothing in this
repeal shall affect any Orders in Council made thereunder, and all
such Orders in Council shall, until altered or revoked by an Order in
Council under this Act, continue in force and have effect as if made
under this Act.

REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT, 1918
8 Geo. 5 , c. 64

Part/ I
Franchises

1 . — (1) A man shall be entitled to be registered as a parliamentary
elector for a constituency (other than a university constituency) if he
is of full age and not subject to any legal incapacity, and —

(a) has the requisite residence qualification; or
(. b ) has the requisite business premises qualification.

(2) A man, in order to have the requisite residence qualification or
business premises qualification for a constituency —

(a) must on the last day of the qualifying period be residing in premises
in the constituency, or occupying business premises in the constitu-
ency, as the case may be ; and

(b) must during the whole of the qualifying period have resided in
premises, or occupied business premises, as the case may be, in the
constituency, or in another constituency within the same parlia-
mentary borough or parliamentary county, or within a parliamen-
tary borough or parliamentary county contiguous to that borough
or^County, or separated from that borough or county by water, not
exceeding at the nearest point six miles in breadth, measured in the
case of the tidal water from low-water mark.

For the purposes of this subsection the administrative county of
London shall be treated as a parliamentary borough.

(3) The expression “business premises” in this section means land or
other premies of the yearly value of not less than ten pounds occupied
for the purpose of the business, profession, or tracte of the person to
be r 6 gjgt«red.

2 . A man shall be entitled to be registered as a parliamentary elector
for a university constituency if he^is of full^ge and not subject to any

Representation of the People Act , igi 8

legal incapacity, and has received a degree (other than an honorary
degree) at any university forming, or forming part of, the constituency,
or in the case of the Scottish universities is qualified under section
twenty-seven of the Representation of the People (Scotland) Act,
1868, or in the case of the University of Dublin has either received a
degree (other than an honorary degree) at the university, or has
obtained a scholarship or fellowship in the University whether before
or after the passing of this Act.

3 . A man shall be entitled to be registered as a local government
elector for a local government electoral area, if he is of full age and
not subject to any legal incapacity, and —

(a) is on the last day of the qualifying period occupying, as owner or
tenant, any land or premises in that area; and

(b) has, during the whole of the qualifying period, so occupied any
land or premises in that area, or, if that area is not an administra-
tive county or a county borough, in any administrative county or
county borough in which the area is wholly or partly situate:

Provided that —

(i) for the purposes of this section a man who himself inhabits any
dwelling-house by virtue of any office, service, or employment,
shall, if tfee dwelling-house is not inhabited by the person in whose
service he is in such office, service, or employment, be deemed to
occupy the dwelling-house as a tenant; and

(ii) for the purposes of this section the word tenant shall include a
person who occupies a room or rooms as £ lodger only where such
room or rooms are let to him in an unfurnished stare.

4 . — (1) A woman shall be entitled to be registered as a parliamentary
elector for a constituency (other than a university constituency) if she —

(a) has attained the age of thirty years; and

( b ) is not subject to any legal incapacity; and

(c) is entitled to be registered as a local government elector in respect
of the occupation in that constituency of land or premises (not loping
a dwelling-house) of a yearly value of not less than five pounds or
of a dwelling-house, or is the wife of a husband entitled to be so
registered.

(2) A woman shall be entitled to be registered as a parliamentary
elector for* a university constituency if she has attained the age of
thirty years and either would be entitled to be so registered if she were
a man, or has beer^admitted to and passed the final examination, and
kept under the conditions required of women by the univ^rsit^ the
period of residence, necessary for a man to obtain a degree St any
university forming, or forming part of, a university constituency which

1 2 Statutes

did not at the time the examination was passed admit women to
degrees.

(3) A woman shall be entitled to be registered as a local government .
elector for any local government electoral area —

(a) where she would be entitled to be so registered if she were a man ;
and

(, b ) where she is the wife of a man who is entitled to be so registered in
respect of premises in which they both reside, and she has attained
the age of thirty years and is not subject to any legal incapacity.

For the purpose of this provision, a naval or military voter who
is registered in respect of a residence qualification which he would •
have had but for his service, shall be deemed to be resident in
accordance with the qualification.

[§ 5 makes special provisions for those on war service.]

6 . The qualifying period shall be a period of six months ending
either on the fifteenth day of January, or the fifteenth day of July,
including in each case the fifteenth day . . .

[§§ 7~9 deal with supplementary provisions as to residence and occupation,
the right of those registered to vote, and disqualifications.]

10 . A person shall, in addition to and without prejudice to any other
qualification, be qualified to be elected a member of the local govern-
ment authority for any local government electoral area if he is the
owner of property held by freehold, copyhold, leasehold or any other
tenure within the area of that authority.

[Part II deals with registration. There is to be a spring and autumn register
of electors each year, to be compiled by the registration officers of each par-
liamentary borough and county; appeals from the registration officer’s decision
shall lie to the county court; the expenses of registration are to be divided
between Parliament and local authorities; universities are to compile their
own registers.]

Part III

Method and Costs of Election. :

20 . — (1) At a contested election for a university constituency,
where there are two or more members to be elected, any election of
the full number of members shall be according to the principle of
proportional representation, each elector having one transferable vote
as defined by this Act.

(2) (a) rlis Majesty may appoint Commissioner^ to prepare as soon
as SP-ay jbe after the passing of this Act a scheme under which as nearly
as possible one hundred members shall be elected to the House of
Commons at a general election on th§ principle of proportional

Representation of the People Act, igi 8 13

representation for constituencies in Great Britain returning three or
more members. ...

21. (1) At a general election all polls shall be held on one day. . . .

[§22 lays down penalties for illegal plural voting.]

[§ 23. Ballot papers may be sent to registered absent voters; soldiers, sailors
and merchant seamen may vote by proxy.]

[§ 24. Electors employed by the returning officer may vote at the most
convenient polling station.]

[§ 25. Candidates may hold meetings in public elementary schools out of
school hours.]

[§§ 26-27 require that a candidate shall deposit £150 with the returning
officer, which shall be returned to him unless he fails to receive more than
one-eighth of the votes cast (or a proportionate number in a constituency
returning more than two members) . A candidate nominated in more than one
constituency may not recover his deposit more than once.]

[§§ 28-32. Duties, payment, etc., of returning officers; polling districts, etc.]

33. — (j) The provisions set out in the Fourth Schedule to this Act
shall be substituted for Part IV. and paragraph (3) of Part V. of the
First Schedule to the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act,
1883 (which relate to the maximum scale of election expenses), and
that Act shall have effect accordingly.

[(2) A candidate may send one communication free of charge by post to
each elector in his constituency.]

34. — -(1) A person other than the election agent of a candidate shall
not incur any expenses on account of holding public meetings or
issuing advertisements, circulars or publications for the purpose of
promoting or procuring the election of any candidate at a parlia-
mentary election, unless he is authorised in writing to do so by such
election agent.

(2) If any person acts in contravention of this section, he shall be
guilty of a corrupt practice. . . .

Part IV

Redistribution of Seats

37. — (1) Each of the areas mentioned in the First Part of the
Ninth Schedule to this Act shall be a parliamentary borough returning
the number of members specified opposite thereto in the said Schedule,
and whert so provided in the Schedule shall be divided into the
divisions specified therein, and each such division shall return one

member. •

•

[In England, 131 parliamentary boroughs, in 255 divisions; in^Val^ and
Monmouthshire, 6 boroughs in 11 divisions; in Scotland, 13 borou^fts in 13
divisions: in all, 299 division^]

Gbg

Statutes

(2) Each of the areas mentioned in the first column of the Second Part of
the Ninth Schedule to this Act shall be a parliamentary county returning
the number of members specified opposite thereto in the said Schedule,
and where so provided in the Schedule shall be divided into the divisions
specified therein, and each such division shall return one member.

[In England, 46 parliamentary counties, in 230 divisions; in Wales and
Monmouthshire, 12 counties in 24 divisions; in Scotland, 21 counties in 38
divisions: in all, 292 divisions.

(3) Each of the universities and combinations of universities men-
tioned in the Third Part of the Ninth Schedule to this Act shall be a
constituency returning the number of members specified opposite ■
thereto in the said Schedule.

[Two members each to be returned by the Universities of Oxford and
Cambridge; one each by the Universities of London and Wales; two members
by the Victoria University of Manchester and the Universities of Durham;
Liverpool, Leeds, Sheffield, Birmingham and Bristol; three members by the
Universities of St. Andrews, Glasgow, Aberdeen and Edinburgh: eleven
university members in all.]

[Part V (General) and Schedules 1-3 and 5-9 omitted.]

Fourth Schedule

The expenses . . . other than personal expenses and tke fee, if any,
paid to the election agent (not exceeding in the case of a county
election seventy-five pounds and of a borough election fifty pounds . . .)

shall not exceed an amount equal—

<•(

in the case of a county election to sevenpence for each elector on

the register;

in the case of an election for a borough to fivepence for each elector

on the register.

RE-ELECTION OF MINISTERS ACT, 1919
9 Geo. 5, c. 2

An Act to make provision for restricting the necessity of the re-election of Members
of the House of Commons on acceptance of office, and to make provision as to the
right of certain Ministers to sit in the House of Commons .

[27th February igigd\

1 . — (1) Notwithstanding anything in any Act, a member of the
Commons TIouse of Parliament shall not vacate Jus seat by reason
only r of his acceptance of an office of profit if that office is an office the
holder^of which is capable of being elected to, or sitting or voting
in, that House, and if such acceptance h*ts taken place within nine

Re-election of Ministers Act, igig 15

months after the issue of a proclamation summoning a new Parliament:

Provided that this section shall not apply to the acceptance of any
• office mentioned in the schedule to this Act, nor shall it affect the
provisions of any Act imposing a limit on the number of Secretaries
or Under Secretaries of State who may sit and vote in the Commons
House of Parliament.

(2) Where by virtue of this section a member of the Commons House
of Parliament does not vacate his seat by reason of his acceptance of
any of the offices mentioned in Schedule H. of the Representation
of the People Act, 1867, and Schedule H. of the Representation of

.the People (Scotland) Act, 1868, and Schedule E. of the Representa-
tion of the People (Ireland) Act, 1 868, as amended by any subsequent
enactment, he shall, for the purposes of section fifty-two, section fifty-
one, and section eleven of those Acts, respectively, be treated as if he
had been returned as a member to serve in Parliament since the
acceptance by him of such office.

(3) This section shall be deemed to have had effect as from the first
day of January nineteen hundred and nineteen.

2 . Where, before or after the passing of this Act, a member of His
Majesty’s Privy Council has been or is appointed to be a Minister of
the Crown at a salary, without any other office being assigned to him,
he shall not by reason thereof be deemed to have been or to be incap-
able of being elected to or of sitting or voting in the Commons House
of Parliament, and the office of such Minister shall be deemed to be an
office included in the above-mentioned schedules:

* Provided that not more than three Ministers to whom this section
applies shall sit as members of thai House at the same time.

3 . This Act may be cited as the Re-election of Ministers Act, 1919.

Schedule
Excepted Offices

Office of Steward or Bailiff of His Majesty’s three Chiltern Hundreds
of Stoke, Desborough and Burnham. ^ ..

Office of Steward or Bailiff of the Manors of East Hendred, Northstead
or Hempholme.

* MINISTRY OF HEALTH ACT, 1919
9 and 10 Geo. 5, c. 21

1. For the purpose of promoting the health of the people d^jmxg^iout
England and Wales, and for the purpose of the exercise of the powers
transferred or conferred b)* this Act, it shall be lawful for His Majesty

Statutes

to appoint a Minister of Health (hereinafter called “the Minister 55 ),
who shall hold office during His Majesty’s pleasure.

2 . — It shall be the duty of the Minister, in the exercise and per- •
formance of any powers and duties transferred to or conferred upon
him by or in pursuance of this Act, to take all such steps as may be
desirable to secure the preparation, effective carrying out and co-
ordination of measures conducive to the health of the people, including
measures for the prevention and cure of diseases, the avoidance of fraud
in connection with alleged remedies therefor, the treatment of physical
and mental defects, the treatment and care of the blind, the initiation
and direction of research, the collection, preparation, publication, and
dissemination of information and statistics relating thereto, and the
training of persons for health services.

3. — (i) There shall be transferred to the Minister —

{a) all the powers and duties of the Local Government Board;

(b) all the powers and duties of the Insurance Commissioners and the
Welsh Insurance Commissioners;

(c) all the powers of the Board 'of Education with respect to attending
to the health of expectant mothers and nursing mothers and of
children who have not attained the age of five years and are not
in attendance at schools recognised by the Board of Education;

(d) all the powers and duties of the Board of Education with respect
to the medical inspection and treatment of children and young
persons under paragraph (b) of subsection ( i ) of section thirteen of
the Education (Administrative Provisions) Act, 1907, as amended
and extended by tht: Education Act, 1918: Provided that, for the
purpose of facilitating the effective exercise and performance of
these powers and duties, the Minister may make arrangements with
the Board of Education respecting the submission and approval of
schemes of local education authorities and the payment of grants

# to local education authorities, so far as such schemes and payment
relate to or are in respect of medical inspection and treatment; and
the powers and duties of the Minister may under any such arrange-
^ _ ments be exercised and performed by the Board on his behalf and
with his authority under such conditions as he may think fit;

(e) all the powers of the Privy Council and of the Lord President of
the Council under the Midwives Acts, 1902 and 1918;

(/) such powers of supervising the administration of Part I. of the
Children Act, igo8 (which relates to infant life protection), as have
heretofore been exercised by the Secretary of State:

Provided that —

<•*

(i) £hejjpwer conferred on the Insurance Commissioners by the proviso
to'subsection (2) of section sixteen of the National Insurance
Act, 19x1, of retaining and applying for the purposes of research

Ministry of Health Act , igig 17

such sums as are therein mentioned shall not be transferred to the
Minister, but the duties heretofore performed by the Medical
Research Committee shall after the date of the commencement of
this Act be carried on by or under the direction of a Committee
of the Privy Council appointed by His Majesty for that purpose,
and any property held for the purposes of the former Committee
shall after that date be transferred to and vested in such persons
as the body by whom such duties as aforesaid are carried on may
appoint, and be held by them for the purposes of that body; and
(ii) in such matters of a judicial nature under the National Insurance
(Health) Acts, ign to 1918, as may be prescribed under those
Acts, the powers and duties of the Insurance Commissioners and
the Welsh Insurance Commissioners by this Act transferred to the
Minister shall be exercised by the Minister through a special body
* or special bodies of persons constituted in such manner as may be
so prescribed.

(2) It shall be lawful for His Majesty from time to time by Order in
Council to transfer to the Minister —

(a) all or any of the powers and duties of the Minister of Pensions with
respect to the health of disabled officers and men after they have
left the service;

(b) all or any of the powers and duties of the Secretary of State under
the enactments relating to lunacy and mental deficiency;

(c) any other powers and duties in England and Wales of any Govern-
ment department which appear to His Majesty to relate to matters
affecting or incidental to the health of the people.

(3) It shall be lawful for His Majesty from time to time by Order
in Council to transfer from the Minister to any other Government
department any of the powers and duties of the Minister, whether
relating to the relief of the poor or otherwise, which appear to His
Majesty not to relate to matters affecting or incidental to the health
of the people.

And it is hereby declared that it is the intention of this ActTHat,
in the event of provision being made by Act of Parliament passed in
the present or in any future session for the revision of the law relating
to the relief of the poor and the distribution amongst other authorities
of the powers exerciseable by boards of guardians, there shall be trans-
ferred from the Minister to other Government departments such of the
powers and duties under the enactments relating to the relief of the
poor then vested m the Minister (not being powers or duues relating
or incidental to the health of the people) as appear to His N|aje^;y to
be such as could be more conveniently exercised and performed by
such other departments.

Statutes

(4) His Majesty may by Order in Council make such incidental,
consequential, and supplemental provisions as may be necessary or
expedient for the purpose of giving full effect to any transfer of powers
or duties by or under this section, including provisions for the transfer
of any property, rights, and liabilities held, enjoyed, or incurred by
any Government department in connection with any powers or duties
transferred, and may make such adaptations in the enactments relating
to such powers or duties as may be necessary to make exerciseable by
the Minister and his officers or by such other Government department
and their officers, as the case may be, the powers and duties so trans-
ferred.

(5) In connection with the transfer of powers and duties to or from
the Minister by or under this Act, the provisions set out in the First
Schedule to this Act shall have effect.

4 , — (1) It shall be lawful for His Majesty by Order in Council tp
establish consultative councils in England and Wales for giving, in
accordance with the provisions of the Order, advice and assistance to
the Minister in connection with such matters affecting or incidental
to the health of the people as may be referred to in such Order.

(2) Every such council shall include women as well as men, and
shall consist of persons having practical experience of the matters
referred to the Council.

5 . The Minister shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, appoint
such officers as he may think fit to constitute a Board of Health in
Wales through whom he may exercise and perform in Wales in such
manner as he may thir^k fit any of his powers and duties; the Board
and any officer who is a member thereof shall act under the directions,
and comply with the instructions, of the Minister.

[§ 6. Staff and remuneration.]

[§ 7. Seal, style and acts of the Minister.]

8. — (1) Any Order in Council made under this Act may be revoked
or varied by a subsequent Order.

(2) Before any Order in Council under this Act (other than an
Order appointing a day for the commencement of this Act or any
provision thereof) is made, notice of the proposal to make the Order
and of the place where copies of a draft of the Order can be obtained
shall be published in the London Gazette, and in such other manner
as the Minister thinks best adapted for insuring publicity, and a draft
of the Order shall be laid before each House of Parliament for not
less than thirty days on which such House is sitting.

(3) In tSe case of a draft of an Order providing^for any transfer of
pow^ryar duties to or from the Minister under subsections (2) and (3)
of section three of this Act, or for the establishment of any consultative
council under section four thereof, the Order shall not be made until

Ministry of Health Act , igig 19

both Houses by resolution have approved the draft, nor, if any modifi-
cations are agreed to by both Houses, otherwise than as so modified,
and in the case of a draft of any other Order which is required to be
laid as aforesaid, if either House before the expiration of such thirty
days presents an Address to His Majesty against the draft, or any part
thereof, no further proceedings shall be taken thereon, without pre-
judice to the making of any new draft Order.

[§ 9. Modifications of Insurance Acts.]

[§ 10. The Chief Secretary to be the Minister of Health for Ireland.]

[§ 11. Short title, interpretation, etc. Two schedules.]

POLICE ACT, 1919
9 and 10 Geo. 5, c. 46

1 . — (1) For the purpose of enabling the members of the police forces
of England and Wales to consider and*bring to the notice of the police
authorities and the Secretary of State all the matters affecting their
welfare and efficiency, other than questions of discipline and pro-
motion affecting individuals, there shall be established in accordance
with the Schedule 1 to this Act an organisation to be called the Police
Federation, which shall act through local and central representative
bodies as provided in that schedule.

(2) The Police Federation and every branch thereof shall be entirely
independent of and unassociated with any body or person outside the
police service.

2 , — (1) Subject as aforesaid, it shall not be lawful for a member of
a police force to become, or after the expiration of one month from the
passing of this Act to be, a member of any trade union, or of any
association having for its objects, or one of its objects, to control or
influence the pay, pensions, or conditions of service of any police force;
and any member of a police force who contravenes this provision shall
be disqualified for continuing to be a member of the force; and, if any
member of a police force continues to act as such after becomfjftf“!>o
disqualified, he shall forfeit all pension rights and be disqualified for
being thereafter employed in any police force;

Provided that, where a man was a member of a trade union before
becoming a constable, he may, with the consent of the chief officer of
police, continue to be a member of that union during the time of his
service in the police force.

(2) If any question arises whether any body is a trade ffhion or an
association to which this section applies, the question shall Jbe deter-
mined by the Minister of Labour.

Schedule omitted.

Statutes

3 . If any person causes, or attempts to cause, or does any act calcu-
lated to cause disaffection amongst the members of any police force,
or induces, or attempts to induce, or does any act calculated to induce
any member of a police force to withhold his services or to commit
breaches of discipline, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and shall
be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment, with or without
hard labour, for a term not exceeding two years, or on summary con-
viction, to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for a term not
exceeding three months, or to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds, or to
both such imprisonment and fine, and in either case, if a member of a
police force, shall forfeit all pension rights and be disqualified for
being a member of any police force : Provided that, where the person
convicted of any such offence was a member of a police force and was
not sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine, the police
authority may, if they think fit, pay to him the whole or any part of
the rateable deductions which may have been made from his pay.

4 . — (i) It shall be lawful for the Secretary of State to make regula-
tions as to the government, mutual aid, pay, allowances, pensions,
clothing, expenses and conditions of service of the members of all
police forces within England and Wales, and every police authority
shall comply with the regulations so made.

(2) A draft of any regulations proposed to be so made as aforesaid
shall be submitted to a council, consisting of the joint central com-
mittee or a deputation from the joint central committee of the Police
Federation and representatives of the chief officers of police and police
authorities selected for |he purpose by the Secretary of State, after
consultation with the County Councils Association and the Association
of Municipal Corporations, and before making the regulations the
Secretary of State shall consider any representations made by such
council.

[§§ 5-6. Pensions.]

[§ 7. Abolition of limits on police rates.]

8 . — (1) The amounts payable or transferable by a county council
un 38 r subsection (2) of section twenty-four of the Local Government
Act, 1 888, on account of police in respect of the year ending the thirty-
first day of March, nineteen hundred and twenty, or any subsequent
year shall, instead of being calculated in manner provided in para-
graphs (i) and (j) of that subsection, be the full amounts payable or
transferable in accordance with the said paragraphs in respect of the
year ending the thirty-first day of March, nineteen hundred and
fifteen. m

(2), This section shall be construed as one with the Local Govern-
ment Act, 1888, and shall apply to county borough councils in like
manner as it applies to county councils.

Police Act , igig

9. It shall be lawful for the police authority of any police force, out
of the police fund, to make contributions to any provident fund
approved by the Secretary of State out of which provision is made for
payments to members of the police force on their retirement, or, on
their death, to their widows, dependants, or representatives.

10 . If any person not being a member of a police force wears without
the permission of the police authority the uniform of the police force,
or any dress having the appearance or bearing any of the distinctive
marks of that uniform, he shall on summary conviction be liable to a
fine not exceeding ten pounds :

Provided that this section shall not prevent persons from wearing
any uniform or dress in the course of a stage play or music hall or
circus performance.

12. This Act shall apply to the City of London Police and to every
police force to which the Police Act, 1890, applies. . . .

13. — ( 1 ) This Act shall apply to Scotland, with the substitution of
references to the Secretary for Scotland for references to the Secretary
of State, of references to Scotland for references to England and Wales,
and of references to the Police (Scotland) Act, 1890, for references to
the Police Act, 1890, and in the case of the schedule, subject to such
modifications as the Secretary for Scotland may by order prescribe
for the purpose of adapting the provisions of that schedule to the
circumstances of Scotland. . . .

14. In making regulations as to government, mutual aid, pay,
allowances, pensions, clothing, expenses and conditions of service of
members of the police force, the Secretary of State and the Secretary
for Scotland shall act in consultation one with another.

15 . — (1) This Act may be cited as the Police Act, 1919.

(2) This Act shall not extend to Ireland.

CHURCH OF ENGLAND ASSEMBLY (POWERS) ACT, 1919
9 and 10 Geo. 5, c. 76

Whereas the Convocations of Canterbury and York have recom-
mended in Addresses presented to His Majesty on the tenth day of
May nineteen hundred and nineteen, that, subject to the control and
authority of His Majesty and of the two Houses of Parliament, powers
in regard to legislation touching matters concerning the Church of
England shall be conferred on the National Assembly of The Church
of England constituted in the manner set forth in identical te^ns i# the
Appendix attached to their several Addresses:

And whereas it is expedient, subject to such control and authority

Statutes

as aforesaid, that such powers should be conferred on the Church
Assembly so constituted :

Be it therefore enacted . . .

[§ i . The National Assembly of the Church of England, the Constitution
of the Assembly and the Legislative Committee shall be as set out in the
Addresses.]

2* — (i) There shall be a Committee of members of both Houses of
Parliament styled “The Ecclesiastical Committee.”

(2) The Ecclesiastical Committee shall consist of fifteen members of
the House of Lords, nominated by the Lord Chancellor, and fifteen
members of the House of Commons, nominated by the Speaker of the
House of Commons, to be appointed on the passing of this Act to
serve for the duration of the present Parliament and thereafter to be
appointed at the commencement of each Parliament to serve for the*
duration of that Parliament.

Any casual vacancy occurring by the reason of the death, resigna-
tion, or incapacity of a member of the Ecclesiastical Committee shall
be filled by the nomination of a member by the Lord Chancellor or the
Speaker of the House of Commons, as the case may be.

(3) The powers and duties of the Ecclesiastical Committee may be
exercised and discharged by any twelve members thereof, and the
Committee shall be entitled to sit and to transact business whether
Parliament be sitting or not, and notwithstanding a vacancy in the
membership of the Committee. Subject to the provisions of this Act,
the Ecclesiastical Committee may regulate its own procedure.

3 . — (x) Every measure passed by the Church Assembly shall be
submitted by the Legislative Committee to the Ecclesiastical Com-
mittee, together with such comments and explanations as the Legisla-
tive Committee may deem it expedient or be directed by the Church
Assembly to add.

(2) The Ecclesiastical Committee shall thereupon consider the
measure so submitted to it, and may, at any time during such con-
sideration, either of its own motion or at the request of the Legislative
Corffimittee, invite the Legislative Committee to a conference to discuss
the provisions thereof, and thereupon a conference of the two com-
mittees shall be held accordingly.

(3) After considering the measure, the Ecclesiastical Committee shall
draft a report thereon to Parliament stating the nature and legal effect
of the measure and its views as to the expediency thereof, especially with
relation to the constitutional rights of all His Majesty’s subjects.

(4) The Ecclesiastical Committee shall commui^icate its report in
draft tojjie Legislative Committee, but shall not present it to Parlia-
ment until the Legislative Committee signify its desire that it should
be so presented.

Church of England Assembly ( Powers ) Act , iQig 23

(5) At any time before the presentation of the report to Parliament
the Legislative Committee may, either on its own motion or by direc-
tion of the Church Assembly, withdraw a measure from further con-
sideration by the Ecclesiastical Committee; but the Legislative Com-
mittee shall have no power to vary a measure of the Church Assembly
either before or after conference with the Ecclesiastical Committee.

(6) A measure may relate to any matter concerning the Church of
England, and may extend to the amendment or repeal in whole or in
part of any Act of Parliament, including this Act:

Provided that a measure shall not make any alteration in the com-
position or powers or duties of the Ecclesiastical Committee, or in the
procedure in Parliament prescribed by section four of this Act.

(7) No proceedings of the Church Assembly in relation to a measure
shall be invalidated by any vacancy in the membership of the Church
-Assembly or by any defect in the qualification or election of any
member thereof.

4 . When the Ecclesiastical Committee shall have reported to Parlia-
ment on any measure submitted by*the Legislative Committee, the
report together with the text of such measure, shall be laid before
both Houses of Parliament forthwith, if Parliament be then sitting, or,
if not, then immediately after the next meeting of Parliament, and
thereupon, on a resolution being passed by each House of Parliament
directing that such measure in the form laid before Parliament should
be presented to His Majesty, such measure shall be presented to His
Majesty, and shall have the force and effect of an Act of Parliament
on the Royal Assent being signified thereto in the same manner as to
Acts of Parliament :

Provided that, if upon a measure being laid before Parliament the
Chairman of Committees of the House of Lords and the Chairman of
Ways and Means in the House of Commons acting in consultation,
shall be of opinion that the measure deals with two or more different
subjects which might be more properly divided, they may, by j'oint
agreement, divide the measure into two or more separate measures
accordingly, and thereupon this section shall have effect as if each of
the measures resulting from such division had been laid before PJnSa-
ment as a separate measure.

5 . This Act may be cited as the Church of England Assembly
(Powers) Act, 1919.

Statutes

EMERGENCY POWERS ACT, 1920
10 and 11 Geo. 5, c. 55

1. — (i) If at any time it appears to His Majesty that any action has
been taken or is immediately threatened by any persons or body of
persons of such a nature and on so extensive a scale as to be calculated,
by interfering with the supply and distribution of food, water, fuel, or
light, or with the means of locomotion, to deprive the community, or
any substantial portion of the community, of the essentials of life, His
Majesty may, by proclamation (hereinafter referred to as a proclama-
tion of emergency), declare that a state of emergency exists.

No such proclamation shall be in force for more than one month,
without prejudice to the issue of another proclamation at or before
the end of that period. *

( 2 ) Where a proclamation of emergency has been made, the occasion
thereof shall forthwith be communicated to Parliament, and, if Par-
liament is then separated by such adjournment or prorogation as will
not expire within five days, a proclamation shall be issued for the
meeting of Parliament within five days, and Parliament shall accord-
ingly meet and sit upon the day appointed by that proclamation, and
shall continue to sit and act in like manner as if it had stopd adjourned
or prorogued to the same day.

2. — ( 1 ) Where a proclamation of emergency has been made, and
so long as the proclamation is in force, it shall be lawful for His
Majesty in Council, by « Order, to 'make regulations for securing the
essentials of life to the community, and those regulations may confer
or impose on a Secretary of State or other Government department,
or any other persons in His Majesty’s service or acting on His Majesty’s
behalf, such powers and duties as His Majesty may deem necessary for
the preservation of the peace, for securing and regulating the supply
and distribution of food, water, fuel, light, and other necessities, for
maintaining the means of transit or locomotion, and for any other pur-
poses essential to the public safety and the life of the community, and
may make such provisions incidental to the powers aforesaid as may
appear to His Majesty to be required for making the exercise of those
powers effective:

Provided that nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorise the
making of any regulations imposing any form of compulsory military
service or industrial conscription:

Provide^ also that no such regulation shall make it an offence for
any person or persons to take part in a strike, or peacefully to persuade
any «tJ^£ person or persons to take part in a strike.

( 2 ) Any regulations so made shall be laid before Parliament as soon
as ma^ be after they are made, and shall tiot continue in force after

Emergency Powers Act % 1920 25

the expiration of seven days from the time when they are so laid
unless a resolution is passed by both Houses providing for the con-
tinuance thereof.

(3) The regulations may provide for the trial, by courts of summary
jurisdiction, of persons guilty of offences against the regulations; so,
however, that the maximum penalty which may be inflicted for any
offence against any such regulations shall be imprisonment with or
without hard labour for a term of three months, or a fine of one hun-
dred pounds, or both such imprisonment and fine, together with the
forfeiture of any goods or money in respect of which the offence has
been committed: Provided that no such regulations shall alter any
existing procedure in criminal cases, or confer any right to punish by
fine or imprisonment without trial.

(4) The regulations so made shall have effect as if enacted in this
Act, but may be added to, altered or revoked by resolution of both
Houses of Parliament or by regulations made in like manner and sub-
ject to the like provisions as the original regulations; and regulations
made under this section shall not be deemed to be statutory rules
within the meaning of section one of the Rules Publication Act, 1893.

(5) The expiry or revocation of any regulations so made shall not
be deemed to have affected the previous operation thereof, or the
validity of any action taken thereunder, or any penalty or punishment
incurred in respect of any contravention or failure to comply therewith,
or any proceeding or remedy in respect of any such punishment or
penalty.

- 3 . — (1) This Act may be cited as the Emergency Powers Act, 1920.

(2) This Act shall not apply to Ireland.

OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT, 1920
10 and 11 Geo. 5 , c. 75

An Act to amend the Official Secrets Act , 1911. , m

\_23rd December 1920. ]

1 . If any person for the purpose of gaining admission, or of
assisting any other person to gain admission, to a prohibited place,
within the meaning of the Official Secrets Act, 1911 (hereinafter
referred to as “the principal Act 55 ), or for any other purpose preju-
dicial to the safety or interests of the State within the meaning of the
said Acts — *

(a) uses or wears, without lawful authority, any naval, military, air-
force, police, or other ^official uniform, or any uniform so nearly

Statutes

resembling the same as to be calculated to deceive, or falsely
represents himself to be a person who is or has been entitled to use
or wear any such uniform; or

(b) orally, or in writing in any declaration or application, or in any
document signed by him or on his behalf, knowingly makes or
connives at the making of any false statement or any omission; or

(c) forges, alters, or tampers with any passport or any naval, military,
air-force, police, or official pass, permit, certificate, licence, or
other document of a similar character (hereinafter in this section
referred to as an official document), or uses or has in his possession
any such forged, altered, or irregular official document; or

(d) personates, or falsely represents himself to be a person holding, or
in the employment of a person holding office under His Majesty,
or to be or not to be a person to whom an official document or
secret official code word or pass word has been duly issued oir
communicated, or with intent to obtain an official document,
secret official code word or pass word, whether for himself or any
other person, knowingly makes any false statement; or

(e) uses, or has in his possession or under his control, without the
authority of the Government Department or the authority con-
cerned, any die, seal, or stamp of or belonging to, or used, made or
provided by any Government Department, or by any; diplomatic,
naval, military, or air-force authority appointed by or acting under
the authority of His Majesty, or any die, seal or stamp so nearly
resembling any such die, seal or stamp as to be calculated to
deceive, or counterfeits any such die, seal or stamp, or uses, or has
in his possession, or under his control, any such counterfeited die,
seal or stamp;

he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.

(2) If any person —

(<2) retains for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the
^State any official document, whether or not completed or issued
tor use, when he has no right to retain it, or when it is contrary
to his duty to retain it, or fails to comply with any directions issued
by any Government Department or any person authorised by such
department with regard to the return or disposal thereof; or

(b) allows any other person to have possession of any official^ document
issued for his use alone, or communicates any secret official code
word or pass word so issued, or, without lawful authority or excuse,
has in his possession any official document or secret official code
worjl or pass word issued for the use of some person other than
himself, or on obtaining possession of any official documents by
finding or otherwise, neglects or fails ter restore it to the person or

Official Secrets Act , ig20 27

authority by whom or for whose use it was issued, or to a police
constable; or

* ( c ) without lawful authority or excuse, manufactures or sells, or has in
his possession for sale any such die, seal or stamp as aforesaid;

he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.

(3) In the case of any prosecution under this section involving the
proof of a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State,
subsection (2) of section one of the principal Act shall apply in like
manner as it applies to prosecutions under that section.

2 . — (1) In any proceedings against a person for an offence under
section one of the principal Act, the fact that he has been in com-
munication with, or attempted to communicate with, a foreign agent,
whether within or without the United Kingdom, shall be evidence that
he has, for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State,
obtained or attempted to obtain information which is calculated to be
or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an
enemy.

(2) For the purpose of this section, but without prejudice to the
generality of the foregoing provision —

{a) A person shall, unless he proves the contrary, be deemed to have
been in communication with a foreign agent if —

(i) He has, either within or without the United Kingdom, visited
the address of a foreign agent or consorted or associated with a
foreign agent; or

• (ii) Either, within or without the United* Kingdom, the name or
address of, or any other information regarding a foreign agent has
been found in his possession, or has been supplied by him to any
other person, or has been obtained by him from any other person:

(b) The expression “foreign agent” includes any person who is or has
been or is reasonably suspected of being or having been employed
by a foreign power either directly or indirectly for the purpose of
committing an act, either within or without the United Kingdom,
prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, or who has or is
reasonably suspected of having, either within or without •fflfe
United Kingdom, committed, or attempted to commit, such an
act in the interests of a foreign power:

(c) Any address, whether within or without the United Kingdom,
reasonably suspected of being an address used for the receipt of
communications intended for a foreign agent, or any address at
which a foreign agent resides, or to which he resorts for the purpose
of giving or reviving communications, or at which he # carries on
any business, shall be deemed to be the address of a foreign agpnt,
and communications addressed to such an address to be com-
munications with a foreign agent.

Statutes

3. No person in the vicinity of any prohibited place shall obstruct,
knowingly mislead or otherwise interfere with or impede, the chief
officer or a superintendent or other officer of police, or any member of
His Majesty’s forces engaged on guard, sentry, patrol, or other similar
duty in relation to the prohibited place, and, if any person acts in
contravention of, or fails to comply with, this provision, he shall be
guilty of a misdemeanour.

[§ 4. The Secretary of State is to have power to require the production of
telegrams.]

[§ 5. Those who carry on the business of receiving postal packets are to be
registered with the police.]

6 . It shall be the duty of every person to give on demand to a chief
officer of police, or to a superintendent or other officer of police not
below the rank of inspector appointed by a chief officer for the purpose,
or to any member of His Majesty’s forces engaged on guard, sentry,
patrol, or other similar duty, any information in his power relating to
an offence or suspected offence under the principal Act or this Act,
and, if so required, and upon? tender of his reasonable expenses, to
attend at such reasonable time and place as may be specified for the
purpose of furnishing such information, and, if any person fails to give
any such information or to attend as aforesaid, he shall be guilty of a
misdemeanour. #

[§ 7. Attempts to commit an offence, and incitement of others.]

8 . — (1) Any person who is guilty of a felony under the principal Act
or this Act shall be liabje to penal -servitude for a term of not less than
three years and not exceeding fourteen years.

(2) Any person who is guilty of a misdemeanour under the principal
Act or this Act shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprison-
ment, with or without hard labour, for a term not exceeding two
years, or, on conviction under the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, to
imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for a term not exceeding
three months or to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds, or both such
imprisonment and fine:

•'Trovided that no misdemeanour under the principal Act or this Act
shall be dealt with summarily except with the consent of the Attorney-
General.

(3) For the purposes of the trial of a person for an offence under the
principal Act or this Act, the offence shall be deemed to have been
committed either at the place in which the same actually was com-
mitted, or at any place in the United Kingdom in which the offender
may be found.

($.) In addition and without prejudice to any powers which a court
may possess to order the exclusion of the public from any proceedings
if, inthe course of proceedings before a co^rt against any person for an

Official Secrets Act , ig20

offence under the principal Act or this Act or the proceedings on
appeal, or in the course of the trial of a person for felony or misde-
meanour under the principal Act or this Act, application is made by
the prosecution, on the ground that the publication of any evidence to
be given or of any statement to be made in the course of the proceedings
would be prejudicial to the national safety, that all or any portion of
the public shall be excluded during any part of the hearing, the court
may make an order to that effect, but the passing of sentence shall in
any case take place in public.

( 5 ) Where the person guilty of an offence under the principal Act
or this Act is a company or corporation, every director and officer of
the company or corporation shall be guilty of the like offence unless
he proves that the act or omission constituting the offence took place
without his knowledge or consent.

[§§ 9 -1 1 an d two schedules omitted.]

RATING AND VALUATION ACT, 1925
15 and 16 Geo. 5, c. 90

Part I
Rating

.1. — ( 1 ) The council of every county borough and the council of
every urban and rural district shall be the rating authority for the
borough or for the county district, and from and after the appointed
day no authority or person other than the council shall have power to
make or levy any rate within the borough or district.

( 2 ) As from the appointed day all powers and duties of the overseers
of the poor in relation to the making, levying, and collection of rates,
and of any other person who by virtue of any local Act has powers in
that behalf, shall in every rating area be exercised and performed by
the rating authority. . . .

2. — ( 1 ) As from the date of the first new valuation, the rating
authority of each urban rating area, in lieu of the poor rate and any
other rate which they have power to make, shall make and levy for
their area a consolidated rate which shall be termed 4 ‘the general rated *

( 2 ) As from the appointed day the rating authority of each rural

rating area shall, in lieu of making a poor rate for each parish, make
and levy a generaffirate for the whole of the district. •

( 3 ) Subject to the provisions of this Act, every general rate shall be a
rate at a uniform amount per pound on the rateable value^bf each
hereditament in the rating area, and shall be made, levied and

Dbg

Statutes

collected, and shall be recoverable, in the same manner in which at the
commencement of this Act the poor rate may be made, levied, col-
lected and recovered, and all the enactments relating to the poor rate
which are in force at the commencement of this Act, including (subject
to the provisions of this Act) enactments relating to appeals against a
poor rate, shall, so far as not repealed by this Act, apply to the general
rate. . . .

Part II
Valuation

39. — ( 1 ) If at any time it is shown to the satisfaction of the High
Court, on an application made by the Minister, or the council of any
county or county borough concerned, that there is reason to appre-
hend that by reason of default made by any authority, committee or
person in complying with any of the provisions of this Part of this
Act a valuation list for any area will not be duly prepared in accord-
ance with those provisions so as to come into force on the proper date,
the court may appoint such person as they think fit to make and
approve the list for the said area or to do any such things as ought to
have been done by the authority, committee or person in default. . . .

Part III
General

* *

66. — ( 1 ) The Minister may by order make such adaptations in the
provisions of any local Act as may seem to him to be necessary in
order to make those provisions conform with the provisions of this Act.

( 2 ) Every order made under this section shall be laid before both
Houses of Parliament forthwith, and if an Address is presented to His
Majesty by either House of Parliament within the next subsequent
twenty-eight days on which that House has sat after any such order is
laid before it praying that the order may be annulled it shall thence-
forth be void, but without prejudice to the validity of anything previ-
ously done thereunder or the making of a new order.

67. — ( 1 ) If any difficulty arises in connection with the application
of this Act to any exceptional area, or the preparation of the first
valuation list for any area, or otherwise in bringing into operation any
of the provisions of this Act, the Minister may by order temove the
difficulty or constitute any assessment committee, or declare any
assessment committee to be duly constituted, or ^ake any appoint-
ment, or do any other thing, which appears to him necessary or
expedient for securing the due preparation of the list or for bringing the
said provisions into operation, and any s*ich order may modify the

Rating and Valuation Act, 1Q25 31

provisions of this Act so far as may appear to the Minister necessary
or expedient for carrying the order into effect:

Provided that the Minister shall not exercise the powers conferred by
this section after the thirty-first day of March, nineteen hundred and
twenty-nine.

(2) Every order made under this secdon shall be laid before both
Houses of Parliament forthwith, and if an Address is presented to His
Majesty by either House of Parliament within the next subsequent
twenty-eight days on which that House has sat after any such order is
laid before it praying that the order may be annulled it shall thence-
forth be void, but without prejudice to the validity of anything previ-
ously done thereunder or the making of a new order.

(3) In this section the expression “exceptional area” includes any
county district which extends into two or more counties or is admin-
istered by the council of another district, and any parish which extends
into two or more counties or county districts, or which is not within the
same district for municipal and sanitary purposes.

[§§ 68-70 and eight schedules omitted.] *

BOARDS OF GUARDIANS (DEFAULT) ACT, 1926
16 and 17 Geo. 5 , c. 20

1. — (1) Where it appears to the Minister of Health . . . that the
board of guardians for any poor la\V union ha**e ceased, or are acting
in a manner as will render them unable, to discharge all or any of the
functions exerciseable by the board, the Minister may by order under
this Act appoint such person or persons, as he may think fit (whether
qualified or not to be guardians for the union), to constitute the board
in substitution for the then existing members of the board (who shall on
the making of the order vacate their office) for such period, not exceeding
twelve months, as may be specified in the order, and the persons so
appointed shall be deemed for all purposes to constitute the board. . . .

(2) The Minister may at any time, and from time to time, by ofuer
extend, for a period not exceeding six months, the term of office of the
appointed guardians.

An order made under this subsection shall be laid before both
Houses of Parliament as soon as may be after it is made, and if either
House witSin twenty-one days after the order has been laid before it
presents an address to His Majesty praying that the order may be
annulled, His Maj^ty may by Order in Council annul the order and
it shall thenceforth be void, but without prejudice to the validity of
anything previously done thereunder, or the making of a fresh order.

[Subsections (3) (4) and (57 of § 1 , and § 2 omitted.]

Statutes

LOCAL GOVERNMENT (COUNTY BOROUGHS AND
ADJUSTMENTS) ACT, 1926
16 and 17 Geo. 5 , c. 38

1 . — (i) It shall not be lawful for the Minister of Health by Provi-
sional Order to constitute a borough into a county borough, and
accordingly paragraph (d) of subsection (i) of section fifty -four of the
Local Government Act, 1888, and in subsection (3) of the same
section the words “or for constituting a borough into a county borough 55
shall be repealed.

(2) It shall not be lawful for the council of any borough to promote
a Bill for the purpose of constituting the borough into a county borough
unless the population of the borough, according to the published
returns of the last census, for the time being is seventy-five thousand »r
upwards.

2 . — (1) Where under section fifty-four of the Local Government
Act, 1888, a representation is made to the Minister of Health by the
council of a county borough for any purpose involving the extension
of the area of the county borough, the Minister shall not entertain
the representation —

(a) unless he is satisfied that the council of the county borough have
sent to the councils of the counties, boroughs and districts affected
notice of the proposed representation, together with a draft of
the order which they desire to have made to give effect to their
proposals; and

(b) unless no notice of objection to procedure by Provisional Order
has been sent to him by any such council within four weeks from
the receipt of the notice from the county borough council, or
unless every such notice or objection has been withdrawn.

ts) Where in consequence of any such notice of objection or on any
other ground the Minister declines to entertain the representation, the
application for the Provisional Order shall be deemed and taken to
b"£ r a petition for leave to bring in a Private Bill . . . :

Provided that the council of a county borough shall forthwith inform
all persons who have objected to the Provisional Order and other
interested persons of their intention to proceed by way of Private Bill.

[§ 3* Modification of the Borough Funds Acts, 1872 and 1903*}

4 . Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Act shall apply to the
union of two county boroughs or affect the powers of the Minister of
Health to effect such a union by Provisional Order.

[§ 5 (Amendment to Local Government (Adjustments) Act, 1913) and § 6
(Short title) omitted.]

Roman Catholic Relief Act, ig 26

ROMAN CATHOLIC RELIEF ACT, 1926
16 and 17 Geo. 5, c. 55

An Act to provide for the further relief of His Majesty's Roman Catholic
subjects .

[lyth December igs6 . ]

1 . The enactments specified in the Schedule to this Act are hereby
repealed to the extent mentioned in the said Schedule.

2. Nothing herein contained shall affect in any manner whatsoever
any power conferred by any Act of Parliament, or by any byelaw made
pursuant to any Act of Parliament, upon any local authority in Great
Britain to make regulations relating to, or otherwise to control, any
i^eeting or procession in or through any street or other public place
whatsoever, or in or through any unfenced ground adjoining or abut-
ting upon any such street or place, nor the power of any local authority
conferred by any Act of Parliament to. make byelaws relating to any
such meeting or procession.

3. Nothing in this Act nor the repeal of any enactments or parts
thereof specified in the Schedule thereof shall in any way alter, add
to, or abridge the law relating to services, acts, matters or things per-
formed or done in any church or chapel of the established Church of
England or relating to clergy or ministers of the said established Church
of England, or relating to any right of presentation to any benefice or
other ecclesiastical living or office in the ^established Church of
England.

Nothing herein contained shall adversely affect the title to properties
which were vested in the Crown by the statute, i Eliz., cap. 24.

4 . This Act may be cited as the Roman Catholic Relief Act, 1926,
and shall not apply to Northern Ireland.

Statutes

Schedule
Enactments Repealed

Session and
Chapter

Short Title

Extent of Repeal

3 & 4 Edw. 6.

The whole Act.

cap. io.

i Eliz. cap. 24

The whole Act,

1 Geo. 1. St. 2.

except sections
three, ten, twelve
and sixteen.

The whole Act.

cap. 50.

31 Geo. 3.

The Roman Catholic Relief

Sections eleven and

cap. 32.

Act, 179I.

seventeen.

10 Geo. 4.

The Roman Catholic Relief

Section twenty-six,

cap. 7.

Act, 1829.

sections twenty-

2 & 3 Will. 4.

The Roman Catholic Chari-

eight to thirty-six
inckisive.

The Schedule.
Section four.

cap. 1 15.

ties Act, 1832.

23 & 24 Viet.

The Roman Catholic Chari-

Section seven.

cap. 134.

ties Act, i860.

Royal and Parliamentary Titles Act , ig2j

ROYAL AND PARLIAMENTARY TITLES ACT, 1927
17 Geo. 5, c. 4

An Act to provide for the alteration of the Royal Style and Titles and of the
Style of Parliament and for purposes incidental thereto.

[ 1 2th April ig2yl\

1. It shall be lawful for His Most Gracious Majesty, by His Royal
Proclamation under the Great Seal of the Realm, issued within six
months after the passing of this Act, to make such alteration in the
style and titles at present appertaining to the Grown as to His Majesty
may seem fit.

2. — (i) Parliament shall hereafter be known as and styled the
Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland; and accordingly, the present Parliament shall be known as the
Thirty-fourth Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, instead of the Thirty-fourth Parliament of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

(2) In every Act passed and public document issued after the passing
of this Act the expression 4 'United Kingdom” shall, unless the context
otherwise requires, mean Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

3. This A(?t may be cited as the Royal and Parliamentary Titles
Act, 1927.

TRADE DISPUTES AND TRADE UNIONS ACT, 1927
17 and 18 Geo. 5, c. 22

1. — (1) It is hereby declared —

(a) that any strike is illegal if it —

(i) has any object other than or in addition to the furtherance of a
trade dispute within the trade or industry in which the strikers "are
engaged; and

(ii) is a strike designed or calculated to coerce the Government
either directly or by inflicting hardship upon the community; and

(b) that ai*y lock-out is illegal if it —

(i) has any object other than or in addition to the furtherance of

a trade dispute ^ithin the trade or industry in which the employers
locking-out are engaged; and .%

(ii) is a lock-out designed or calculated to coerce the Government
either directly or by inflkting hardship upon the community:.

Statutes

and it is further declared that it is illegal to commence, or continue,
or to apply any sums in furtherance or support of, any such illegal
strike or lock-out. . . .

(2) If any person declares, instigates, incites others to take part in
or otherwise acts in furtherance of a strike or lock-out, declared by
this Act to be illegal, he shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine
not exceeding ten pounds or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
three months, or on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a
term not exceeding two years :

Provided that no person shall be deemed to have committed an
offence under this section or at common law by reason only of his
having ceased work or refused to continue to work or to accept em-
ployment.

(3) Where any person is charged before any court with an offence
under this section, no further proceedings in respect thereof shall be
taken against him without the consent of the Attorney-General except
such as the court may think necessary by remand (whether in custody
or on bail) or otherwise to secure the safe custody of the person charged,
but this subsection shall not apply to Scotland, or to any prosecution
instituted by or on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions.

(4) The provisions of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906, shall not, nor
shall the second proviso to subsection (1) of section two^of the Emer-
gency Powers Act, 1920, apply to any act done in contemplation or
furtherance of a strike or lock-out which is by this Act declared to be
illegal, and any such act shall not be deemed for the purposes of any
enactment to be done* in contemplation or furtherance of a trade
dispute :

Provided that no person shall be deemed to have committed an
offence under any regulations made under the Emergency Powers Act,
1920, by reason only of his having ceased work or having refused to
continue to work or to accept employment.

2 . — (1) No person refusing to take part or to continue to take part
in any strike or lock-out which is by this Act declared to be illegal,
shall be, by reason of such refusal or by reason of any action taken by
him under this section, subject to expulsion from any trade union or
society, or to any fine or penalty, or to deprivation of any right or
benefit to which he or his legal personal representatives would other-
wise be entitled, or liable to be placed in any respect either directly or
indirectly under any disability or at any disadvantage as compared
with other members of the union or society, anything to tne contrary
in the rules of a trade union or society notwithstanding.

(2) No provisions of the Trade Union Acts, 18^1 to 1917, limiting
the* proceedings which may be entertained by any court, and nothing
in the rules of a trade union or society requiring the settlement of dis-
pute^ in any manner shall apply to any proceeding for enforcing any

Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act , IQ2J 37

right or exemption secured by this section, and in any such proceeding
the court may, in lieu of ordering a person who has been expelled from
membership of a trade union or society to be restored to membership,
order that he be paid out of the funds of the trade union or society such
sum by way of compensation or damages as the court thinks just.

(3) As respects any strike or lock-out before the passing of this Act
but since the first day of May, nineteen hundred and twenty-six, which,
according to the law as declared by this Act, was illegal, this section
shall have effect as if it had been in operation when the strike or lock-
out took place.

3 . — (1) It is hereby declared that it is unlawful for one or more
persons (whether acting on their own behalf or on behalf of a trade
union or of an individual employer or firm, and notwithstanding that
they may be acting in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute)

Xp attend at or near a house or place where a person resides or works
or carries on business or happens to be, for the purpose of obtaining or
communicating information or of persuading or inducing any person
to work or to abstain from working, if .they so attend in such numbers
or otherwise in such manner as to be calculated to intimidate any person
in that house or place, or to obstruct the approach thereto or egress
therefrom, or to lead to a breach of the peace; and attending at or
near any house or place in such numbers or in such manner as is by
this subsection declared to be unlawful shall be deemed to be a watch-
ing or besetting of that house or place within the meaning of section
seven of the Conspiracy, and Protection of Property Act, 1875.

• (2) In this section the expression ‘ho intimidate” means to cause
in the mind of a person a reasonable apprehension of injury to him or
to any member of his family or to any of his dependants or of violence
or damage to any person or property, and the expression “injury”
includes injury to a person in respect of his business, occupation, em-
ployment or other source of income, and includes any actionable
wrong.

(3) In section seven of the Conspiracy, and Protection of Property *

Act, 1875, the expression “intimidate” shall be construed as having the
same meaning as in this section. **

(4) Notwithstanding anything in any Act, it shall not be lawful for
one or more persons, for the purpose of inducing any person to work
or to abstain from working, to watch or beset a house or place where a
person resides or the approach to such a house or place, and any
person who acts in contravention of this subsection shall be liable on
summary conviction to a fine not exceeding twenty pounds or to
imprisonment for g term not exceeding three months. *

4 . — (1) It shall not be lawful to require any member of a trade
union to make any contribution to the political fund of a trade union
unless he has at some tiros after the commencement of this Act and

Statutes

before he is first after the thirty-first day of December, nineteen hun-
dred and twenty-seven, required to make such a contribution delivered
at the head office or some branch office of the trade union, notice in
writing in the form set out in the First Schedule to this Act of his will-
ingness to contribute to that fund and has not withdrawn the notice
in manner hereinafter provided; and every member of a trade union
who has not delivered such a notice as aforesaid, or who, having
delivered such a notice, has withdrawn it in manner hereinafter pro-
vided, shall be deemed for the purposes of the Trade Union Act, 1913,
to be a member who is exempt from the obligation to contribute to the
political fund of the union, and references in that Act to a member
who is so exempt shall be construed accordingly. . . .

(2) All contributions to the political fund of a trade union from
members of the trade union who are liable to contribute to that fund
shall be levied and made separately from any contributions to thp
other funds of the trade union and no assets of the trade union, other
than the amount raised by such a separate levy as aforesaid, shall be
carried to that fund, and no assets of a trade union other than those
forming part of the political fund shall be directly or indirectly applied
or charged in furtherance of any political object to which section three
of the Trade Union Act, 1913, applies; and any charge in contraven-
tion of this subsection shall be void.

(3) All rules of a trade union made and approved in accordance
with the requirements of section three of the Trade Union Act, 1913,
shall be amended so as to conform to the requirements of this Act, and
as so amended shall ,be approved by the Registrar of Friendly
Societies. . . .

5 . — (1) Amongst the regulations as to the conditions of service in
His Majesty’s civil establishments there shall be included regulations
prohibiting established civil servants from being members, delegates,
or representatives of any organisation of which the primary object is
to influence or affect the remuneration and conditions of employment
of its members, unless the organisation is an organisation of which the
membership is confined to persons employed by or under the Crown
aifu is an organisation which complies with such provisions as may be
contained in the regulations for securing that it is in all respects inde-
pendent of, and not affiliated to, any such organisation as aforesaid
the membership of which is not confined to persons employed by or
under the Crown or any federation comprising such organisations, that
its objects do not include political objects, and that it is not associated
directly or indirectly with any political party or organisation. . . .

(2) Sufyect as hereinafter provided, any established civil servant
who contravenes the regulations made under this section shall be
disqualified for being a member of the Civil Service:

Provided that, in the case of a first offence, a civil servant shall

Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act , igsj 39

forthwith be warned by the head of his department, and the said dis-
qualification shall not take effect if within one month after such warning
the civil servant ceases to contravene the said regulations. . . .

6 . — (1) It shall not be lawful for any local or other public authority
to make it a condition of the employment or continuance in employ-
ment of any person that he shall or shall not be a member of a trade
union, or to impose any condition upon persons employed by the
authority whereby employees who are or who are not members of a
trade union are liable to be placed in any respect either directly or
indirectly under any disability or disadvantage as compared with other
employees.

(2) It shall not be lawful for any local or other public authority to
make it a condition of any contract made or proposed to be made
with the authority, or of the consideration or acceptance of any tender
in connection with such a contract, that any person to be employed
by any party to the contract shall or shall not be a member of a trade
union.

(3) Any condition imposed in contravention of this section shall be
void.

(4) There shall be added to section five of the Conspiracy, and Pro-
tection of Property Act, 1875, the following provision, that is to say: —

“If any person employed by a local or other public authority wilfully
breaks a contract of service with that authority, knowing or having
reasonable cause to believe that the probable consequence of his so
doing, either alone or in combination with others, will be to cause
injury or danger or grave inconvenience to^he community,* he shall
be liable, on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding ten pounds
or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months. 55

7 . Without prejudice to the right of any person having a sufficient
interest in the relief sought to sue or apply for an injunction to restrain
any application of the funds of a trade union in contravention of the
provisions of this Act, an injunction restraining any application of the
funds of a trade union in contravention of the provisions of section
one of this Act may be granted at the suit or upon the application of
the Attorney-General.

In the application of this section to Scotland, there shall be substi-
tuted therein for references to an injunction references to an interdict,
and for the reference to the Attorney-General a reference to the Lord
Advocate.*. . .

[§ 8 (Short title, etc.) and two schedules omitted.]

Statutes

AUDIT (LOCAL AUTHORITIES) ACT, 1927
17 and 18 Geo. 5, c. 31

1 . — (i) Subject to the provisions of this Act, every person who, at

any audit, has been surcharged with an amount exceeding five hun-
dred pounds by a district auditor shall for a period of five years com-
mencing at the expiration of the period allowed for making an appeal
or application with respect to the surcharge under the provisions of
this Act or, if such an appeal or application is made, commencing on
the date on which such an appeal or application is finally disposed of
or abandoned or fails by reason of the non-prosecution thereof, be dis-
qualified for being elected or appointed or being a member of any
local authority, and if he is a member of a local authority his office
shall thereupon become vacant. ... •

(3) If any person acts as a member of any local authority when dis-
qualified under this section, he shall for each offence be liable on
summary conviction to a fine not exceeding twenty pounds.

2 . — (1) Any person who is aggrieved by a decision of a district
auditor on any matter with respect to which he made representations
at the audit, and any person aggrieved by a disallowance or surcharge
of a district auditor may, where the disallowance or surcharge or other
decision relates to an amount exceeding five hundred pounds, appeal
to the High Court, and may in any other case appeal either to the High
Court or to the Minister of Health . . . and the Court or Minister shall
have power to confirm, */ary or quash the decision of the auditor with
such directions as the Court or Minister thinks fit for giving effect to
the decision on appeal, and if the decision of the auditor is quashed, or
is varied so as to reduce the amount of the surcharge to five hundred
pounds or less, the appellant shall not be subject to the disqualification
imposed by this Act. . . .

(2) In the case of a surcharge the person surcharged may, whether
or not he appeals under the last preceding subsection, apply to the
tribunal (whether the High Court or the Minister) to which he appeals
or, if he does not appeal, to the tribunal ... to which he might have
appealed, for a declaration that in relation to the subject matter of the
surcharge he acted reasonably or in the belief that his action was
authorised by law, and the Court or Minister, if satisfied that there is
proper ground for doing so, may make a declaration to that effect, and
where such a declaration is made the person surcharged, if by reason
of the surcharge he is subject to the disqualification imposed by this
Act, shall not be subject to that disqualification, #and the Court or
Mimster may, if satisfied that the person surcharged ought fairly to be
excused, relieve him either wholly or partly from personal liability in
respegt of the surcharge; the decision of tht Court or Minister under

Audit ( Local Authorities ) Act , 192J 41

this subsection shall be final and shall not be subject to appeal. . .

(4) Where under this section an appeal or application is made to
the Minister, the appellant or applicant shall be entitled, if he so
desires, to a personal hearing by a person appointed for the purpose
by the Minister. . . .

[§ 3 (Recovery of sums certified by the auditor), § 4 (Short title, etc.) and
Schedule omitted.]

REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE (EQUAL FRANCHISE)

ACT, 1928

18 and 19 Geo. 5, c. 12

' 1 . For the purpose of providing that the parliamentary franchise
shall be the same for men and women, subsections (1) and (2) of
section four of the Representation of the People Act, 1918 (in this Act
referred to as “the principal Act”) shall be repealed and the following
sections shall be substituted for sections one and two of that Act: —

{Section to be substituted for the said section one.)

. — (1) 4 person shall be entitled to be registered as a parlia-
mentary elector for a constituency (other than a university constitu-
ency), if he or she is of full age and not subject to any legal incapacity;
and

( a ) has the requisite residence qualification ; of
{b) has the requisite business premises qualification; or
(r) is the husband or wife of a person entitled to be so registered in
respect of a business premises qualification.

(2) A person, in order to have the requisite residence qualification
or business premises qualification for a constituency —

{a) must on the last day of the qualifying period be residing in premises
in the constituency, or occupying business premises in the consti-
tuency, as the case may be; and .

{b) must during the whole of the qualifying period have resided in
premises, or occupied business premises, as the case may be, in the
constituency, or in another constituency within the same parlia-
mentary borough or parliamentary county, or within a parlia-
mentary borough or parliamentary county contiguous to that
borough or county, or separated from that borough or county by
water, not exceeding at the nearest point six miles m breadth,
measured in thS case of tidal water from low-water mark.

For the purposes of this subsection the administrative county of
London shall be treated as* a parliamentary borough.

Statutes

(3) The expression ‘business premises 5 in this section means land or
other premises of the yearly value of not less than ten pounds occupied
for the purpose of the business, profession, or trade of the person to
be registered. 55

(Section to be substituted for the said section two.)

“ . A person shall be entitled to be registered as a parliamentary
elector for a university constituency if he or she is of full age and not
subject to any legal incapacity, and has received a degree (other than
an honorary degree) at any university forming, or forming part of,
the constituency, or in the case of the Scottish universities is qualified
under section twenty-seven of the Representation of the People (Scot-
land) Act, 1868, or, if a woman, has been admitted to and passed the
final examination, and kept under the conditions required of women
by the university, the period of residence, necessary for a man to
obtain a degree at any university forming, or forming part of, a
university constituency which did not at the time the examination
was passed admit women to degrees. 55

2. For the purpose of providing that the local government franchise
shall be the same for men and women, subsection (3) of section four
of the principal Act shall be repealed, and the following section shall
be substituted for section three of that Act:

“ .A person shall be entitled to be registered as a local government
elector for a local government electoral area if he or she is of full age
and not subject to any legal incapacity, and —

(a) is on the last day of the qualifying period occupying as owner or
tenant any land or premises in that area; and

(b) has during the whole of the qualifying period so occupied any land
or premises in that area, or, if that area is not an administrative
county or a county borough, in any administrative county or

f county borough in which the area is wholly or partly situate ; or

(c) is the husband or wife of a person entitled to be so registered in
respect of premises in which both the person so entitled and the

^ husband or wife, as the case may be, reside :

Provided that —

(i) for the purposes of this section a person who inhabits any dwelling-
house by virtue of any office, service, or employment, shall, if the
dwelling-house is not inhabited by the person in whose service he
or she is in such office, service, or employment, be deemed to
occupy the dwelling-house as a tenant; and

(ii) for the purposes of this section the word ter*ant shall include a
• person who occupies a room or rooms as a lodger only where the

room or rooms is or are let to that person in an unfurnished state ;

Representation of the People Act, IQ 28 43

(iii) for the purpose of paragraph (c) of this section, a naval or military
voter who is registered in respect of a residence qualification
which he or she would have had but for his or her service shall be
deemed to be resident in accordance with that qualification/ 5

[§ 3. Consequential amendments to 8 Geo. 5, c. 64.]

[§ 4. No person is to vote at a general election for more than one constitu-
ency for which he or she has a residence qualification, or for more than one
constituency for which he or she has any other qualification.]

[§ 5. The Fourth Schedule to the principal Act . . . shall have effect as if for
the word “sevenpence” there were substituted the word “sixpence.”]

[§§ 6-8 and one Schedule omitted.]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT, 1929
19 Geo. 5, c. 17

Part I
Poor Law

Transfer and Administration of Functions

1. On the appointed day the functions of each poor law authority,
shall, subject to the provisions of this Act and except as otherwise
expressly provided by this Act, be transferred to the council of the
county or county borough comprising the pooulaw area for which the
poor law authority acts, or, if the poor law area is not wholly com-
prised within one county or county borough, the functions of the poor
law authority so far as they relate to any county or county borough
into which the area extends shall be transferred to the council thereof,
and as from the appointed day all then existing poor law authorities
shall cease to exist.

[§ 2. Duties of local authorities in regard to infant life protection and
vaccination.]

3. — (1) Where any two or more councils, whether councils of
counties or county boroughs, consider that it is expedient that the
areas of the councils should be combined for any purpose connected
with the administration of the functions transferred or to be transferred
under this part of this Act and make application to the Minister for the
purpose, the Minister may make an order for combining the areas of
the councils for th^ purposes named therein.

(2) Where it appears to the Minister that the combination of^he
areas of any two or more councils . . . would tend to diminish expense,
or would otherwise be of public or local advantage, the Minister^may

44 Statutes

make an order for combining the areas of the councils for the purposes
named therein:

Provided that an order shall not be made under this subsection,
except after a local inquiry, unless all the councils whose areas are to
be so combined consent. . . .

(6) An order under this section shall be laid before Parliament as
soon as may be after it is made.

4 . The council of every county and county borough shall prepare,
and within six months after the commencement of this Act submit to
the Minister, a scheme (hereinafter referred to as an administrative
scheme) of the administrative arrangements proposed to be made for
discharging the functions transferred to the council under this Part of
this Act. . . .

[§ 5. Provisions as to alternative powers of giving assistance.]

6 . — (1) An administrative scheme shall provide for the constitution

of a committee of the council (hereinafter referred to as the public
assistance committee)

7 . — (1) In the case of a county the administrative scheme shall
provide —

(a) for the division of the county into areas, each area consisting of

one or more districts, and for the constitution for e^ch such area

of a local sub-committee of the public assistance committee (to be

called the guardians committee of the area) consisting of not more

than thirty-six nor less than twelve members. . . .

<=> •

8. — (1) As soon as an administrative scheme has been submitted to
the Minister, the council submitting the scheme shall publish in one
or more newspapers circulating in their area a notice stating that the
scheme has been so submitted and that a copy thereof is open to
inspection at a specified place, and that representations thereon may
be made to the Minister within four weeks after the publication of the
notice, and in the case of a scheme submitted by a county council shall
send a copy of the scheme to the council of each district wholly or
partly within the county.

(2) No scheme so submitted to the Minister shall be of any effect
unless and until it is approved by the Minister, and the Minister, after
considering any representations with respect to the scheme which may
be submitted to him within four weeks after the publication of such
notice as aforesaid by any local authorities and other parties who
appear to him to be interested, and after consultation (if and so far as
the scheme relates to education) with the Board of Education, may
approve the scheme with or without modifications.

(3) If a council fail to submit to the Minister an administrative
scheme within the time allowed for the ^purpose, the Minister may,

Local Government Act , igzg

after consultation [as in (2)] himself make an administrative scheme
[under the conditions in (1)], and shall consider any representations
•which may be submitted to him . . . , and any scheme so made shall
have effect as if it were a scheme submitted by the council and approved
by the Minister.

[§§ 9-16 deal with the councils’ powers to acquire land, disqualifications
for membership of councils, consultations with hospital authorities, assessment
committees, recovery of expenses from those maintained in institutions who
are able to pay, and the consequential repeal and amendment of certain Acts.]

17 . Separate accounts shall be kept by the council of every county
borough of their receipts and expenditure in respect of the functions . . .
transferred to them under this Part of this Act, . . . and those accounts
shall be made up and audited in like manner and subject to the same
provisions as in the case of a county council, and the enactments
rdating to the audit of the accounts of a county council and to all
matters incidental thereto and consequential thereon, including penal
provisions, shall apply in lieu of the provisions of the Municipal
Corporations Act, 1882, relating to accounts and audit.

[§ 18. Application to London.]

[§§ 19-20. Application to guardians appointed, or constituted under a local
Act.]

• Part II

Registration of Births. Deaths and Marriages

On the appointed day the function^ of boards of guardians
under the Registration Acts in relation to a registration district and to
any sub-districts comprised therein shall —

(a) if the registration district is wholly comprised within one county or
county borough, be transferred to the council of that county or
county borough;

(b) if the registration district is not wholly comprised within one county
or county borough, be transferred to the council of the county or
county borough which is estimated by the Registrar-General to con-
tain on the first day of January preceding the appointed day tSe
larger or largest part of the population of the registration district;

and the functions so transferred are in this Part of this Act referred to
as “transferred functions.”

[§§ 22— 2 3. •Registration officers to become salaried officials.]

[§ 24. Councils to submit to the Minister schemes for dividing their area*
into registration districts.]

[§ 25. Salary of the ^Registrar-General.]

[§ 26. Methods of notifying births and deaths.]

[§ 27. Application to London.]

[§ 28. Construction of previous Acts.]

Ebg

Statutes

Part III

Roads and Town Planning

Roads

29 . — (1) The council of every county shall be the highway authority
as respects every road in the county which at the appointed day is a
main road, or which would, apart from this section, at any time there-
after have become a main road, and every such road and every other
road as respects which a county council becomes by virtue of this Part
of this Act the highway authority, shall be termed a county road, and
all enactments relating to main roads shall as from the appointed day
have effect as if for references therein to main roads there were sub-
stituted references to county roads. . . .

30 . — (1) As from the appointed day, every county council shall be
the highway authority as respects such part of the county as is for the
time being comprised in any rural district and as respects the highways
therein, and as such shall hav£ all such functions under the Highway
Acts, 1835 to *885, as were exercisable by rural district councils who
by virtue of the Local Government Act, 1894, became successors of
highway boards, and rural district councils shall cease to be highway
authorities. , . .

31 . — (1) As from the appointed day, the county council shall be the
highway authority as respects all classified roads which, immediately
before the appointed day, were vested in the councils of urban districts
within the county. . . ..

32 . — (1) Where an urban district has a population exceeding twenty
thousand, the urban district council may claim to exercise the functions
of maintenance and repair of any county road within their district, and
if a claim is made within the time hereinafter limited, then, as from
such date as in hereinafter mentioned, the urban district council shall
be entitled to exercise those functions, and the road shall vest in that
council, and for the purpose of the maintenance, repair and improve-
ment of, and other dealing with, any such road, that council shall
have the same functions as if they were as respects that road the
highway authority and the road were an ordinary road vested in
them. . . .

[§ 33 * County councils to contribute towards the maintenance of county
roads by urban district councils.]

[§§ 34-36. Maintenance of unclassified roads.]

[§§ 37~39- Miscellaneous.]

Town Planning

40 . — (1) Where after the appointed day the council of a county
and^y local authority or local authorities under the Town Planning

Local Government Act , igsg 47

Act, 1925, are desirous of acting jointly in the preparation or adoption
of a town planning scheme, they shall be entitled to do so, and the
•council and the local authority or authorities may concur in appoint-
ing out of their respective bodies a joint committee for the purpose,
and in conferring, with or without restrictions, on such a joint com-
mittee any powers which the local authority or local authorities might
exercise for the purpose. . . .

[§41. Minister’s power to combine two or more councils, after holding a
local inquiry, if necessary.]

[§§ 42-45 provide for the relinquishing of powers by district councils to
county councils, amendments, etc.]

Part IV

Miscellaneous Local Government Provisions
Rearrangement of County Districts

46 . — (1) The Council of every county shall as soon as may be after
the commencement of this Act, after conferences with representatives
of the councils of the several districts wholly or partly within the
county, review the circumstances of all such districts and consider
whether it is ^desirable to effect any of the following changes:

{a) any alteration of definition of the boundaries of any such district
or of any parish ;

(b) the union of any such district or parish with another such district

or parish; #

(d) the conversion of any such district or any part thereof, if it is a
rural district, into an urban district, or if it is an urban district,
into or so as to form part of a rural district;

(e) the formation of any new district or parish;

and shall forthwith after the review is completed as respects the whole
or any part of the county, and before the first day of April nineteen
hundred and thirty- two, or such later date as the Minister may in any
case allow, send to the Minister a report of the review, together with
proposals as to the changes, if any, which they consider desirable :

Provided that, before making any such proposals the county council
shall consult with the councils of the county boroughs adjoining the
county, and the Minister shall give those councils an opportunity of
laying before him Jheir views on the proposals made by tine county
council. *

(2) The proposals may include proposals for the transfer of a part
of a non-county borough te another district, or of another district or

Statutes

part of another district to a non-county borough, and, if the council
of the county borough concerned agree, for an alteration of boundaries
between a county borough and the county and any district therein
but, save as aforesaid, the proposals shall not affect any borough.

(3) As soon as any proposals are made to the Minister, the council
making the proposals shall send copies thereof to the councils of the
several districts affected thereby and shall publish in one or more
newspapers circulating in those districts a notice stating that proposals
have been made and that a copy thereof is open to inspection at a
specified place, and that representations with respect thereto may be
made to the Minister within six weeks after the publication of the
notice.

(4) The Minister shall consider the proposals and any representa-
tions with respect to the proposals, or any of them, which may have
been made by any local authorities (including parish councils a»d
parish meetings) or any local government electors affected thereby,
and either may make an order giving effect to the proposals, or any
of them, with or without modifications, or may refuse to make such an
order :

Provided that, if an objection with respect to any proposal is made
by a local authority affected thereby, and is not withdrawn, the
Minister shall not make an order giving effect to the proposal without
first holding a local inquiry into the objection.

(5) If, either on representations made by a district council or other-
wise it appears to the Minister, after consultation with such authorities
as appear to him to be- interested; that there is a prima facie case for
making any such change as aforesaid, and that the county authorities
have failed to make a proposal for the purpose within the time allowed,
the Minister shall publish in one or more newspapers circulating in the
districts affected a notice stating that he proposes to make the change,
and that a copy of his proposals is open to inspection at a specified
place, and that representations with respect thereto may be made to
him within six weeks after the publication of the notice; and the
Minister after considering any representations which may be made
within that period, and, if any objections are made by any local
authority and are not withdrawn, after holding a local inquiry with
respect to the proposals to which the objections relate, may make an
order effecting the change or such modified change as appears to him
to be expedient. . . .

(7) An order under this section shall be laid before PaVliament as
soon as may be after it is made.

47 . — (x) A county council may subsequently whenever they think
it desirable, and shall if so required by the Minister, review generally
the circumstances of the districts within the county, so, however, that
the interval between the original review and the first review under this

Local Government Act , ig2g 49

section, or between any two reviews under this section, shall in no
case be less than ten years. . . .

[§ 48. Saving of powers under, and amendment to, the Local Government
Act, 1888.]

49 . — (1) Where at the commencement of this Act any district or
parish is not wholly comprised within one county, or where a part of a
county is wholly detached therefrom, the county councils concerned
shall as soon as may be take the case into consideration, and if as a
result of such consideration a joint representation is made to the
Minister by those councils, the Minister may, after holding a local
inquiry, except in cases where he is satisfied that an inquiry is unneces-
sary, by order make such alteration of the counties as may be necessary
to secure that the whole of the district or parish shall be within a single
county, or to provide that such detached part shall be included in or
divided amongst the county or counties surrounding it.

(2) The Minister may, on a joint representation being made by the
council of a county and the council of a county borough, after holding
a local inquiry, except in cases where he is satisfied that an inquiry
is unnecessary, by order alter or define the boundary between the
county and the county council.

(3) An orcfer under this section shall be laid before Parliament as
soon as may be after it is made.

[§ 50* County councils are to review electoral districts.]

f§§ 51-62. Miscellaneous.] • *

[§ 63. Councils to provide, with the Ministers approval, hospital accom-
modation for infectious disease.]

[§ 64. The Minister may, on the application of the London County Council,
transfer or delegate functions to metropolitan borough councils. The order is
to be laid before Parliament.]

Part V

Rating and Valuation

Relief from Rates

61 . — (1) No person shall, in respect of any period beginning on or
after the appointed day, be liable to pay rates in respect of any agricul-
tural land or agricultural buildings or be deemed to be in occupation
thereof for rating purposes, and notwithstanding anything in the prin-
cipal Act, or in the Rating and Valuation (Apportionment) Act, 1928,
no such land or buildings shall be included in any rate made^in respect
of a period beginning on or after that date.

[(2) Agricultural land shall be deemed to have no rateable value.]

[§ 68. Relief from rates of industrial and freight transport hereditaments.]

Statutes

Part VI

Exchequer Grants and Other Financial Provisions
Discontinued Grants

85. — (i) The grants set out in the Second Schedule to this Act 1 . . .
shall cease to be payable. . . .

General Exchequer Contributions

86 . — (i) There shall be paid out of moneys provided by Parliament
in respect of . . . each . . . year, an annual contribution towards
local government expenses in counties and county boroughs to be
called the c ‘General Exchequer Contribution.”

(2) The amount of the General Exchequer Contribution shall be
periodically revised; the amount first fixed shall be for a period of
three years beginning on the appointed day, the amount fixed on the
first revision shall be for a period of four years from the expiration of
the first period, the amount fixed on any subsequent revision shall
be for a period of five years from the expiration of the previous
period, and a period for which the General Exchequer Contribution
is so fixed is hereinafter referred to as a “fixed grant period.”

(3) The amount of the General Exchequer contribution shall be
the sum of the following amounts, that is to say :

(a) an amount equal to the totgf losses on account of rates of all
counties and county boroughs:

(b) an amount equal to the total losses on account of grants of all
counties and county boroughs:

(c) in respect of each year in the first fixed grant period, five million
pounds, and in respect of each year of every following fixed

- period such amount as Parliament may hereafter determine with
respect to the fixed grant period so, however, that the proportion
which the General Exchequer Contribution for any fixed grant
period bears to the total amount of rate and grant borne
expenditure in the penultimate year of the preceding fixed
grant period shall never be less than the proportion which the
General Exchequer Contribution for the first fixed grant period
bore to the total amount of rate and grant borne expenditure in the
first year of that fixed grant period. . . .

87. — (i_) Towards the General Exchequer Contribution there shall
at such times and in such manner as the Treasury* may direct be paid
ovrt of the Road Fund ... an annual contribution. . . .

1 Grants payable out of the Consolidated Fund; grants in aid of certain health
services; road grants

Local Government Act , ig2g 51

88 . — (1) The General Exchequer Contributions shall be appor-
tioned amongst the several counties and county boroughs in manner

• hereinafter following, that is to say :

(a) during the first four fixed grant periods there shall out of the
General Exchequer Contribution for each year be apportioned to
each county or county borough an amount equal to the appro-
priate percentage of the losses on account of rates and grants of the
county or county borough:

(b) during the first four fixed grant periods the residue, and thereafter
the whole, of every General Exchequer Contribution, shall each
year be apportioned amongst the several counties and county
boroughs in proportion to their weighted populations.

(2) The amount apportioned under this section to a county shall be
called “the county apportionment 5 ’ and the amount so apportioned to a
county borough shall be called “the county borough apportionment. 55

89. Out of the county apportionment of every county other than the
county of London there shall be set aside such amount as will be
sufficient to pay to the councils of districts situate wholly or partly
within the county the sums hereinafter directed to be so set aside; the
residue of the county apportionment after such sums as aforesaid have
been so set aside, shall be paid to the council of the county and shall
be called the “General Exchequer Grant 55 of that council:

Provided that, if in the case of any county the county apportionment
is less than the amount to be so set aside, the deficiency shall be paid
out of moneys provided by Parliament, and ti*e sums so paid shall be
treated as part of the county apportionment.

[§ 90. Provision for an “additional Exchequer Grant 5 ’ to counties.]

[§§ 9 I- 94* Grants to county districts.]

95. The whole of every county borough apportionment shall be paid
to the council of the county borough and the sum so paid shall ’be
called the “General Exchequer Grant 55 of that council.

[§§ 96-97. Additional Exchequer Grants to county boroughs.] ^

f§§ 98-100. Grants to the county of London and the metropolitan boroughs.]
[§§ 101-102. Payments by councils to voluntary associations.]

103. The grants under this Part of this Act shall be payable to the
councils entitled thereto at such times and in such manner as the
Treasury shall direct.

104. The Minister may reduce the grant payable in respect of any
year under this Part of the Act to any council by such amount as he
thinks just, if, — •

(a) he is satisfied, either upon representations made to him by any
association or other body of persons experienced or interested in

Statutes

matters relating to public health or without any such representa-
tions that the council have failed to achieve or maintain a reason-
able standard of efficiency and progress in the discharge of their
functions relating to public health services, regard being had to
the standards maintained in other areas whose financial resources
and other relevant circumstances are substantially similar, and
that the health or welfare of the inhabitants of the area of the
council or some of them has been or is likely to be thereby endan-
gered; or

( b ) he is satisfied that the expenditure of the council has been
excessive and unreasonable, regard being had to the financial
resources and other relevant circumstances of the area; or

(c) the Minister of Transport certifies that he is satisfied that the
council have failed to maintain their roads or any part thereof in
a satisfactory condition:

Provided that, whenever the Minister makes such a reduction, he
shall make and cause to be laid before Parliament a report stating the
amount of the reduction, and the reasons therefor.

108. — (i) The Minister may make regulations for giving effect to
the provisions of this Part of this Act. . . .

(4) All regulations made under this Part of this Act shall be laid
before Parliament as soon as may be after they are mad^.

[§§ 1 09-1 12 of Part VI and Part VII (Property Liabilities and Officers)
omitted.]

Part VIII
General

130. — (x) If any difficulty arises in connection with the application
of this Act to any exceptional area, or in bringing into operation any
of 'the provisions of this Act, the Minister may make such order for
removing the difficulty as he may judge to be necessary for that pur-
pose, and any such order may modify the provisions of this Act so far as
may appear to the Minister necessary for carrying the order into effect:

Provided that the Minister shall not exercise the powers conferred
by this section after the thirty-first day of December, nineteen hundred
and thirty.

(2) Every order made under this section shall come into operation
upon the date specified therein in that behalf, but shall be laid before
Parliament as soon as may be after it is made and shall cease to have
effect upon the expiration of a period of three months from the date
upon which it came into operation, unless at some time before the
expiration of that period it has been approved by a resolution passed
by each House of Parliament;

Local Government Act, ig2g 53

Provided that, in reckoning any such period of three months as
aforesaid, no account shall be taken of any time during which Pariia-
.ment is dissolved or prorogued, or during which both Houses are
adjourned for more than four days.

[§§ 131-138 and twelve schedules omitted.]

HOUSING ACT, 1930
20 and 21 Geo. 5, c. 39

[Part I of the Act gives local authorities, with the approval of the Minister
of Health, powers to require the clearance or improvement of buildings in
unhealthy areas, and, in certain circumstances, powers of compulsory pur-
chase.]

11 . — (1) The provisions of this section shall have effect with respect
to the validity of clearance orders an^f compulsory purchase orders
made under this Act, and the date on which such an order is to come
into operation.

(2) So soon as may be after an order has been confirmed by the
Minister, the local authority shall publish in a newspaper circulating
in their district a notice in the prescribed form stating that the order
has been confirmed, and naming a place where a copy of the order as
confirmed and of the map referred to therein may be seen at all reason-
able hours, and shall serve a like notice on ev^ry person who, having
given notice to the Minister of his objection to the order, appeared at
the public local inquiry in support of his objection.

(3) If any person aggrieved by an order desires to question its
validity on the ground that it is not within the powers of this Act or
that any requirement of this Act has not been complied with, he may,
within six weeks after the publication of the notice of confirmation,
make an application for the purpose to the High Court, and where
any such application is duly made the court —

•

(i) may by interim order suspend the operation of the order either
generally or in so far as it affects any property of the applicant
until the final determination of the proceedings ; and

(ii) if satisfied upon the hearing of the application that the order is
not within the powers of this Act or that the interests of the appli-
cant have been substantially prejudiced by any requirement of this
Act not having been complied with, may quash the oilier either

generally or in #0 far as it affects any property of the applicant.

•

(4) Subject to the provisions of the last preceding subsection, an
order shall not, either before or after its confirmation, be questioned

Statutes

by prohibition or certiorari or in any legal proceedings whatsoever,
and shall become operative at the expiration of six weeks from the
date on which notice of its confirmation is published in accordance
with the provisions of subsection (2) of this section.

(5) Except by leave of the Court of Appeal, no appeal shall lie to
the House of Lords from a decision of the Court of Appeal in proceed-
ings under this section.

(6) So soon as may be after an order has become operative, the local
authority shall serve a copy thereof on every person on whom a notice
was served by them of their intention to submit the order to the
Minister for confirmation.

IMPORT DUTIES ACT, 1932
22 Geo. 5, c. 8

Most Gracious Sovereign,

We, Your Majesty’s most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons
of the United Kingdom in Parliament assembled, with a view to the
restricting in the national interest of the importation of snoods into the
United Kingdom, to the providing of a remedy in cases where a
foreign country discriminates in the matter of importation as against
goods produced or manufactured in the United Kingdom, in certain
other parts of Your Majesty’s dominions or in territories under Your
Majesty’s protection or in respect of which a mandate is being exercised
by Your Majesty’s Government of the United Kingdom, and to the
making of an addition to the public revenue, have freely and volun-
tarily resolved to give and grant unto Your Majesty the duties for
which provision is hereinafter contained; and do therefore most
humbly beseech Your Majesty that it may be enacted, and be it
enacted, by the King’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice
and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in
tins present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same,
as follows:

Part I

General ad valorem Duty and Additional Duties

1, — (1) As from the first day of March, nineteen hundred and thirty-
two, there shall, subject to the provisions of this Aqf, be charged on all
gouds imported into the United Kingdom, other than goods exempted
as hereinafter provided from the provisions of this section, a duty of
customs equal to ten per cent, of the valuer of the goods.

Import Duties Act , ig $2 55

(2) The following goods shall be exempted from the provisions of this
section —

(a) goods for the time being chargeable with a duty of customs by or
under any enactment other than this Act, but not including (sub-
ject to the provisions of this Act) any composite goods in the case
of which duty is chargeable under any such enactment as afore-
said because some (but not all) of their components are articles so
chargeable ;

(£) goods of any class or description specified in the First Schedule to
this Act or added to that Schedule by an order made under the
next following subsection.

(3) The Treasury, after receiving a recommendation from the Com-
mittee to be constituted under the following provisions of this Act that
g«ods of any class or description ought to be exempted from the pro-
visions of this section, and after consultation with the appropriate
department, may by order direct that goods of all or any of the classes
or descriptions specified in the recommendation shall be added to the
First Schedule to this Act:

Provided that, except in such cases as seem to them of special
urgency, the said Committee shall not take into consideration the
question whether any recommendation ought to be made under this
subsection until the expiration of six months from the passing of this
Act,

(4) The duty imposed by this section is in this Act referred to as

“the general ad valorem duty. 55 . . •

2 . — (1) For the purpose of giving advice and assistance in connec-
tion with the discharge by the Treasury of their functions under this
Act, there shall be constituted a committee, to be called “the Import
Duties Advisory Committee, 55 consisting of a chairman and not less
than two or more than five other members to be appointed by the
Treasury.

(2) The members of the Committee shall hold office for a period of

three years and shall be eligible for re-appointment from time to time
on the expiration of their term of office. #

If a member becomes, in the opinion of the Treasury, unfit to con-
tinue in office or incapable of performing his duties under this Act,
the Treasury shall forthwith declare his office to be vacant and shall
notify the fact in such manner as they think fit, and thereupon the
office shall become vacant.

(3) The Committee shall, as soon as may be after the commencement
of this Act, take int<j consideration the provisions of this Act, and shall,
from time to time, take into consideration any representations which
may be made to them with respect to matters on which, under the
provisions of this Act, acticfti may be taken on a recommendation by

Statutes

the Committee, and may make recommendations to the Treasury
with respect to the matters aforesaid.

(4) The Treasury shall publish in such manner as they think fit any'
recommendation made to them by the Committee as soon as may be
after they have made an order in pursuance of the recommendation
or have determined to make no order on the recommendation.

(5) The expenses of the Committee to such an amount as may be
approved by the Treasury (including the expenses of their staff and
such salaries or other remuneration paid to all or any of the members
as the Treasury may determine) shall be paid out of moneys provided
by Parliament.

(6) The Committee may make rules —

(< a ) for regulating the proceedings, including the quorum, of the
Committee; and

(b) for authorising the delegation of any of the functions of the
Committee to a sub-committee consisting of members of the Com-
mittee.

(7) The Committee, so far as they consider it necessary or desirable
so to do for the purpose of the proper discharge of their functions, may
by notice in writing require any person to furnish them with returns
or other information, or, subject to the payment or Render of the
reasonable expenses of his attendance, to attend as a witness before
them or before any person authorised by them and to give evidence
or to produce documents, and if any person fails without reasonable
excuse to comply with* the provisions of any such notice, he shall be
liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds, and
in the case of a second or subsequent conviction to a fine not exceeding
two hundred pounds :

Provided that the power of the Committee under this subsection to
require a person to attend as a witness before a person authorised by
them shall not be exercised unless the Committee are satisfied that,
having regard to the nature of the proposed inquiry, it can be con-
ducted more conveniently or more efficiently by a person so authorised
t£an by the Committee, and that the person proposed to be authorised
possesses the necessary qualifications for the purpose.

(8) The Committee or any person authorised by them shall have
power to take evidence on oath s and for that purpose to administer
oaths.

3 . — (1) Where it appears to the Committee that an additional duty
of customs ought to be charged in respect of goods of any class or des-
cription which are chargeable with the general a$ valorem duty and
wl>ich, in their opinion, are either articles of luxury or articles of a kind
which are being produced or are likely within a reasonable time to be
produced in the United Kingdom in quantities which are substantial

Import Duties Act, 1932 57

in relation to United Kingdom consumption, the Committee may
recommend to the Treasury that an additional duty ought to be
•charged on goods of that class or description at such rate as is specified
in the recommendation.

(2) In deciding what recommendation, if any, to make for the pur-
poses of this section, the Committee shall have regard to the advisa-
bility in the national interest of restricting imports into the United
Kingdom and the interests generally of trade and industry in the
United Kingdom, including those of trades and industries which are
consumers of goods as w r ell as those of trades and industries which are
producers of goods.

(3) The Treasury, after receiving a recommendation from the Com-
mittee that an additional duty of customs ought to be charged on goods
of any class or description, may, if they think fit so to do, and after
CQnsultation with the appropriate Department, by order direct that
such additional duty of customs as is specified in the order (being a
duty at a rate not exceeding the rate specified in the recommendation)
shall be charged on the importation into the United Kindom of goods
of all or any of the classes or description specified in the recommenda-
tion, and an additional duty so directed to be charged shall for all
purposes be deemed to be chargeable under this section. . . .

[§§ 4 - 5 . Imperial preference.]

19 . — (1) Any order made by the Treasury or the Board of Trade
under this Act shall be laid before the Commons House of Parliament
as-soon as may be after it is made. * «

(2) Any such order as aforesaid imposing a duty of customs shall
cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of twenty-eight days
from the date on which it is made, unless at some time before the
expiration of that period it has been approved by resolution passed by
that House, but without prejudice to anything previously done there-
under or to the making of a new order.

(3) Any such order as aforesaid, other than an order imposing a duty
of customs, shall cease to have effect if the Commons House of Parlia-
ment within a period of twenty-eight days from the date on which tSe
order is laid before the House, resolves that the order shall be annulled,
but without prejudice to anything previously done thereunder or to
the making of a new order.

(4) In reckoning any such period of twenty-eight days as aforesaid
no account shall be taken of any time during which Parliament is dis-
solved or prorogued, or during which the Commons House is adjourned
for more than four jlays.

(5) Any such order as aforesaid may be varied or revoked b^ a
subsequent order made in the like manner and subject to the like
provisions :

Statutes

5 8

Provided that —

(< a ) this subsection shall not apply to an order made under section one
of this Act; and

(b) an order made on the recommendation of the Committee may, not-
withstanding any further recommendation and without any further
recommendation, be revoked or varied by the Treasury as they
think fit, after consultation with the appropriate Department,
except that the rate of an additional duty shall not be increased
above the rate specified in the original recommendation without a
further recommendation.

[§§ 20-23 and three schedules omitted.]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT, 1933
23 and 24 Geo. 5, c. 51

Part I

CONSTITUTION AND ELECTIONS

Local Government Areas

1 . — (1) For the purpose of local government, England and Wales
(exclusive of London) shall be divided into administrative counties
and county boroughs, r and administrative counties shall be divided
into county districts, being either non-county boroughs, urban dis-
tricts or rural districts, and county boroughs and county districts shall
consist of one or more parishes.

[(2) Refers to the First Schedule, enumerating the local government areas.]

(3) Every county borough shall, with respect to the functions which
the council of the borough discharge, form a separate administrative
area.

# Administrative Counties

Constitution of County Councils

2. — (1) For every administrative county there shall be a county
council consisting of the chairman, county aldermen and county coun-
cillors, and the council shall have all such functions as are vested in the
county council by this Act or otherwise.

(2) Thb county council shall be a body corporate . . . and shall have
perpetual succession and a common seal and power to hold land for
the purposes of their constitution without licence in mortmain.

£§§. 3-5. Election of the chairman and vice-chairman of the council.]

Local Government Act , 1333

County Aldermen

6. — (i) The county aldermen shall be elected by the county council
•from among the county councillors or persons qualified to be county
councillors.

(2) The number of county aldermen shall be one-third of the whole
number of county councillors or, if that number is not divisible by
three, one-third of the highest number below that number which is
divisible by three. . . .

(4) In every third year, being the year in which county councillors
are elected, one half as near as may be of the whole number of county
aldermen, being those who have been county aldermen for the longest
time without re-election, shall retire immediately after the election of
the new county aldermen, and their places shall be filled by the
newly elected county aldermen who shall come into office on that day.

• 7 . — (1) The ordinary election of county aldermen shall be held in
every third year, being the year in which county councillors are
elected, at the annual meeting of the county council, and shall take
place immediately after the election of the chairman. . . .

County Councillors

8 . — (1) The county councillors shall be elected by the local govern-
ment electors for the county in manner provided by this Act.

(2) The term of office of county councillors shall be three years,
and they shall retire together in every third year, on the eighth day of
March, and their places shall be filled by the newlv-elected councillors,
who shall come into office on that day. ,

[§ 9. Elections to be held in March.]

Election of County Councillors

10 . For the purpose of the elec den of county councillors, every
county shall be divided into electoral divisions, each returning one
councillor, and there shall be a separate election for each electoral
division.

[§§ 11-16, Electoral details.]

Boroughs

[§ 17. Name of corporations and constitution of councils of boroughs.]

The Mayor

18 . — (1) The mayor shall be elected annually by the council of the
borough from among the aldermen or councillors of the borough or
persons qualified to be aldermen or councillors of the borofigh.

(2) The term of office of the mayor shall be one year. ... #

(3) During his term of office, the mayor shall continue to be a
member of the council. . .

60 Statutes

(4) The council may pay to the mayor such remuneration as they
think reasonable.

(5) The mayor shall have precedence in all places in the borough

Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall prejudicially affect

Plis Majesty’s royal prerogative. . . .

(7) The mayor shall, by virtue of his office, be a justice of the peace
for the borough. . . .

(8) The mayor of a non-county borough, shall, in addition, during
his term of office be a justice of the peace for the county in which the
borough is situate. . . .

(9) The mayor, if present, shall be entitled to preside at all meetings
of justices of the peace held in the borough. . . .

[§§ 19-20. Election of mayor, and power of mayor to appoint a deputy.]
Aldermen

21 . — (1) The aldermen of a borough shall be elected by the council
of the borough from among the councillors or persons qualified to be
councillors of the borough.

(2) The number of aldermen shall be one-third of the whole number
of councillors.

(3) If a councillor is elected to, and accepts the office of, alderman
of the borough, his office of councillor shall thereupon become vacant.

(4) The term of office of an alderman of a borough shall be six years,
and one half, as near as may be, of the whole number of aldermen,
being those who have been aldermen for the longest time without
re-election, shall retire in every third year immediately after the
election of the new aldermen, and their places shall be filled by the
newly-elected aldermen who shall come into office on that day.

Councillors

23 . — (1) The councillors of a borough shall be elected by the local
government electors for the borough in manner provided by this Act.

(2) The term of office . . . shall be three years, and one third of
the whole number of councillors . . . shall retire in every year on the
first day of November. . . .

(3) The ordinary day of election of councillors shall be the first day
of November.

[§§ 24-30. Electoral details.]

Urban and Rural Districts

31 . — (i) For every urban district there shall £>e an urban district
council consisting of the chairman and councillors, and the council
shall have all such functions as are vested in the urban district council
by this Act or otherwise. . . .

Local Government Act , 1933

32. — ( 1 ) Subject to the provisions of this Act, for every rural district
there shall be a rural district council consisting of the chairman and
•councillors. . . .

[§§ 33~4 2 * Electoral details.]

Rural Parishes

43. — ( 1 ) For every rural parish there shall be a parish meeting, and,
subject to the provisions of this Act, for every rural parish or group
of parishes having a parish council immediately before the commence-
ment of this Act there shall continue to be a parish council.

( 2 ) If a rural parish has not a separate parish council, the county
council shall by order establish a parish council for that parish —

{a) if the population of the parish is three hundred or upwards; or
(b) if, in the case of a parish having a population of two hundred or
upwards but under three hundred, the parish meeting of the
parish so resolve,

•

and the county council may, in the case of a parish having a population
of less than two hundred, by order establish a parish council for that
parish if the parish meeting so resolve. . . .

44. — ( 1 ) Where the population of a rural parish having a separate
parish council is less than two hundred, the parish meeting may
petition the county council for the dissolution of the parish council,
and thereupon the county council may by order dissolve the parish
council, and from such date as maybe specified in the order this Act
shall apply to that parish as to a parish not having a separate parish
council.

( 2 ) Where a petition for an order under this section is rejected,
another petition for the same purpose may not be presented within
two years from the presentation of the previous petition.

45. — ( 1 ) The parish meeting of a rural parish may apply to the
county council for an order grouping the parish with some neighbour-
ing parish or parishes in the same county under a common parish
council, and the county council may thereupon make an order (in this
Act referred to as “a grouping order”) accordingly:

Provided that —

(a) no parish shall be so grouped without the consent of the parish
meeting of that parish ; and

(b) unless the county council for special reasons otherwise direct, the
grouped parishes shall be within the same rural district . \ . .

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Part III

COMMITTEES AND JOINT COMMITTEES

General Power of Local Authorities to Appoint Committees

85 . — (i) A local authority may appoint a committee for any such
general or special purpose as in the opinion of the local authority
would be better regulated and managed by means of a committee,
and may delegate to a committee so appointed, with or without
restrictions or conditions, as they think fit, any functions exercisable
by the local authority either with respect to the whole or a part of the
area of the local authority, except the power of levying, or issuing a
precept for, a rate, or of borrowing money. . . .

(2) A committee appointed under this section (other than a com-
mittee for regulating and controlling the finance of the local authority
or of their area) may include persons who are not members of the
local authority:

Provided that at least two-thirds of the members of every committee
shall be members of the local authority. . . .

Finance Committees of County Councils , etc.

86 . — (1) A county council shall appoint a finance committee con-
sisting of such number of members of the council as they think fit for
regulating and controlling the finance of the county, and shall .fix
the term of office of the members of the committee.

(2) Subject to the provisions of any enactment relating to the
standing joint committee or to any other statutory committee, no
costs, debt or liability exceeding fifty pounds shall be incurred by a
county council except upon a resolution of the council passed on an
estimate submitted by the finance committee.

87 . — (1) A rural district council may, at a meeting specially con-
vened for the purpose, appoint for any one or more contributory
places within their district a parochial committee consisting either
wholly of members of the district council or partly of such members
and partly of local government electors for such contributory place or
places, as the council may determine. . . .

(2) A rural district council may delegate to a parochial committee,
with or without restrictions or conditions, as they think fit, any func-
tions exercisable by them within the contributory place or places for
which the committee is formed, except the power of levying a rate or
borrowing money.

(3) If a rural district council refuse to appoint a parochial com-
mittee for a contributory place after receiving a request to that effect

Local Government Act> 1933 63

from the parish council or parish meeting of a parish which is wholly
or in part comprised in the contributory place, the parish council or
•parish meeting may petition the Minister and the Minister may by
order direct the rural district council to appoint a parochial com-
mittee for that contributory place.

88 . — (1) A rural district council may delegate to a parish council
any functions which, under the preceding section, may be delegated
to a parochial committee, and thereupon that section shall apply as if
the parish council were a parochial committee. . . .

Joint Committees

91 . — (x) A local authority may concur with any one or more other
local authorities in appointing from amongst their respective members
adjoint committee of those authorities for any purpose in which they
are jointly interested, and may delegate to the committee, with or
without restrictions or conditions, as they think fit, any functions of
the local authority relating to the purpose for which the joint com-
mittee is formed, except the power of levying, or issuing a precept for,
a rate, or of borrowing money. , . .

[§ 92. Joint committees for parts of parishes.]

[§ 93. Expenses of joint committees to be defrayed by the local authorities
by whom the committee is appointed.]

[§§ 94 ~ 7 * General provisions relating to joint committees.]

[Parts IV (Officers) and V (Offices and Buildings) omitted.]

Part VI

ALTERATION OF AREAS-

129 . — (1) If, on a petition presented to His Majesty by the council
of an urban or rural district praying for the grant of a charter of
incorporation, His Majesty, by the advice of His Privy Council, thinks
fit by charter to create the district or any part thereof with or without
any adjoining area a borough, and to incorporate the inhabitants
thereof, it shall be lawful for His Majesty by the charter to extend to
that borough and the inhabitants thereof so incorporated the provisions
of this Act relating to boroughs.

(2) A petition for a charter of incorporation shall not be presented
except upon a resolution passed by a majority of the whole number
of members of the council of the district at a meeting specially con-
vened for that purpose, and confirmed by a like majority at a second
meeting of the council specially convened for that purpose not earl&r
than one month after the passing of the resolution. . . .

136 . Nothing in this or # any other public general Act or in*any

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scheme made under this Part of this Act shall authorise the establish-
ment in a borough of a new separate police force not consolidated with
the county police force, unless the population of the area which is*
created a borough, according to the census last published before the
date of the petition for the charter, was twenty thousand or
upwards. . . .

139 . The council of a borough shall not promote a Bill for the pur-
pose of constituting the borough a county borough, unless the popula-
tion of the borough is seventy-five thousand or upwards.

[§§ 1 40-1 45 (Alterations of Boundaries), § 146 (Review of Areas by County
Councils, § 147 (Changes of Name of District or Parish), and §§ 148-155
(Miscellaneous) omitted.]

Part VII

ACQUISITION OF, AND DEALINGS IN, LAND

159 . — (1) A county council may be authorised to purchase com-
pulsorily any land, whether situate within or without the county,
for the purpose of any of their functions under this or any other public
general Act, including any such functions as are exercised through
the standing joint committee.

(2) The council of a borough or urban or rural district may be
authorised to purchase compulsorily any land, whether situate within
or without the area of the local authority, for any of the purposes of
the Public Health Acts, 1875 to 1932.

160 . — (1) The following provisions of this section shall have effect
with respect to the compulsory purchase of land by a local authority
in cases where power to authorise the local authority to purchase land
compulsorily is conferred —

(a) by this Act; or

(b) by any enactment or statutory order in force immediately before
the commencement of this Act and incorporating or applying
section one hundred and seventy-six of the Public Health Act,

" 1875; or

(c) by any enactment passed or statutory order made after the com-
mencement of this Act empowering the Minister to authorise the
local authority to purchase land compulsorily by means of a
provisional order made by him and confirmed by Parliament.

(2) The local authority shall publish in one or more local newspapers
circulating in the locality in which the land proposed to be purchased
is situate a notice describing the land and staging the purpose for
vs’hich the land is required.

(3) The local authority shall serve in the prescribed manner on every
owner, lessee and occupier (excppt tenants for a month or any period

Local Government Act , iggg 65

less than a month) of the land proposed to be purchased, a notice in the
prescribed form indicating in each case the particular land intended
•to be purchased and the purpose for which the land is required, and
stating that the authority propose to request the Minister to make a
provisional order empowering them to purchase the land compulsorily,
and specifying the time within which and the manner in which
objections can be made to the proposed order.

(4) On compliance with the foregoing provisions of this section, the
local authority may request the Minister to make a provisional order
empowering them to purchase the land compulsorily.

(5) If no objection is duly made by any of the persons upon whom
notices are required to be served, or if all objections so made are with-
drawn, the Minister, upon being satisfied that the proper notices have
been published and served, may, if he thinks fit, make a provisional
onder authorising the local authority to purchase compulsorily the
land comprised in the order, but in any other case he shall, before
making the provisional order, cause a local inquiry to be held, and
shall consider any objection not withdrawn and the report of the
person w 7 ho held the inquiry:

Provided that the Minister may require any person who has made
an objection to state in writing the grounds thereof, and may make a
provisional or$er without causing a local inquiry to be held, if satisfied
that every objection duly made and not withdrawn relates exclusively
to matters which can be dealt with by the tribunal by whom the

compensation is to be assessed. . . .

• • •

[§ 16 1. Procedure for compulsory purchase of land by means of an order
confirmed by the Minister.]

162 . — (1) If any person aggrieved by a compulsory purchase order
(other than a compulsory purchase order which is provisional only
unless and until it is confirmed by Parliament) desires to question its
validity, he may, within two months after the publication of the notice
of confirmation in accordance with the provisions of the last preceding
section, make an application for the purpose to the High Court, an^i
if upon any such application the court are satisfied that the order is
invalid, and, where the invalidity of the order arises from a failure to
comply w r ith any provision governing the procedure for the making
or confirmation thereof, are further satisfied that the interests of the
applicant have been substantially prejudiced by that failure, the court
may quash the order either generally or in so far as it affects any
property of the applicant. *

(2) Subject to tfys provisions of the last preceding subsection a
compulsory purchase order shall not, either before or after its ccfft-
firmation, be questioned by prohibition or certiorari or in any legal
proceedings.

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(3) Except by leave of the Court of Appeal, no appeal shall lie to the
House of Lords from a decision of the Court of Appeal in proceedings
under this section.

[§§ 163-179. Miscellaneous provisions relating to the acquisition and dis-
posal of lands.]

[Part VIII (Expenses) and Part IX (Borrowing) omitted.]

Part X

ACCOUNTS AND AUDIT

219. The following accounts shall be subject to audit by a district
auditor under this Part of this Act, that is to say, —

(a) the accounts of every county council, metropolitan borough
council, urban district council, rural district council and parish
council, and of every parish meeting for a rural parish not having
a parish council;

(. b ) the accounts of any committee appointed by any such council or
parish meeting;

(c) the accounts of any joint committee constituted under Part III of
this Act or under any enactment repealed by this Act, of which one
or more of the constituent authorities are a county or metropolitan
borough or district or parish council or the council of a borough
all of whose accounts are subject to audit by a district auditor;

(d) any other accounts*) which are^made subject to audit by a district
auditor by virtue of any enactment or statutory order or, in the
case of the accounts of the council of a borough, by virtue of a
resolution adopting the system of district audit passed by the
council in accordance with the provisions of this Part of this Act:

Provided that in relation to any audit of accounts under paragraph
(d) of this section this Part of this Act shall have effect subject to the
provisions of the relevant enactment or statutory order.

^ 228. — (1) It shall be the duty of the district auditor at every audit
held by him —

(< a ) to disallow every item of account which is contrary to law;

(b) to surcharge the amount of any expenditure disallowed upon the
person responsible for incurring or authorising the expenditure ;

(r) to surcharge any sum which has not been duly brought into account
upon^the person by whom that sum ought to have been brought
into account; r

(u*) to surcharge the amount of any loss or deficiency upon any person
by whose negligence or misconduct the loss or deficiency has been
incurred;

Local Government Act , 1933 67

(e) to certify the amount due from any person upon whom he has
made a surcharge;

'(f) to certify at the conclusion of the audit his allowance of the accounts,
subject to any disallowances or surcharges which he may have made:

Provided that no expenses paid by an authority shall be disallowed
by the auditor, if they have been sanctioned by the Minister. . . .

229. — (1) Any person who is aggrieved by a decision of a district
auditor . . . may, where the disallowance or surcharge or other decision
relates to an amount exceeding five hundred pounds, appeal to the
High Court, and may in any other case appeal either to the High
Court or to the Minister.

(2) The Court or Minister on such an appeal shall have power to
confirm, vary or quash the decision of the auditor, and to remit the
case to the auditor with such directions as the Court or Minister thinks
fif for giving effect to the decision on appeal. . . .

237. — (1) In every borough there shall, unless and until any such
alternative method of audit as hereinafter mentioned is in force at
the commencement of this Act or is adopted by the council, be three
borough auditors, two elected by the local government electors for the
borough, called elective auditors, and one appointed by the mayor,
called mayor’s auditor. . . .

239. — (1) The council of a borough may, by means of a resolution
passed and confirmed in accordance with the provisions of this section,
adopt either —

(a) the system of district aud::: or •

(b) the system of professional audit. . . .

[Part XI (Local Financial Act urns) omitied.]

Part XII

BYELAWS

249. — (1) A county council and the council of a borough may mal^
byelaw r s for the good rule and government of the whole or any part
of the county or borough, as the case may be, and for the prevention
and suppression of nuisances therein :

Provided that byelaws made under this section by a county council
shall not have effect in any borough.

(2) The confirming authority in relation to byelaws made under this
section shall be the Secretary of State, except that as respect^ byelaws
relating to public health or to any other matter which, in the opinion
of the Secretary of State and of the Minister [of Health], concerns tfee-
functions of the Minister rather than those of the Secretary of State the
confirming authority shall fte the Minister.

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(3) The validity of a byelaw made under this section and confirmed
by the Secretary of State or by the Minister shall not be questioned
in any legal proceedings on the ground that the Secretary of State or-
the Minister, as the case may be, is not the confirming authority in
relation to that byelaw.

(4) Where by or under any enactment in force in any area provision
is made for the prevention and suppression in a summary manner of
any nuisance, power to make byelaws under this section for that
purpose shall not be exercisable as respects that area.

(5) The council of an urban or rural district shall have power to
enforce byelaws made by a county council under this section which are
for the time being in force in the district or any part thereof.

[Parts XIII (Local Bills), XIV (Freemen), XV (General Provisions) and
eleven Schedules omitted.]

HIS MAJESTY’S DECLARATION OF ABDICATION ACT, 1936

1 Edw. 8, c. 3

An Act to give effect to His Majesty s declaration of ab dilation; and for
purposes connected therewith .

[ nth December 1936*.]

Whereas His Majesty by His Royal Message of the tenth day* of
December in this present year has been pleased to declare that He is
irrevocably determined to renounce the Throne for Himself and His
descendants, and has for that purpose executed the Instrument of
Abdication set out in the Schedule to this Act, and has signified His
desire that effect thereto should be given immediately:

And whereas, following upon the communication to His Dominions
of His Majesty’s said declaration and desire, the Dominion of Canada
pursuant to the provisions of section four of the Statute of Westminster,
1931, has requested and consented to the enactment of this Act, and
the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, and
the Union of South Africa have assented thereto:

Be it therefore enacted by the King’s most Excellent Majesty, by
and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal,
and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the
authority, of the same, as follows :

1 . — (1) Immediately upon the Royal Assent being signified to this
- — ict the Instrument of Abdication executed by His present Majesty on
the tenth day of December, nineteen hundred and thirty-six, set out in
the Schedule to this Act, shall h^ve effect^ and thereupon His Majesty

Abdication Act , igg 6 69

shall cease to be King and there shall be a demise of the Crown, and
accordingly the member of the Royal Family then next in succession
■to the Throne shall succeed thereto and to all the rights, privileges,
and dignities thereunto belonging.

(2) His Majesty, His issue, if any, and the descendants of that issue,
shall not after His Majesty’s abdication have any right, title or interest
in or to the succession to the Throne, and section one of the Act of
Settlement shall be construed accordingly.

(3) The Royal Marriages Act, 1772, shall not apply to His Majesty
after His abdication nor to the issue, if any, of His Majesty or the
descendants of that issue.

2 . This Act may be cited as His Majesty’s Declaration of Abdication
Act, 1936.

Schedule

I, Edward, the Eighth, of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British
Dominions beyond the Seas, King, Emperor of India, do hereby
declare My irrevocable determination to renounce the Throne for
Myself and for My descendants, and My desire that effect should be
given to this Instrument of Abdication immediately.

In token whereof I have hereunto set My hand this tenth day of
December, nineteen hundred and thirty-six, in the presence of the
witnesses whose signatures are subscribed.

Edward R.I.

Signed at Fort Belvedere
* in the presence of
Albert.

Henry.

George.

PUBLIC ORDER ACT, 1936
1 Edw, 8 and 1 Geo. 6, c. 6

1. — (1) Subject as hereinafter provided, any person who in any
public place or at any public meeting wears uniform signifying his
association with any political organisation or with the promotion of
any political object shall be guilty of an offence:

Provided that, if the chief officer of police is satisfied that the wearing
of any such uniform as aforesaid on any ceremonial, anniversary ^-or^
other special occasion will not be likely to involve risk of public dis-
order, he may, with the eonsent of a Secretary of State, by order

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permit the wearing of such uniform on that occasion either absolutely
or subject to such conditions as may be specified in the order.

(2) Where any person is charged before any court with an offence-
under this section, no further proceedings in respect thereof shall be
taken against him without the consent of the Attorney-General except
such as the court may think necessary by remand (whether in custody
or on bail) or otherwise to secure the due appearance of the person
charged, so, however, that if that person is remanded in custody he
shall, after the expiration of a period of eight days from the date on
which he was so remanded, be entitled to be discharged from custody
on entering into a recognisance without sureties unless within that
period the Attorney-General has consented to such further proceedings
as aforesaid.

2 . — (1) If the members or adherents of any association of persons,
whether incorporated or not, are —

{a) organised or trained or equipped for the purpose of enabling them
to be employed in usurping the functions of the police or of the
armed forces of the Grown; or

(b) organised and trained or organised and equipped either for the
purpose of enabling them to be employed for the use or display of
physical force in promoting any political object, or in such manner
as to arouse reasonable apprehension that they are organised and
either trained or equipped for that purpose;

then any person who takes part in the control or management of the
association, or in so organising or 'training as aforesaid any members
or adherents thereof, shall be guilty of an offence under this section:

Provided that in any proceedings against a person charged with the
offence of taking part in the control or management of such an associa-
tion as aforesaid it shall be a defence to that charge to prove that he
neither consented to nor connived at the organisation, training, or
equipment of members or adherents of the association in contravention
of the provisions of this section.

(2) No prosecution shall be instituted under this section without the
consent of the Attorney-General.

(3) If upon application being made by the Attorney-General it
appears to the High Court that any association is an association of
which members or adherents are organised, trained, or equipped in
contravention of the provisions of this section, the Court may make
such order as appears necessary to prevent any disposition without
the leave of the Court of property held by or for the association and in
accordance with rules of court may direct an inquiry and report to be

^ as to any such property as aforesaid and as to the affairs of the

association and make such further orders as appear to the Court to
be just and equitable for the application of*Such property in or towards

re-

public Order Act , 1936

the discharge of the liabilities of the association lawfully incurred
before the date of the application or since that date with the approval
•of the Court, in or towards the repayment of moneys to persons who
became subscribers or contributors to the association in good faith and
without knowledge of any such contravention as aforesaid, and in or
towards any costs incurred in connection with any such inquiry and
report as aforesaid or in winding-up or dissolving the association, and
may order that any property which is not directed by the Court to be
so applied as aforesaid shall be forfeited to the Crown.

(4) In any criminal or civil proceedings under this section proof of
things done or of words written, spoken or published (whether or not
in the presence of any party to the proceedings) by any person taking
part in the control or management of an association or in organising,
training or equipping members or adherents of an association shall be
admissible as evidence of the purposes for which, or the manner in
which, members or adherents of the association (whether those persons
or others) were organised, or trained, or equipped.

(5) If a judge of the High Court is satisfied by information on oath
that there is reasonable ground for suspecting that an offence under
this section has been committed, and that evidence of the commission
thereof is to be found at any pi~emises or place specified in the informa-
tion, he may, # on an application made by an officer of police of a rank
not lower than that of inspector, grant a search warrant authorising any
such officer as aforesaid named in the warrant together with any other
persons named in the warrant and any other officers of police to enter
the premises or place at any time within one month from the date of
the warrant, if necessary by force, and to search the premises or place
and every person found therein, and to seize anything found on the
premises or place or on any such person which the officer has reason-
able ground for suspecting to be evidence of the commission of such an
offence as aforesaid:

Provided that no woman shall, in pursuance of a warrant issued
under this subsection, be searched except by a woman.

(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting the
employment of a reasonable number of persons as stewards to assist m
the preservation of order at any public meeting held upon private
premises, or the making of arrangements for that purpose or the instruc-
tion of the persons to be so employed in their lawful duties as such
stewards, or their being furnished with badges or other distinguishing
signs.

3. — (j) if the chief officer of police, having regard to the time or
place at which and the circumstances in which any public procession
is taking place or is intended to take place and to the route taken*£^
proposed to be taken by the procession, has reasonable ground for
apprehending that the procession maj T occasion serious public disorder,

Statutes

he may give directions imposing upon the persons organising or taking
part in the procession such conditions as appear to him necessary for
the preservation of public order, including conditions prescribing the'
route to be taken by the procession and conditions prohibiting the
procession from entering any public place specified in the directions :

Provided that no conditions restricting the display of flags,
banners, or emblems shall be imposed under this subsection except
such as are reasonably necessary to prevent risk of a breach of the
peace.

(2) If at any time the chief officer of police is of opinion that by
reason of particular circumstances existing in any borough or urban
district or in any part thereof the powers conferred on him by the last
foregoing subsection will not be sufficient to enable him to prevent
serious public disorder being occasioned by the holding of public pro-
cessions in that borough, district or part, he shall apply to the council
of the borough or district for an order prohibiting for such period not
exceeding three months as may be specified in the application the
holding of all public processions or of any class of public procession
so specified either in the borough or urban district or in that part
thereof, as the case may be, and upon receipt of the application the
council may, with the consent of a Secretary of State, make an order
either in terms of the application or with such modifications as may
be approved by the Secretary of State.

This subsection shall not apply within the City of London as defined
for the purposes of the Acts relating to the City police or within the
Metropolitan police district.

(3) If at any time the Commissioner of the City of London police or
the Commissioner of police of the Metropolis is of opinion that, by
reason of particular circumstances existing in his police area or in any
part thereof, the powers conferred on him by subsection (1) of this
section will not be sufficient to enable him to prevent serious public
disorder being occasioned by the holding of public processions in that
area or part, he may, with the consent of the Secretary of State, make
an order prohibiting for such period not exceeding three months as
may be specified in the order the holding of all public processions or
of any class of public procession so specified either in the police area
or in that part thereof, as the case may be.

(4) Any person who knowingly fails to comply with any directions
given or conditions imposed under this section, or organises or assists
in organising any public procession held or intended to be held
in contravention of an order made under this section or incites
any person to take part in such a procession, shall be guilty of an

^ n ^ nr.p.

4 . — (1) Any person who, while present at any public meeting or on
the occasion of any public profession, tfes with him any offensive

Public Order Act , igj 6 73

weapon, otherwise than in pursuance of lawful authority, shall be
guilty of an offence.

• (2) For the purposes of this section, a person shall not be deemed to

be acting in pursuance of lawful authority unless he is acting in his
capacity as a servant of the Grown or of either House of Parliament
or of any local authority or as a constable or as a member of a recog-
nised corps or as a member of a fire brigade.

5 . Any person who in any public place or at any public meeting
uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent
to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is
likely to be occasioned, shall be guilty of an offence.

6 . Section one of the Public Meeting Act, 1908, (which provides
that any person who at a lawful public meeting acts in a disorderly
manner for the purpose of preventing the transaction of the business
fotf which the meeting was called together, or incites others so to act,
shall be guilty of an offence) shall have effect as if the following
subsection were added thereto —

“(3) If any constable reasonably suspects any person of committing an
offence under the foregoing provisions of this section, he may if
requested so to do by the chairman of the meeting require that
person to declare to him immediately his name and address and,
if that person refuses or fails so to declare his name and address
or gives a false name and address he shall be guilty of an offence
under this subsection and liable on summary conviction thereof
to a fine not exceeding forty shillings, and if he refuses or fails
so to declare his name and address or if tfie constable reasonably
suspects him of giving a false name and address, the constable
may without warrant arrest him.”

7 . — (1) Any person who commits an offence under section two of
this Act shall be liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a
term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding one hundred
pounds, or to both such imprisonment and fine, or, on conviction on
indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to
a fine not exceeding five hundred pounds, or to both such imprisonment
and fine.

(2) Any person guilty of any other offence under this Act shall be
liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceed-
ing three months or to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds, or to both
such imprisonment and fine.

(3) A constable may without warrant arrest any person reasonably
suspected by him to be commitdng an offence under sectioi? one, four
or five of this Act. •

[§ 8. Application to Scotland.]

[§ 9. Interpretation, etc.]

Statutes

10 . — (i) This Act may be cited as the Public Order Act, 1936.

(2) This Act shall not extend to Northern Ireland.

(3) This Act shall come into operation on the first day of January
nineteen hundred and thirty-seven.

MINISTERS OF THE CROWN ACT, 1937
1 Edw. 8 and 1 Geo. 6, c. 38

Part I

Salaries and Pension

1. — (1) The annual salaries payable —

(a) to each of the Ministers of the Crown named in Part I of the First
Schedule to this Act, shall? subject to the provisions of this Act as
to number, be five thousand pounds;

(b) to each of the Ministers of the Crown named in Part II of the said
Schedule, shall be three thousand pounds;

(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act as to number, the annual
salaries payable to the Parliamentary Under-Secretaries to the Depart-
ments of State shall —

(a) in the case of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury, be three
thousand pounds, and in the case of the Financial Secretary to the
Treasury, be two thousand pounds;

(£) in the case of the Secretary for Mines and of the Secretary of the
Department of Overseas Trade, be two thousand pounds each;

(e) in the case of each of the Parliamentary Under-Secretaries to the
Departments of State specified in the Second Schedule to this Act,
other than the Parliamentary Secretaries mentioned in the last
foregoing paragraph, be fifteen hundred pounds;

(d) in the case of the Assistant Postmaster-General, be twelve hundred
pounds :

Provided that, if and so long as there are two Parliamentary Under-
secretaries to the Foreign Office, to the Admiralty, or to the War
Qffice, the annual salary payable to each of the two Parliamentary
Under-Secretaries may be of such amount as may be determined by
the Treasury, but so that the aggregate of the annual salaries payable
to both of them does not exceed ^hree thousand pounds.

Ministers of the Crown Act , iggj 75

(3) Subject to the provisions of this Act as to number, the annual
salaries payable to each of the Junior Lords of the Treasury shall be
.one thousand pounds.

^ 2 . — (1) The number of persons holding office as Secretary of State
to whom salaries may be paid under this Act shall not exceed eight.

(2) The number of Parliamentary Under-Secretaries to the Depart-
ments of State to whom salaries may be paid under this Act shall —

(a) in the case of the Treasury, not exceed two;

(b) in the case of the Board of Trade, not exceed three, including the
Secretary for Mines and the Secretary of the Department of
Overseas Trade;

(d) in the case of any other Department of State mentioned in the
% Second Schedule to this Act, and in the case of the Post Office, not

exceed one.

(3) The number of the Junior Lords of the Treasury to whom salaries
may be paid under this Act shall not exceed five.

3 . — (1) If and so long as any Minister of the Crown to whom this
section applies is a member of the Cabinet, there shall be paid to him
an additional salary of such amount as together with the salary pay-
able to him m respect of the office held by him will amount to five

^/thousand pounds a year.

(2) The date upon which any Minister of the Crown to whom this
section applies becomes or ceases to*be a member of the Cabinet shall
be published in the London Gazeue, and any such notification shall be
conclusive evidence for the purposes of this section.

(3) This section applies to any Minister of the Crown named in
Part II of the First Schedule to this Act, and to the Chancellor of the
Duchy of Lancaster, if, in any case, his salary as such is less than five
thousand pounds a year.

4 . — (1) There shall be paid to the person who is Prime Minister and
First Lord of the Treasury an annual salary of ten thousand pounds.

(2) Any person who, whether before or after the passing of this AcT^
has been Prime Minister and has as First Lord of the Treasury taken
the official oath prescribed by section five of the Promissory Oaths Act,
1868, shall be entitled to a pension of two thousand pounds a year:

Provided that no pension shall be payable under this subsection to
any person so long as he is in receipt of any pension under the Political
Offices Pension Act, 1869, or any salary payable out of moneys pro-
vided by Parliament, the revenues of the Duchy of Lancaster or the
Consolidated Fund t>f the United Kingdom.

5 . There shall be paid to the Leader of the Opposition an annual
salary of two thousand pounds :

Statutes

Provided that, if the Leader of the Opposition is in receipt of a
pension payable to him under this Act, no salary shall be payable to
him under this section, and if he is in receipt of a pension under the-
Political Offices Pension Act, 1869, the salary payable to him under
this section shall be reduced by an amount equal to the amount of
that pension.

6 . — (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act as to the payment of
additional salaries to certain Cabinet Ministers, a person to whom
any salary is payable under this Act, shall be entitled to receive only
one such salary, but if he is the holder of two or more offices in respect
of which a salary is so payable and there is a difference in the salaries
payable in respect of those offices, the office in respect of which salary
is payable to him shall be that in respect of which the highest salary
is payable.

(2) No person in receipt of a salary or pension under this Act shall
be entitled to receive any sum out of moneys provided by Parliament
by way of salary or allowance in respect of his membership of the House
of Commons. r .

7 . — (1) The salaries payable under this Act, except that payable to
the Leader of the Opposition, shall be paid out of moneys provided
by Parliament.

(2) The salary payable under this Act to the Leader of the Opposi-
tion, and any pension payable under this Act to a person who has been
Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, shall be charged on
and payable out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom or
the growing produce thereof.

8. The amount specified in this Act as being the amount of any
salary payable thereunder out of moneys provided by Parliament shall
be taken to be the maximum amount so payable, and accordingly,
notwithstanding the provisions of this Act as to any such amount, the
salary so payable in any year in respect of any office may be of a less
amount than that so specified.

Part II

Capacity to Sit in the House of Commons

9 . — (1) Subject as hereinafter provided no person to whom a salary
is payable under this Act shall by reason of his being the holder of the
office or place in respect of which such a salary is payable, be rendered
incapable of being elected, or of sitting and voting, as a member of
the House of Commons :

Provided that —

L't) the number of persons entitled to sit and vote^in that House while

^ they are Ministers of the Crown named in Part I of the First
Schedule to this Act shall not exceed ffifteen;

Ministers of the Crown Act , iggy 77

(b) the number of persons entitled to sit and vote in that House while
they are Ministers of the Crown named in Part II of the said
, Schedule shall not exceed three; and
(< c ) the number of persons entitled to sit and vote in that House while
they are Parliamentary Under- Secretaries shall not exceed twenty.

(2) If at any time the number of persons who are members of the
House of Commons while they are Ministers of the Crown named in
Part I or in Part II of the First Schedule to this Act, or while they are
Parliamentary Under-Secretaries, exceeds the number respectively
entitled under this section to sit and vote in that House, the election
of those members shall not be invalidated by reason of the excess, but
of the number none except any who held his office and was a member
of that House before the excess occurred, shall sit or vote therein
until the number of Ministers of the Crown named in the said Part I
or % in the said Part II or of Parliamentary Under-Secretaries, as the
case may be, who are members of the House of Commons has been
reduced, by death, resignation or otherwise, to the number entitled
under this section to sit and vote in that House.

(3) If any Minister of the Crown named in Part I or in Part II of
the First Schedule to this Act or any Parliamentary Under-Secretary
sits or votes in the House of Commons at a time when he is not entitled
to do so by virtue of this section he shall be liable to a penalty not
exceeding five hundred pounds for each day on which he so sits or
votes.

. * «

Part III

Supplementary

10. — (1) In this Act unless the context otherwise requires the follow-
ing expressions have the meanings hereby respectively assigned to them,
that is to say; —

“Junior Lords of the Treasury” means the Lords Commissioners of the
Treasury other than the First Lord and the Chancellor of the
Exchequer;

“Leader of the Opposition” means that member of the House of
Commons who is for the time being the Leader in that House of
the party in opposition to His Majesty’s Government having the
greatest numerical strength in that House;

“Parliamentary Under-Secretary” means the Parliamentary Secretary
and the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, any Parliamentary
Under-Secretar^ of State, the Parliamentary and Financial Sec%-.
tary to the Admiralty, the Financial Secretary of the War Office,
the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, # the Parliamentary Secretaries to

Gbg

Statutes

the Departments of State specified in the Second Schedule to this
Act, and the Assistant Postmaster-General; but does not include
any Parliamentary Secretary to whom no salary is payable.

(2) For the purposes of this Act, the Secretary of the Department of
Overseas Trade shall be deemed to be a Parliamentary Secretary to
the Board of Trade, but without prejudice to the provisions of the
Overseas Trade Department (Secretary) Act, 1918, relating to the
method of his appointment and the functions to be discharged by him.

(3) If any doubt arises as to which is or was at any material time
the party in opposition to His Majesty’s Government having the
greatest numerical strength in the House of Commons, or as to who
is or was at any material time the leader in that House of such a party,
the question shall be decided for the purposes of this Act by the
Speaker of the House of Commons, and his decision, certified in
writing under his hand, shall be final and conclusive. . . .

Firs,t Schedule

Ministers of the Crown to whom Salaries are payable under this Act

Part I

Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Secretaries of State.

First Lord of the Admiralty.

President of the Board of Trade.

Minister'of Agriculture and Fisheries.

President of the Board of Education.

Minister of Health.

Minister of Labour.

Minister of Transport.

Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence.

Part II

Lord President of the Council.

Lord Privy Seal.

Postmaster-General.

First Commissioner of Works.

Part III

r Minister of Pensions.

[Second, Third and Fourth Schedules omitted.]

Administration of Justice Act , ig$8

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (MISCELLANEOUS
PROVISIONS) ACT, 1938
1 and 2 Geo. 6, c. 63

7. — (i) The prerogative writs of mandamus, prohibition and
certiorari shall no longer be issued by the High Court.

(2) In any case where the High Court would, but for the provisions
of the last foregoing subsection, have had jurisdiction to order the
issue of a writ of mandamus requiring any act to be done, or a writ
of prohibition prohibiting any proceedings or matter, or a writ of
certiorari removing any proceedings or matter into the High Court
or any division thereof for any purpose, the Court may make an order
requiring the act to be done, or prohibiting or removing the proceed-
ings or matter, as the case may be.

(3) The said orders shall be called respectively an order of man-
damus, an order of prohibition and an order of certiorari.

(4) No return shall be made to any such order and no pleadings in
prohibition shall be allowed, but the order shall be final, subject to
any right of appeal therefrom.

(5) In any enactment references to any writ of mandamus, prohibi-
tion or certioi^ri shall be construed as references to the corresponding
order and references to the issue or award of any such writ shall be
construed as references to the making of the corresponding order.

8 . The power of the High Court under any enactment to require
justices of the peace or a judge or dfficer of a county court to do any
act relating to the duties of their respective offices, or to require any
court of summary jurisdiction or court Gf quarter sessions to state a
case for the opinion of the Court, in any case where immediately
before the commencement of this Act the Court had by virtue of any
enactment jurisdiction to make a rule absolute or to make an order,
as the case may be, for any of those purposes, shall be exercisable by
order of mandamus.

9 . — (1) Informations in the nature of quo warranto are hereby
abolished.

(2) In any case where any person acts in an office in which he is

not entitled to act and an information in the nature of quo warranto
would, but for the provisions of the last foregoing subsection, have lain
against him, the High Court may grant an injunction restraining him
from so acting and may (if the case so requires) declare the office to
be vacant. *

(3) No proceedings for an injunction under this section shall be
taken by a person who would not immediately before the commence-
ment of this Act have been entitled to apply for an information in the
nature of quo warranto.

Statutes

EMERGENCY POWERS (DEFENCE) ACT, 1939
2 and 3 Geo. 6, c. 62

1. — (i) Subject to the provisions of this section, His Majesty may by
Order in Council make such Regulations (in this Act referred to as
“Defence Regulations 55 ) as appear to him to be necessary or expedient
for securing the public safety, the defence of the realm, the maintenance
of public order and the efficient prosecution of any war in which His
Majesty may be engaged, and for maintaining supplies and services
essential to the life of the community.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by

the preceding subsection, Defence Regulations may, so far as appears
to His Majesty in Council to be necessary or expedient for any of the
purposes mentioned in that subsection, — *

(a) make provision for the apprehension, trial and punishment of
persons offending against the Regulations, and for the detention of
persons whose detention appears to the Secretary of State to be
expedient in the interests of the public safety or the defence of the
realm;

(b) authorise —

(i) the taking of possession or control, on behalf of His Majesty,
of any property or undertaking;

(ii) the acquisition, on behalf of His Majesty, of any property other
than land;

id) provide for amending any enactment, for suspending the operation
of any enactment, and for applying any enactment with or without
modification.

(3) Defence Regulations may provide for empowering such authori-
ties, persons or classes of persons as may be specified in the Regulations
to make orders, rules and byelaws for any of the purposes for which
juch Regulations are authorised by this Act to be made, and may

contain such incidental and supplementary provisions as appear to His
Majesty in Council to be necessary or expedient for the purposes of the
Regulations.

(4) A Defence Regulation, and any order, rule or byelaw duly made
in pursuance of such a Regulation, shall have effect notwithstanding
anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other
than thig Act or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any
enactment other than this Act.

V (5) Nothing in this section shall authorise the imposition of any form
of compulsory naval, military or air force service or any form of indus-
trial conscription, or the making of pro'Wsion for the trial by courts

Emergency Powers [Defence) Act , 1939 81

martial of persons not being persons subject to the Naval Discipline
Act, to military law or to the Air Force Act.

• (6) In this section the expression “enactment” includes any enact-

ment of the Parliament of Northern Ireland.

2 . — (1) The Treasury may by order provide for imposing and
recovering, in connection with any scheme of control contained in or
authorised by Defence Regulations, such charges as may be specified
in the order; and any such order may be varied or revoked by a
subsequent order of the Treasury.

(2) Any charges recovered by virtue of such an order as aforesaid
shall be paid into the Exchequer of the United Kingdom or, if the
order so directs, be paid into such public fund or account as may be
specified in the order.

(3) Any such order as aforesaid shall be laid before the Commons

Ffouse of Parliament as soon as may be after it is made, but, notwith-
standing anything in subsection (4) of section one of the Rules Publica-
tion Act, 1893, shall be deemed not to be a statutory rule to which
that section applies. t

(4) Any such order as aforesaid imposing or increasing a charge shall
cease to have effect on the expiration of the period of twenty-eight days
beginning with the day on which the order is made, unless at some
time before the expiration of that period it has been approved by a
resolution of the Commons House of Parliament, without prejudice,
however, to the validity of anything previously done under the order
or to the making of a new order.

In reckoning any period of twenty-eight days for the purposes of this
subsection, no account shall be taken of any time during which Parlia-
ment is dissolved or prorogued, or during which the Commons House
is adjourned for more than four clays.

(5) Without prejudice to the preceding provisions of this section,
any Defence Regulations may provide —

[a) for charging, in respect of the grant or issue of any licence, permit,
certificate or other document for the purposes of the; Regulations,
such fee not exceeding five pounds as may be prescribed under tb?
Regulations with the approval of the Treasury; and

( b ) for imposing and recovering such charges as may be so prescribed
in respect of any services which, in pursuance of such Regulations,
are provided on behalf of His Majesty, or under arrangements
made on behalf of His Majesty, other than services necessary for the
performance of duties imposed by law upon the Crown;

and all sums received by way of such fees or charges as aforesaid shall
be paid into the Exchequer of the United Kingdom or, if the Treasury
so direct, be paid into such public fund or account as they may deter-
mine.

Statutes

3. — (i) Unless the contrary intention appears therefrom, any pro-
visions contained in, or having effect under, any Defence Regulation
shall—

(a) in so far as they specifically impose prohibitions, restrictions or
obligations in relation to ships, vessels or aircraft, or specifically
authorise the doing of anything in relation to ships, vessels or air-
craft, apply to all ships, vessels or aircraft in or over the United
Kingdom and to all British ships or aircraft, not being Dominion
ships or aircraft, wherever they may be; and

(b) in so far as they impose prohibitions, restrictions or obligations on
persons apply (subject to the preceding provisions of this subsec-
tion) to all persons in the United Kingdom and all persons on
board any British ship or aircraft, not being a Dominion ship or
aircraft, and to all other persons being British subjects except
persons in any of the following countries or territories, that is'to
say,—

(i) a Dominion,

(ii) India, Burma and Southern Rhodesia,

(iii) any country or territory to which any provisions of this Act
can be extended by Order in Council, and

(iv) any other country or territory, being a country or territory

under His Majesty’s protection or suzerainty: r

Provided that Defence Regulations may make provision whereby
the owner, manager or charterer of any British ship or aircraft, being
a person resident in thedJnited Kingdom or a corporation incorporated
under the law of any part of the United Kingdom, is subjected to
restrictions in respect of the employment of persons in any foreign
country or territory in connection with the management of the ship
or aircraft.

(2) In this section the expression £ ‘Dominion ship or aircraft” means
a British ship or aircraft registered in a Dominion, not being a ship or
aircraft for the time being placed at the disposal of, or chartered by
gr on behalf of, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom;
and, for the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, any ship or air-
craft registered in India, Burma or Southern Rhodesia, not being a
ship or aircraft for the time being placed at the disposal of, or chartered
by or on behalf of. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom,
shall be treated as if it were a Dominion ship or aircraft.

(3) Subsection (1) of this section shall apply in relation to British pro-
tected persons, as that subsection applies in relation to British subjects.

4 . — (x) His Majesty may by Order in Council direct that the pro-
visions of this Act other than this section shall extend, with such
exceptions, adaptations and modifications, if any, as may be specified
in tfye Order, —

Emergency Powers (Defence) Act , zggg

(a) to the Isle of Man or any of the Channel Islands,

(b) to Newfoundland or any colony,

• (c) to any British protectorate,

(d) to any territory in respect of which a mandate on behalf of the
League of Nations has been accepted by His Majesty, and is being
exercised by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom,
and

(e) (to the extent of His Majesty’s jurisdiction therein) to any other
country or territory being a foreign country or territory in which
for the time being His Majesty has jurisdiction;

and, in particular, but without prejudice to the generality of the pre-
ceding provisions of this section, such an Order in Council may direct
that any such authority as may be specified in the Order shall be sub-
stituted for His Majesty in Council as the authority empowered to
make Defence Regulations for the country or territory in respect of
which the Order is made.

(2) His Majesty may by Order in Council make, or authorise the
making of, provision whereby persons offending against any Defence
Regulations may be apprehended, tried and punished in the United
Kingdom, or any of the countries or territories specified in the pre-
ceding subsection, whether section one of this Act extends to that
country or territory or not.

5 . — (1) If and so far as the provisions of any Act for purposes of
defence passed by the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia
onby the Parliament of the Dominion of New Zealand purport to have
extra-territorial operation as respects —

(a) ships or aircraft registered in the said Commonwealth or Dominion,
or

(b) the employment of persons in relation to British ships or aircraft
by owners, managers or charterers of such ships or aircraft who are
persons resident in the said Commonwealth or Dominion or cor-
porations incorporated under the law of the said Commonwealth
or Dominion or any part thereof,

the said provisions shall be deemed to have such operation.

(2) No law made for purposes of defence by the Indian Legislature
or the Federal Legislature of India or by the Legislature of Burma
shall, on the ground that it would have extra-territorial operation, be
deemed to be invalid in so far as it makes provision whereby any
owner, manager or charterer of a British ship or aircraft ^who is a
person resident in India or Burma or a corporation incorporated under
the law of India or ihirma or any part thereof, is subjected to restric-
tions in respect of the employment of persons in relation to the ship
or aircraft.

Statutes

Nothing in this subsection shall be taken to prejudice the effect of
section ninety-nine of the Government of India Act, 1935, or section
thirty-three of the Government of Burma Act, 1935.

(3) If and so far as the provisions of any law for purposes of defence
made by the Legislature of Southern Rhodesia purport to have extra-
territorial operation as respects —

(a) aircraft registered in Southern Rhodesia, or

( b ) the employment of persons in relation to British aircraft by owners,
managers or charterers of such aircraft who are persons resident in
Southern Rhodesia or corporations incorporated under the law of
Southern Rhodesia,

the said provisions shall be deemed to have such operation.

6 . — (1) If, as respects any proceedings before a court (whether
instituted before or after the commencement of this Act), the court is
satisfied that it is expedient, in the interests of the public safety or the
defence of the realm so to do, the court —

[a) may give directions that, throughout, or during any part of, the
proceedings, such persons or classes of persons as the court may
determine shall be excluded;

( b ) may give directions prohibiting or restricting the disclosure of
information with respect to the proceedings.

The powers conferred by this subsection shall be in addition to,
and not in derogation of, any other powers which a court may have
to give such directions ns aforesaid.

(2) If any person contravenes any directions given by a court under
the preceding subsection, then, without prejudice to the law relating
to contempt of court, he shall be liable, on summary conviction, to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or to a fine not
exceeding one hundred pounds or to both such imprisonment and such
fine, or, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding two years or to a fine not exceeding five hundred pounds or
to both such imprisonment and such fine.

(3) The operation of subsection (4) of section eight of the Official
Secrets Act, 1920, shall be suspended during the continuance in force
of this Act.

7 ♦ Every document purporting to be an instrument made or issued
by any Minister or other authority or person in pursuance of any pro-
vision contained in, or having effect under, Defence Regulations, and
to be signed by or on behalf of the said Minister, authority or person,
shall be received in evidence, and shall, until the contrary is proved,
b$. deemed to be an instrument made or issued by that Minister,
authority or person; and prima facie evidence of any such instrument
as aforesaid may, in any legal pijpceedingy (including arbitrations), be

Emergency Powers {Defence) Act , iggg 85

given by the production of a document purporting to be certified to
be a true copy of the instrument by, or on behalf of, the Minister or
other authority or person having power to make or issue the instrument.

8— (1) Every Order in Council containing Defence Regulations
shall be laid before Parliament as soon as may be after it is made; but
notwithstanding anything in subsection (4) of section one of the Rules
Publication Act, 1893, such an Order shall be deemed not to be a
statutory rule to which that section applies.

(2) If either House of Parliament, within the next twenty-eight days
on which that House has sat after such an Order in Council as afore-
said is laid before it, resolves that the Order be annulled, the Order
shall thereupon cease to have effect except as respects things previously
done or omitted to be done, without prejudice, however, to the making
of a new Order.

43 ) An Y power conferred by the preceding provisions of this Act to
make an Order in Council shall be construed as including a power to
vary or revoke the Order.

9 . The powers conferred by or under this Act shall be in addition to,
and not in derogation of, the powers exercisable by virtue of the
prerogative of the Crown.

10. — (1) In this Act the expression “Dominion” means any Dom-
inion within the meaning of the Statute of Westminster, 1931, except
Newfoundland, and includes any territory administered by His
Majesty’s Government in such a Dominion.

(2) References in this Act to British aircraft shall be construed as
references to aircraft registered in any part of His Majesty’s dominions,
in any British protectorate or in any territory in respect of which a
mandate on behalf of the League of Nations has been accepted by His
Majesty and is being exercised by the Government of any part of His
Majesty’s dominions.

(3) For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that any refer-
ence in this Act to Defence Regulations includes a reference to regula-
tions made under any provision of this Act, as extended to any country
or territory by an Order in Council under this Act, and that any
reference in this Act to any country or territory includes a reference tcT
the territorial waters, if any, adjacent to that country or territory.

11 . — (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, this Act shall con-
tinue in force for the period of one year beginning with the date of the
passing of this Act, and shall then expire :

Provided that, if at any time while this Act is in force, an address
is presented to His Majesty by each House of Parliament praying that
this Act should be continued in force for a further period of one year
from the time at whfch it would otherwise expire, His Majesty may ^y
Order in Council direct that this Act shall continue in force for that
further period.

Statutes

(2) Notwithstanding anything in the preceding subsection, if His
Majesty by Order in Council declares that the emergency that was the
occasion of the passing of this Act has come to an end, this Act shall*
expire at the end of the day on which the Order is expressed to come
into operation.

(3) The expiry of this Act shall not affect the operation thereof as
respects things previously done or omitted to be done.

12. This Act may be cited as the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act,

1 939 -

OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT, 1939
2 and 3 Geo. 6, c. 121

1. For section six of the Official Secrets Act, 1920, there shall^be
substituted the following section:

“ 6 . — (1) Where a chief officer rof police is satisfied that there is reason-
able ground for suspecting that an offence under section one of
the principal Act has been committed and for believing that any
person is able to furnish information as to the offence or suspected
offence, he may apply to a Secretary of State for # permission to
exercise the powers conferred by this subsection and, if such per-
mission is granted, he may authorise a superintendent of police, or
any police officer not below the rank of inspector, to require the
person believed ter be able tef furnish information to give any in-
formation in his power relating to the offence or suspected offence,
and, if so required and on tender of his reasonable expenses, to
attend at such reasonable time and place as may be specified by
the superintendent or other officer; and if a person required in pur-
suance of such an authorisation to give information, or to attend as
aforesaid, fails to comply with any such requirement or knowingly
gives false information, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.

J2) Where a chief officer of police has reasonable grounds to believe
that the case is one of great emergency and that in the interest of
the State immediate action is necessary, he may exercise the
powers conferred by the last foregoing subsection without applying
for or being granted the permission of a Secretary of State, but
if he does so shall forthwith report the circumstances to the
Secretary of State.

(3) References in this section to a chief officer of police shall be con-
strued as including references to any other officer of police
• expressly authorised by a chief officer of police to act on his behalf
for the purposes of this section when by reason of illness, absence,
^or other cause he is unable to do so.’*

Emergency Powers (Defence) Act , ig^o

EMERGENCY POWERS (DEFENCE) ACT, 1940
3 and 4 Geo. 6, c. 20

Whereas by the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, His
Majesty was enabled to exercise certain powers for the purpose of
meeting the emergency existing at the date of the passing of that Act:

And whereas by reason of the development of hostilities since that
date it has become necessary to extend the said powers in order to
secure that the whole resources of the community may be rendered
immediately available when required for purposes connected with the
defence of the Realm:

Now therefore be it enacted . . . : —

4 . — (1) The powers conferred on His Majesty by the Emergency
Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, (hereinafter referred to as the “principal
Act 55 ) shall, notwithstanding anything in that Act, include power by
Order in Council to make such Defence Regulations making provision
for requiring persons to place themselves, their services, and their pro-
perty at the disposal of His Majesty, as appear to him to be necessary
or expedient for securing the public safety, the defence of the Realm,
the maintenance of public order, or the efficient prosecution of any
war in which His Majesty may be engaged, or for maintaining supplies
or services essential to the life of the community.

(2) In paragraph ( d ) of subsection (2) of section one of the principal
Act and in subsection (4) of that section the expression “enactment 55
shall mean any enactment passed before the commencement of this
Act.

(3) Subsection (1) of section eleven of the principal Act (which
relates to the duration of that Act) shall have effect as if for the words
“one year 55 , where those words first occur, there were substituted the
words “two years. 55

[§ 2 (Short title and citation) omitted.]

EDUCATION ACT, 1944
6 and 7 Geo* 6, c. 31

1 . — (1) It shall be lawful for His Majesty to appoint a^Minister
(hereinafter referred to as “the Minister 55 ), whose duty it shall be to
promote the education of the people of England and Wales and tl^e
progressive development of institutions devoted to that purpose, and
to secure the effective execution by local authorities, under his control

Statutes

and direction, of the national policy for providing a varied and com-
prehensive educational sendee in every area.

( 2 ) The Minister shall for all purposes be a corporation sole under-
the name of the Minister of Education, and the department of which
he is in charge shall be known as the Ministry of Education. . . .

4. — ( 1 ) There shall be two Central Advisory Councils for Education,
one for England and the other for Wales and Monmouthshire, and it
shall be the duty of those Councils to advise the Minister upon such
matters connected with educational theory and practice as they think
fit, and upon any questions referred to them by him.

( 2 ) The members of each Council shall be appointed by the Minister,
and the Minister shall appoint a member of each Council to be Chair-
man thereof and shall appoint an officer of the Ministry of Education
to be secretary thereto. . . .

5. The Minister shall make to Parliament an annual report giving
an account of the exercise and performance of the powers and duties
conferred and imposed upon him by this Act and of the composition
and proceedings of the Central Advisory Councils for Education.

6. — ( 1 ) Subject to the provisions of Part I of the First Schedule to
this Act,i the local education authority for each county shall be the
council of the county, and the local education authority for each
county borough shall be the council of the county borough.

( 2 ) The local administration of the statutory system of public educa-
tion shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Parts II 2
and III 3 of the said Schedule. . . .

68. If the Minister is satisfied, 'either on complaint by any person
or otherwise, that any local education authority or the managers or
governors of any county or voluntary school have acted or are pro-
posing to act unreasonably with respect to the exercise of any power
conferred or the performance of any duty imposed by or under this
Act, he may, notwithstanding any enactment rendering the exercise
of the power or the performance of the duty contingent upon the
opinion of the authority or of the managers or governors, give such
directions as to the exercise of the power or the performance of the
duty as appear to him to be expedient. . . .

99. — ( 1 ) If the Minister is satisfied, either upon complaint by any
person interested or otherwise, that any local education authority, or
the managers or governors of any county school or voluntary school,
have failed to discharge any duty imposed upon them by or for the

1 The Minister may appoint joint boards as the local education authority for two
or more cc^mcils.

2 Local education authorities are to establish education committees, in accordance

vrith arrangements approved by the Minister. *

3 Local education authorities (except those which are the councils of county
boroughs) may make “schemes of divisional administration’ ’ and delegate functions
to divisional executives.

Education Act> 1944 89

purposes of this Act, the Minister may make an order declaring the
authority, or the managers or governors, as the case may be, to be in
default in respect of that duty, and giving such directions for the pur-
pose of enforcing the execution thereof as appear to the Minister
to be expedient; and any such directions shall be enforceable, on an
application made on behalf of the Minister, by mandamus. . . .

100 . — (1) The Minister shall by regulations make provision:

(a) for the payment by him to local education authorities of annual
grants in respect of the expenditure incurred by such authorities in the
exercise of any of their functions relating to education, other than their
functions relating to the medical inspection and treatment of pupils. . . .

(2) The Minister of Health shall by regulations make provision for
the payment by him to local education authorities of annual grants in
aid of the expenditure incurred by such authorities in the exercise of
thsir functions relating to the medical inspection and treatment of
pupils. ...

(3) Any regulations made by the Minister or the Minister of Health
under this section may make provision* whereby the making of pay-
ments by him in pursuance thereof is dependent upon the fulfilment
of such conditions as may be determined by or in accordance with the
regulations, and may also make provision for requiring local education
authorities an$l other persons to whom payments have been made in
pursuance thereof to comply with such requirements as may be so
determined. . . .

[§§ 1 01-122 and nine schedules omitted.]

SUPPLIES AND SERVICES (TRANSITIONAL POWERS) ACT,

1945

9 Geo. 6, c. 10

1 .— (1) If it appears to His Majesty to be necessary or expedient tha*^
any Defence Regulation to which this section applies should have
effect" for the purpose of so maintaining controlling and regulating
supplies and services as —

(<2) to secure a sufficiency of those essential to the wellbeing of the
community or their equitable distribution or their availability at

fair prices; or *

(b) to facilitate the demobilisation and resettlement of persons and to

secure the orderfy disposal of surplus material ; or ^

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9 °

( d ) to assist the relief of suffering and the restoration and distribution
of essential supplies and services in any part of His Majesty’s
dominions or in foreign countries that are in grave distress as the
result of war;

he may by Order in Council direct that the Regulation shall have
effect by virtue of this Act whether or not it is for the time being neces-
sary or expedient for the purposes specified in subsection ( 1 ) of section
one of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939.

(2) An Order in Council made under this section with respect to
any Defence Regulation shall provide for the making in the Regula-
tion of such adaptations, if any, as appear to His Majesty to be neces-
sary or expedient for rendering it applicable for the purposes aforesaid.

(3) Where an Order in Council is made under this section with
respect to any Defence Regulation, all orders and other instruma*its
made under the Regulation and in force at the date when the Order
in Council comes into operation shall continue in force and shall, save
as is otherwise expressly provided in the Order in Council, have effect
as if they had been made under the Regulation as extended by the
Order in Council and as if any references in those orders and instru-
ments to any of the purposes specified in subsection (1) of section one
of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, include^ references to
the purposes specified in subsection (1) of this section.

(4) This section applies to any Defence Regulation contained in
Part III or Part IV of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, at the
date of the passing of this Act and r to any Defence Regulation specified
in the second column of the First Schedule to this Act, and references
in any Order in Council made under this section to any such Regula-
tion shall be construed as references to that Regulation as in force at
the date on which the Order comes into operation.

2 . — (1) The powers conferred on His Majesty by the principal Acts
to make such Defence Regulations as appear to him to be necessary or
expedient for the purposes specified in subsection (1) of section one of
^the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, shall include power by
Order in Council to make such Defence Regulations as appear to him
to be necessary or expedient for controlling the prices to be charged
for goods of any description or the charges to be made for services of
any description, whether or not such Regulations are necessary or
expedient for the purposes specified in the said subsection (1).

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by
the last fpregoing subsection, any Defence Regulation made in pursu-
ance thereof may amend the Goods and Services (Price Control) Acts,

*£39 t0 * 943 * *

(3) Any Defence Regulation expressed to be made in pursuance of
the said power shall have effect <hy virtue" of this Act.

Supplies and Services Act , 1945 91

3 . — (1) His Majesty, by Order in Council made under this Act, may

revoke in whole or in part any Defence Regulation which has effect
by virtue of this Act or may vary any such Regulation in such manner
as appears to him — #

(a) in the case of a Regulation to which section one of this Act applies,
to be necessary or expedient for any of the purposes specified in
subsection (1) of that section or, while the principal Acts continue
in force, for any of the purposes specified in subsection (1) of
section one of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, or
(£) in the case of a Regulation made in pursuance of the power con-
ferred by the last foregoing section, to be necessary or expedient for
the additional purpose specified in subsection (1) of that section.

(2) Subsection (3) of section eight of the Emergency Powers (De-
fence) Act, 1939 (which relates to the power to revoke or vary Orders
in Council made under that Act) shall not apply to any Defence
Regulation which has effect by virtue of this Act.

4 . — (x) Every Order in Council made under the principal Acts (or
under those Acts as extended by section two of this Act) which contains
Defence Regulations, every order or other instrument made under
powers conferred by Defence Regulations which is determined in
accordance with regulations made under section three of the Rules
Publication A?t, 1 893, to be a statutory rule within the meaning of the
said section and to be of the nature of a public Act or which is or is
deemed to be a statutory rule to which the Rules Publication Act
(Northern Ireland), 1925, applies (bpingan Orjjer in Council order or
instrument made after the passing of this Act), and every Order in
Council made under this Act, shall be laid before Parliament as soon
as may be after it is made; and if either House oi Parliament, within
the period of forty days beginning with the day on which any such
Order in Council, order or instrument is laid before it, resolves that it
be annulled, it shall cease to have effect, but without prejudice to
anything previously done thereunder or to the making of any new
Order in Council, order or other instrument.

In reckoning any period for the purposes of this subsection no'
account shall be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved
or prorogued or during which both Houses are adjourned for more
than four days.

(2) Section one of the Rules Publication Act, 1893? shall not apply
to any such Order in Council, order or other instrument as afoiesaid.

(3) Subsections (1) and (2) of section eight of the Emergency
Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, are hereby repealed.

5. — (j) Save as is otherwise expressly provided in the last two fore-
going sections of this Act, nothing in this Act shall be construed as
restricting the operation of the principal Acts while those Acts remain

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in force, or as affecting their application to Defence Regulations having
effect by virtue of this Act, and any reference in those Acts to the pur-
poses for which Defence Regulations may be made shall, in their
application to Defence Regulations having effect by virtue of this Act,
be construed as including a reference to the purposes specified in
section one or, as the case may be, section two of this Act.

(2) If the principal Acts expire while this Act is in force —

(a) the provisions of those Acts, except the provisions specified in the
Second Schedule to this Act, shall, notwithstanding their expiry
for all other purposes, continue to apply (so far as applicable)
while this Act is in force to any Defence Regulation having effect
by virtue of this Act, any order or other instrument made under
any such Regulation and any scheme of control contained in or
authorised by any such Regulation; and

(b) any such Regulation and any order or other instrument niade
under any such Regulation shall have effect, as from the date of
the expiry of the said Acts, as if references therein to any of the
purposes specified in subsection (1) of section one of the Emer-
gency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, were omitted therefrom.

(3) Any enactment other than the principal Acts referring to Defence
Regulations or to powers conferred under the Emergency Powers
(Defence) Act, 1939, shall be construed as including a reference to
Defence Regulations having effect by virtue of this Act or, as the case
may be, to powers conferred thereby.

(4) Section four of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939
(which provides for the application of that Act to colonies and other
territories) shall have effect as if the reference to the provisions of that
Act included a reference to the foregoing provisions of this Act, and
as if the reference to the authority empowered to make Defence
Regulations included a reference to the authority empowered to
exercise the powers of His Majesty in Council under the foregoing
provisions of this Act; and the said section shall, if the principal Acts
expire while this Act is in force, continue in force, notwithstanding

'"such expiry, so far as it provides for the extension of the foregoing
provisions of this Act to any country or territory mentioned in the
said section.

(5) The provisions of Parts II, V and VI of the Requisitioned Land
and War Works Act, 1945 (which confer temporary powers to acquire
and retain possession of land used for war purposes and to maintain,
use and remove war works) shall, subject as hereinafter provided, have
effect as if the expression <e war period” included any period after
the expiry of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Art, 1939, during which
this Act is in force and as if the expression “war purposes” included the
purposes specified in subsection„(i) of section one of this Act, and any

Supplies and Services Act , 1945 93

other provisions of the said Requisitioned Land and War Works Act,
1945 (except section forty-five thereof), shall, so far as they relate to
the provisions aforesaid, have the like effect;

Provided that no powers shall be exercisable by virtue of this sub-
section unless the appropriate Minister has certified —

(a) in a case where the powers arise in consequence of the doing of
work on land, that the work was done after the date of the expiry
of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, for the purposes
specified in subsection (1) of section one of this Act, or that works
constructed in the course of the work have been used after the said
date for the purposes aforesaid; or

( b ) in a case where the powers arise in consequence of the possession
or use of land or damage caused by the use of land, that the land
has been used after the said date for the purposes aforesaid;

and has served a copy of the certificate, either by delivery or by pre-
paid registered letter on any person to whom compensation under
paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of section two or subsection (2) of
section three of the Compensation (Defence) Act, 1939, is in course
of payment in respect of the land to which the certificate relates. . . .

6 . — (1) For the purposes of the Ministry of Supply Act, 1939 (which
confers powerg on the Minister to acquire, produce or dispose of articles
required for the public service and to exercise certain other powers in
relation to such articles) the expression “articles required for the public
service 5 ’ shall include any supplies which the Minister of Supply is
satisfied that it is necessary or expedient to maintain, control or regulate
for any of the purposes specified in subsection (1) of section one of this
Act, and the expression “works required for the public ser.ice 55 shall
be construed accordingly.

(2) Notwithstanding anything in proviso (i) to subsection (1) of
section two of the Ministry of Supply Act, 1939, the powers of the
Minister of Supply under that subsection may, so long as this Act
continues in force, be exercised in relation to the supply to any other
government department of any articles required by that department*
for the purpose of the discharge of its functions, whether or not the
powers of that department in relation to the supply of those articles
are for the time being transferred to or made exercisable by the Minister
under section three of the Ministry of Supply Act, 1939.

(3) Notwithstanding anything in proviso (ii) to the said subsection
(1) of section two, the powers of the said Minister under that subsection
of manufacturing or otherwise producing articles may continue to be
exercised so long as this Act continues in force in respect of any articles
whatsover required for the public service within the meaning of the
Ministry of Supply Act, 1939, as amended by this Act.

(4) Notwithstanding anything in section fourteen of the Ministry of

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Supply Act, 1939, the provisions of sections seven to thirteen thereof
shall continue in force so long as this Act continues in force.

7. There shall be defrayed out of moneys provided by Parliament
any expenses incurred by any Minister of the Grown in consequence
of the passing of this Act, and any increase attributable to the passing
of this Act in any sums authorised or required by any other enactment
to be paid out of moneys provided by Parliament.

8. — (1) Subject as hereinafter provided this Act shall continue in force
for the period of five years after the passing thereof and shall then expire :

Provided that, if at any time while this Act is in force, an Address
is presented to His Majesty by each House of Parliament praying that
this Act should be continued in force for a further period of one year
from the time at which it would otherwise expire, His Majesty may by
Order in Council direct that this Act shall continue in force for that
further period. m

(2) Subsection (2) of section thirty-eight of the Interpretation Act,
1889, shall apply upon the expiry of this Act as if this Act had then
been repealed. ?

9. Nothing in this Act shall restrict the powers of the Parliament of
Northern Ireland to make laws with respect to any matter with respect
to which that Parliament has power to make laws, and any laws made
by that Parliament with respect to any such matters shall have effect
notwithstanding anything in any Defence Regulation having effect
by virtue of this Act and applicable to Northern Ireland, or in any
order or other instrument made under such a Regulation.

10. — (1) This Act m?:y be cited as the Supplies and Services (Transi-
tional Powers) Act, 1945.

(2) In this Act the expression “Defence Regulation” means a Regu-
lation made under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, or
under that Act as extended by any subsequent enactment (including
this Act), and the expression “the principal Acts” means the Emer-
gency Powers (Defence) Acts, 1939 to 1945.

[Two schedules omitted.]

MINISTERS OF THE CROWN (TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS)

ACT, 1946
9 and 10 Geo. 6, c. 31

General Power to redistribute Functions of Ministers

r 1. — (1) His Majesty may by Order in Council provide for the trans-
fer to any Minister of the Crown of any functions theretofore exercisable
by another Minister of the Crown.

Ministers of the Crown Act , 1946 95

(2) His Majesty may by Order in Council provide for the dissolution
of the Government Department in the charge of any Minister of the
Crown and the transfer to or distribution among such other Minister
or Ministers of the Crown as may be specified in the Order of any
functions theretofore exercisable by the Minister in charge of that
Department.

(3) An Order in Council under this section may contain such inci-
dental, consequential and supplemental provisions as may be neces-
sary or expedient for the purpose of giving full effect to the Order,
including provisions —

{a) for the transfer of any property, rights and liabilities held, enjoyed
or incurred by any Minister of the Crown in connection with any
functions transferred or distributed;

( b ) for the carrying on and completion by or under the authority of
~*the Minister to whom any functions are transferred of anything
commenced by or under the authority of a Minister of the Crown
before the date when the Order takes effect;

(i c ) for such adaptations of the enactments relating to any functions
transferred as may be necessary to enable them to be exercised by
the Minister to whom they are transferred and his officers ;

(d) for making in the enactments regulating the number of offices in
respect of* which salaries may be paid cr the number of office
holders who may be elected, and sit and vote, as members of the
House of Commons such modifications as may be expedient by

# reason of any transfer of functions or dissolution of a Department
effected by the Order, so, however, that such modifications shall
not increase the amount of any salary which may be paid or the
aggregate number of persons ro whom such salaries may be paid
under such enactments or the aggregate number of persons capable
thereunder of being elected, and cf sitting and voting, as aforesaid;

(e) for the substitution of the Minister to whom functions are trans-
ferred for any other Minister of the Crown in any instrument, con-
tract, or legal proceedings made or commenced before the date
when the Order takes effect.

(4) Where by any Order made under this section provision is made
for the transfer of functions in respect of which any Minister may sue
or be sued by virtue of any enactment, the Order shall make any pro-
vision which may be required for enabling the Minister to whom those
functions are transferred to sue or be sued in like manner.

(5) A certificate issued by a Minister of the Crown that any property
vested in any other Minister immediately before an Order under this
section takes effect his been transferred by virtue of the Order to the
Minister issuing the certificate shall be conclusive evidence of the
transfer.

Statutes

2 . If His Majesty is pleased by Order in Council to direct that any
change shall be made in the style and title of a Minister of the Crown,
the Order may contain provisions substituting the new style and title —

( a ) in the enactments (including such enactments as are mentioned in

paragraph (d) of subsection (3) of the last foregoing section)

relating to the Minister;

( b ) in any instrument, contract, or legal proceedings made or com-
menced before the date when the Order takes effect.

3 . — (1) No Order in Council which provides for the dissolution of a
Government Department shall be made under this Act unless, after
copies of the draft thereof have been laid before Parliament, each House
presents an Address to His Majesty praying that the Order be made.

(2) An Order in Council under this Act, not being an Order made
in pursuance of such an Address as aforesaid, shall not come into
operation until copies thereof have been laid before Parliament, and
if either House, within the period of forty days beginning with the day
on which a copy thereof is laid before it, resolves that an Address be
presented to His Majesty praying that the Order in Council be
annulled, no further proceedings shall be taken thereunder after the
date of the resolution, and His Majesty may by Order in Council
revoke the Order, so, however, that any such resolution and revocation
shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done
thereunder or to the making of a new Order.

In reckoning any such period of forty days, no account shall be taken
of any time during \yhich Parliament is dissolved or prorogued, or
during which both Houses are adjourned for more than four days.

(3) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (4) of section one of the
Rules Publication Act, 1893, an Order under this Act shall be deemed
not to be, or to contain, statutory rules to which that section applies.

(4) Any Order under this Act may be varied or revoked by a subse-
quent Order thereunder made in the like manner and subject to the
like conditions, so however that the variation or revocation of an
Order providing for the dissolution of a Government Department shall

* not affect the dissolution thereof.

(5) No provision in any Act passed before the commencement of this
Act shall be construed as limiting the powers conferred by this Act.

(6) Nothing in this Act shall prejudice any power exercisable by
virtue of the prerogative of the Grown in relation to the functions of
Ministers of the Crown.

(7) Any reference in the foregoing provisions of this Act to a Minister
of the drown shall include a reference to Ministers acting jointly.

[§§ 4~7> and the First Schedule, provide for the continuance of the office and
functions of the Ministers of Food, Labour and National Service, and Trans-
portj and the Secretary of the Department of Overseas Trade.]

Statutory Instruments Act , 1946

STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS ACT, 1946
9 and 10 Geo. 6, c. 36

An Act to repeal the Rules Publication Act, i8g 5, and to make further provision
as to the instruments by which statutory powers to make orders, rules , regulations
and other subordinate legislation are exercised .

[26th March 1946.1

1 . — (1) Where by this Act or any Act passed after the commence-
ment of this Act power to make, confirm or approve orders, rules,
regulations or other subordinate legislation is conferred on His Majesty
in Council or on any Minister of the Crown then, if the power is
expressed —

(a] * in the case of a power conferred on His Majesty, to be exercisable

by Order in Council;

(b) in the case of a power conferred on a Minister of the Crown, to
be exercisable by statutory instrument,

any document by which that power is exercised shall be known as a
“statutory instrument” and the provisions of this Act shall apply
thereto accordingly.

(2) Where by any Act passed before the commencement of this Act
power to make statutory rules within the meaning of die Rules Publi-
cation Act, 1893, was conferred on any rule-making authority within
the meaning of that Act, any document h\* which that power is
exercised after the commencement of this Act shall, save as is otherwise
provided by regulations made under this Act, be known as a “statu-
tory instrument” and the provisions of this Act shall apply thereto
accordingly.

2. — (1) Immediately after the making of any statu tory instrument,
it shall be sent to the King's printer of Acts of Parliament and num-
bered in accordance with regulations made under this Act, and
except in such cases as may be provided by any Act passed after the**,
commencement of this Act or prescribed by regulations made under
this Act, copies thereof shall as soon as possible be printed and sold
by the King's printer of Acts of Parliament.

(2) Any statutory instrument may, without prejudice to any other
mode of citation, be cited by the number given to it in accordance
with the provisions of this section, and the calendar year.

[§ 3. Supplementary provisions as to publication.]

4. — (1) Where by^this Act or any Act passed after the commence-
ment of this Act any statutory instrument is required to be laid before
Parliament after being made, a copy of the instrument shall belaid

Statutes

before each House of Parliament and, subject as hereinafter provided,
shall be so laid before the instrument comes into operation :

Provided that if it is essential that any such instrument should
come into operation before copies thereof can be so laid as aforesaid,
the instrument may be made so as to come into operation before it has
been so laid; and where any statutory instrument comes into operation
before it is laid before Parliament, notification shall forthwith be sent
to the Lord Chancellor and to the Speaker of the House of Commons
drawing attention to the fact that copies of the instrument have yet to
be laid before Parliament and explaining why such copies were not so
laid before the instrument came into operation.

(2) Every copy of any such statutory instrument sold by the King’s
printer of Acts of Parliament shall bear on the face thereof —

(a) a statement showing the date on which the statutory instrument
came or will come into operation; and

( b ) either a statement showing the date on which copies thereof were
laid before Parliament or a statement that such copies are to be
laid before Parliament.

(3) Where any Act passed before the date of the commencement of
this Act contains provisions requiring that any Order in Council or
other document made in exercise of any power confer^d by that or
any other Act be laid before Parliament after being made, any statu-
tory instrument made in exercise of that power shall by virtue of this
Act be laid before Parliament and the foregoing provisions of this
section shall apply thGreto accordingly in substitution for any siich
provisions as aforesaid contained in the Act passed before the said
date.

5 . — (1) Where by this Act or any Act passed after the commence-
ment of this Act, it is provided that any statutory instrument shall be
subject to annulment in pursuance of resolution of either House of
Parliament, the instrument shall be laid before Parliament after being
made and the provisions of the last foregoing section shall apply thereto
^accordingly, and if either House, within the period of forty days
beginning with the day on which a copy thereof is laid before it,
resolves that an Address be presented to His Majesty praying that the
instrument be annulled, no further proceedings shall be taken there-
under after the date of the resolution, and His Majesty may by Order
in Council revoke the instrument, so however, that any such resolution
and revocation shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything
previously done under the instrument or to the making of a new
statutory instrument.

+ (2) Where any Act passed before the date of t?ie commencement of
this Act contains provisions requiring that any Order in Council or
othej document made in exercise of any power conferred by that or

Statutory Instruments Act, ig ^6 99

any other Act shall be laid before Parliament after being made and
shall cease to be in force or may be annulled, as the case may be, if
within a specified period either House presents an address to His
Majesty or passes a resolution to that effect, then, subject to the pro-
visions of any Order in Council made under this Act, any statutory
instrument made in exercise of the said power shall by virtue of this
Act be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either
House of Parliament and the provisions of the last foregoing subsection
shall apply thereto accordingly in substitution for any such provisions
as aforesaid contained in the Act passed before the said date.

6 . — (1) Where by this Act or any Act passed after the commencement
of this Act it is provided that a draft of any statutory instrument shall
be laid before Parliament, but the Act does not prohibit the making of
the instrument without the approval of Parliament, then, in the case
of^n Order in Council the draft shall not be submitted to His Majesty
in Council, and in any other case the statutory instrument shall not be
made, until after the expiration of a period of forty days beginning
with the day on which a copy of the draft is laid before each House of
Parliament, or, if such copies are laid on different days, with the later
of the two days, and if within that period either House resolves that
the draft be not submitted to His Majesty or that the statutory instru-
ment be not ^nade, as the case may be, no further proceedings shall
be taken thereon, but without prejudice to the laying before Parliament
of a new draft.

• (2) Where any Act passed before the date of the commencement of

this Act contains provisions requiting that atdrafi of any Order in
Council or other document to be made in exercise c f any power con-
ferred by that or any other Act shall he laid before Parliament before
being submitted to His Majesty, or before being made, as the case
may be, and that it shall not be so submitted or made if within a
specified period either House presents an address to His Majesty or
passes a resolution to that effect, then, subject to the provisions of any
Order in Council made under this Act, a draft of any statutory instru-
ment made in exercise of the said power shall by virtue of this Act be
laid before Parliament and the provisions of the last foregoing sub-
section shall apply thereto accordingly in substitution for any such
provisions as aforesaid contained in the Act passed before the said date.

7 . — (1) In reckoning for the purposes of either of the last two fore-
going sections any period of forty days, no account shall be taken of
any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during
which both Houses are adjourned for more than four days. %

(2) In relation to any instrument required by any Act, whether
passed before or afte^j the commencement of this Act, to be laid before
the House of Commons only, the provisions of the last three foregoing

sections shall have effect as if references to that House were therein

x oo Statutes

substituted for references to Parliament and for references to either
House and each House thereof.

(3) The provisions of sections four and five of this Act shall not
apply to any statutory instrument being an order which is subject to
special Parliamentary procedure, or to any other instrument which is
required to be laid before Parliament, or before the House of Commons,
for any period before it comes into operation.

8 . — (x) The Treasury may, with the concurrence of the Lord
Chancellor and the Speaker of the House of Commons, by statutory
instrument make regulations for the purposes of this Act, and such
regulations may, in particular: —

(a) provide for the different treatment of instruments which are of
the nature of a public Act, and of those which are of the nature of
a local and personal or private Act ;

(b) make provision as to the numbering, printing, and publicatiorf of
statutory instruments including provision for postponing the num-
bering of any such instrument which does not take effect until it
has been approved by Parliament, or by the Plouse of Commons,
until the instrument has been so approved;

(c) provide with respect to any classes or descriptions of statutory
instrument that they shall be exempt, either altogether or to such
extent as may be determined by or under the regulations, from the
requirement of being printed and of being sold by the King’s
printer of Acts of Parliament, or from either of those requirements ;

(d) determine the classes of cases in which the exercise of a statutory
instrument by any e rule-making authority constitutes or does not
constitute the making of such a statutory rule as is referred to
in subsection (2) of section one of this Act, and provide for the
exclusion from that subsection of any such classes;

(e) provide for the determination by a person or persons nominated
by the Lord Chancellor and the Speaker of the House of Commons
of any question —

(i) as to the numbering, printing, or publication of any statutory
instrument or class or description of such instruments :

(ii) whether or to what extent any statutory instrument or class
or description of such instruments is, under the regulations, exempt
from any such requirement as is mentioned in paragraph (c) of this
subsection :

(iii) whether any statutory instrument or class or description of
such instruments is in the nature of a public Act or of a local and
personal or private Act:

r (iv) whether the exercise of any power confe^ed by an Act passed
before the commencement of this Act is or is not the exercise of a
power to make a statutory ru ip.

IOI

Statutory Instruments Act , ig^.6

(2) Every statutory instrument made under this section shall be subject
to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament,

9 . — (1) If with respect to any power to confirm or approve orders,
rules, regulations or other subordinate legislation conferred on a
Minister of the Crown by any Act passed before the commencement
of this Act, it appears to His Majesty in Council that, notwithstanding
that the exercise of that power did not constitute the making of a
statutory rule within the meaning of the Rules Publication Act, 1893,
it is expedient that the provisions of this Act should apply to documents
by which that power is exercised, His Majesty may by Order in Council
direct that any document by which that power is exercised after such
date as may be specified in the Order shall be known as a “statutory in-
strument 55 and the provisions of this Act shall apply thereto accordingly.

(2) If with respect to any Act passed before the commencement of
thi^Act it appears to His Majesty in Council that by reason of the
exceptional nature of any provisions of that Act the application of
subsection (2) of section five or subsection (2) of section six of this Act
to statutory instruments made under, any provisions of that Act
would be inexpedient, His Majesty may by Order in Council direct
that those subsections shall not apply to statutory instruments made
under those provisions, or shall apply thereto subject to such modifica-
tions as may be specified in the Order.

(3) A draft of any Order in Council proposed to be made under
this section shall be laid before Parliament.

10 . — (1) This Act shall come into operation on such date as His
Majesty may by Order in Council appoint: «

Provided that, without prejudice to the pro\isions of section thirty-
seven of the Interpretation Act. 1889. the last foregoing section and,
in relation to any Order in Council made thereunder, the provisions
of sections six and seven of this Act shall come into operation on the
passing of this Act.

(2) The Order in Council made under this section shall be laid
before Parliament after being made.

11 . — (1) For the purposes of this Act, any power to make, confirm
or approve orders, rules, regulations or other subordinate legislation
conferred on the Treasury, the Admiralty, the Board of Trade or
any other government department shall be deemed to be conferred on
the Minister of the Crown in charge of that department.

(2) If any question arises whether any board, commissioners or
other body on whom any such power as aforesaid is conferred are a
government department within the meaning of this section, or what
Minister of the Crown is in charge of them, that question shall be
referred to and determined by the Treasury. ^

12 . — (1) The Rules Publication Act, 1893, is hereby repealed.

(2) The publication in the London, Edinburgh or Belfast Gazette

102

Statutes

of a notice stating that a statutory instrument has been made, and
specifying the place where copies thereof may be purchased, shall be
sufficient compliance with the provisions of any enactment, whether
passed before or after the commencement of this Act, requiring that
instrument to be published or notified in that Gazette.

13 . — (r) This Act maybe cited as the Statutory Instruments Act, 1946.

(2) This Act shall apply to any statutory instrument made by His
Majesty in Gouncil or by any Minister of the Crown (not being a
rule-making authority within the meaning of the Rules Publication
Act (Northern Ireland), 1925) in so far as it extends to Northern
Ireland, but except as aforesaid this Act shall not extend to Northern
Ireland.

TRADE DISPUTES AND TRADE UNIONS ACT, 1946
9 and 10 Geo. 6, c. 52

Be it enacted by the King’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with
the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and
Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and bv the authority
of the same, as follows :

1. The Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1927 (in this Act
referred to as “the Act of 1927”) is hereby repealed, and, subject to
the transitional provisions set ou£ in the Schedule to this Act, every
enactment and rule of law amended or otherwise affected by that Act
shall, as from the commencement of this Act, have effect as if the Act
of 1927 had not been passed.

2. This Act may be cited as the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act,
1946.

COAL INDUSTRY NATIONALISATION ACT, 1946
9 and 10 Geo. VI, c. 59

An Act to establish public ownership and control of the coal-mining industry and
certain allied activities; and for purposes connected therewith.

\i 2th July 1946.1

The National Coal Board

1 . — (1*) There shall be a National Coal Board which shall, on and
after the primary vesting date, be charged with the duties of —

(<2) working and getting the coal in Great Britain, to the exclusion
(save as in this Act provide^ of any other person;

Coal Industry Nationalisation Act , 194.6 103

{b) securing the efficient development of the coal-mining industry; and

(c) making supplies of coal available, of such qualities and sizes, in
such quantities and at such prices, as may seem to them best
calculated to further the public interest in all respects, including
the avoidance of any undue or unreasonable preference or advant-
age.

(2) The functions of the National Coal Board (in this Act referred
to as “the Board 55 ) shall include the carrying on of all such activities
as it may appear to the Board to be requisite, advantageous or con-
venient for them to carry on for or in connection with the discharge
of their duties under the preceding subsection, and in particular, but
without prejudice to the generality of this section, —

(a) searching and boring for coal in Great Britain, to the exclusion of
% any other person;

(b) treating, rendering saleable, supplying and selling coal;

(d) producing or manufacturing any goods or utilities which are of a
kind required by the Board for or in connection with the working
and getting of coal or any other of their activities, or which can
advantageously be produced or manufactured by the Board by
reason of their having materials or facilities for the production or
manufacture thereof in connection with the working and getting
of coal or any other of their activities, and supplying and selling
goods or utilities so produced or manufactured;

(e) any activities which can advantageously be carried on by the
Board with a view to making the best use of any of the assets
vested in them by this Act;

(/) activities conducive to advancing the skill of persons employed or
to be employed for the purposes of any of the activities aforesaid,
or the efficiency of equipment and methods to be used therefor,
including the provision by the Board themselves, and their assist-
ing the provision by others, of facilities for training, education and
research.

(3) The Board shall have power to do any thing and to enter into
any transaction (whether or not involving the expenditure, borrowing
in accordance with the provisions of this Act in that behalf or lending
of money, the acquisition of any property or rights, or the disposal of
any property or rights not in their opinion required for the proper
discharge of their functions) which in their opinion is calculated to
facilitate the proper discharge of their duties under subsection (x) <*f
this section or the carrying on by them of any such activities as afore-
said, or is incidental or conducive thereto.

Statutes

104

(4) The policy of the Board shall be directed to securing, consist-
ently with the proper discharge of their duties under subsection (1) of
this section, — -

(a) the safety, health and welfare of persons in their employment;

(b) the benefit of the practical knowledge and experience of such
persons in the organisation and conduct of the operations in which
they are employed;

(c) that the revenues of the Board shall not be less than sufficient for
meeting all their outgoings properly chargeable to revenue account
(including, without prejudice to the generality of that expression,
provisions in respect of their obligations under sections twenty-eight
and twenty-nine of this Act) on an average of good and bad years.

2 . — (1) The Board shall be a body corporate by the name of “the
National Coal Board”, with perpetual succession and a common ^eal
and power to hold land without licence in mortmain.

(2) The Board shall consist of a chairman and eight other members.

(3) The chairman and qther members of the Board shall be
appointed by the Minister of Fuel and Power (in this Act referred to
as “the Minister”) from amongst persons appearing to him to be
qualified as having had experience of, and having shown capacity in,
industrial, commercial or financial matters, applied science, adminis-
tration, or the organisation of workers.

(4) A person shall be disqualified for being appointed or being a

member of the Board so long as he is a member of the Commons House
of Parliament. r

(5) The Minister shall appoint one of the members of the Board to
act as deputy chairman.

(6) There shall be paid to the members of the Board such salaries
and allowances as may be determined by the Minister with the
approval of the Treasury, and, on the retirement or death of any of
them as to whom it may be so determined to make such provision,
such pensions and gratuities to them or to others by reference to their
service as may be so determined.

The said salaries and allowances, and any such pensions and
gratuities as aforesaid, shall be paid out of the revenues of the Board.

(7) The Minister may make regulations with respect to —

(<z) the appointment of, and the tenure and vacation of office by, the
members of the Board;

(b) the quorum, proceedings and meetings of the Board, and deter-
minations of the Board ; and

(c) the execution of instruments and the mode of entering into con-
tracts by and on behalf of the Board, and t 3 ?e proof of documents
purporting to be executed, issued or signed by the Board or a
member, officer or servant thereof.

Coal Industry Nationalisation Act , ig46 105

(8) Subject to the provisions of any regulations made under the last
preceding subsection, the Board shall have power to regulate their
own procedure.

3 . — (1) The Minister may, after consultation with the Board, give
to the Board directions of a general character as to the exercise and
performance by the Board of their functions in relation to matters
appearing to the Minister to affect the national interest, and the
Board shall give effect to any such directions.

(2) In framing programmes of reorganisation or development in-
volving substantial outlay on capital account, the Board shall act on
lines settled from time to time with the approval of the Minister.

(3) In the exercise and performance of their functions as to training,
education and research, the Board shall act on lines settled as aforesaid.

(4) The Board shall afford to the Minister facilities for obtaining
information with respect to the property and activities of the Board,
and shall furnish him with returns, accounts and other information
with respect thereto and afford to him facilities for the verification of
information furnished, in such manner # and at such times as he may
require.

4 . — (1) There shall be established for the purposes mentioned in
this section two consumers’ councils, to be known respectively as the
Industrial Coal Consumers’ Council and the Domestic Coal Con-
sumers’ Council.

(2) Each of the said councils shall consist of such number of persons
as the Minister may think fit, appointed by him to represent the
Board, and — » *

(a) in the case of the Industrial Coal Consumers’ Council, after con-
sultation with such bodies representative of the interests concerned
as the Minister thinks fit, to represent consumers of coal, coke and
manufactured fuel respectively, for industrial purposes or other
purposes involving supply in bulk, and persons engaged in organ-
ising or effecting the sale or supply, whether for home use or for
export, of coal, coke and manufactured fuel respectively, for those
purposes ;

(b) in the case of the Domestic Coal Consumers’ Council, after con-
sultation with such bodies representative of the interests concerned
as the Minister thinks fit, to represent consumers of coal, coke and
manufactured fuel respectively, for domestic purposes and other
purposes not falling within the preceding paragraph, and persons
engaged in organising or effecting the sale or supply of coal, coke
and manufactured fuel respectively, for those purposes. •

In formulating hk proposals for appointments to each of the said
councils, the Minister shall have particular regard to nominations
made to him by the said bodies .representative of the interests

io6

Statutes

concerned of persons recommended by them as having both adequate
knowledge of the requirements of those interests and also qualifications
for exercising a wide and impartial judgment on the matters to be
dealt with by the council generally.

(3) The Industrial Goal Consumers 5 Council shall be charged with
the duties —

(a) of considering any matter affecting the sale or supply, whether for
home use or for export, of coal, coke or manufactured fuel for the
purposes mentioned in paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this
section which is the subject of a representation made to them by
consumers for those purposes of coal, coke or manufactured fuel,
as the case may be, or which appears to them to be a matter to
which consideration ought to be given apart from any such repre-
sentation, and, where action appears to them to be requisite as to
any such matter, of notifying their conclusions to the Minister*,

(b) of considering, and reporting to the Minister on, any such matter
which may be referred to them by the Minister.

(4) The Domestic Coal Consumers 5 Council shall be charged with
the like duties in relation to the sale or supply of coal, coke and manu-
factured fuel for the purposes mentioned in paragraph (b) of subsection
(2) of this section.

(5) On the notification or making to the Minister by either of the
said councils of their conclusions or report on any matter, if it appears
to him, after consultation with the Board, that a defect is disclosed
in the Board’s general arrangements for the production, sale or supply
of coal, coke or manufactured fuel, as the case may be, he may give
to the Board such directions as he may think requisite for remedying
the defect, and the Board shall give effect to any such directions. . . .

(8) Each of the said councils shall make an annual report to the
Minister, and the Minister shall lay the reports before both Houses of
Parliament.

[§§ 5~ 2 5- Detailed provisions for the transfer of assets to the Board, com-
pensation, etc.]

[§ 26. The Mi n ister may make advances to the Board for capital expendi-
ture.]

[§27. The Board may, with the Minister’s consent, borrow sums not
exceeding £10,000,000 at any one period.]

[§28. Payments by the Board to the Minister to recoup expenses incurred
by the Crown during the process of nationalisation, and of interest on
advances.]

29 . — (1) The Board shall establish a reserve fund.

# (2) The management of the said fund, the su#is to be carried from
time to time to the credit thereof, and the application thereof, shall be
as the Board may determine :

Coal Industry Nationalisation Act , 1946 107

Provided that —

(a) no part of the said fund shall be applied otherwise than for pur-
poses of the Board; and

(b) the power of the Minister to give directions to the Board shall
extend to the giving of them, with the approval of the Treasury,
of directions as to any matter relating to the establishment or man-
agement of the said fund, the carrying of sums to the credit thereof,
or the application thereof, notwithstanding that the directions
may be of a specific character.

30 . Any excess of the Board’s revenues for any financial year of the
Board over their outgoings for that year properly chargeable to
revenue account (including, without prejudice to the generality of
that expression, provisions in respect of their obligations under the
two Jast preceding sections) shall be applied for such purposes as the
Board may determine:

Provided that —

(a) no part of any such excess shall be applied otherwise than for
purposes of the Board ; and

(b) the power of the Minister to give directions to the Board shall
extend to the giving to them, with the approval of the Treasury,
of directions as to the application of any such excess, notwith-
standing that the directions may be of a specific character.

31 . — (1) The Board shall keep proper accounts and other records
in relation thereto, and shall prepare in respect # c*f each financial year
of the Board a statement of accounts in such form as the Minister may
direct, being a form which shall conform with the best commercial
standards and which shall distinguish the colliery activities and each
of the main ancillary activities of the Eoarcl.

(2) The accounts of the Board shall be audited by auditors to be
appointed annually by the Minister.

(3) So soon as the accounts of the Board have been audited, they
shall send a copy of the statement of accounts referred to in subsection
(1) of this secdon to the Minister together with a copy of any report
made by the auditors on that statement or on the accounts of the
Board.

(4) The Minister shall lay a copy of every such statement and report
before each House of Parliament.

[§§ 32-33. Provisions as to stock.]

34 . — (1) The Treasury may issue to the Minister out of the Con-
solidated Fund such jums as are necessary to enable him to mak%
money payments, ancr advances to the Board, under this Act.

(2) For the purpose of providing su*ns (or any part of sums) to be

io8

Statutes

issued under the preceding subsection, or of providing for the replace-
ment of all or any part of sums so issued, the Treasury may, at any
time, if they think fit, raise money in any manner in which they are
authorised to raise money under the National Loans Act, 1939, and
any securities created and issued to raise money under this subsection
shall be deemed for all purposes to have been created and issued under
that Act.

[§§ 35~45* Account of Minister’s receipts; provisions regarding superannua-
tion, welfare of miners, research, etc.]

46 . — (1) It shall be the duty of the Board to enter into consultation
with organisations appearing to them to represent substantial propor-
tions of the persons in the employment of the Board, or of any class
of such persons, as to the Board’s concluding with those organisations
agreements providing for the establishment and maintenance of joint
machinery for —

(a) the settlement by negotiation of terms and conditions of employ-
ment, with provision for reference to arbitration in default of such
settlement in such cases as may be determined by or under the
agreements; and

(b) consultation on —

(i) questions relating to the safety, health or Welfare of such
persons;

(ii) the organisation and conduct of the operations in which such
persons are employed and other matters of mutual interest to the
Board and such persons arising out of the exercise and performance
by the Board of their functions.

(2) The Board shall deposit with the Minister and the Minister of
Labour and National Service copies of any such agreement as afore-
said entered into by the Board and of any instrument varying the
terms of any such agreement.

47 . Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to exempt the Board from
liability for any tax, duty, rate, levy, or other charge whatsoever,
whether general or local.

[§ 48 , Transfer of certain liabilities from colliery concerns to the Board.]

49 . — (1) The Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, an< ^ section
twenty-one of the Limitation Act, 1939, shall not apply to any action,
prosecution or proceeding against the Board, or for or in respect of
any ac^, neglect or default done or committed by a servant or agent
of the Board in his capacity as a servant or agent of theirs.

~ (2) In their application to any such action as- aforesaid sections two
and three of the Limitation Act, 1939 (which delate to the limitation
of actions of contract and tort- and certain other actions) shall have

Coal Industry Nationalisation Act> 1946 109

effect with the substitution for references therein to six years of refer-
ences to three years.

(3) No right adverse to the title of the Board to any coal or mine

of coal shall be capable of being acquired under the Limitation Act,

*939- *

(4) For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that the author-
isations conferred on the Board by section one of this Act, whilst dis-
charging them in the exercise and performance of the functions therein
mentioned from limitations to which they might otherwise have been
subject arising from the law relating to the capacity of statutory cor-
porations, are not to be construed as authorising disregard of any
enactment or any act or omission unlawful on any other ground.

[§ 50. The Board not required to insure against liabilities for workmen’s
compensation.]

[§? 5 X ~53* Board’s documents as public records, etc.]

54. — (1) The Board shall, as soon as possible after the end of each
financial year of the Board make to tjie Minister a report on the
exercise and performance by them of their functions during that year
and on their policy and programmes, and the Minister shall lay a
copy of every such report before each House of Parliament.

(2) The report for any year shall set out any direction given by the
Minister to the Board during that year unless the Minister has notified
to the Board his opinion that it is against the national interest so to do.

[§§ 55-61. General provisions regarding disclosures of information relating
to individual businesses, penalties for fa!%e information, prosecutions, arbitra-
tion, etc.]

62. — (1) Regulations made 'whether by the Minister or by the
Treasury) for the purposes of any provision of this Act (in this section
referred to, in relation to the regulations in question, as “the author-
ising enactment’ 5 ) may, in addition to providing for any matters
specified in the authorising enactment, provide —

(a) for imposing limits of time within which things to be done for the
purposes of the regulations must be done, with or without power
to any authority therein specified to extend limits imposed;

(b) for punishing persons offending against provisions of the regula-
tions ;

(c) for the determination of questions of fact or of law which may
arise in giving effect to the regulations, and as to evidence for that
purpose, and for regulating (otherwise than in relation* to any
court proceedings) any matters relating to the practice and proce-
dure to be follow^ in connection with the determination of such,
questions, including provision as to parties and their representa-
tion and provision for the right to appear and be heard (as we^i in

1 10

Statutes

court proceedings as otherwise) of the Minister, District Valuation
Boards, referees, or other authorities, and as to awarding costs of
proceedings for the determination of such questions, determining
the amount thereof and the enforcement of awards thereof;

(d) for amending or repealing enactments inconsistent with the pro-
vision to be made for the purposes of the authorising enactment,
and for applying enactments with or without modification; and
{e) for any incidental or supplementary matters for which it appears
to the Minister to be necessary or expedient for the purposes of the
authorising enactment to provide:

Provided that any punishment imposed by virtue of paragraph (b)
of this subsection shall not exceed that provided for by section fifty-
eight of this Act or, in the case of a fine imposed in respect of each
day on which a person is in default, five pounds.

(2) Regulations made (whether by the Minister or by the Treasury)
under this Act shall be laid before Parliament as soon as may be after
they are made, and if either House of Parliament within the period of
forty days beginning with the day on which any such regulations are
laid before it resolves that the regulations be annulled, the regulations
shall thereupon become void, without prejudice, however, to the
validity of anything previously done thereunder or to the making of
new regulations.

In reckoning any such period of forty days as aforesaid, no account
shall be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or
prorogued, or during. which both Houses are adjourned for more tfian
four days.

(3) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (4) of section one of the
Rules Publication Act, 1893, regulations made (whether by the
Minister or by the Treasury) under this Act shall be deemed not to
be, or to contain, statutory rules to which that section applies.

[§ 63, Interpretation of expressions.]

[§ 64, Application to Scotland.]

65 . — (1) This Act may be cited as the Coal Industry Nationalisation
Act, 1946.

(2) This Act shall not extend to Northern Ireland. . . .

[Four schedules omitted.]

National Health Service Act , 194.6

NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE ACT, 1946
9 and 10 Geo* 6, c* 81

Part I

CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION

1 . — (1) It shall be the duty of the Minister of Health (hereafter in
this Act referred to as “the Minister”) to promote the establishment
in England and Wales of a comprehensive health service designed to
secure improvement in the physical and mental health of the people
of England and Wales and the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of
illness, and for that purpose to provide or secure the effective provision
of services in accordance with the following provisions of this Act.

(«) The services so provided shall be free of charge, except where
any provision of this Act expressly provides for the making and
recovery of charges.

2. — (1) There shall be constituted . ♦ . a council, to be called the
Central Health Services Council and hereafter in this Act referred to
as “the Central Council”, and it shall be the duty of the Central
Council to advise the Minister upon such general matters relating to
the services p^pvided under this Act. or any services provided by local
health authorities in their capacity as such authorities, as the Council
think fit and upon any questions referred to them by him relating to
those services. . . .

*(3) The Minister may, after consultation with the Central Council,
by order constitute standing advisory committees for the purpose of
advising him and the Central Council on such of the services aforesaid
as may be specified in the order. . . .

(5) The Central Council shall make an annual report to the Minister
on their proceedings and on the proceedings of any standing advisory
committee constituted under this section, and the Minister shall lay that
report before Parliament with such comments (if any) as he thinks fit:

Provided that, if the Minister, after consultation with the Central
Council, is satisfied that it would be contrary to the public interest to
lay any such report, or a part of any such report, before Parliament,
he may refrain from laying that report or part. . . .

Part II

HOSPITAL AND SPECIALIST SERVICES

Provision of Services by Minister
\ *%

3 . — (1) As from the appointed day, it shall be the duty of the Min-
ister to provide throughout England ^nd Wales, to such extent as he

1 1 2 Statutes

considers necessary to meet all reasonable requirements, accommoda-
tion and services of the following descriptions, that is to say:

(a) hospital accommodation;

(b) medical, nursing and other services required at or for the purposes
of hospitals ;

(c) the service of specialists, whether at a hospital, a health centre
provided under Part III of this Act or a clinic or, if necessary on
medical grounds, at the home of the patient;

and any accommodation and services provided under this section are

in this Act referred to as “hospital and specialist services”.

(2) Regulations may provide for the making and recovery by the

Minister of such charges as may be prescribed —

(a) in respect of the supply, as part of the hospital and specialist ser-
vices, of any appliance which is, at the request of the person
supplied, of a more expensive type than the prescribed type, or in
respect of the replacement or repair of any such appliance. . . .

[§§ 4~5- Payments by private patients.]

Transfer of Hospitals to the Minister

6 . — (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, there shall, on the
appointed day, be transferred to and vest in the Minister by virtue of
this Act all interests in or attaching to premises forming part of a
voluntary hospital or tlsed for the purposes of a voluntary hospital. .' . .

(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, there shall also, on the
appointed day, be transferred to and vest in the Minister by virtue of
this Act all hospitals vested in a local authority immediately before the
appointed day. . . .

[§ 7, Endowments of voluntary hospitals.]

[§ 8. Exception for medical and dental schools.]

[§§ 9-10. Supplementary provisions.]

11 . — (1) The Minister shall by order constitute . . . boards, to be
called Regional Hospital Boards, for such areas as he may by order
determine, for the purpose of exercising functions with respect to the
administration of hospital and specialist services in those areas. . . .

(3) Every Regional Hospital Board shall, within such period as the
Minister may by direction specify, submit to the Minister a scheme
for the appointment by them of committees, to be called Hospital
Management Committees, for the purpose of exercising functions with
pespect to the management and control of individual hospitals or
groups of hospitals, other than teaching hospitals, providing hospital
and specialist services in the arsa of the Board. . . .

National Health Service Act , 1946 1 1 3

12 . — (1) Subject to the exercise of functions by Hospital Management
Committees . . . , it shall be the duty of a Regional Hospital Boards sub-
ject to and in accordance with regulations and such directions as may
be given by the Minister, generally to administer on behalf of the
Minister the hospital and specialist services provided in their area. . . .

[§§ I 3~ I 4* Legal status of boards and committees; conditions of service of
hospital officers.]

[§ 15. Incorporation of medical schools in London.]

[§§ 16-18. The Minister may provide research, bacteriological and blood
transfusion services.]

Part III

HEALTH SERVICES PROVIDED BY LOCAL HEALTH AUTHORITIES

19 . — (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the local authority
for»the purposes of this Part of this Act, who shall be called the “local
health authority 55 , shall for each county be the council of the county
and for each county borough be the council of the county borough.

[(2) The Minister may combine authorities into joint boards.]

20 . — (1) Every local health authority shall, within such period as
the Minister may by direction specify, submit to the Minister pro-
posals for carrying out their duties under the next following eight
sections of thS Act. . . .

(3) The Minister may approve the proposals with or without
modifications (which may include additions or exceptions), and it
shall be the duty of the local health authorin' to carry out their duties
under the next following eight sections of this Act in accordance with
the proposals submitted and approved tor their area under this
section, subject to any modifications made by subsequent proposals so
submitted and approved. . . .

[§§ 21-28. Local authorities shall provide health centres; make arrange-
ments for the care of mothers and young children; provide midwifery services;
provide for home nursing ; make arrangements for vaccination and immunisa-
tion; ensure that ambulances are available; and provide for preventive
measures and the care of convalescents.]

[§ 29, A local authority may provide domestic help for households in which
there is an invalid.]

[Parts IV (General Services) and V (Mental Health Services) omitted.]

Part VI

GENERAL

Financial Provisions

52 . — (1) Any expanses incurred by the Minister in the exercise of
his functions under this Act, the Lunacy and Mental Treatment Acts,

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114

1890 to 1930, or the Mental Deficiency Acts, 1913 to 1938, shall be
defrayed out of moneys provided by Parliament.

(2) All sums received by the Minister under this Act, except sums
required to be transferred to the Hospital Endowments Fund, shall
be paid into the Exchequer.

53 . — (1) In respect of the period beginning with the appointed day
and ending with the thirty-first day of March next following and each
subsequent period of twelve months, there shall be paid out of moneys
provided by Parliament to every local health authority a grant in
respect of the expenditure, estimated in the prescribed manner,
incurred by the authority in carrying out their functions as a local
health authority, whether under this Act or any other enactment, and
the grant shall be payable in accordance with regulations made by the
Minister with the approval of the Treasury:

Provided that the total amount of the grant payable to any lpcal
health authority in respect of any such period shall not exceed three-
quarters of the total expenditure estimated as aforesaid of that authority
and shall not be less than three-eighths of that expenditure.

[§§ 54-56. Payments to Regional Hospital Boards, etc., accounts, etc.]
Administrative Provisions

57 . — (1) Where the Minister is of opinion, on complaint or other-
wise, that any Regional Hospital Board, Board of Governors of a
teaching hospital, Hospital Management Committee, Executive
Council, Ophthalmic Services Committee or local health authority/ or
the Medical Practices Committee or the Dental Estimates Board have
failed to carry out any functions conferred or imposed on them by
or under this Act, or have in carrying out those functions failed to
comply with any regulations or directions relating thereto, he may
after such inquiry as he may think fit make an order declaring them
to be in default.

(2) Except where the body in default is a local health authority,
the members of the body shall forthwith vacate their office and the
order shall provide for the appointment, in accordance with the pro-
visions of this Act, of new members of the body, and may contain such
provisions as seem to the Minister expedient for authorising any person
to act in the place of the body in question pending the appointment of
the new members.

(3) If the body in default is a local health authority, the order shall
direct tfiem, for the purposes of remedying the default, to discharge
such of their functions, in such manner and within such time or times,
*s may be specified in the order, and if the authority fail to comply
with any direction given under this subsection, within the time limited
for compliance therewith, the Minister, in lieu of enforcing the order

National Health Service Act , 1946 x 1 5

by mandamus or otherwise, may make an order transferring to himself
such of the functions of the authority as he thinks fit.

(4) Any expenses certified by the Minister to have been incurred by
him in discharging functions transferred to him under this section
from a local health authority shall on demand be paid to him by that
authority and shall be recoverable by him from them as a debt due
to the Crown. . . .

[§§ 58-80 and ten schedules omitted.]

CROWN PROCEEDINGS ACT, 1947
10 and 11 Geo. 6, c. 44

1. % Where any person has a claim against the Crown after the com-
mencement of this Act, and, if this Act had not been passed, the claim
might have been enforced, subject to the grant of His Majesty’s fiat,
by petition of right, or might have be*en enforced by a proceeding
provided by any statutory provision repealed by this Act, then, sub-
ject to the provisions of this Act, the claim may be enforced as of right,
and without the fiat of His Majesty, by proceedings taken against
the Crown for* that purpose in accordance with the provisions of this
Act.

2. — ( 1 ) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Crown shall be
subject to all those liabilities in tort to which, if it were a private
person of full age and capacity, it would be subject:

(a) in respect of torts committed by its servants or agents ;

(h) in respect of any breach of those duties which a person otves to his
servants or agents at common law by reason of being their em-
ployer; and

(c) in respect of any breach of the duties attaching at common law to
the ownership, occupation, possession or control of property:

Provided that no proceedings shall lie against the Crown by virtue
of paragraph (a) of this subsection in respect of any act or omission of
a servant or agent of the Crown unless the act or omission would apart
from the provisions of this Act have given rise to a cause of action in
tort against that servant or agent or his estate.

(2) Where the Crown is bound by a statutory duty which is binding
also upon persons other than the Crown and its officers, then, subject
to the provisions of this Act, the Crown shall, in respect of h failure
to comply with that duty, be subject to all those liabilities in tort (if
any) to which it wou^d be so subject if it were a private person of fuii
age and capacity.

ii6

Statutes

(3) Where any functions are conferred or imposed upon an officer
of the Crown as such either by any rule of the common law or by
statute, and that officer commits a tort while performing or purporting
to perform those functions, the liabilities of the Crown in respect of the
tort shall be such as they would have been if those functions had been
conferred or imposed solely by virtue of instructions lawfully given by
the Crown.

(4) Any enactment which negatives or limits the amount of the
liability of any Government department or officer of the Crown in
respect of any tort committed by that department or officer shall, in
the case of proceedings against the Crown under this section in respect
of a tort committed by that department or officer, apply in relation
to the Crown as it would have applied in relation to that department
or officer if the proceedings against the Crown had been proceedings
against that department or officer.

(5) No proceedings shall lie against the Crown by virtue of this
section in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by any
person while discharging or purporting to discharge any responsibilities
of a judicial nature vested in him, or any responsibilities which he has
in connection with the execution of judicial process.

(6) No proceedings shall lie against the Crown by virtue of this
section in respect of any act, neglect or default of any officer of the
Crown, unless that officer has been directly or indirectly appointed
by the Crown and was at the material time paid in respect of his
duties as an officer of the Crown wholly out of the Consolidated Fund
of the United Kingdopi, moneys provided by Parliament, the Road
Fund, or any other Fund certified by the Treasury for the purposes of
this subsection or was at the material time holding an office in respect
of which the Treasury certify that the holder thereof would normally
be so paid.

[§§ 3“9 • Provisions regarding industrial property, the law as to indemnity,
contributory negligence, etc., Crown ships, docks and harbours, etc.]

10 . — (1) Nothing done or omitted to be done by a member of the
armed forces of the Crown while on duty as such shall subject either
him or the Crown to liability in tort for causing the death of another
person, or for causing personal injury to another person, in so far as
the death or personal injury is due to anything suffered by that
other person while he is a member of the armed forces of the Crown
if—

(a) at the time when that thing is suffered by that other person, he is
either on duty as a member of the armed forces of the Crown or
is, though not on duty as such, on any land, premises, ship, air-
craft or vehicle for the time being used fo# the purposes of the
armed forces of the Crown ^ and

Crown Proceedings Act , igg.y uy

( b ) the Minister of Pensions certifies that his suffering that thing has
been or will be treated as attributable to service for the purposes
of entitlement to an award under the Royal Warrant, Order in
Council or Order of His Majesty relating to the disablement or
death of members of the force of which he is a member :

Provided that this subsection shall not exempt a member of the said
forces from liability in tort in any case in which the court is satisfied
that the act or omission was not connected with the execution of his
duties as a member of those forces.

(2) No proceedings in tort shall lie against the Crown for death or
personal injury due to anything suffered by a member of the armed
forces of the Crown if —

(a) that thing is suffered by him in consequence of the nature or con-
dition of any such land, premises, ship, aircraft or vehicle as afore-
said, or in consequence of the nature or condition of any equip-
ment or supplies used for the purposes of those forces ; and
(1 b ) the Minister of Pensions certifies a$ mentioned in the preceding
subsection;

nor shall any act or omission of an officer of the Crown subject him
to liability in tort for death or personal injury, in so far as the death
or personal ii3*ury is due to anything suffered by a member of the
armed forces of the Crown being a thing as to which the conditions
aforesaid are satisfied.

(3) The Admiralty or a Secretary of State, if satisfied that it is the

fact: — ’

(a) that a person was or was not on any particular occasion on duty
as a member of the armed forces of the Crown; or

(b) that at any particular time any land, premises, ship, aircraft,
vehicle, equipment or supplies was or was not, or were or were
not, used for the purposes of the said forces ;

may issue a certificate certifying that to be the fact; and any such
certificate shall, for the purposes of this section, be conclusive as to
the fact which it certifies.

11 . — (1) Nothing in Part I of this Act shall extinguish or abridge
any powers or authorities which, if this Act had not been passed,
would have been exercisable by virtue of the prerogative of the Crown,
or any powers or authorities conferred on the Crown by any statute,
and, in particular, nothing in the said Part I shall extinguish or
abridge any powers or authorities exercisable by the Crown, whether
in time of peace or of war, for the purpose of the defence of the realn^
or of training, or maintaining the efficiency of, any of the armed
forces of the Crown.

Statutes

1 18

(2) Where in any proceedings under this Act it is material to
determine whether anything was properly done or omitted to be done
in the exercise of the prerogative of the Crown, the Admiralty or a
Secretary of State may, if satisfied that the act or omission was neces-
sary for any such purpose as is mentioned in the last preceding sub-
section, issue a certificate to the effect that the act or omission was
necessary for that purpose; and the certificate shall, in those proceed-
ings, be conclusive as to the matter so certified.

[§ 12. Transitional provisions.]

[§§ 13-15. Proceedings in the High Court and in county courts.]

16 . The Crown may obtain relief by way of interpleader proceedings,
and may be made a party to such proceedings, in the same manner
in which a subject may obtain relief by way of such proceedings or be
made a party thereto, and may be made a party to such proceedings
notwithstanding that the application for relief is made by a sheriif or
other like officer; and all rules of court and county court rules relating
to interpleader proceedings shall, subject to the provisions of this Act,
have effect accordingly.

17 . — (1) The Treasury shall publish a list specifying the several
Government departments which are authorised departments for the
purposes of this Act, and the name and address for service of the
person who is, or is acting for the purposes of this Act /s, the solicitor
for each such department, and may from time to time amend or vary
the said list. . . .

(2) Civil proceedings by the Crown may be instituted either by an
authorised Government department in its own name, whether that
department was or was not at the commencement of this Act authorised
to sue, or by the Attorney General.

(3) Civil proceedings against the Crown shall be instituted against
the appropriate authorised Government department, or, if none of the
authorised Government departments is appropriate or the person insti-
tuting the proceedings has any reasonable doubt whether any and if so
which of those departments is appropriate, against the Attorney General.

(4) Where any civil proceedings against the Crown are instituted
against the Attorney General, an application may at any stage of the
proceedings be made to the court by or on behalf of the Attorney
General to have such of the authorised Government departments as
may be specified in the application substituted for him as defendant
to the proceedings; and where any such proceedings are brought
against an authorised Government department, an application may
at any stage of the proceedings be made to the court on behalf of that
department to have the Attorney General or such of the authorised
Government departments as may be specified it the application sub-
stituted for the applicant as th$. defendant to the proceedings.

Crown Proceedings Act , IQ4? 1 19

Upon any such application the court may if it thinks fit make an
order granting the application on such terms as the court thinks just;
and on such an order being made the proceedings shall continue as if
they had been commenced against the department specified in that
behalf in the order, or, as the case may require, against the Attorney
General.

(d) No proceedings instituted in accordance with this Part of this
Act by or against the Attorney General or an authorised Government
department shall abate or be affected by any change in the person
holding the office of Attorney General or in the person or body of
persons constituting the department.

[§§ 18-39 omitted.]

40. — (1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to proceedings by or against,
or authorise proceedings in tort to be brought against His Majesty in
His private capacity.

(2) Except as therein otherwise expressly provided, nothing in this
Act shall : —

(a) affect the law relating to prize salvage, or apply to proceedings in
causes or matters within the jurisdiction of the High Court as a
prize court or to any criminal proceedings: or

(b) authorise proceedings to be taken against the Crown under or in
accordance with this Act in respect of any alleged liability of the
Crown arising otherwise than in respect of His Majesty's Govern-
ment in the United Kingdom, or affect proceedings against the

* Crown in respect of any such alleged liability as aforesaid ; or
{c) affect any proceedings by the Crown otherwise than in right of His
Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom; or

(d) subject the Crown to any greater liabilities in respect of the acts or
omissions of any independent contractor employed by the Crown
than those to which the Crown would be subject in respect of such
acts or omissions if it were a private person; or

(e) subject the Crown, in its capacity as a highway authority, to any
greater liability than that to which a local authority is subject in
that capacity; or

(/) affect any rules of evidence or any presumption relating to the
extent to which the Crown is bound by any Act of Parliament. . . .

and, without prejudice to the general effect of the foregoing provisions,
Part III of this Act shall not apply to the Crown except in right of His
Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom.

(3) A certificate of a Secretary of State: —

(a) to the effect that any alleged liability of the Crown arises otherwise
than in respect oHHis Majesty’s Government in the United King-
dom;

120

Statutes

(b) to the effect that any proceedings by the Crown are proceedings
otherwise than in right of His Majesty’s Government in the
United Kingdom;

shall, for the purposes of this Act, be conclusive as to the matter so
certified. . . .

(5) This Act shall not operate to limit the discretion of the court to
grant relief by way of mandamus in cases in which such relief might
have been granted before the commencement of this Act, notwith-
standing that by reason of the provisions of this Act some other and
further remedy is available.

[§§ 41-54 an d two schedules omitted.]

SUPPLIES AND SERVICES (EXTENDED PURPOSES) ACT, 1947
10 and 11 Geo. 6, c. 55

An Act to extend the purposes of the Supplies and Services ( Transitional Powers)
Act , 1945.

[13th August 1947.]

Whereas under the Supplies and Services (Transitional Powers) Act,
1945, Defence Regulations appearing to His Majesty to be necessary
or expedient for the purposes mentioned in subsection (1) of section
one of that Act (being purposes connected mainly with the orderly
transition from war to peace, the maintenance of a sufficiency of
supplies essential to the well-being of the community and the alloca-
tion of available supplies and services during the transition) were
continued in force by virtue of that Act:

And whereas, by reason of the war and the dislocation of trade
consequent thereon, supplies and services available are, or are likely
shortly to become, insufficient for meeting the essential needs of the
community, and it has become necessary that the use of the powers
conferred by those Regulations should be directed more particularly
to increasing production and redressing the balance of trade :

Now, therefore, be it enacted by the King’s most Excellent Majesty,
by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Tem-
poral, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the
authority of the same, as follows : —

1 . — (*) The Regulations which at the date of the passing of this Act
have effect by virtue of the Supplies and Services (Transitional
^Powers) Act, 1945 (hereafter in tiffs Act referred to as “the Act of
1945”), and any orders or other instruments in force thereunder, shall,
in sp far as their operation is limited, expressly or by implication, to

1 2 I

Supplies and Services Act, igpy

the purposes mentioned in subsection (i) of section one of that Act,
be extended so as to be applicable for the following additional purposes,
that is to say: —

(a) for promoting the productivity of industry, commerce and agricul-
ture;

(b) for fostering and directing exports and reducing imports, or
imports of any classes, from all or any countries and for redressing
the balance of trade; and

(c) generally for ensuring that the whole resources of the community
are available for use, and are used, in a manner best calculated to
serve the interests of the community;

and accordingly any references in the said Regulations, orders and
other instruments to the purposes mentioned in subsection (i) of
section one of that Act shall be construed as including references to
the purposes aforesaid:

Provided that nothing in this Act shall be held to authorise the
suppression or suspension of any newspaper, periodical, book or other
publication.

(2) In section three of the Act of 1945 (which confers powers to
revoke and vary Regulations having effect by virtue of that Act)
references to tjie purposes specified in subsection f 1 ; of section one of
that Act shall be construed as including references to the purposes
specified in the preceding subsection.

(3) In paragraph (d) of subsection (2) of section one of the Emer-
gency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939,, as applied* by section five oi the
Act of 1945, to Regulations having effect by virtue of that Act, and
in subsection (4) of that section as so applied, the expression ‘ ‘enact-
ment 5 5 shall mean any enactment passed before the commencement of
this Act, other than the Act of 1945 and the provisions of the Emer-
gency Powers (Defence) Acts, 1939 and 1940, applied by section five
of the Act of 1945.

(4) His Majesty may by Order in Council direct that the preceding
provisions of this section shall apply, with such exceptions, adaptations,
and modifications, if any, as may be specified in the Order, in relation
to —

(a) any Regulation having effect by virtue of the Act of 1945 i* 1 or * n
respect of any of the countries or territories specified in section
four of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, and any orders
or other instruments made thereunder; and
(. b ) any power to vary such Regulations.

2 . This Act may be cited as the Supplies and Services (Extended*
Purposes) Act, 1947.

122

Statutes

LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT, 1948
11 and 12 Geo. 6, c. 26

Part I

Exchequer Grants and Other Financial Provisions (. England and Wales)
Discontinued Grants

1. Save as otherwise provided by this Part of this Act —

( a ) no Exchequer grant shall be payable under the Local Government
Acts, 1929 to 1946, for the year 1948-49 or any subsequent year;
and

(b) the third fixed grant period shall for the purposes of all enactments
be terminated at the end of March, nineteen hundred and f?rty-
eight.

Exchequer Grants to Counties and r County Boroughs

2. — (1) Where for the year 1948-49 or any subsequent year the
rateable value for a county or county borough is less than the standard
rateable value for that county or county borough (as defined by the
subsequent provisions of this Part of this Act), there sh ^.11 be paid out
of moneys provided by Parliament to the council of the county or
county borough a grant equal to the relevant fraction (as so defined)
of the amount of the difference.

(2) The said difference is in t^ie subsequent provisions of this Part
of this Act referred to as the rateable value credited to the county or
county borough.

(3) Grants under this section are in the subsequent provisions of this
Part of this Act referred to as “Exchequer Equalisation Grants. 55

3 . — (1) The standard rateable value for a county or county borough
for the purposes of the preceding provisions of this Part of this Act is
the amount which bears to the weighted population of that county or
county borough for the year in question that same proportion as the
sum which is to be taken for the purposes of this subsection as the rate-
able value for England and Wales for that year bears to the aggregate
of the weighted populations of all the counties and county boroughs
in England and Wales for that year.

(2) In this section, the expression “the weighted population 55 in
relation to a county or county borough means the population thereof
plus th$ number of children under fifteen years of age therein and, in
the case of a county the population whereof divided by the road-
.^mileage thereof is less than seventy, plus also one-third of the additional
population needed in order that the populationfthereof divided by the
road-mileage thereof should bef-seventy.

123

Local Government Act , 1948

(3) The sum which is to be taken for the purposes of subsection (1)
of this section as the rateable value for England and Wales for any
year is the rateable value for England and Wales for that year, in-
creased, in the case of any year subsequent to the year 1948-49, to
such extent, if any, as the Minister may direct in relation to that
subsequent year.

(4) The power conferred on the Minister by the last preceding sub-
section to direct such increases as are therein referred to shall, as
respects any year, be used for the purpose and only for the purpose
of securing that the proportion which the aggregate of the rateable
values credited to all the counties and county boroughs in England
and Wales bears to ‘the rateable value for England and Wales shall be
as nearly as may be the same for that year as for the year 1948-49;
but the Minister shall not use the said power as respects any year
unless the effect of the use thereof would be to increase the aggregate
of the rateable values credited to all counties and county boroughs in
England and Wales for that year by at least one per cent.

4 . — (1) The relevant fraction for a county or county borough for
the purposes of the preceding provisions of this Part of this Act is the
fraction arrived at by dividing the relevant local expenditure for the
year in question by the sum of the following amounts, that is to say,
the rateable y^tlue credited to the county or county borough for that
year and the product of a rate of one pound in the pound for the
county or county borough for that year.

(2) In this section, the expression <% the relevant local expenditure 5
means so much of the total expenditure for the* year —

(a) in the case of a county, of the council of the county and of the other
local authorities in the county: and
(£) in the case of a county borough, of the council of the county
borough,

as would have to be met out of rates levied within the county or
county borough if no Exchequer Grants under this Part of this Act
and (so far as any such Grant is relevant to the year in question) no
Exchequer Grants payable for any previous year under the Local
Government Acts, 1929 to 1946, were payable, and if no grants had
been made out of moneys provided by Parliament to local authorities
by the Minister by way of special assistance in respect of their financial
difficulties arising out of the war.

(3) Where, by virtue of a precept or other instrument, not being a
precept or instrument issued by a county council, any sum f^lls to be
paid by a local authority to any other authority, the amount payable
shall be treated for the purposes of subsection (2) of this section a^
expenditure of the fi&t-mentioned authority.

(4) The provisions of subsection (2> of this section shall, as respects

Statutes

124

the year 1948-49, have effect subject to the special provisions relating
to Exchequer Grants for that year contained hereafter in this Part
of this Act.

[§ 5. Exchequer Transitional Grants for the first five years.]

6. — (1) The Minister may, subject to the provisions of this section,
reduce any Exchequer Equalisation Grant or Exchequer Transitional
Grant payable to a council by such amount as he thinks just, if —

(a) he is satisfied, either upon representations made to him or without
any such representations, that the council have failed to achieve
or maintain a reasonable standard of efficiency and progress in the
discharge of their functions, regard being had to the standards
maintained in other areas ; or

( b ) he is satisfied that the expenditure of the council has been excessive
and unreasonable, regard being had to the financial resources and
other relevant circumstances of the area.

(2) Before reducing any grant by virtue of this section, the Minister
shall make and cause to be laid before Parliament a report stating the
amount of the reduction, and the reasons therefor, and he shall not
make the reduction until the said report is approved by a resolution
of the Commons House of Parliament.

7 . — (1) The amount of any grant payable out of moneys provided
by Parliament under subsection (1) of section fifty- three of the National
Health Service Act, 1946, to a local health authority shall, in lieu
of being determined by regulations under the said subsection (1),
be one-half of the expenditure in respect of which the grant is
made. . . .

[§ 8. Payments to voluntary associations.]

9 . — (1) Before the beginning of the year 1948-49 and each subse-
quent year, the Minister shall estimate for the year in relation to
every county district in England and Wales the amount following, that
is to say, the amount which is equal to the fraction hereinafter specified
of the aggregate of the Exchequer Equalisation Grants which will
become payable for that year to the councils of counties in England
and Wales outside London, and the council of each county shall pay
to the council of each county district in the county the amount so
estimated by the Minister in relation to that district.

(2) That said fraction is —

(a) in the case of any county district other than a rural district, one-
half of the population of the county district; and

(b) in the case of a rural district, one-quarter o£ the population of the
rural district,

Local Government Act, i g 48 125

divided, in any case, by the aggregate of the population of all counties
in England and Wales outside London.

(3) Any payment under this section may, if the councils concerned
so agree, be effected in whole or in part by making the appropriate
deduction from the amount due under a precept.

[§ 10. Payments to metropolitan boroughs.]

[§§ 11-16 (Miscellaneous) and Part II (Scotland) omitted.]

Part III

Valuation and Rating Procedure

General

33 . — (1) Valuation lists shall, instead of being prepared and
amended by the bodies and at the times, in accordance with the con-
ditions and subject to the rights as to objection and appeal specified
in the Rating and Valuation Acts, 1925 to 1940, and the Rating
and Valuation (Metropolis) Acts, 1869 t0 x 94 °> prepared and
amended by valuation officers of the Commissioners of Inland
Revenue at the times, in accordance with the conditions and subject
to the rights as to objection and appeal specified in this Part of this
Act; and

•

(1 a ) assessment committees, county valuation committees and the
central valuation committee shall cease to exist.; and
(b) save as hereafter provided in this Part of this Act, rating authorities
# shall have no functions in relation to the preparation and amend-
ment of valuation lists.

(2) Nothing in this section affects any rights of a rating authority as
a person who is aggrieved by anything done or omitted to be done by
the valuation officer in a valuation list or draft valuation list in relation
to any hereditament.

(3) In this Part of this Act, the expression “the valuation officer 55 ,
in relation to a valuation list, means such officer of the Commissioners
of Inland Revenue as may for the time being be authorised by the
Commissioners to act (either generally or for the particular purpose in
question) as the valuation officer in relation to that list.

[§ 34. Provisions for new valuation lists at five-yearly intervals.]

[§§ 35-43 • Preparation and revision of, and objections to, valuation lists.]

44. — ( x ) Local valuation courts constituted as hereinafter provided
shall be convened as often as may be necessary for the purpose of
hearing and determining appeals under the preceding provisions o^
this Part of this Act against draft valuation lists and against objections
to proposals for the alteration of valuation lists. ...

Kbg

126 Statutes

(3) Every such court shall consist of —

[a) either the chairman of the local valuation panel or the deputy
chairman (or, if more than one, one of the deputy chairmen)
thereof; and

( b ) two other members of the panel selected in accordance with the
scheme under which the panel is constituted.

45 . — (1) It shall be the duty of the council of every county and
county borough to make and submit to the Minister a scheme for the
constitution of a local valuation panel for the county or county borough
or two or more local valuation panels for areas which together com-
prise the whole of the county or county borough:

Provided that any two or more councils, whether councils of counties
or of county boroughs, may, and, if so directed by the Minister, shall,
make and submit to the Minister a joint scheme for the constitution
of a local valuation panel or local valuation panels for the whole of
their respective areas, or for areas which together comprise the whole
of their respective areas. . . . r

[§§ 46-48. Membership, staff, expenses, procedure, etc., of panels and
valuation courts.]

49 . — (1) Any person who, in pursuance of the last preceding
section, appeared before a local valuation court on the hearing of an
appeal and is aggrieved by the decision of the court thereon may,
within twenty-one days from the date of the decision, appeal to the
county court for the gounty court district in which the hereditament
in question is situated, or, where The hereditament extends into more
than one county court district, to the county court for any one of the
county court districts in which any part of the hereditament is situated,
and the court, after hearing such of the persons as appeared as afore-
said as desire to be heard, may give any directions which the local
valuation court might have given. . . .

50 . — (1) Notwithstanding anything in the preceding provisions of
this Part of this Act, the persons who would be entitled to appear and
be heard before any local valuation court or any county court may by
agreement in writing agree to refer to arbitration any matter which
would but for the agreement fall to be heard or determined by that
local valuation court or county court, and the matter shall be referred
to arbitration accordingly.

(2) The Arbitration Acts, 1889 to 1934, shall apply to any such
arbitration.

[§§ 5 i ~*73 (provisions regarding rates, inspection, etc.) and Part IV (valua-
tion of dwelling houses) omitted.]

Local Government Act , igp8

127

Part V

Rating of Transport and Electricity Authorities

General

85 . — (1) Save as is otherwise provided in this Part of this Act, no
premises which are or form part of either —

(a) a railway or canal hereditament (as defined for the purposes of
this Part of this Act) ; or

(b) a hereditament occupied by the British Electricity Authority, an Area
Electricity Board or the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board,

shall be liable to be rated or be included in any valuation list or in
any rate, and the British Transport Commission, the British Electricity
Authority and the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board shall, in
the*year 1948-49 and all subsequent years, make such payments for
the benefit of local authorities as are provided for by the subsequent
provisions of this Part of this Act in lieu of the rates which would,
apart from the provisions of this Part of this Act, be payable to rating
authorities in respect of those hereditaments. . . .

[§§ 93 ~ 99 ‘ Provisions by which the amounts of payments are to be calculated
and adjusted.]

•

100 . — (1) The sums falling to be paid under the preceding provisions
of this Part of this Act for the benefit of local authorities in England
and Wales shall be paid to the Minister, and the sums falling to be
p£id under the said provisions for jhe benefit? of local authorities in
Scotland shall be paid to the Secretary of State.

(2) The sums so paid to the Minister for any year shall, subject to
the provisions of this Part of this Act relating to liabilities of the Rail-
way Assessment Authority’ and the Anglo-Scottish Railways Assess-
ment Authority, be distributed by him, at such times as he may
determine, in the manner following, that is to say —

(a) the sums shall first be allocated among the rating authorities in
England and Wales in proportion to the rateable values for their
respective areas for that year;

(b) in the case of the council of a county borough, the amount so
allocated to that council shall be paid to that council;

to that authority shall be paid as to one-third thereof to that
authority and as to two-thirds thereof to the council of the county
of which the area of that authority forms part. •

(3) The sums so paid to the Secretary of State for any year shall b£
distributed by him Recording to their respective rateable valuations
among the rating authorities —

128

Statutes

(a) throughout Scotland;

(fi) in that part of Scotland which is not included in the North of
Scotland District; and
(c) in the said District,

according as the said sums represent sums paid to the Secretary of
State by the British Transport Commission, the British Electricity
Authority and the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board.

[§§ 101-148 and two schedules omitted.]

NATIONAL ASSISTANCE ACT, 1948
11 and 12 Geo. 6, c. 29

Part I

Introductory

1. The existing poor law shall cease to have effect, and shall be
replaced by the provisions of Part II of this Act as to the rendering,
out of moneys provided by Parliament, of assistance to persons in
need, the provisions of Part III of this Act as to accommodation and
other services to be provided by local authorities, and the related
provisions of Part IV of this Act.

Part II

NATIONAL ASSISTANCE

The National Assistance Board

2 . — (1) The Assistance Board shall be known as the National
Assistance Board, and in addition to the functions for the time being
exercisable under any other enactment shall exercise the functions con-
ferred on them by the following provisions of this Act.

(2) The National Assistance Board (hereafter in this Act referred
to as “the Board 55 ) shall exercise their functions in such manner as
shall best promote the welfare of persons affected by the exercise
thereof.

(3) For the purpose of securing the prompt discharge of their func-
tions under this Act, the Board shall by regulations provide for the
local administration of their said functions, and in particular, but sub-
ject to any arrangements for the discharge thereof by officers of
another Government department or of a local authority, for the dis-
charge by local officers of the Bpard of the functions of the Board in

National Assistance Act , ip4<9 129

relation to applications for assistance and the decision of all questions
arising thereon.

(4) Annual reports on the activities of the Board shall be made by the
Board to the Minister of National Insurance, and the said Minister shall
lay each report of the Board under this subsection before Parliament.

(5) The constitution and proceedings of the Board shall continue to
be governed by the provisions set out in the First Schedule to this Act,
being the provisions in that behalf of the Unemployment Assistance
Act, 1934.

3 . — (1) For the purpose of securing that full use is made of the
advice and assistance, both on general questions and on difficult indi-
vidual cases, of persons having local knowledge and experience in mat-
ters affecting the functions of the Board, the Board shall arrange for
the establishment of advisory committees throughout Great Britain
to $ct for such areas as the Board think fit.

(2) The Board shall pay to members of advisory committees
appointed by the Board such travelling and other allowances (includ-
ing compensation for loss of remunerative time) as the Board, after
consultation with the Minister of National Insurance and with the
consent of the Treasury, may determine.

Giving cf Assistance by Board

4 . It shall be the duty of the Board in accordance with the following
provisions of this Part of this Ac: to assist persons in Great Britain who
are without resources to meet theii; requirements, or whose resources
(including benefits receivable under the National Insurance Acts,
1946) must be supplemented in order to meet rheir requirements.

5 . — (1) The question whether a person is in need of assistance, and
the nature and extent of any assistance to be given to him, shall,
subject to the provisions of this Act as to appeals, be decided by the
Board.

(2) The Minister of National Insurance shall in accordance with the
provisions of the next following section make regulations as to the
computation of requirements and resources for the purposes of this
Part of this Act and as to the decision of any such question as afore-
said, and the Board shall give effect to the relevant provisions of the
regulations.

(3) Regulations under this section may make different provision for
different classes of cases, and in particular shall make special provision
for blind persons and persons who have suffered a loss of ificome in
order to undergo treatment for tuberculosis of the respiratory system.

(4) Regulations under this section shall include provision fq£
securing that the rujes as to disregarding certain assets set out in the
Second Schedule to this Act shall be observed in computing resources.

Statutes

130

6. — ( 1 ) The Board shall as soon as may be after the passing of this Act,
and thereafter from time to time as occasion may require, prepare and
submit to the Minister of National Insurance (in this section referred to
as “the Minister 53 ) draft regulations under the last foregoing section.

(2) The Minister shall consider any draft submitted to him under
the last foregoing subsection and shall make draft regulations either
in the form of the draft as submitted or with such variations and
amendments as he thinks fit.

(3) Where the Minister makes any draft regulations otherwise than
in the form of the draft submitted to him, then before making the draft
regulations he shall inform the Board of the variations and amend-
ments which he intends to make, the Board shall report to him thereon,
and he shall consider the report.

(4) Any draft regulations made by the Minister under this section
shall be laid before Parliament as soon as may be after they are m^de,
and, if the draft regulations so laid are made otherwise than in the
form submitted to the Minister, there shall also be laid before Parlia-
ment a statement of the Minister’s reasons for, and a copy of the report
of the Board on, the variations and amendments made by him.

(5) If each House resolves that draft regulations made by the
Minister under this section be approved, the Minister shall in the
terms of the draft make regulations under the last foregqing section to
take effect on such date as may be specified in the regulations.

[§§ 7 ” I 3 - Details of assistance, disqualifications, etc.]

14 . — (1) Where a person applying for, or in receipt of, assistance, is
aggrieved by a decision of the Board ... he may appeal to the Appeal
Tribunal. . . .

(4) On an appeal under this section the Appeal Tribunal may confirm
the decision of the Board appealed against or substitute therefore any
decision which the Board could have made under this Part of this Act,
and any decision of the Tribunal shall be conclusive for all purposes. . . .

[§15. Supplementary provisions for assistance.]

[§§ 16-20. Re-establishment and reception centres.]

Part III

LOCAL AUTHORITY SERVICES

Provision of Accommodation

21 . — (1) It shall be the duty of every local authority, subject to and
in accordance with the provisions of this Part of this Act, to provide —

£a) residential accommodation for persons who by reason of age,
infirmity or any other circumstances are ip. need of care and
attention which is not otherwise available to them;

National Assistance Act, 1948 13 1

(b) temporary accommodation for persons who are in urgent need
thereof, being need arising in circumstances which could not rea-
sonably have been foreseen or in such other circumstances as the
authority may in any particular case determine.

(2) In the exercise of their said duty a local authority shall have
regard to the welfare of all persons for whom accommodation is pro-
vided, and in particular to the need for providing accommodation of
different descriptions suited to different descriptions of such persons
as are mentioned in the last foregoing subsection.

(3) A local authority shall exercise their functions under this section
in accordance with a scheme made thereunder.

(4) Accommodation provided by a local authority in the exercise
of their said functions shall be provided in premises managed by the
authority or, to such extent as may be specified in the scheme under
thia section, in such premises managed by another local authority as
may be agreed between the two authorities and on such terms, includ-
ing terms as to the reimbursement of expenditure incurred by the said
other authority, as may be so agreed. . * .

[§§ 22-23. Charges for accommodation and management of premises.]

24 . — (1) The local authority liable under this Part of this Act to
provide residential accommodation for any person shall subject to the
following provisions of this Part of this Act be the authority in whose
area the person is ordinarily resident.

(2) The local authority liable under this Part of this Act to provide
temporary accommodation for any person sh^ll be the authority in
whose area the person is.

(3) Where a person in the area of a local authority —

(a) is a person with no settled residence, or

(b) not being ordinarily resident in the area of the local authority, is in
urgent need of residential accommodation under this Part of this Act,

the authority shall have the like duty to provide residential accommo-
dation for him as if he were ordinarily resident in their area. . . .

25 . — (1) Where the Board are satisfied that a person in the area of a
local authority is in urgent need of accommodation under this Part of
this Act, the Board may require the local authority to provide such
accommodation for him. . . .

(3) Where a local authority are aggrieved by any requirement made
by the Board under subsection (1) of this section, the authority may,
but without prejudice to their duty to comply with the requirement in
the meanwhile^ appeal to the Appeal Tribunal, and on any su 5 h appeal
the Tribunal may cancel or confirm the requirement of the Board.

[§ 26. Premises mair^ained by voluntary organisations.]

[§27. Investigation of applicants’ resources.]

Statutes

132

28 . — (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the Minister shall
make annual contributions to local authorities in respect of premises
provided by them for the purposes of the foregoing provisions of this
Part of this Act, being premises provided in accordance with proposals
approved by the Minister and used in accordance with any conditions
subject to which the proposals were approved. . . .

[§ 29. Welfare arrangements for blind, deaf, dumb and crippled persons,
etc.]

[§§ 30-31. Voluntary organisations for the disabled, and old people’s
organisations.]

[§32. Financial adjustments between local authorities.]

[§33. Definition of local authorities.]

34 . — (1) The following provisions of this section shall have effect as
to schemes made under section twenty-one or twenty-nine of this Act.

(2) Subject to the provisions of this section, any such scheme shall
be made by the local authority and submitted to the Minister, and
shall come into force when approved by him.

(3) Not later than the date r on which any such scheme is submitted
to the Minister by the council of a county, that council shall send a
copy of the scheme —

(a) in the case of London to the Common Council qf the City of

London and to the council of each metropolitan borough;

(b) in the case of any other county, to the council of each county

district in the county;

and the Minister before approving the scheme shall take into con-
sideration any representations by any such council as is referred to in
paragraph (a) or (b) of this subsection made with respect to the
scheme within one month from the date on which it was submitted
to the Minister.

(4) The Minister may approve any such scheme submitted to him
either in the form in which it is submitted or with such modifications
as he thinks fit.

(5) Any scheme under either of the said sections may be varied or
revoked by a subsequent scheme thereunder, and the provisions of the
three last foregoing subsections shall apply to such a varying or
revoking scheme.

(6) Where in the case of any local authority no scheme is for the
time being in force for the exercise of their functions under section
twenty-one of this Act, or for the exercise of any powers under section
twenty-nine of this Act which the authority are under a duty to
exercise, the Minister may require the authority, within such time as
^ie may specify, to submit such a scheme to him for his approval, and
if the authority —

^33

National Assistance Act , 194 #

{a) fail to comply with the requirement, or
( b ) submit a scheme which appears to the Minister not proper to be
approved by him either as submitted or with modifications,

the Minister may himself make a scheme for the exercise of the said
functions or powers by the local authority.

(7) Where it appears to the Minister that by reason of a change of
circumstances it is expedient that any scheme for the exercise by a
local authority of their functions under section twenty-one or twenty-
nine of this Act should be varied, the Minister may require the
authority, within such time as he may specify, to submit to him for
his approval a scheme for varying the first-mentioned scheme in such
respects as may be specified in the requirement, and if the local
authority fail to comply with the requirement the Minister may
himself make the varying scheme.

(8) This section shall have effect in its application to Scotland as if
for subsection (3) the following subsection were substituted:

“(3 ) Not later than the date on which any scheme made under section
twenty-one of this Act is submitted to the Minister by the council of
a county, the council shall send a copy of the scheme to the town
council of each small burgh in the county and the Minister before
approving the scheme shall take into consideration any representa-
tions by any such town council made with respect to the scheme
within one month from the date on which it was submitted to the
Minister.”

35 . — (1) For the purposes of thi» Part cf tfiis Act the expression
“the Minister” means the Minister of Health as inspects England and
Wales, and the Secretary of State as respects Scotland.

(2) Subject to the provisions of schemes under this Part of this Act,
local authorities shall exercise their functions under this Part of this
Act (including any discretion conferred on them thereunder) under
the general guidance of the Minister, and in accordance with the
provisions of any regulations of the Minister made for the purposes of
this sub-section.

(3) Without prejudice to the generality of the last foregoing sub-
section, regulations thereunder —

(a) may provide for conferring on officers of the Minister authorised
under the regulations such powers of inspection as may be pre-
scribed in relation to the exercise of functions under this Part of
this Act by or by arrangement with or on behalf of local authorities;

(b) may prescribe requirements as to the provision to be made in
rules for the conduct of, and preservation of order in, premises in
which accommodation is provided under this Part of this Act by
local authorities;

Statutes

134

(c) may make provision with respect to the qualifications of officers
employed by local authorities for the purposes of this Part of this
Act or by voluntary organisations acting under arrangements with
or on behalf of local authorities for those purposes.

36 . — (1) Where the Minister is of opinion, whether on representa-
tions made to him or otherwise, that a local authority have failed to
discharge any of their functions under this Part of this Act, or have in
the discharge thereof failed to comply with any regulations relating
thereto, he may after such inquiry as he may think fit make an order
declaring the authority to be in default.

(2) An order under the last foregoing subsection shall direct the
authority, for the purpose of remedying the default, to discharge such
of their functions, in such manner and within such time or times, as
may be specified in the order; and if the authority fail to comply with
any direction given under this subsection within the time specified in
the order, then without prejudice to any other means of enforcing the
order the Minister may make an order transferring to himself such
of the functions of the authority as he thinks fit.

(3) Any expenses certified by the Minister to have been incurred by

him in discharging functions transferred to him under this section shall
on demand be paid to him by the authority from which the functions
were transferred. r

(4) An authority shall have the like power of raising money required
for paying expenses certified by the Minister as aforesaid as they have
of raising money for paying expenses incurred directly by them, and
the payment of any r expenses certified as aforesaid shall, to such
extent as may be sanctioned by the Minister, be a purpose for which
the authority may borrow money in accordance with the statutory
provisions relating to borrowing by that authority.

(5) An order under this section may contain such incidental or sup-
plemental provisions as appear to the Minister to be necessary or
expedient, including provision for the transfer to the Minister of
property and liabilities of the authority in default.

(6) Where any such order is varied or revoked by a subsequent
order, the revoking order or a subsequent order may make provision
for the re-transfer to the authority in default of any property or
liabilities transferred from that authority to the Minister under the
first-mentioned order and for the transfer to that authority of any
property or liabilities acquired or incurred by the Minister in discharg-
ing any of the functions transferred to him.

[Part IV (General and Supplementary) and seven schedules omitted.]

Representation of the People Act, 1948

T S5

REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT, 1948
11 and 12 Geo. 6, c. 65

Part I

Parliamentary Franchise and Its Exercise

Parliamentary Franchise and Distribution of Seats

1 * ( I ) Subject to any Order in Council hereafter made under the

House of Commons (Redistribution of Seats) Act, 1944, there shall for
the purpose of parliamentary elections be the county and borough con-
stituencies, each returning a single member, which are described in the
First Schedule to this Act, and no other constituencies. 1

(2) The persons entitled to vote as electors at a parliamentary
election in any constituency shall be those resident there on the
qualifying date who, on that date and on the date of the poll, are
British subjects of full age and not subject to any legal incapacity to
vote:

Provided that a person shall not be entitled to vote as an elector in
any constituency unless registered there in the register of parliamentary
electors to be used at the election nor, at a general election, to vote as
an elector in more than one constituency.

(3) The qualifying date for parliamentary elections shall be deter-
mined by reference to the date fixed for the poll as follows: —

(a) in Great Britain —

(i) where the date fixed for the poll is between the fifteenth day
of March and the second day of October in any year, the qualifying
date shall be, in England and Wales, the twentieth day of the pre-
ceding November and, in Scotland, the first day of the preceding
December ;

(ii) where the date fixed for the poll is between the first day of
October in any year and the sixteenth day of the following March,
the qualifying date shall in all parts of Great Britain be the fifteenth
day of the preceding June;

(b) in Northern Ireland (subject to the following provisions of this
Act)—

(i) where the date fixed for the poll is between the firs? day of
April and the second day of October in any year, the qualify-
ing date shall be the thirty-first day of October in the preceding
year;

y No university constituencies are included.

Statutes

136

(ii) where the date fixed for the poll is between the first day
of October in any year and the second day of the following
April, the qualifying date shall be the thirtieth day of the preceding
April.

[§ 2. Questions of residence to be determined according to the general
principles of the Representation of the People Act, 1918.]

[§ 3. Amendments to the House of Commons (Redistribution of Seats) Acts
of 1944 and 1947, and to the Representation of the People Act, 1945.]

[§ 4. Electoral registration officers.]

[§ 5. Duty of registration officers to prepare a spring and autumn register
each year.]

6 . — (1) The following persons shall have a service qualification for
the purpose of this Act, namely, —

{a) any person who is a member of the forces; r

(b) any person who is employed in the service of the Crown in a post
outside the United Kingdom of any prescribed class or description;

(c) any woman who is the wife of a person having a service qualifica-
tion and is residing outside the United Kingdom to be with her
husband. . . .

(2) A service declaration shall be made only by a person who has
a service qualification or, subject to any prescribed conditions, by a
person about to leave the United Kingdom in such circumstances as
to acquire a service qualification.

(3) A service declaration may be made by such a person notwith-
standing the fact that by reason 'of his age he is not yet entitled to be
registered or to vote. . . .

(5) A person whose service declaration is in force on the qualifying
date —

(1 a ) shall be treated for the purposes of registration as resident at the
address specified in the declaration. . . .

[§ 7. Polling districts and polling places.]

8. — (1) All persons voting as electors at a parliamentary election
shall do so in person at the polling station allotted to them under the
Ballot Act, 1872, except in so far as this section makes exceptions for —

(a) those registered as service voters ;

(b) those unable or likely to be unable to go in person to the polling
station for one of the following reasons: —

(i) the general nature of the occupation, service or employment
of the person in question;

(ii) that person’s service as a member of* any of His Majesty’s
reserve or auxiliary forces; *

Representation of the People Act, igpS 137

(iii) the particular circumstances of that person’s employment on
the date of the poll either as a constable or, for a purpose connected
with the election, by the returning officer;

(iv) at a general election, the candidature in some other consti-
tuency of that person or that person’s wife or husband ;

(v) at a general election, the fact that that person is acting as
returning officer for some other constituency;

(vi) at a general election, the particular circumstances of that
person’s employment on the date of the poll by the returning officer
for some other constituency for a purpose connected with the
election in that constituency;

(c) those unable or likely to be unable, by reason either of blindness
or any other physical incapacity, to go in person to the polling
station or, if able to go, to vote unaided;

(d) those unable or likely to be unable to go in person from their
qualifying address to the polling station without making a journey
by air or sea;

(1?) those no longer residing at their quahfying address.

(2) A person registered as a service voter may vote by proxy unless
either —

(a) he is entitled in pursuance of an application made under subsection
(4) of this section to vote by post; or

(b) he applies for a ballot paper to vote in person before a ballot paper
has been issued for him to vote by proxy;

but (where there is in force an appointment of a proxy to vote for
him) shall not be entitled to vote in person unless he does so apply.

(3) A person not registered as a service voter if unable or likely to
be unable to go in person to the polling station by reason either —

(a) of the general nature of his occupation, service or employment: or

(b) of his service as a member of any of His Majesty’s reserve or
auxiliary forces;

may vote by proxy if he applies to be treated as an absent voter and is
likely to be at sea or out of the United Kingdom on the date of the
poll.

(4) Any of the persons mentioned in paragraphs (a) to ( e ) of sub-
section (1) of this section may vote by post if he applies to be treated
as an absent voter and furnishes an address in the United Kingdom
to which a ballot paper is to be sent for the purpose:

Provided that —

(a) a person shall not be entitled to vote by post if he is not registered
as a service voter 3jid there is in force an appointment of a proxy
to vote for him; and

1 38 Statutes

(b) a person shall not be entitled to vote by post on the ground that
he no longer resides at his qualifying address if at the time of his
application he resides at an address in the same area ; and

(c) a person registered as a service voter shall not be entitled to vote
by post on any ground other than his being so registered.

(5) At an election for which a person’s application to be treated as
an absent voter is allowed, he shall not be entitled to vote in person. . . .

[§ 9. Applications to be treated as an absent voter to be made to the regis-
tration officer.

[§§ 10— 1 1 . Voting by proxy.]

[§ 12. Timetable and procedure to be as laid down in the schedules to this
Act.]

[§13, Register to be conclusive on residence, etc.]

14 . — (1) Where, after the counting of the votes by the returning
officer (including any re-count) is completed, an equality of votes is
found to exist between any candidates at a parliamentary election in
any constituency, and the addition of a vote would entitle any of those
candidates to be declared elected, the returning officer shall not be
entitled to a casting vote but shall forthwith decide between those
candidates by lot, and proceed as if the candidate on whom the lot
falls had received an additional vote. . . .

[§ 15. Deposits.]

[§§ 16—18. Returning officers and their duties.]

[§§ 19-20. Infringements of secrecy and tampering with postal votes by
those present at the counting of vot^s.]

Part II

General Provisions as to Local Government Franchise and Its Exercise
Local Government Franchise

21 . — (1) The persons entitled to vote as electors at a local govern-
ment election in any electoral area shall be those who —

(a) on the qualifying date either —

(i) are resident in the area; or

(ii) under the following provisions of this section have a non-
resident qualification therein; and

(b) are in either case on that date and on the date of the poll, British
subjects of full age and not subject to any legal incapacity to vote:

Provided that a person shall not be entitled to vote as an elector in
any electoral area, unless registered there ip the register of local
government electors to be us«-d at the election nor, at an ordinary

Representation of the People Act, igp 8 139

election for any local government area which is not a single electoral
area, to vote as an elector in more than one electoral area.

(2) In England and Wales, a person shall be deemed for the pur-
poses of this section to have a non-resident qualification in an area if
he is occupying as owner or tenant any rateable land or premises
therein of the yearly value of not less than ten pounds.

(3) In Scotland, a person shall be deemed to have a non-resident
qualification in an area if he is the owner, or occupier as tenant, of
any lands and heritages within the area which are of the yearly value
of not less than ten pounds and in respect of which rates are payable.

(4) The qualifying date for a local government election shall be
determined by reference to the date fixed for the poll in the same way
as if it were a parliamentary election.

[§22. Definitions of residence, occupation, etc.]

23. — (1) It shall be the duty of a registration officer to prepare for
the local government areas or parts of local government areas included
in the area for which he acts a register # of local government electors
whenever he prepares a register of parliamentary electors.

(2) The two registers shall so far as practicable be combined, the
names of persons registered only as local government electors being
marked to indicate that fact.

(3) The elections for which any register of local government electors

is to be used shall be determined by reference to the date fixed for the
poll in the same way as in the case of the register of parliamentary
electors. •

(4) Subject to any enactment imposing any disqualification for
registration as a local government elector, all persons who may be
entitled to vote as electors at elections for which any register is to be
used shall be entitled to be registered therein:

Provided that —

[a) a person shall not be entitled to be registered more than once in
any local government area; and

{b) a person who on the qualifying date has a service qualification
shall not be entitled to be registered as resident in any local gov-
ernment area, except in pursuance of a service declaration such as is
mentioned in the next following subsection and in force on that date.

(5) The service declaration in pursuance of which a person having

a service qualification may be registered as a local government elector
shall — ^

(a) except in the case of a person who is as a peer subject to a legal
incapacity to vote at parliamentary elecdons, be the service
declaration (if any ^ made by him for the purpose of parliamentary
elections; and

Statutes

140

(b) in the case of such a person as aforesaid, be a declaration marked
to show that it is available for local government elections only, but
in all other respects the same as other service declarations.

(6) A person entitled as a resident to be registered as a local govern-
ment elector in any local government area shall not be entitled to be
so registered as a non-resident.

(7) Subsections (3) and (5) of section five and section six of this Act
shall apply for the purposes of this Part thereof as they apply for the
purposes of Part I thereof.

[§§ 24-27. Place and manner of voting.]

[§28. Amendments to local elections rules, to bring them into conformity
with those for parliamentary elections.]

[§29. Effects of the register, etc.]

[§ 30. Tampering with postal votes and breaches of duty by electoral
officers.]

Part III

Corrupt and Illegal Practices and Other Provisions as to Election Campaign
Parliamentary Elections

32 , — (1) Parts III and IV of the First Schedule to the parliamentary
corrupt practices Act (which limit the amount of election expenses)
shall cease to have effect, and for any reference in that Act to the
maximum amount specified in the said Part IV (which deals with the
aggregate amount of the permitted expenses) there shall be substituted
a reference to the following maximum amount, namely —

{a) in relation to an election in a county constituency, four hundred
and fifty pounds together with an additional twopence for each
entry in the register of parliamentary electors to be used at the
election ;

(b) in relation to an election in a borough constituency, four hundred
and fifty pounds together with an additional penny halfpenny for
each such entry as aforesaid:

Provided that, if the said register is not published before the day of
publication of the notice of election, then for any reference in this sub-
section to an entry in the register there shall be substituted a reference
to an entry in the electors lists therefor as first published which gives
the name of a person appearing from those lists to be entitled to be
registered.

(2) The said maximum amount shall not be required to cover the
candidate’s personal expenses as defined in the said Act, but shall
- cover the whole of any fee paid to the candidate’s election agent. . . .
(6) In Northern Ireland paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1)
and subsection (2) of this section shall not apply and —

Representation of the People Act , 1948 141

(a) the maximum amount referred to in the said subsection (1) shall
(subject to the proviso to that subsection) be the same as at the
passing of this Act, namely, twopence for each entry in the register
of parliamentary electors to be used at the election ; and

(b) the said maximum amount shall not be required to cover either
the candidate’s personal expenses as defined in the said Act or (to
an amount not exceeding in the case of an election in a county
constituency seventy-five pounds and in the case of an election in
a borough constituency fifty pounds) the fee, if any, paid to his
election agent.

(7) This section shall apply for the purposes of the first general
election after the passing of this Act and any subsequent election.

33 . — (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not,
with a view to supporting or opposing the candidature of any indi-
vidual as against any other or others at a parliamentary election, either
let, lend or employ, or hire, borrow or use, any motor vehicle for the
purpose of the conveyance of electors or their proxies to or from the
poll, and a person knowingly acting in contravention of this subsection
shall be guilty of an illegal practice within the meaning of the parlia-
mentary corrupt practices Act:

Provided that —

[a) the court teefore whom a person is convicted under this subsection
may, if they think it just in the special circumstances of the case,
mitigate or entirely remit any incapacity imposed by section ten
of the said Act; and

(b) a candidate shall not be liable, nor shall Ins election be avoided,
for an illegal practice under this subsection committed without his
consent or connivance by an agent other than his election agent.

(2) Where it is shown —

(, a ) that a motor vehicle was employed for the purpose aforesaid; and
(b) that at the time when it was so employed there was to the know-
ledge of any person employing or using it for that purpose displayed
on it or on a trailer drawn by it any placard, colours or other thing
indicating a preference for or against any candidate at the election;

it shall be presumed until the contrary is shown that that person was
so employing or using it with a view to supporting or opposing the
candidature of some individual as against some other or others.

(3) Nothing in this section shall —

(a) render unlawful anything made lawful by subsection (3) of section
fourteen of the parliamentary corrupt practices Act (which relates
to the use of vehicles by electors at their joint cost) ; or
(&) prevent any person employing a motor vehicle for the purpose of
conveying to or fr%m the poll hin^elf or any member of the same

Lbg

142

Statutes

household, or borrowing a motor vehicle from a member of the
same household to be employed for that purpose; or

(c) prevent a candidate at an election or some person on his behalf
employing a motor vehicle for the purpose of conveying any person
to or from the poll, if the conditions hereafter mentioned in this
section are complied with, or borrowing a motor vehicle to be
employed for that purpose from any person; or

(d) prevent a person lending or using a motor vehicle in a case in
which it is lawfully borrowed or employed by virtue of either of
of the last two foregoing paragraphs.

(4) The conditions under which a motor vehicle may be employed
under the said paragraph (r) by or on behalf of a candidate are the
following : —

{a) the motor vehicle shall be registered in the prescribed manner- with
the returning officer, and there shall be prominently displayed
thereon a placard indicating that it is so registered;

(b) the number of motor vehicles so employed shall not exceed in a
county constituency one for every fifteen hundred electors or in a
borough constituency one for every twenty-five hundred
electors. . . .

[§ 34. Free postage for candidate’s electoral address.]

[§ 35 - Candidates to have the right to use certain schools and halls for
election meetings.]

[§ 36. Use of committee rooms in schools.]

37 . — (1) No person shall, with intent to influence persons to give or
refrain from giving their votes at a parliamentary election, use, or aid,
abet, counsel, or procure the use of, any wireless transmitting station
outside the United Kingdom for the transmission of any matter having
reference to the election otherwise than in pursuance of arrangements
made with the British Broadcasting Corporation for it to be received
and transmitted by that Corporation.

(2) No person shall for the purpose of promoting or procuring the
election of any candidate at a parliamentary election issue any poll
card or document so closely resembling an official poll card as to be
calculated to deceive.

(3) Any offence under this section shall be an illegal practice within
the meaning of the parliamentary corrupt practices Act:

Provided that the court before whom a person is convicted of an
offencemnder this section may, if they think it just in the special cir-
cumstances of the case, mitigate or entirely remit any incapacity
imposed by section ten of that Act.

(4) Where any act or omission of an association or body of persons,
corporate or unincorporated, ia an illegal practice under this section,

Representation of the People Act, igp 8 143

any person who at the time of the act or omission was a director,
general manager, secretary or other similar officer of the association
or body, or was purporting to act in any such capacity, shall be
deemed to be guilty of the illegal practice, unless he proves that the
act or omission took place without his consent or connivance and that
he exercised all such diligence to prevent the commission of the illegal
practice as he ought to have exercised having regard to the nature of
his functions in that capacity and to all the circumstances.

[§§ 38“4 0 * Extensions and amendments to local corrupt practices Act.]
[§41. Candidates not liable for rates on premises used for election meetings.]

42 . — (1) No expenses shall, with a view to promoting or procuring
the election of a candidate at a parliamentary or local government
election, be incurred by any person other than the candidate, his elec-
tion agent and persons authorised in writing by the election agent on
account —

(a) of holding public meetings or organising any public display; or

(b) of issuing advertisements, circulars or publications ; or

(c) of otherwise presenting to the electors the candidate or his views
or the extent or nature of his backing or disparaging another
candidate :

Provided that paragraph (c) of this subsection shall not —

(i) restrict the publication of any matter relating to the election in
a newspaper or other periodical: or

(ii) apply to any expense- noi g exceeding in the aggregate the
sum of ten shillings which may he incurred by an individual and
are not incurred in pursuance of a plan suggested by or concerted
with others, or to expenses incurred by any person in travelling or
in living away from home or similar personal expenses. . . .

[§§ 43“56* Miscellaneous amendments to election expenses; penalties for
corruption; powers of the courts to restrain false statements; periods of inca-
pacity for corrupt and illegal practices, etc.]

[Parts IV and V {§§ 57-65) contain special provisions for local government
elections in England and Wales, and Scotland.]

[Part VI (§§ 66-80) contains supplemental provisions as to registration,
etc. Short title in § 81. Thirteen schedules.]

144

Statutes

GAS ACT, 1948
11 and 12 Geo. 6, c. 67

Part I

Area Gas Boards and the Gas Council

1. — (i) There shall be established Boards ... in this Act referred
to as “Area Boards 55 , for the areas which are described in general
terms in [the first Schedule]. . . .

(2) Every Area Board shall have power to carry on all such activities
as it may appear to the Board to be requisite, advantageous or con-
venient for them to carry on for or in connection with the discharge
of their duties. . . .

2. — (1) There shall be established a Council, to be known a^ the
Gas Council, and it shall be the duty of that Council —

(a) to advise the Minister on ^questions affecting the gas industry and
matters relating thereto; and

(b) to promote and assist the efficient exercise and performance by
Area Boards of their functions.

(2) The Gas Council shall have power, if so authorised by all the
Area Boards or a group of Area Boards, to perform services for, or act
on behalf of, the Boards concerned in relation to matters of common
interest to those Boards. . . .

[§ 3. Research.] *

[§ 4. Training and education.]

[§ 5. Constitution of Area Boards and the Gas Council.]

[§ 6. Minister’s power to define and vary areas for which Boards are estab-
lished.]

7. — (1) The Minister may give to Area Boards generally or to a
particular Area Board or to the Gas Council such directions of a
general character as to the exercise and performance ... of their
functions as appear to the Minister to be requisite in the national
interest, and they shall give effect to any such directions:

* Provided that —

(a) before giving any such direction, the Minister shall consult with
the Gas Council; and

(b) before giving any such direction to a particular Area Board, the
Minister shall consult with that Board. . . .

„ 9* — (1) A Council, to be known as a Gas Consultative Council, shall

... be established for the purposes mentioned jm this section for the
areajof every Area Board. e

Gas Ad, 1948 1 45

( 2 ) A Gas Consultative Council shall consist of a chairman appointed
by the Minister and not less than twenty nor more than thirty other
members appointed by the Minister. . . .

( 4 ) The Gas Consultative Council for each area shall be charged
with the duties —

(a) of considering any matter affecting the supply of gas in the area . . .

(b) of considering and reporting to the Area Board on any such matter
which may be referred to them by that Board. . . .

10. — ( 1 ) Every Area Board and the Gas Council shall, as soon as
possible after the end of each financial year, make to the Minister a
report on the exercise and performance by them of their functions
during that year and on their policy and programmes, and every Area
Board shall, as soon as their report has been made to the Minister,
send a copy thereof to the Gas Council.

(ft) Every such report of any Area Board or of the Gas Council . . .
shall set out any direction given by the Minister to the Board or
Council during that year unless the Minister has notified the Board
or Council of his opinion that it is ag*ainst the interests of national
security to do so. . . .

(5) The Minister shall lay before each House of Parliament a copy
of the report made for each financial year by each Area Board and
the Gas Couifcil, and shall at the same rime lay before each House of
Parliament a report with respect to the exercise of his functions during
that year under this Act except as regards matters which in his opinion
it is against the interests of national security to disclose.

[§§ II_ 77 anc l four Schedules omitted?]

PARLIAMENT ACT, 1949
12, 13 and 14 Geo. 6, c. 103

An Act to amend the Parliament Act , 19 1/.

\_16tk December 1949 .]

1. The Parliament Act, 19 x 1 , shall have effect, and shall be deemed
to have had effect from the beginning of the session in which the Bill
for this Act originated (save as regards that Bill itself), as if —

(< 3 ) there had been substituted in subsections ( 1 ) and (4) of section
two thereof, for the words “in three successive sessions 55 , “for the
third time 55 , “in the third of those sessions 55 , “in the third # session 55 ,
and “in the second or third session 55 respectively, the words “in
two successive sessions 55 , “for the second time 55 , “in the second of
those sessions 55 , “in the second session 55 , and “in the second session 55
respectively; and*

146 Statutes

( b ) there had been substituted in subsection (1) of the said section
two, for the words “two years have elapsed 55 the words “one year
has elapsed 55 :

Provided that, if a Bill has been rejected for the second time by the
House of Lords before the signification of the Royal Assent to the
Bill for this Act, whether such rejection was in the same session as
that in which the Royal Assent to the Bill for this Act was signified or
in an earlier session, the requirement of the said section two that a
Bill is to be presented to His Majesty on its rejection for the second
time by the House of Lords shall have effect in relation to the Bill
rejected as a requirement that it is to be presented to His Majesty as
soon as the Royal Assent to the Bill for this Act has been signified,
and, notwithstanding that such rejection was in an earlier session,
the Royal Assent to the Bill rejected may be signified in the
session in which the Royal Assent to the Bill for this Act Avas
signified.

2 . — (1) This Act may be cited as the Parliament Act, 1949.

(2) This Act and the Parliament Act, 1911, shall be construed as
one and may be cited together as the Parliament Acts, 19 11 and
1949, and accordingly subsection (1) of section four of the Parliament
Act, 1 9 1 1 (which specifies the words of enactment to be inserted in a
Bill presented to His Majesty under that Act) shall have effect with
the substitution of the words “the Parliament Acts, 1911 and 1949 55
for the words “the Parliament Act, 1911.”

REGENCY ACT, 1953
2 Eliz. 2 , c. 1

Whereas Your Majesty, by Your Majesty’s Royal Message to both
Houses of Parliament, has been pleased to recommend that Parliament
should consider the expediency of providing that His Royal Highness
the Duke of Edinburgh should be the Regent if a child of Your Majesty
and His Royal Highness accedes to the Throne while under the age of
eighteen years or if a Regency becomes necessary during the lifetime
of Your Majesty while there is no child or grandchild of Your Majesty
and His Royal Highness who can be the Regent, and also the expedi-
ency of amending the law so that the heir apparent or heir presumptive
to the Tyrone should be capable of being Regent if he or she has
attained the age of eighteen years:

And whereas Your Majesty by the same Message recommended
that Parliament should consider the amendment of the Regency Acts,
I937jand 1943, so as to add Her- Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Queen

Regency Act, 1953 147

Mother to the persons to whom, as Counsellors of State, royal functions
can be delegated:

Now, therefore, we, Your Majesty’s most dutiful and loyal subjects,
the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present
Parliament assembled, do most humbly beseech Your Majesty that it
be enacted, and be it enacted by the Queen’s Most Excellent Majesty,
by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Tem-
poral, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by
the authority of the same, as follows:

1. — (1) If a Regency becomes necessary under the Regency Act,
I 937? on ^ ie succession to the Crown of a child of Her Majesty 7 and
His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh while under the age of
eighteen years, His Royal Highness, if living, shall be the Regent.

(2) If a Regency becomes necessary under the Regency Act, 1937,
during the reign of Her present Majesty, His Royal Highness the Duke
of Edinburgh, if living, shall be the Regent unless, or (as the case may
be) until, there is a child or grandchild of Her Majesty and His Royal
Highness who can under the provisions €>f the said Act be the Regent.

(3) The preceding provisions of this section shall have effect subject
to —

(a) subsection (2) of section three cf the Regency Act, 1 937 x which
enumerates the disqualifications for becoming or being Regent),
and

(, b ) subsection (5) of that section .'which provides for the case where
the Regent is incapacitated by infirmity for performing the royal
functions or is not available for the pcvlhrmance of those functions),

but, save as aforesaid, that section shah have effect subject to the
preceding provisions of this section.

(4) Where His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh is Regent
by virtue of this section, section six of the Regency Act, 1937 (which
relates to the appointment of Counsellors of State) shall have effect as
if the following provision were substituted for subsection (4) thereof:

“(4) The provisions of this section shall apply in relation to a Regent
with the substitution for references to the Sovereign of references to
the Regent and the omission, in subsection (2) thereof, of the
reference to the wife or husband of the Sovereign.”

2. The heir apparent or heir presumptive to the Throne shall be

deemed for all the purposes of the Regency Act, 1937, to be of full age
if he or she has attained the age of eighteen years. #

1 “(2). A person shall be disqualified from becoming or being Regent, if he is not
a British subject of full age and domiciled in some part of the United Kingdom, or
is a person who would, under section two of the Act of Settlement, be incapable of ^
inheriting, possessing, aqd enjoying the Grown; and section three of die Act 01
Settlement shall apply in me case of a Regen%as it applies in the case of a Sovereign.

Statutes

148

3 . Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother shall be added
to the persons whom subsection (2) of section six of the Regency Act,
1 937 (as set out in section one of the Regency Act, 1943) 1 requires,
subject as therein mentioned, to be the Counsellors of State for the
purposes of any delegation of royal functions under that section,
and accordingly during her life that section shall have effect as if a
reference to her were inserted in subsection (2) thereof next after the
reference to the wife or husband of the Sovereign.

4 . — (1) This Act may be cited as the Regency Act, 1953, and shall
be construed as one with the Regency Acts, 1937 and 1943, an d those
Acts and this Act may be cited together as the Regency Acts, 1937

to 1953.

(2) In subsection (2 a) of section six of the Regency Act, 1937 (set
out in section one of the Regency Act, 1943) the words “The heir
apparent or heir presumptive to the Throne if not under the age of
eighteen years shall not be disqualified from being a Counsellor of
State by reason only of his not being of full age, but save as aforesaid 5 3
(being words rendered unnecessary by section two of this Act) are
hereby repealed.

1 “ . . . the Counsellors of State shall be the wife or husband of the Sovereign (if the
Sovereign is married), and the four persons who, excluding any person disqualified
under this section, are next in the line of succession to the Crown, or if the number
of such persons next in the line of succession is less than four, then all 5a ch persons . .

SECTION II

Parliament

REFORM OF THE SECOND CHAMBER, 1918

Letter from Viscount Bryce to the Prime Minister , reporting the conclusions of
the Conference on the Reform of the Second Chamber ( Cd . gogS; igi8)

Functions Appropriate to a Second Chamber

6. (i) The examination and revision of Bills brought from the
House of Commons, a function which has become more needed since,
on many occasions, during the last 30 years, the House of Commons
has been obliged to act under special rules limiting debate.

(2) The initiation of Bills dealing with subjects of a comparatively
non-controversial character which may have an easier passage through
the House of Commons if they have been fully discussed and put into
a well-considered shape before being submitted to it.

(3) The interposition of so much delay (and no more) in the passing
of a Bill into law as may be needed to erfable the opinion of the nation
to be adequately expressed upon it. This would be specially needed as
regards Bills which affect the fundamentals of the Constitution or
introduce new principles of legislation, or which raise issues whereon
the opinion oS the country may appear to be almost equally divided.

(4) Full and free discussion of large and important questions, such
as those of foreign policy, at moments when the House of Commons
may happen to be so much occupied that it cannot find sufficient time
for them. Such discussions may oft^n be all t?ie more useful if con-
ducted in an Assembly whose debates and divisions do not involve
the fate of the Executive Government.

Elements that ought to find a Place in the Second Chamber

7. (1) Persons of experience in various forms of public work, such
as judicial work, Local Government work, Civil Service work, Par-
liamentary work; persons possessing special knowledge of important
departments of the national life, such as Agriculture, Commerce,
Industry, Finance, Education, Naval and Military Affairs; and persons
who possess a like knowledge of what are called Imperial Questions
such as foreign affairs and matters affecting the Over-Seas Dominions.

(2) Persons who, while likely to serve efficiently in a Second Cham-
ber, may not have the physical vigour needed to bear the increasing
strain which candidacy for a seat in the House of Commons, and
service in it involve.

(3) A certain proportion of persons who are not extreme partizans,
but of a cast of mind which enables them to judge political questions
with calmness and comparative freedom from prejudice or bias**. . .

152 Parliament

Position which the Second Chamber ought to hold . . .

8. It was agreed that a Second Chamber ought not to have equal
powers with the House of Commons, nor aim at becoming a rival of
that assembly. In particular, it should not have the power of making
or unmaking Ministeries [sic], or enjoy equal rights in dealing with
finance. . . .

All precautions that could be taken ought to be taken to secure
that in a Reformed Second Chamber no one set of political opinions
should be likely to have a marked and permanent predominance, and
that the Chamber should be so composed as not to incur the charge of
habitually acting under the influence of party motives. . . .

It should . . . endeavour to enlighten and influence the people
through its debates, and be recognised by the people as qualified,
when a proper occasion arose, to require the reconsideration of
important measures on which their opinion had not been fully ascer-
tained.

Composition qf the Second Chamber

10. The principle of endeavouring to preserve some real measure of
continuity between the House of Lords and the new Second Chamber,
a principle accepted by all, though some members attached more
importance to it than did others, suggested that a cerfain portion of
the Chamber should be taken from the existing peerage, but the other
principle that three important requisites for the strength of the Cham-
ber would be found in its having popular authority behind it, in its
opening to the whole *of His Majesty’s subjects free and equal access
to the Chamber, and in its being made responsive to the thoughts and
sentiments of the people, also prescribed that the large majority of the
members should be so chosen as to enjoy that popular authority. . . .

11. The Conference rejected the idea of having a chamber elected
on the basis of a property qualification . . . [and] . . . proceeded to
examine five methods that might be adopted for constituting that
popular element in the Chamber which it had been agreed to make
predominant.

[The methods were:

(i) Nomination by the Crown . It was thought unlikely that the country would
favour this.

(ii) Direct Election . This was rejected, principally because “it was forcibly
urged that a Chamber elected on the same franchise . . . would inevitably
become a rival of the House of Commons, and would, because it had an equal
‘mandat from the people, be likely to claim equal financial powers, and tend
to fall into conflict with that principle of the Constitution which assigns to the
House of Commons the function of making and unmaking Administrations.”

(iii) Election by Local Authorities . It was objected that this method “would
certainly introduce party politics i*ito the elections of those County Councils

Reform of the Second Chamber , igi 8 153

and Borough Councils which had hitherto been conducted on non-party
lines , .

(iv) Selection by a Joint Standing Committee of Both Houses. It was felt that a
“broader basis 55 of election was required.

(v) Election by the House of Commons. The majority of the Conference recom-
mended that the Second Chamber should consist of 327 persons, of whom 246
should be elected by members of the House of Commons (grouped into terri-
torial areas), and the remaining 81 (to be chosen at first from the existing
peerage) by a Joint Standing Committee of both Houses. The tenure of seats
would be of 12 years, and one-third of the members would retire every four
years.]

Legislative Functions of the Second Chamber

43. ... It has always been understood in this country . . . that
the Second Chamber should be entitled to full power in the sphere of
such legislation as is not of a financial character. . . .

43. It is recognised on all hands that Bills of a purely financial
nature belong to the House of Commons alone and ought not to be
rejected or amended by the Second Chamber.

But what is a purely financial Bill ?

46. . . . The Conference spent many hours in trying to find such
a definition, but without success. . . . But an examination of the cases
of doubt which had arisen in this country and elsewhere, showed that
most, perhaps # nearly all of them, could have been disposed of after a
not very protracted discussion round a table by a dozen practical
fair-minded men; and the Conference was thus led to believe that the
be$t method of treating these doubtful and disputable Bills would be
to refer them to a small carefully selected Joint Standing Committee
of both Houses of Parliament, making its decision final. . . -

[There should, therefore, be a Finance Committee, of not more than seven
members from each House, to which either House might refer controversial
financial Bills. Those Bills, or parts of Bills, which the committee declared to
be non-financial might be handled in the normal way by the Second Chamber.]

Adjustment of Differences between the two Houses

[Differences should be settled at a Free Conference of not more than sixty
members drawn from both Houses.]

49. . . . If and when agreement is reached by the Free Conference
its terms would be reported to both Houses. Each House would then
consider them and accept them or reject them. ... If, however, the
Bill (as reported by the Free Conference) was accepted by one House
but rejected by the other, some further method of effecting an«adjust-
ment would be required. . . .

52. ... Three such methods were put forward for consideration. . . .

53. The first was that the House which accepted the Bill as reported
by the Free Conference should have* the right of referring it £0 a

154 Parliament

Joint Sitting of both Houses. . . . [This] finally failed to command
general assent.

54. A second plan was that of referring the matters in controversy
between the Houses to the country by means of a Referendum or
popular vote of all the registered electors. . . .

55. The majority of the Conference, however, did not approve this
plan on the ground (among others) that the use of the Referendum
once introduced could not be confined to the cases for which it was in
this instance proposed, that it might tend to lower the authority and
dignity of Parliament, and that it was unsuited to the conditions of
a large country, and especially of the United Kingdom, for different
parts of which different legislation is sometimes required.

56. . . . [A] method of adjustment . . . was at last discovered by
returning to and carrying further that mode of proceeding by Free
Conference. . . .

. . . This step would be to send the Bill back to the Free Confer-
ence, which would take up the matter again in the Session next follow-
ing that in which the Bill originated. If the Free Conference should
then, after further consideration, again report the Bill to the Houses
in the same form in which it had been previously reported, the Houses
would again consider the Bill.

If they both agreed to it, it would pass ; if they both disagreed to it,
or if the House of Commons alone disagreed, it would lapse. If, how-
ever, the House of Commons alone agreed to the Bill, and it had been
reported by the Free Conference by a majority of not less than three
of the members present and voting, it would be submitted for the
Royal Assent.

Should the Free Conference however fail to agree to report the Bill
again in the same form, or if the majority by which it agreed to report
it should be less than three the Bill would lapse, unless of course it was
accepted by both Houses as reported.

61. . . . We had to reconcile the sentiment of attachment to a
venerable institution with the needs of new social conditions and the
demands of new phases of thought. There were two principles on which
a Second Chamber might be constructed. One was that of filling a
House with the largest available number of capable and experienced
men whose presence would win for it that kind of authority which
comes from personal eminence. The other principle was that of
creating a Chamber which should be most quickly responsive and
most fully responsible to public opinion, drawing its strength from the
fact that it had been popularly elected. It was impossible to give full
scope and application to either of these principles and to secure in
ample measure the benefit of either source of strength without losing
some of the merits to be expected from the other. We had, therefore, to
finc^means whereby to combine as many as possible of the advantages

Reform of the Second Chamber , igi8 155

with as few as possible of the defects of either course, and we had
to remember that a plan which philosophers might approve would not
necessarily find like favour with the bodies by whose will it would
have to pass into law. So, too, when the powers of the Second Chamber
had to be defined, similar perplexities arose. It was generally agreed
that a Second Chamber would be of little use unless it were strong
enough to differ from the House of Commons when a proper occasion
arose — a proper occasion being one in which there was reason to
believe that some decision of the Commons did not express the full
and deliberate will of the people. But it was also agreed that the
Second Chamber ought not to be so strongly entrenched as to dispose
it to engage in frequent contests with the House of Commons, so as to
embarrass the Executive and clog the wheels of legislation. It thus
became necessary to steer a middle course between these extremes. . . .

THE DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT, 1923

From a speech by Mr. H. IL Asquith at the National Liberal Club on 18

December ig2$

Mr. Asquith: . . . And now let me say here, by way of parenthesis,
there seems to be a good deal of confusion in the public mind on the
subject of the power of dissolution. I may claim to speak, 1 won’t
say with authority, but with some experience* on this matter, for I
am the only person now living who* has felt it. his duty to advise the
Crown to dissolve Parliament twice in a single year — the year 1910. .. .
I need hardly tell you there is absolutely no analogy between that
case and the circumstances of the present time.

The dissolution of Parliament is in this country one of the preroga-
tives of the Crown. It is not a mere feudal survival, but it is part, and
I think a useful part, of our constitutional system, for which there is
no counterpart in any other country. ... It does not mean that the
Crown should act arbitrarily and without the advice of responsible
Ministers, but it does mean that the Crown is not bound to take the
advice of a particular Minister to put its subjects to the tumult and
turmoil of a series of General Elections so long as it can find other
Ministers who are prepared to give it a trial. The notion that a Minister
— a Minister who cannot command a majority in the House of Com-
mons, but who is in a minority of 3 1 P er cent, the notion that a
Minister in those circumstances is invested with the right to demand a
dissolution is as subversive of constitutional usage as it would, in my
opinion, be pernicious to the general and paramount interests of the
nation at large. . . .

156

Parliament

LEGISLATION AND PARLIAMENTARY TIME, 1930

House of Commons Debates, 18 February 1930; Official Report , cc. 1226-7

Colonel Ashley: ... I am naturally anxious that the [Road
Traffic] Bill should receive a favourable reception, because ... I
had certainly a substantial share in the fashioning of the Bill. In 1927
I circulated, for criticism and suggestion, a draft Traffic Bill to all
local authorities and organisations of people who were legitimately
interested. That Bill was not founded on my personal opinion, but on
the reports of two Departmental Committees. It was not, if I may
say so, a Government Bill. It was not an official Bill in the sense
that we did not tie ourselves down to any of the details, and it
was circulated solely for the purposes of gathering criticisms and
remarks, so as to enable us to ascertain the real views of the people
concerned. . . .

„ . . This Bill is long overdue, and I make a present of that remark
to any hon. Member opposite who may wish to ask me why I did not
introduce it when I had the honour to occupy the position of Minister
of Transport. But the reason for that is well known. Every Govern-
ment wishes to pass more legislation than there is time for, and if a
Department has had one big Measure allotted to it in the course of a
Parliament, it is considered to be lucky. We in the Ministry of Trans-
port had the Electricity Act. Naturally, all the other Ministers make
it their business to see that one Department does not get more than
one Bill of that importance in order that their own Departments may
have opportunities. That is the real explanation of why the Traffic
Bill was kept over for two or three years. . . .

THE WORKING OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1931

Evidence before the Select Committee on Procedure on Public Business ( H.C .

161 of 1931)

(A) The Right Hon. J. Ramsay Macdonald, M.P., The Prime
Minister, Examined:

Sir Hugh O’Neill

8. Might I ask . . . one question which, perhaps, rather goes to the
root of the matter. Do you consider, Prime Minister, that the main
function of the procedure of Parliament should be primarily to get
things done as quickly as possible, to get things through; of course

The Working of the House of Commons , iggi 157

that would favour principally the Government; or should it be really
aimed principally at favouring careful deliberation and adequate
criticism of the different measures that are brought forward? — It is
really a combination of both. . . . Standing Orders and Procedure
Rules should limit abuses as much as possible, but protect the right
of the Opposition to be heard, and to give counsel, and to make its
position clear to the country; and, against that, you have to balance
up the rights of the Government, which are, in a sentence, to get legis-
lation through after due examination. A Parliamentary machine is
rather like a living organism, you have to balance up rights and
wrongs.

9. Do you consider the procedure of Parliament unduly handicaps
the Government in getting its business through? — On the whole,
yes.

10. So any reforms you would suggest would be in the direction of
making it easier for the Government to get its business through, and
consequently putting more spokes in the wheels of the Opposition,
whose object it is to prevent and delay business? — If the business of the
Opposition is to delay, then I am perfectly willing to put spokes in
their wheel. If the business of the Opposition is to secure adequate
examination, I do not propose to put any spokes in their wheel.
Members disagree as to where the line between the two is to be
drawn.

29. . . . — This fundamental question comes. Really, what is the
House of Commons itself? It consists not only of a Government, but
of .an Opposition, and they have both got fury: tions and rights. The
great right of the Opposition is the Mi discussion of measures proposed
by the Government. It is there, I think, that our fundamental weakness
lies. There is a doctrine that it is the function of the Opposition to
oppose. I have always regarded that as a crime against the State. It
is not the function of the Opposition to oppose; it is the function of
the Opposition to oppose Second Readings, but once the Second
Reading has been accepted, the only function of the Opposition is to
improve in its own direction within the scope of the Vote that has
been registered, that is, that it should have full liberty to examine on
Committee and Report, and then to say its final word of opposition
on the Third Reading of the Bill. The Opposition has no right to
obstruct in the sense of making Parliament barren or unproductive. . . .

(B) The Right Hon. Stanley Baldwin, M.P., Examined:

Mr. Hore-Belisha

237. Do not you think it is impossible for any Parliamentary
Assembly to control finance in detail, unless it delegates that function
to an expert Committie? — I think, iry practice, that is so. . . .

Mbg

158 Parliament

Mr . Ede

239. ... Is it not a fact that at the time when the grants were made
more or less directly to the King, the Executive was outside the
House, whereas today the Executive is in the House, is an integral
part of the House, and in a good many Parliaments the Parliament
could not continue unless the Executive was constantly there voting
for itself? — Yes.

243. We are trying to carry on in the twentieth century a system
that is based on a theory when the composition of the House in relation
to the Executive was entirely different? — Yes.

244. Is there any remedy for that, that will enable the House to
recover control of finance and to examine for necessary economies
itself, without the dreadful alternative of having to throw the Govern-
ment out to do it, and getting a Government that quite possibly it
does not want in return? — I quite see what you mean, but all the
economies that you are talking about, and all the economies that can
be obtained, or that you could hope to obtain, by what you call
control of Parliament, are a mere bagatelle compared with the power
that the House of Commons has itself of spending money. There, I
think, your observation comes in perfectly truly, Mr. Hore-Belisha. It
is broad policy that means, I will not use the word “extravagance,”
but that means expenditure. Over that the House of -Commons has
complete control, but, of course, that control is whether or no it
accepts certain Bills. As you were saying, it means the dismissal of a
Government if they do not like to spend money. The amount of
subjects to which the Control of Parliament, in the way of examining
the details of expenditure extends, is really very limited.

Chairman {Mr. Ernest Brown)

350. The Committee would like to know whether you consider there
is any justification for the public criticism of the present system of
procedure . . . ? — ... I have no doubt at all there is a good deal of
criticism of Parliamentary institutions altogether, and I think there
is a very great and growing disappointment with Parliament . . .
[353] * • • The only real endeavour made in recent years to secure
economy has been in consequence of pressure from outside on the
Executive. I am referring to the Geddes Committee. There has been
no examination by the House of Commons itself of the Estimates . . .
That will be my first criticism on the procedure of the House of
Commons, and one of the reasons why I think on the whole it is
losing a good deal of prestige amongst the masses of the people. . . .
My [second] criticism would be that the control of the Executive by
the House of Commons is confined to rather perfunctory discussions,

The Working of the House of Commons^ iggi 159

which do not excite any real interest, apart from an element of censure
which is conducive to excitement, but does not achieve the real pur-
pose of establishing control over the Executive. . . . [356] . . . The
fact of the matter is that the House of Commons has no real effective
and continuous control over the actions of the Executive. I noticed
that questions were put — I forget whether to Mr. Baldwin or to the
Prime Minister — with regard to the setting up of Committees and the
analogy of the municipalities was referred to. I think there is a good
deal to be said about that. Every municipality in the land has com-
mittees which consider every important detail of administration, and
report upon it to the council. The general discussions take place there.
The examination in detail takes place in the committees which are set
up for that purpose. You have a finance committee, a surveyors’ com-
mittee, a police committee, and a health committee, and there are all
kinds of committees. On questions of principle you have a debate in
the # council chamber, but the close examination takes place by com-
mittees where the officials are present and questions can be put to
them, and if the committees would lik^ to have any outside opinion,
if they think any other opinion would enlighten them upon the topics
they are examining, they can send for anybody. But you have no
machinery of that kind in the House of Commons, and until you have
it the House # of Commons will have no effective control over the
Executive. . . .

Mr, Hore-Bdisha

362. That committee would control the Departmental affairs in
regard to administration ? — No. I would not like to say that. The
control must rest with the Minister because he is responsible to Par-
liament, and through Parliament to the Crown. The Minister must
have the ultimate say. subject to what Parliament says, but it would
enable the House of Commons effectively to supervise, and not only
that, but to keep itself informed.

363. Do you envisage the Minister being Chairman of such a com-
mittee? — No. The Minister is in the House.

364. He is summoned before the committee? — Yes; he comes before
the committee.

365. And a Civil Servant might also be summoned ? — Certainly. I
would suggest that you have power to send for anybody.

366. And no information could be withheld? — Oh, no. . . .

Chairman m

909. . . . There has been some difference of opinion as to the com-
parative merits of the guillotine and the kangaroo, and as to where
they ought to be applied, and to what Bills? I have come to the
conclusion that there 3 S a certain type of Bill you can never get through

i6o

Parliament

the House of Commons unless you have a guillotine. If it is a highly
controversial Bill, I think it is quite impossible to get it through. . . .

Mr. Hore-Belisha

935. You agree that the guillotine is a device to be resorted to in
exceptional circumstances only? — In exceptional circumstances,
certainly.

936. Then you disagree with the Prime Minister, who suggested it
should be a normal process? — I am not in favour of making it a
normal process. You know by the very touch of the thing what Bills
are likely to provoke, I do not like to use the word ‘obstruction, 5 but
obstructive opposition; not only obstructive opposition, but an
opposition which cannot be restrained within the bounds of time.

937. You think every Bill ought to be sent upstairs to a small Com- '
mittee? — Yes, I have absolutely no doubt about that.

938. Except the major Bills? — Yes. . . . [1034] . . . my suggestion
is that you should have many more Committees. You would have
Committees, first of all, to deal with administration. You would have
Committees to deal with legislation, and then one Member would
say: ct I am a Member of the Budget Committee or the Finance Com-
mittee 55 ; another Member would say: “I am a Member of the Com-
mittee which deals with the defence of this country 55 ; and so on. There
is no doubt at all that it gives an absolutely new status to a Member,
and enables you to give him a blue ribbon without making him a
Member of the Administration. . . .

(D) Sir Archibald Sinclair, M.P., Examined:

Captain Bourne

1262. . . . You said that you would like smaller and more numerous
Standing Committees? — Yes.

1263. I suppose you realise that there are at the present moment
only three decent Committee Rooms in the House? I am putting it
as a question that it would be difficult to bring it in at once ? — Frankly,

I did not quite realise that structural difficulty, but I imagine it could
be overcome.

1264. I imagine it could be overcome, but actually if Standing
Committees are to sit in private Committee rooms of that sort, there
are only two good ones and two bad ones in the House; there are
No. 14, No. 10, the Grand Committee Room in Westminster Hall, and
No. 1 2. (Those are the only ones which exist, and No. 12 is very small?
— Perhaps with smaller Committees it would be possible to put up a
partition.

1265. It would necessitate a certain amount of structural alteration
of the House. I do not know whether you realised that ? — Yes, it would.

The Working of the House of Commons , iggi 161

(E) The Right Hon. Lord Eustace Percy, M.P., Examined;

Chairman

1886. I think the Committee has received a memorandum which
you kindly forwarded. I do not know whether you would prefer to
deal with it, or shall we incorporate it in the minutes as it is? — Just
as you wish. The memorandum is as follows;

“1. Proposals for reforming the procedure of the House of Commons
usually fail because their purpose is not defined. By demanding that
it should be more businesslike without defining what its business is,
reformers often get no further than proposals which would make it
look more businesslike, without really enabling it to do more business.

“2. The proper business of the House of Commons may be defined
roughly as follows: to focus public attention on the important issues
of the day, to grant taxation limited to the immediate needs of the
Executive, to appropriate the public revenues to particular services,
to press the Executive (in return for the taxes granted) for the redress
of popular grievances, and to grant tjie Executive such additional
legal powers as may be necessary for the efficient conduct of public
administration.

“The critic may object that this definition is an old-fashioned one.
The reply to # that objection is that, whether we like it or not, the
House of Commons has never succeeded in extending its effective
action much beyond the held where it had established itself two
hundred years ago, after ir had asserted its legitimate rights against
the Crown. It does not, and cannot, itself govern the country, and
many of its present defects probabIy*arise rrom the recent ‘democratic’
tendency to convert it into a sovereign parliamentary assembly on the
Continental model, governing the country through a committee of
ministers. In our constitutional pracuce, the distinction between
Executive and Legislature is, in essence, more clearly drawn than in
the written constitutions of countries which have nominally adopted
the principle of the ‘separation of powers.’ The King’s Ministers are
responsible to Parliament, but they are responsible for the discharge
of duties which Parliament is radically unfitted to discharge for itself.
It is not even the business of the House of Commons to ‘control the
King’s Ministers, if by that is meant to control the detail of their
administration or even of their expenditure. It controls Ministers most
effectively by forming a broad general opinion as to their personal
reliability and treating them accordingly, but it never has been, and
never will be, able to offer them authoritative guidance in the*pfficient
and economical management of their departments. ...

“5. We now come to the more difficult questions of the duties of the
House in regard to taxation and legislation. In considering these
questions, we must at*the outset face-the reallv serious charge which

162

Parliament

can be levelled against the House. It is not that on really far-reaching and
contendous Bills we prolong debate and hamper the Government. . . .
The serious charge is that we obstruct non-contentious legislation in
order that there may be less time for the passage of contentious legisla-
tion. There can be no improvement in Parliamentary procedure unless
this practice is abandoned. But we must also face the fact that this
practice will not be, and perhaps ought not to be, abandoned unless
at the same time some limit is placed on the time available for con-
tentious legislation. Obstructive tactics largely arise from uncertainty
as to the allocation of Parliamentary time during a Session ; the early
months of every Session are a kind of gamble on time, and a keen
Opposition often deprives the Government of more time than, even
in its own view, is good for the conduct of necessary business, while a
busy Government often wastes the time of the House by introducing
more legislation than it could pass even if the Opposition abstained
from all obstruction.

“6. The only remedy for this is to fix the length of Parliamentary
Sessions and, to some extent,* to allocate time to fixed objects during
each Session. . . .”

(F) The Right Hon. Sir Herbert Samuel, M.P., Examined:

Chairman

2531. You were, I believe, the Chairman of the Select Committee
on National Expenditure in 1917-1918? — Yes.

2533- • • * — The reference to that Committee covered partly the
same ground as the reference t6 your present Committee. We had
among other things to consider the procedure of this House in relation
to Supply and Appropriation, so as to secure more effectual control
by Parliament over public expenditure. ... We issued a questionnaire
to a large number of authorities on matters of procedure . . . and the
consensus of opinion that was shown by the replies . . . was very
strongly in favour of the establishment of an Estimates Committee. . . .

Captain Bourne

2536. Would you elaborate a little what you mean by examination
of the Estimates by a Committee . . . ? — Yes, certainly. Perhaps first
I might say the reasons why we made that recommendation. ... We
found that for 25 years on no occasion had the House of Commons
ever of its own motion reduced any Estimate presented to it on financial
ground#, and I believe that during the years that have elapsed since
1918 the same condition has applied. The law of the Constitution does
not allow the House of Commons to increase any of the Estimates that
are submitted, and the practice of the Constitution has not in fact
allowed the House of Commonson any occasioif to reduce an Estimate.

The Working of the House of Commons , igji 163

The currents of opinion within the House of Commons may influence
the amount of expenditure, but there is no formal direct control over
expenditure by the House itself. The Treasury control was in our
view not adequate. The Treasury is part of the Executive. If the
Minister who wishes to increase expenditure under any head secures
the personal assent of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Treasury
is necessarily silent. ... A Committee was appointed after the war
under the name of the Estimates Committee in 1922, and has been
appointed annually ever since. ... [It] differs in many particulars
from what was contemplated by the Committee of 1918. In the first
place, we suggested as a matter of fact that there should be two Com-
mittees ... of 1 5 Members each, which would be able to examine each
year a very considerable portion of the whole body of Estimates. That
was not done; there is one Committee of 26 Members. And more
important than that, we recommended very strongly that there should
be 3 technical adviser attached to the Committee who should be its
own officer and whose duty it would be to examine the Estimates or
some groups of Estimates each year apd report to the Committee
upon them. . . , Estimates are very technical things, and it needs an
expert to understand them. A mere Committee of the House of
Commons of ordinary average Members faced by the great blocks of
Estimates thaj are circulated each year are helpless, and we reported
in our view the appointment of such an officer was essential ; we used
that word. The Comptroller and Auditor General, for reasons which
we gave, could not perform in our view those functions as well. We
suggested that an Officer of the Treasury would not be adequate. The
Treasury, after all, have already passed all the Estimates, and there-
fore merely to attach an Officer of the Treasury to an Estimates Com-
mittee of the House of Commons would be to ask an official of a
Department to draw the attention of the Committee to what might
be regarded as the failure of his own Department to exercise adequate
control; in addition to which the Treasury is merely a branch of the
Executive. ... No officer was in fact attached to the Committee at all
until 1926, and then it was an Officer of the Treasury. . . . That is the
main reason in my view why the Estimates Committee has not been as
effective as we anticipated in 1918 that such a body might be.

Then there is the second point. We recommended very strongly that
there should be an opportunity for discussion in the House of Commons
itself of any particular recommendations made by an Estimates
Committee. . . .

Chairman

2537. May I ask in what form the Committee proposed that this
opportunity should present itself to the House? — We suggested that
some of the Supply d£ys . . . should J?e allocated. . . . And, further,

Parliament

164

we ventured to make a strong recommendation that discussions and
divisions on reports of the Estimates Committee should not be re-
garded as questions of confidence in the Government of the day. . . .
[2538] . . . The Estimates Committee, we suggested, should not deal
with questions of policy. Of course, it is very difficult to draw any
line, and on some particular occasion the Government might regard
a particular economy as trenching upon policy. Then we reported in
these words: “That limitation should exclude from their recommenda-
tions any proposals which, if carried against the Government, could
properly entail either their resignation or a dissolution of Parliament. 55

Sir Basil Peto

2539. If I might just interrupt, would not that militate against any
successful check being put upon expenditure by such a Committee if
the proposal was of a major character of any size at all? — I do r not
know about any size at all. You ought not to apply questions of the
rule with regard to policy too rigidly. I should say it was a question
of policy whether you should have two more battleships or not, but it
would not be a question of policy what should be the scale of pay of a
particular class of employees.

Mr. Ede *

2540. You would not convince Mr. W. J. Brown of that? — No. . . .
[2541] . . .You cannot, I think, give any definition of what is policy
and what is not.

2542. And in the same way pan one give a definition of what is
confidence and what is not? Can anybody do that except the Govern-
ment? — I think that in the last resort that is so, but all that I am
pleading for is that there should be a change in the convention, which
used to regard everything as a vote of confidence. . . .

(G) Sir Malcolm Ramsay, the Comptroller and Auditor-
General, Examined:

Chairman

3686. The Committee is much obliged to you . . . for your very full
Memorandum. — The Memorandum was as follows :

c< . . * 2. The present system has, I believe, been generally criticised
on the ground of its ineffectiveness in controlling the Executive,
especially as regards expenditure. Such criticism is, in my opinion,
to a large extent misdirected as proceeding from an imperfect appre-
ciation of the functions of Parliament: of what it can and ought to
do. . . .

“3. * . . If on the other hand ‘Ineffectiveness in controlling the
Executive* is used merely in a ^general sense, Chen I should say that

The Working of the House of Commons , iggi 165

during the past 30 years, and specially since the outbreak of the Euro-
pean War, Parliament has allowed the Executive a freer hand in
financial matters.

“4. This result is due not so much to defects in the financial proce-
dure, which still allows the House opportunity in plenty of financial
criticism, but to other causes. On the one hand, there is the enormous
growth both in volume and complexity of expenditure, and the
financial and economic difficulties arising out of the War: on the
other, there has been a change in the attitude of Members at large. . . .
“5. The following examples may illustrate my meaning:

(a) Borrowing . Before 1914 H.M. Government could not issue a public
loan or borrow money (apart from purely temporary advances) except
on the authority of a resolution passed in Committee of Ways and
Means . . . which was the foundation of a Bill giving specific authority
for the amount and nature of the issue. But these limitations were
swept away by the War: and now under the provisions of the War
Loan Acts, 1916 and 1919, and the Finance Act, 1921 (s. 47), the
Treasury has a general power, until Par&ament otherwise determines,
of replacing any securities issued during the War. . . .

“( b ) The institution of separate Funds, such as the Road Fund (fed by
assigned taxes), the Development Fund, the Forestry Fund and the
Empire Marketing Fund (all three fed by Grants in Aid), has probably
tended to emancipate the Executive from control or at any rate to
curtail the opportunity of informed criticism in Parliament. . . .

il (c) A growing proportion of the public expenditure has taken the
form of block grants , e.g. the grant for Scottish Education (which is in a
fixed ratio to the expenditure of Eitgland and Wales) or the grants
towards police expenditure and health services (a fixed proportion of
the expenditure of Local Authorities).

“6, Functions of the Comptroller and Auditor-General. The Public Accounts
Committee differs radically from the Estimates Committee in that
attached to it is a special officer, uncontrollable by the Executive,
responsible directly to Parliament, and removable only on a Resolu-
tion of both Houses, who — and this is most important — is assisted by
an examining staff of some 230 persons, of whom all but 40 are actually
quartered in the premises of the Departments whose accounts are
audited, and of whom all are engaged continuously throughout the
year in examining the public accounts and have direct access to the
books and other departmental records. . . .

“7. Functions of the Public Accounts Committee. The Committee itself has
a purely general reference: c to examine the accounts’ and jyhlle it
takes as its text the reports of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, it
is at liberty to and does explore the field of economy.

“Unlike the Estimates Committee, it is not expressly excluded from
makinsr recommendations involving questions of policy, but it ventures

Parliament

1 66

warily into that domain. ‘Policy 5 is a vague term, and doubtless
different Committees would adopt a different definition. But probably
most Members would agree that while the Committee would be very
ill-advised to attempt to criticise major decisions of policy which have
already been decided by Parliament as a whole, ... it is not debarred
from referring to minor matters of policy or calling attention to certain
aspects of policy, particularly such as might not be familiar to the
House. Thus, it would seem not improper for the Committee to point
out that some particular policy has proved more expensive than was
anticipated or to ask whether a particular object cannot be attained
by some alternative and cheaper method. . . .

“9. ... Its influence is not only direct . . . . [10] It is also indirect , but
not less valuable though incalculable and unseen. It is still true, as
Mr. Gibson Bowles said in 1903, that ‘there is ground for believing
that the spending Departments stand more in awe of the Public
Accounts Committee than of the House itself, probably because there
is less chance of escaping its close scrutiny. 5

“The mere fact that the Committee exists, and that the Comptroller
and Auditor General can invoke its assistance, fortifies the Accounting
Officers against temptation to stray from the path of economy or of
financial regularity: further, it enables the Comptroller and Auditor-
General to dispose at once, and in his stride, of* many matters of which
Parliament never hears. . . .

“16. The Estimates Committee has, I am afraid, failed to realise the
expectations of those who advocated its establishment. . . . This
result ... is not due to^any shortcoming on the part of the Committee,
but to the difficulties (foreseen by many experts) which are inherent
in any attempt to institute detailed examination and control by the
House of Commons without offence to the cardinal doctrine of Cabinet
and Ministerial responsibility.

“17. Chief of these is the extent, imperfectly realised, to which policy
covers expenditure. All the big money lies in policy, as is shown by
the following analysis of the Estimates for 1 93 1 taken from the Budget
Statement, H.C. 90.

Taking the various categories there shown in Table VI, we find:

I 49>339? 000

i 5°T9 2 5 000

111.412.000

11.516.000

302.950.000

25.907.000

1 . Grant Services account for .

2. Pensions and Insurance account for

3. Defence accounts for ....

4. Tax Collection accounts for.

5. DebtfTnterest and Management account for

6. All other services account for

Total ordinary expenditure

• ^75^316,000

The Working of the House of Commons, iggi 167

“Items i, 2, and 5 are determined almost entirely by policy. Nearly
all of item 3, again, is policy, and of the remaining items, 4 and 6
(which amount to £37,423,000 or less than 5 per cent, of the whole
ordinary expenditure), a great deal consists of salaries (which again
are matters of policy) fixed by the Government on the recommenda-
tions of Royal Commissions, or as the result of agreements arrived at
with Staff Associations, or of decisions given by arbitration and other
courts. . .

“22. (1) If expenditure, including the policy of expenditure, is to be
reviewed in detail by a Committee or Committees of the House a
revolutionary change must be made in procedure and indeed in the
constitution. . . .”

Chairman

3765. The Public Accounts Committee have, on occasion, called
Miiysters of the Crown in front of them, and questioned them on
matters of policy, have they not ? — That is so, yes.

3766. But it is very infrequent, is it not? — Very rare. We have had
two instances in my experience; we had*the Secretary of State for Air
down once, and the Secretary of State for War.

(H) Sir William Graham-Harrisox, Parliamentary Counsel
to the ^Treasury, Examined:

Mr. Ede

4422. If the House increased the number of Standing Committees
upstairs so that there might be additional Bills front of Committee's
at the same time, it would probably involve an increase in your Depart-
ment to cope with the work involved, would it not ? It would mean,
I imagine, that a good many more Bills would get through altogether,

would it not ? ^

4423. Presumably that would be the object of doing it, of having
more Bills simultaneously considered in Committee? — I do not think
we can turn out much more than we are doing now, with our present
staff. I should like to say that nothing is more difficult in the world
than to get people to come to my office. It is highly specialised and is
extremely unpopular.

Mr. Malone

4424. Why is that? — Because it is slavery.

Chairman ^

4425. It is a blind alley ?— Perhaps you do not know how one has
to work. One begins at 10 to half-past, and one cannot make a single
engagement for the evenings of Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and
Thursday. I have to Vork on Friday, and the only time I get for

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1 68

thinking about anything without interruption is Saturday. I have to
work on Sunday too through the session.

Mr. Leach

4426. What is your recruiting method? — One talks to one’s friends
down at the Temple and Lincoln’s Inn and sees if they have anyone
who is at all likely ... I have had enormous difficulty in getting any-
body who is competent. I have a very good staff now, but it was very
difficult to get them, and I could not get them at all until I told the
Treasury that I must have more money to pay them. . . .

4428. Have you drawn any men out of private practice? — Yes, a few.
I have two men from quite large practices. I do not think they like it very
much now they have come.

Mr. Ede

4429. As far as I can gather from your description of it the life is
very much like the life of a Member of Parliament, except there is no
publicity for it? — I think perhaps we get abused more than you do.

A MEMBER AND HIS TRADE UNION, 1931

House of Commons Debates , 8 September 1931 ; Official Report , cc. 3-6

Mr. Speaker: I have to inform the House that I have received a
letter from the hon. Jyfember for the Newton Division of Lancaster
(Sir Robert Young) announcingchis resignation of the office of Chair-
man of Ways and Means. The letter is as follows:

“Dear Mr. Speaker,

“It is my duty to inform the House of Commons through you
that a situation has arisen which makes it necessary for me to resign
the position of Chairman of Ways and Means.

“On 26th August, as a result of the changed political situation, I
wrote a letter to my constituency and said:

“ £ The Chairman of Ways and Means is appointed for the duration of
Parliament. It is, however, a Party nomination but subject to the approval of
the House of Commons. I was appointed by unanimous consent. Nevertheless
should the Prime Minister on the one hand, or the Labour party on the other
side, think I should resign I shall certainly do so.’

“I s^nt a copy of the letter to the Prime Minister, the Leader of the
Opposition, and to the executive of the Amalgamated Engineering
Union, The Prime Minister did not ask me to re^’gn. My trade union
executive, however, expressed the opinion that I should tender my
resignation. . . P

Allocation of Time, 1933

169

ALLOCATION OF TIME, 1935

House of Commons Debates , 11 February 1935; Official Report , cc. iyio-11 .

The Lord President of the Council (Mr. Stanley Baldwin) : . . .
I desire to inform the House of an agreement which has been reached
with regard to the time to be devoted to the Committee stage of [the
Government of India] Bill, and ... I think this agreement redounds
immensely to the credit and the common sense and the responsible
sense of the House. I am grateful to all sections of the Opposition for
having joined in it. . . .

The agreement is this. The Government propose to allocate 30 days
for the Committee stage of the Government of India Bill, and 26 of
those days will be apportioned by a time-table Resolution, so that the
Houre may have a definite programme, while the remaining four days
will be reserved and drawn upon if it should be found that any par-
ticular apportionment is inadequate. I think that a very wise and
sensible provision. It will enable great* matters of principle to be
debated at length and I think will constitute a useful precedent which
might well be followed in the future. If this proposal can be worked
with good will, the elasticity of such an arrangement will undoubtedly
lead to the convenience of Members. I am pleased to be able to inform
the House that the Chief Whip has secured a large measure of agree-
ment with regard to the arrangement of the time-table. It is proposed
that an informal committee representing all parties and all sections
shall meet and draw up a time-table for the 26 ^days in the most con-
venient form, and the Chairman of Ways and Means has kindly
consented to take the chair of that Committee, . . .

PROCEDURE ON MONEY RESOLUTIONS, 1937-8

House of Commons Debates, 9 November 1937; Official Report 5 cc. 1393-6
Mr. Lambert asked the Prime Minister what action the Govern-
ment propose to take with regard to the report of the Committee on
Money Resolutions ?

The Prime Minister (Mr. Neville Chamberlain) : . . . i ne
Select Committee in their report make two mam recommendations
which may be summarised shortly as follow:^ *

First, the passing of a declaratory resolution by the House to be
enforced by the authority of the Chair indicating certain general lines
upon which Financial Resolutions should be drawn.

Secondly, the alteration of Standing Orders so as to allow the

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170

Second Reading of Money Bills (other than those originating in Com*
mittee of Ways and Means) to be taken before consideration of the
relevant Financial Resolutions in Committee.

The Government, for their part, are prepared to accept in substance
the second recommendation, as enabling hon. Members to express
their views on the detailed provisions of the Bill at an early stage, anc
as meeting the criticism that the House should not be required tc
examine and discuss the terms of the financial provisions as set out ir
the Financial Resolution before being fully informed of the Govern-
ment’s intentions as detailed in the clauses of the Bill. . . .

While appreciating the considerations upon which the resolution
included in the first recommendation is founded, the Governmenl
cannot feel that the directions set out therein are compatible with the
fundamental principle embodied in Standing Order No. 63, namely,
that of the Crown’s initiative in regard to expenditure, a principle the
wisdom of which the Committee recognised. ...

Although unable to subscribe to the proposed declaratory resolution,
His Majesty’s Government . welcome the opportunity of declaring
that it is their definite intention to secure that Financial Resolutions
in respect of Bills shall be so framed as not to restrict the scope within
which the Committee on the Bills may consider amendments further
than is necessary to enable His Majesty’s Government to discharge
their responsibilities in regard to public expenditure and to leave to
the Committee the utmost freedom for discussion and amendment of
details which is compatible with the discharge of those responsibilities.

Accordingly, written instructions are being given to Departments
and to the Parliamentary Couitsel’s Office drawing attention to the
Report of the Select Committee on Procedure relating to Money
Resolutions and to the statement which I am now making and
Requiring that in future the terms of any Financial Resolution, for the
drafting of which they are responsible, shall not be so drawn as to
involve undue restrictions and that this declaration shall be complied
with. The House may wish to hear the actual terms of the instructions.
They are as follow:

“Sir,

“ Financial Resolutions

“I am directed by the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty’s Treasury to
invite your attention to the Report of the Select Committee on Procedure
relating to Money Resolutions (H.C. 149 of 1937) and to the reply given by
the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on 9 November 1937, and in
particular to the declaration that it is the definite intention of His Majesty’s
Government to secure that financial resolutions in respect of Bills shall be so
framed as not to restrict the scope within which the Committee on the Bills
may consider amendments further than is necessary to enable the Government
to discharge their responsibilities ife regard to public expenditure and to leave

Procedure on Money Resolutions , 1937-8 171

to the Committee the utmost freedom for discussion and amendment of details
which is compatible with the discharge of those responsibilities.

“I am further to request that the necessary steps be taken to acquaint all
those concerned with the requirement that the terms of any Financial Resolu-
tion, in the drafting of which they are concerned, shall not be so drawn as to
involve undue restrictions and that the Government’s declaration shall be
complied with in all cases.

“I am, etc.”

House of Commons Debates , 1 February 1938; Official Report , c. 103
Ordered :

“That a Bill (other than a Bill which is required to originate in Committee
of Ways and Means) the main object of which is the creation of a public
charge may either be presented, or brought in upon an Order of the House,
by a Minister of the Crown, and, in the case of a Bill so presented or brought
in, the creation of the charge shall not require to be authorised by a Com-
mitt& of the whole House until the Bill has been read a Second time, and
that after the charge has been so authorised the Bill shall be proceeded with
in the same manner as a Bill which involves a charge that is subsidiary to its
main purpose.”

Ordered :

“That this Order be a Standing Order of the House.”

[The Prime Minister .]

DELEGATED LEGISLATION

House of Commons Debates , 27 January 1937 ; Official Report , cc, 1026 $qq.

Mr. Dingle Foot: I beg to move,

“That in the opinion of this House, the power of the Executive has increased,
is increasing, and ought to be diminished.”

. . . There are two aspects of this subject to which I want to call
the attention of the House. The first is the continuous encroachment *
of the Executive at the expense of the House of Commons, with the
result that this House becomes more and more subservient to the
Government of the day. The second is the attempt that has been
deliberately made in Statute after Statute in recent years to invest
Government Departments with completely arbitrary powers. Hon.
Members will not be surprised if I have occasion to quote the words
of the Lord Chief justice . . . which he wrote in his book published
eight years ago: 1

1 Lord Hewart %f Bury, The New despotism (London, 1929).

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172

“The old despotism, which was defeated, offered Parliament a challenge.
The new despotism, which is not yet defeated, gives Parliament an anaesthetic.
The strategy is different, but the goal is the same. It is to subordinate Parlia-
ment, to evade the courts, and to render the will or caprice of the Executive
unfettered and supreme.”

... I know that it is inevitable in these days that we in Parliament
should delegate a good deal of authority to bodies outside, and I know
that we have to give Government Departments considerable power to
issue Orders, Rules and Regulations; but the feature of almost all
Regulations, even when they come under the review of this House and
require affirmative Resolutions, is that they cannot be amended. We
cannot do more than either accept or reject them as a whole. . . .

[The House was counted out.]

(B)

House of Commons Debates , ij May 1944; Official Report , cc . 202 sqq .

Mr. Molson: I beg to move,

“That this House would welcome the setting up of a Select Committee . . .
to carry on a continuous examination of all Statutory Rules and Orders and
other instruments of delegated legislation presented to Parliament. ...”

There are a number of reasons why delegated legislation is not only
desirable but necessary. In the first place, it economises the time of the
Legislature. . . .

In the second place f delegated legislation is flexible. It can limit.the
application of legislation by time, location, ownership, age or other-
wise, and all these limitations are able to be changed at short notice. . . .

In the third place, the value of delegated legislation is that, in a
eudden emergency, it enables the Legislature to dispense with long
deliberation and to arm the Executive with the special powers that
are needed. . . .

In the fourth place, where a Legislature is forced to influence the
economic life of the country by physical measures, powers of this kind
are almost inevitable. When we are using duties, quotas, licences,
bounties and various other expedients, it is obvious that some power
has to be given either to the Treasury or the Tariff Advisory Committee
to give effect to the policy of Parliament. . . .

Among those who have given special attention to the matter of
delegated legislation there are many who think that we should rely
upon the courts to protect the people’s liberty. I venture to think that
that is an error. The courts are only suited for the purpose of determin-
ing what is legal and what is illegal. What we arefprimarily concerned
about are Orders and Regulations issued by the Executive which are
perfectly lucid and legal but which are bureaucratic, vexatious,

Delegated Legislation , 1937-50 173

embarrassing and harassing to the subject. Whether or not this House
should approve an Order of that kind is a political decision which
only a Legislature is competent to make. . . .

Mr. Silverman: There has been so far throughout the Debate a
considerable amount of agreement. Certain principles appear not to
be controversial at all. One is that the delegation to Ministers of
Parliament’s sovereign right to make laws is to that extent an infringe-
ment and an abrogation of the functions of Parliament. The second
thing that appears to be agreed is that, even though that be conceded,
it is inevitable in our complicated world that, if this House is to func-
tion at all, such delegation shall be made. . . . The third ... is that
it remains necessary, and becomes more and more necessary, that the
House should apply some kind of selective principle. While it agrees
that some part of its sovereign authority to make law must be handed
over to Ministers, we must, in order that we may retain our control of
the fews of the country, retain our own responsibility for what is done.
We may delegate the act, but we cannot delegate the responsibility
for the act. . . .

. . . What are the conditions on which judicial functions can be
exercised? The first is that the tribunal, the judge, shall have no
interest whatever in the result of the case he is trying. The second is
that he shall ]je answerable to nobody for what he does. . . . He has
to be free from criticism or penalty for what he does, and he has to be
uninfluenced, in his judicial determination of a question before him,
by the consequences of what he does. It is not for the court to say: “We
will not do justice in this case because the consequences go far beyond
the importance of the case.” He ha? to do justice in the case before
him, though the Heavens fall. Unless those three conditions are
satisfied, judicial functions cannot be exercised at all.

. . . Those conditions, which are vital to the exercise of judicial func-
tions, are the antithesis of the principles on which we work in thiS
House. . . .

... I say that, inevitably, when the House is concerned to consider
whether the Minister is right or wrong in the exercise of his functions
under the Regulations, it may have to consider at one and the same
time two distinct questions. One is: “Does the House wish the Govern-
ment to fall?” The other is: “Was the particular exercise right or
wrong?” . . .

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr.
Herbert Morrison) : . . . [The] terms of reference must be such that
the Committee does not try to do the work of the courts of la^. It is
not for the Committee to decide — indeed, it is not for Parliament to
decide what is the proper, legal interpretation of a Statute, or whether
Regulations are within-the legal terms of the Statute. That is for the
courts, and it is constitutionally of th# greatest importance that the

Nbg

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174

independence and freedom from Parliamentary interference of the
courts, even to the extent of Parliament not trying to interpret the
law, should be guarded. . . .

[Motion, by leave , withdrawn .]

(G)

House of Commons Debates , 21 Jane 1944: Official Report , cc. 910-11
Ordered :

“That a Select Committee be appointed to consider every Statutory
Rule or Order (including any Provisional Rule made under Section 2
of the Rules Publication Act, 1893) laid or laid in draft before the
House, being a Rule, Order, or Draft upon which proceedings may be
taken in either House in pursuance of any Act of Parliament, with a
view to determining whether the special attention of the House sl^puld
be drawn to it on any of the following grounds :

“(i) that it imposes a charge on the public revenues or contains
provisions requiring payment to be made to the Exchequer or any
Government Department or to any local or public authority in
consideration of any licence or consent, or of any services to be
rendered, or prescribes the amount of any such charge or pay-
ments :

“(ii) that it is made in pursuance of an enactment containing
specific provisions excluding it from challenge in the courts, either
at all times or after the expiration of a specified period :

“(iii) that it appears to mak£ some unusual or unexpected use of
the powers conferred by the Statute under which it is made :

“(iv) that there appears to have been unjustifiable delay in the
^publication of it :

i “(v) that for any special reason, its form or purport calls for
elucidation. 55

Ordered :

“That the Committee shall have the assistance of the Counsel to
Mr. Speaker. 55

Ordered :

“That the Committee have power to sit notwithstanding any
Adjournment of the House, and to report from time to time. 55

Ordered :

“That the Committee have power to requij£ any Government
Department concerned to submit a memorandum explaining any
Rule, Order, or Draft which may be under t^eir consideration or to

Delegated Legislation , 1937-30 175

depute a representative to appear before them as a Witness for the
purpose of explaining any such Rule, Order, or Draft.”

Ordered :

“That it be an Instruction to the Committee that before reporting
that the special attention of the House should be drawn to any Rule,
Order, or Draft the Committee do afford to any Government Depart-
ment concerned therewith an opportunity of furnishing orally or in
writing such explanations as the Department think fit.”

[Mr. Herbert Morrison .]

(D)

Special Report from the Select Committee on Statutory Instruments ( H.C . 123

of 1950)

[Select Committee appointed to consider every Statutory Instrument laid
or laid in draft before the House, being an Instrument or Draft of an Instru-
ment upon which proceedings may be or njight have been taken in either
House in pursuance of any Act of Parliament, with a view to determining
whether the special attention of the House should be drawn to it on any of
the following grounds:

(i) that it imposes a charge on the public revenues or contains provisions
requiring payments to be made to the Exchequer or any Government Depart-
ment or to any local or public authority in consideration of any licence or
consent, or of any services to be rendered, or prescribes the amount of any
such charge or payments;

(ii) that it is made in pursuance of an enactment Containing specific provi-
sions excluding it from challenge in the courts, either at all times or after the
expiration of a specified period ;

(iii) that it appears to make some unusual or unexpected use of the powers

conferred by the Statute under which it is made; **

(iv) that it purports to have retrospective effect where the parent Statute
confers no express authority so to provide;

(v) that there appears to have been unjustified delay in the publication or
in the laying of it before Parliament;

(vi) that there appears to have been unjustifiable delay in sending a notifi-
cation to Mr. Speaker under the proviso to subsection (1) of section four to
the Statutory Instruments Act, 1946, where an Instrument has come into
operation before it has been laid before Parliament;

(vii) that for any special reason its form or purport calls for elucidation.]

1. Your Committee have examined 682 Statutory Instruments and

Drafts of Instruments since the beginning of the Session and have
drawn the attention of the House to seven. Of the 682 Instruments
examined, 325 arore out of Emergency legislation, i.e. were presented
under the Supplies ^nd Services (Transitional Powers) Act, 1945, as
extended by the Supplies and Services (Extended Purposes) Act,
1947, Emergency Ljp.ws (Transitional Provisions) Act, 1946, or the

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176

Goods and Services (Price Control) Acts, 1939 and 1941. Of the seven
Instruments brought to the special attention of the house, one was
reported under the fifth head of the Committee's Order of Reference
(unjustifiable delay in laying before Parliament) and six under the
seventh (need for elucidation). . . .

(E)

Report from the Select Committee on Delegated Legislation; 2J October , 4955.
(■ H.C . 310 of 1353)

1. Your Committee were appointed by a resolution of this House on
the 1 8th of December, 1952, to consider in what respects the existing
procedures, by which the control of this House over delegated legisla-
tion is exercised, need to be improved or supplemented and by ^vhat
means this can best be achieved. ... *

4. Your Committee have been asked, in the first place, to consider
the existing procedures by <. which the control of this House over
delegated legislation is exercised.

5. The power to legislate, when delegated by Parliament, differs
from Parliament’s own power to legislate : Parliament is supreme and
the power of the Queen in Parliament to legislate is unlimited. On the
other hand, the power of legislation granted by Parliament to another
body or persons is limited by the exact extent of the delegated power
so granted; the purported exercise of power beyond the extent so
granted will be ultra vires and ineffective.

6. The legality of an Act of Parliament cannot be challenged in or
by the Courts of Law, but the question whether subordinate legislation
is.within the power delegated by Parliament can be and is challenged
in and by the Courts of Law.

7. Frequently, subordinate legislation is issued in the form of an
Order in Council, that is an Order expressed to be made by Her
Majesty by and with the advice of Her Privy Council and signed by
the Clerk of the Council.

But not every instrument so issued is an enactment of subordinate
legislation under a power delegated by Act of Parliament.

Orders in Council are of two kinds and they differ fundamentally in
constitutional principle. The two kinds are:

(a) those made in virtue of the Royal Prerogative, and

(b) those which are authorised by Act of Parliament.

The Royal Prerogative is that which remains of the original sovereign
power of the Crown to legislate without the autrority of Parliament,
e.g. power to declare a rigid blockade of enemy territory in time of war.

This power is in no sense delegated and Oders in Gouncil issued

177

Delegated Legislation , 1937-50

in exercise of this power are not subordinate; they are original legis-
lation. Your Committee are not concerned with them in this report.
Your Committee have to consider (inter alia) those Orders in Council
made under the authority of an Act of Parliament. . . .

20. The figures for 1952 were:

Acts of Parliament, 64; one volume of 1,437 pages (including, as it
happened, over 900 pages of merely consolidating statutes) ; Public
Instruments; registered, 1,029 — 3 volumes of 3,980 pages; Local
Instruments, registered, 1,283 — not published collectively. . . .

24. One classification of the instruments of delegated legislation is
into:

(a) Those which are required by the enabling Act to be laid

before Parliament;

(1 b ) Those which are not so required by the enabling Act.

25. The requirement to lay before Parliament first occurred in the
Acts of the 1830’s, but it was not regularly insisted upon until a long
way into the 1 9th century. The requirement and the nature and extent
and timing of it are matters entirely governed by Parliament in passing
the enabling Bill empowering the making of the particular instru-
ment. ...

28. Figures are available of the annual totals of Statutory rules and
orders or Statutory instruments registered since the beginning of 1894.
From the first, as already stated, the register discriminated between
those which were General and those which were Local. Local ones deal
with such matters as Local Authorities’ powers, fishery districts,
traffic orders about built-up areas, or one way streets, burial grounds,
diseases of animals, water supply, land drainage, wild bird protection
and so on. With certain exceptions, referred to below in paragraph 31,
Parliament has not thought it worth while to exercise any special con-
trol over, or even to require information about, instruments of merely
local application. . . .

29. . . . The annual combined total of all instruments, general and
local, has never exceeded 3,000; the annual total of general instruments
has never exceeded 2,000. But to estimate the total of all instruments
in operation to-day would be mere guesswork . . .

31. Sir Cecil Carr* estimated that out of 377 draft or final instru-
ments which came before the Scrutiny Committee (hereafter referred
to) this year only 79 could be described as local in character. They
were made up as follows: 37 se ^ s London Traffic Regulations; 14
orders restoring rights of way suspended under War Regulations; 6
re-arranging boundaries of constituencies; 6 Scottish hydro-electric
schemes; 3 amendfng Local Acts; 3 bringing into force in specified
areas the statutory provisions for special designations of milk; 2 dealing

1 Counsel to Mr » Speaker.

Parliament

178

with open spaces in London; 5 relating to Local Courts; 2 altering
statutory areas for gas and electricity; 1 relating to levy of expenses
in a fisheries district.

32. The decision whether power shall be granted to a subordinate
authority to legislate is made by the Queen in Parliament, and the
decision also provides the conditions under which that authority shall
be exercised. The decision is contained in the enabling Act.

33. We asked for information from 22 Departments on two points,
namely :

( 1 ) the procedure followed in the Department in connection with
drafting a clause in a Bill giving power to make regulations, and,

(2) the procedure followed in the Department in making the
regulations. . . .

36. In broad outline, the methods followed in all the Departments

are the same. *

37. The procedure in connection with the preparation of a bill is
as follows :

(1) All important matters of policy and principle are dealt with
directly in the Bill itself and the general practice is to limit regulation-
making powers to :

(a) matters too detailed, e.g. procedural points or technical issues;

(b) matters in which elasticity is desirable to enable alterations to
be made in the light of changed circumstances ;

(c) matters in which new Statutory powers are being created and
in which the line of future developments cannot be fully foreseen.

(2) The Minister throughout is responsible. He settles the general
line of the proposed legislation. The Clause giving power to make
regulations is carefully considered from the outset and the Minister
decides its form and the extent of the powers which he will recommend
to Parliament.

38. Then with regard to the instrument, made in pursuance of the
power given by the enabling Act, the practice is to follow the instruc-
tions of the Minister. Wherever practicable, outside interests which
may be affected (e.g. local authorities, trade interests, professional
organisations and so on), are consulted informally. The document is
then drafted by the Legal Staff of the Department. In some Depart-
ments there is a regular Committee of senior officials of the Department
who go through all draft instruments in detail and report thereon to
the Minister before he signifies his final approval.

39 * AU regulations which are subject to Parliamentary procedure
and all other regulations of importance are signe 4 /by the Secretary of
State or other Minister responsible. In minor cases such as those
relating to purely local matters, the instrument i^ay be signed on behalf

Delegated Legislation , 1937-50 1 79

of the Minister, provided, even in the those cases, that the approval of
the Minister has first been obtained.

40. In certain cases subordinate legislation is submitted for approval
to the Legislation Committee of the Cabinet whose terms of reference
leave it to the discretion of the Minister concerned to decide whether
a particular instrument should be submitted in draft to the Committee.
The Committee must, however, have an opportunity of examining:

{a) all Orders in Council under emergency or transitional legisla-
tion.

( b ) all statutory instruments likely to affect a large number of
Departments whose interests cannot conveniently be ascertained by
direct consultation.

% ( d ) all statutory instruments involving any departure from prece-
dent, e.g. in the type of penalties imposed, in the procedure relating
to such matters as appeals, or in encroachments on the liberty of the
subject. *

The Legislation Committee is presided over by a Senior Cabinet
Minister and normally includes the Lord Chancellor, the Leaders of
the two Houses, and Law Officers and the Chief Whip. The Depart-
ment concerned with the proposed instrument prepares and sends to
the Committee a memorandum explaining why the Order is required
and the Minister has to obtain the approval of his colleagues. . . .

*46. ... In 1944 a sessional Committee of the* House was established.
It has been continued in all subsequent sessions. It is now known as
the Select Committee on Statutory Instruments but it is usually and
in this Report referred to as the Ci Scrutiny Committee. 55

47. The Scrutiny Committee consists of eleven members. The
quorum is three. The practice is to appoint a member of the Opposi-
tion as Chairman and this seems to be in process of becoming a con-
vention. It usually meets fortnightly, and, in special circumstances,
more often. . . .

48. The Scrutiny Committee cannot consider or report on the merits
or policy of any of the instruments. In drawing the attention of the
House to an instrument, it gives no detailed reasons, but merely refers
to the heading under which it reports. Before, however, it reports, it
must and does hear what the Department concerned with the instru-
ment has to say. The Department’s answer is annexed to the report
and usually indicates the Committee’s point. In several sessions the
Committee has submitted a Special Report containing general com-
ments on possible improvements in departmental practice. Treasury'
circulars have directed the attention of Departments to these Special
Reports.

1 80 Parliament

49. There are two matters in connection with the Scrutiny Commit-
tee to which attention should be directed, namely :

(a) Owing to the delay in setting up the Committee at the begin-
ning of a Session, the time-limit for moving an address against
some instruments may expire before the Committee examines them.
That, in fact, happened this Session. This defect could be mitigated,
if not overcome, by making it a permanent Standing Committee
instead of one appointed each Session.

(. b ) The time-lag caused by obtaining and considering the Depart-
ment’s answer has the consequence that the Committee’s report
sometimes reaches the House too late to be effective.

50. From its inception towards the end of 1944 down to the end of
last year, the Scrutiny Committee had seen some 6,900 instruments,
namely all that are subject to either the affirmative or negative pro-
cedure of the House. It drew the attention of the House to 93 of tfyese.

51. Sir Cecil Carr, who attends and advises the Scrutiny Committee,
made this comment on all officially registered instruments and those
which come before the Comniittee.

“The total of nearly 7,000 instruments examined may be compared
with the total of approximately 19.400 instruments officially registered
in the same period. Probably some 10,250 of this gross total were public
instruments. If so, and if generalisation is pardonable r on figures so
imprecise, it seems that not quite 70 per cent, of the general instru-
ments come within the purview of Parliament as either requiring
affirmative approval or exposed to the negative procedure. Anyone
who cares to study the contents^ of the annual volumes of statutory
instruments will probably be satisfied that much of the text is of a
routine or administrative character involving no great issues of liberty
or, public rights.”

, 52. The nature of a Statutory Instrument, the requirement of publi-
cation and the standard machinery of parliamentary control are pre-
scribed in the Statutory Instruments Act, 1946 (brought into force on
January 1st, 1948), and the Statutory Instruments Regulations, 1947,
made thereunder. . . .

Parliamentary Control

64. As stated in paragraphs 32 to 38, the Minister introducing a Bill
is responsible for the decision to propose to Parliament that a clause be
included in the Bill empowering the making of statutory instruments
embodying some legislation. The Minister proposes, but Parliament
itself decides in each enabling Act.

(a) whether power shall be delegated to, make subordinate
legislation.

(b) to whom the power shaAl be delegated.,

Delegated Legislation^ 1937-50 18 1

(d) the form in which it shall be exercised,

(e) whether the instrument whereby the power is exercised shall
or shall not be laid before Parliament.

(f) whether the instrument shall be subject to an affirmative or a
negative resolution or neither.

65. Parliament has dealt in various ways with instruments embodying
delegated legislation which have to be laid before it :

[a) Laying without further provision for control ;

( b ) Laying with deferred operation;

(, c ) Laying with immediate effect but subject to annulment;

(, d ) Laying in draft but subject to resolution that no further
proceedings be taken;

(e) Laying in draft and requiring affirmative resolution;

* (f) Laying with operation deferred until approval given by
affirmative resolution;

(g) Laying with immediate effect but requiring affirmative resolu-
tion as a condition of continuance.

The most usual are (c) laying with immediate effect but subject to
annulment and (e) laying in draft and requiring affirmative resolu-
tion. . . .

77. In his memorandum Sir Frederic Metcalfe, the Clerk of the

House, produced an analysis of the time taken by the House in con-
sidering statutory instruments. *

In session 1951-52 the total time taken in the House on Affirmative
Resolutions was 14*- hours and on motions under the negative proce-
dure was just over 25 hours. In the session 1952 to the 5th February,
1953, the total time taken on Affirmative Resolutions was 18 hours
8 minutes and on the Negative procedure 9 hours. Motions under thfe
negative procedure are hereafter referred to as “prayers 55 , a term
derived from the words “An Humble Address, praying 55 — which occur
in the form of the motion.

78. As the Minister concerned wants the instrument awaiting the
affirmative resolution to become effective, the Government, as has
been stated, find the time for the resolution to be brought forward and,
if the House so requires, debated. Although affirmative resolutions,
like prayers, are business exempted from Standing Order as to time
of adjournment, the necessary time is, on occasions, found before the
usual hour of adjournment. Sir Frederic Metcalfe has supplied a
summary and an analysis of the time taken before and after 10 p.m.
in the sessions from 1947 to 1952. The figures show that the number
of resolutions and tire time taken thereby is slightly greater after than
before 10 p.m.

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Parliament

79. The prayer to annul a statutory instrument is put down by a
Member. Any Member may put it down and he may or may not be
supported by other Members. The Member putting down the prayer
must seek an opportunity upon which to move the prayer. That
opportunity will not occur until Government business is disposed of
and this normally means that the opportunity will not occur until
after 10 p.m.

The Member moving the prayer must try to ensure that there is a
quorum of Members (namely 40) present. Moreover, the Government
must also be prepared to require the attendance of their supporters
in case there is a division. The Government can move the adjourn-
ment of the House immediately before a prayer. This power could be
so exercised as to prevent discussion of the motion or the annulment
of the instrument within the statutory period. In practice, only occa-
sional use of the power has been made. It could, however, be effective
and practicable against obstruction. A prayer may be put down agSinst
every single statutory instrument and an opportunity sought to move
it. If that were done then the. whole business of the House would soon
be brought to a complete standstill.

80. As it is, the House may sit on for a considerable time each night
after its normal hour of rising. It has sat on many occasions into the
small hours of the morning of the next day and even through the night.

81. The question has thus arisen not only as to the convenience of
Members, and the time available for the proper discharge of the
ordinary business of the House, but also whether, by the method and
time now available a#d the advantage that may be taken of it by a
Member or a group of Members, the House is fully aware of the
matters that may arise on a statutory instrument and so exercise that
control which is necessary and desirable. . . .

*107. Your Committee therefore recommend:

(1) That, with regard to Statutory Instruments which are subject to
the Negative Prayer, the procedure shall continue as at present, except
that if a prayer is under discussion at 1 1.30 p.m. the Speaker shall at
that hour put the question to the House, unless he shall be of opinion
that:

(a) owing to the lateness of the time of starting the discussion on
the prayer, or

( b ) owing to the importance of the issues raised by the Statutory
Instrument,

the tii^e for debate has not been adequate, the debate shall be ad-
journed to the next ordinary sitting day of the House (other than a
Friday) when it shall be resumed at the end of government business
for that day and it shall be subject to the same procedure as on the
first day;

Delegated Legislation , 1937-50 183

(2) That the Prayer for the annulment of a Statutory Instrument
should set out the reasons for such annulment;

(3) That the Scrutiny Committee should not be made into a Stand-
ing Committee but its appointment at the beginning of each Session
should be treated as a matter of urgency.

(4) That the Scrutiny Committee should include with its Report to
the House any letter from it to a Government Department in which
the point in issue on a Statutory Instrument, and the reason for
inviting a Departmental Memorandum, are indicated, and the Com-
mittee should, as now, include also the reply of the Department.

(5) That the period of 40 days shall commence from the day when
the Statutory Instrument is available to Members in the Vote Office
and that the date when it is so available be placed thereon; but that
where the Scrutiny Committee in their Report draw the particular
attention of the House to a Statutory Instrument, then the time shall
be ?o days from the date when the Report of that Committee is made
or the statutory 40 days, whichever time is the longer;

(6) That at the head of a Statutory Instrument there shall be printed
a note stating whether it is subject to the Affirmative or to the Nega-
tive procedure or whether it is exempt from both processes ;

(7) That the recommendations made by the Donoughmore Com-
mittee in paragraph 15, ’page 64, of their Report be endorsed, namely,
that the expressions “regulation, rule, order” should not be used
indiscriminately to describe the Instruments by which the law-making
power conferred on Ministers by Parliament is exercised.

THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION, 1937

(A)

House of Commons Debates , 9 December 1937 ; Official Report , cc. 564-5
Mr. Liddall asked the Prime Minister whether he will give an
early date for the discussion of the motion standing in the name of the
hon. Member for Lincoln ?

[“That in view of the fact that at Madrid on 6 December 1937, notwith-
standing he had, before leaving this country, given an undertaking not to take
part in any activities liable to be interpreted as inconsistent with His Majesty’s
Government’s policy of non-intervention, the Leader of His Majesty’s official
Opposition (Mr. Clement Attlee) stated publicly, ‘When we return to
London, administered by Socialists and workers, we shall convene £ public
meeting to inform the people about the facts of the situation and unbeaten^
invincible Republican spain’, this House declares that the Right Honourable
Gentleman the Member for Limehouse is guilty of a breach of faith and is
unfit to again be granted <a visa to Spain.

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Parliament

(B)

House of Commons Debates , 15 December 1937; Official Report , cc. 821-4

Mr. Attlee : Mr. Speaker, I desire, with your permission to make
a personal statement. . . .

The basis of the charge [in Mr. LiddalPs motion] appears to be
that because at a luncheon party given in my honour by the Com-
mander-in- Chief of the Spanish Army, in response to a speech of
welcome, I expressed my sympathy with the Spanish Government and
my intention of informing the people of this country of the facts of the
situation, I had thereby violated an undertaking given before my
departure from this country. . . . Before proceeding to Spain I signed
an undertaking in the following terms:

“I undertake that nothing shall take place in the course of my visit that
could be considered as implying any intervention by me on behalf of either
side of the present dispute in Spain.”

This is the common form signed by all persons proceeding from this
country to any part of Spanish territory. It applies to business men,
journalists and relief workers. It is exacted from British subjects by
His Majesty’s Government in pursuance of the policy of non-
intervention. ... ^

The assumption underlying the Motion ... is that the signing of
this undertaking imposes upon the signatory the duty of refraining,
while in Spain, from expressing any opinion in favour either of the
Government of Spain«or of the rebels. I cannot possibly accept such
an interpretation. If such were* the meaning of this undertaking it
would be one which no British Government ought to impose and
which no Member of Parliament who had regard to the rights and
privileges of Members could possibly accept. It would mean that a
Member of Parliament, of any party, must not express his own opinions,
but must reflect the policy of the Government; that he may go to
Spain, but only in a muzzle. I do not believe for one moment that this
was the purpose aimed at in exacting the undertaking. If I had thought
this to be the meaning of the undertaking, I would never have signed
it, for I could not have implemented it.

Obviously, a Member of Parliament, especially the leader of a
party, is bound, in the course of conversation, or on occasions of more
formality, such as the exchange of courtesies, to express opinions on
the merits of the contest in Spain. . . .

It cannot be too strongly emphasised that a private Member of
Parliament does not by his words or actions Involve the British Gov-
'ernment, but that he is a free man with the right of freely expressing
his opinions. In his Motion, the hon. Member for Lincoln has specifically
referred to me as “the Leadertfof His Majesty’s Official Opposition,”

The Leader of the Opposition , igjy 185

and seems to imply that this places me in a special category.
The Leader of the Opposition is a private Member. He owes no
allegiance to the Government. No action of his can in any way impli-
cate the Government. He is responsible only to his constituents and to
the Members from whom he derives his position. He is, I think, under
a special obligation to defend the rights and privileges of private
Members, particularly the right of every Member to express his
opinion freely on all matters of public policy. I make no excuse or
apology for anything said or done by me in the course of my visit to
Spain. The particular words of which the hon. Member for Lincoln
complains are inaccurately reported, but I make no attempt to shield
myself by alleging misrepresentation. I did state my sympathy for the
Spanish people and the Spanish Government, and I did state the
intention of the party which I have the honour to lead to do their
utmost in every legitimate way to assist them in their struggle. I claim
thaf, as a Member of this House, I have every right to do so. I utterly
repudiate the suggestion that in doing so I have broken any pledge.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Neville Chamberlain) : I rise only to say
this. ... I hope the House will now accept this statement, and take what
seems to me the right and most dignified course — namely, to let it rest
there.

THE DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT, 1944

- House of Commons Debates , 29 March 1944; Official Report , c, 1516

Mr. Price: . . . [It] is impossible to say that, because this House
has on this occasion voted against the Government [in amending the
Education Bill, to provide equal payment for men and women
teachers], therefore there is no confidence in the Government. . . .
[The] Prime Minister ... is claiming for the Executive now to dissolve
Parliament and go to the country

The Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill) : I never said anything of
the sort. I must make it absolutely dear that it does not rest with any
Prime Minister to dissolve Parliament. The utmost he can do is to
tender advice to the Crown.

Mr. Price : That, of course, is the law, but in actual fact the advice
comes from the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister: This is one of the exceptional occasions when
the Prerogative of the Crown comes into play and where in doubtful
circumstances the Crown would refer to other advisers. It has been
done on several occasions. I must make it absolutely clear that it does,
not rest with the Government of the day. It would be most improper!
on my part to use any language which suggested that I have the/
power to make such a ^ecision. ^

i86

Parliament

COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1945

Proceedings before the Select Committee on Procedure , 1945-6

The Right Hon. Herbert Morrison, M.P., Lord President of
the Council, Examined :

Mr. Messer

134. As is known by those who have had any experience of Com-
mittees, a lot of time has been wasted sometimes owing to the inability
to get a quorum. Of course we understand that it is the Government’s
job to ensure its quorum, but does Mr. Morrison think it would be an
improvement if the Selection Committee selected smaller Committees
as permanent Committees, with a number of added people who would
have specialised knowledge and that the quorum should be reduced ? —
On the face of it, I am sympathetic to the point that Mr. Messer puts.
There are some complications about it. My whole bias would be in
favour of smaller Committees sitting round a horseshoe table and
arguing out in a friendly and objective way the details of a Bill. The
question is whether they would argue them out in a friendly and
co-operative way, and whether they would act in the horseshoe spirit,
which is rather contrary to the general Parliamentary tradition on the
handling of Bills on Committee stage. If they could do it in the right
spirit, in the spirit that would be conducive to that end, there is a lot
to be said for a smaller Committee, but I doubt whether it fits into
our Parliamentary traditions that they will do so. The trouble about
a small Committee is, to be perfectly frank, that it reduces the Govern-
ment’s majority, and if the Government’s majority is reduced too much,
whatever Government it may be, irrespective of Party, then the risk
tends to increase unless it has got absolutely iron reliability on the part
of its own members, which it has not always got in a Committee. . . .

Now, as to the matter of specialisation of members, I think that the
principle which now obtains, whereby there is a Committee A, B, C,
and so on, with a number of members on it to which a number of
members are added who want to go on, or are supposed to have special
knowledge and probably very often have special knowledge about it,
is right. But I would not myself favour the principle that you tried to
turn the Standing Committees into specialists on a Bill. I think a lot
of longhaired planners on a Town Planning Bill, all of them long-
haired, would be a dreadful thing. A substantial body of common-
sense citizens would be a good thing. I think a body of 100 per cent,
educationists on an Education Bill would be a dreadful thing, or a
"body of doctors on a Health Bill. The great quality of Parliament is
the quality of sense, of average intelligence examining into these
matters, Jbeing a sort of Jury*? and I do not favour the SDecialist

Committees of the House of Commons , 1949 187

committee too much; but a specialist element on a Committee is a
good thing. . . .

136. You do spend a lot of time in Committee, and when you get
to the end of a Session, and you are not able to complete it, it means
that the whole of that time has been wasted. Is there not some argu-
ment in favour of carrying on to the next Session? — There is. I am
in two minds about it. It is an awful thing if the House and the Com-
mittees have considered a Bill at some length and then the prorogation
comes and off it goes. It is a very sad event, and it is a shocking waste
of Parliamentary time. On the other hand, as with most things about
Parliamentary procedure, there are two angles to it. If the Government
knows that it can carry on it may be less forthcoming in coming to a
compromise with the Opposition and its critics; it may be more
obstinate and more pigheaded; there is that against it. The other thing
is that the Opposition is in a dilemma, too. If it proceeds to block or
obstsuct a Bill towards the end of a Session, which it knows to be
popular, it may think twice about it, if it means the death of the Bill.
It may think more about it if the Bill is unpopular, or it believes it is
unpopular. Therefore, it is a two-edged sword; it cuts both ways. In
my present mood (I reserve the right to change my opinion), I should
say that taking the balance of things, on the whole it is a good thing
that both the Government and the Opposition should know that if they
do not get their business finished by a certain date then something sad is
going to happen. It is a good incentive to both sides, and whilst I want
guillotines and closures, and whatnot within reason, I think it is a good
thing to reserve the element of excitement, adventure, and even gamble,
about Parliament, in some respects, because it keeps us ail alive ....

PARLL4MENTARY CONTROL OF NATIONALISED
INDUSTRIES

(A)

House of Commons Official Report; Standing Committees , 1496-47, VoL II,

cc. 1900 sqq .

Transport Bill; Standing Committee B ; 29 February 1947
Sir David Maxwell Fyfe: . . . the Minister is taking extremely
wide and unnecessary powers. It will be observed that . . . he —

may, after consultation with the Commission —

and, of course, consultation with the Commission ties him to nothing,
but merely means th&t there must be a discussion between his officials
and the officials of the Commission — ,

i88

Parliament

. . . give to the Commission directions of a general character as to the exercise
and performance by the Commission of their functions . . .

That, again, would be very wide in itself; but there are the additional
words :

... in relation to matters which appear to him to affect the national interest. . . .

We have heard from the learned Attorney-General that when such
words as c appear to him” are inserted in a Clause, the effect is to
leave it entirely to the Minister, without check or control of any kind,
and to make the test an entirely subjective one. Therefore, it appears
to us that it is equivalent to saying he may give directions of a general
character on any matter on which he chooses. . . .

Mr. Barnes: . . . There is a definite constitutional change in the
legislation we are introducing in this Parliament with regard to public
corporations from what prevailed in similar types of corporations
before the war. For instance, in the legislation which created bodies
like the London Passenger Transport Board or the Electricity Com-
missioners, you do not find within the provisions of those Acts of Par-
liament the powers which the Minister is given in . . . this Bill, but
then it was not contemplated by the Government of the day that they
should be part of the economic organisation pf the State to secure, or
to give their contribution towards, a policy of full employment. . . .

(B)

House of Commons Official Report ; Standing Committees , igqG-qy, VoL IV,

cc. 633 sqq.

Electricity Bill; Standing Committee E; 13 March igqj
„ Mr. R. S. Hudson: ... I think it would be for the general con-
venience of the Committee if I asked the Minister if he could give us
a short description of how he visualises the development of his rela-
tions . . . with the Central [Electrical] Authority. For example, we
would like to know of the extent to which he visualises the Central
Authority will be under his control, and to what extent can Parliament
hold the Minister responsible for the actions of the Central
Authority. . . .

The Minister of Fuel and Power (Mr. Emmanuel Shinwell) :

. . . To begin with, we are following the precedent created in 1938 by
the then Conservative Government, when the Board of Trade was
"■empowered to give to the Coal Commission general directions as to the
exercise of their functions in a certain part of 7 the Coal Act. The
powers so vested in the Board ^f Trade were to be exercised without

Parliamentary Control of Nationalised Industries 1 89

consultation. We have gone further ...;we have said that the Minister
may exercise his power of general direction after consultation with the
Central Authority. The procedure we propose to adopt is provided for
in the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act; it is also in the Civil Aviation
Act. . . .

[The] National Coal Board was appointed by the Minister (that
is, by myself), and ... he took no responsibility for appointments to
be made by them. There was no provision in the Coal Industry Nation-
alisation Act for the setting up of Divisional Boards or Area Boards. . . .
That was left entirely to the discretion of the National Coal Board;
they were to create the organisation appropriate to the proper con-
duct of the industry. Therefore, when questions were addressed to me
in the House on the administrative activities of the National Coal Board
I naturally declined to give an answer, because upon these matters I
did not enter into consultation with the National Coal Board. . . .

With regard to our purpose in seeking this power of general direc-
tion, I will endeavour to give three reasons which apply so far as
electricity supply is concerned. ... It is [not] desirable that in the
provision of huge structures like generating stations, strategical interest
should be ignored. . . .

Regarding the provision of electricity supply, it is . . . part of the
Government’s economic policy to provide for development in what
were previously regarded as depressed or special areas. ... It may,
therefore, be necessary for the Minister to exercise a power of direction
and to indicate to the Central Authority that it is desirable to provide
electricity supplies in a particular area in order to fit in with the
Government’s economic policy.

There is also the question of research. ... [It] is desirable that the
Government should be able to give some indication of a new departure
breaking into new fields of study and research, and to ask for investiga-
tion into matters of this sort. ... c

(C)

House of Commons Debates , 4 December 194J ; Official Report , cc, 565 sqq.

Mr. Herbert Morrison: In the light of experience so far gained,
the Government have reviewed the question of replies to Parliamentary
inquiries about the work of socialised industries. . . .

Under recent legislation, boards have been set up to run socialised
industries on business lines on behalf of the community; and Ministers
are not responsible for their day-to-day administration. A large degree
of independence for the boards in matters of current administration is
vital to their efficiency as commercial undertakings. A Minister ir»y
responsible to Parliament for action which he may take in relation to
a board, or action coming; within his* statutory powers which he has

Obg

Parliament

igo

not taken. This is the principle that determines generally the matters
on which a Question may be put down for answer by a Minister in
the House of Commons. Thus, the Minister would be answerable for
any directions he gave in the national interest, and for the action which
he took on proposals which a board was required by Statute to lay
before him.

It would be contrary to this principle, and to the clearly expressed
intention of Parliament in the governing legislation, if Ministers were
to give, in replies in Parliament or in letters, information about day-
to-day matters. Undue intervention by the Minister would tend to
impair the board’s commercial freedom of action. The boards of
socialised industries are under an obligation to submit annual reports
and accounts which are to be laid before Parliament. In the Govern-
ment’s view, it is right that Parliament should from time to time review
the work of the boards, on the basis of the reports and accounts
presented to Parliament. ... „

(D)

House of Commons Debates , y June 1948; Official Report , cc. 1699 sqq.

Mr. Speaker (Colonel Clifton Brown) : . . . I am now in a
position to state the conclusions I have reached after careful considera-
tion of the difficulties which have recently arisen with regard to
Questions dealing with the nationalised industries.

. . . Questions addressed to Ministers should relate to the public
affairs with which they are officially connected, to proceedings pending
in Parliament or to matters of c administration for which they are
responsible. Rule 26 . . . excludes Questions repeating in substance
Questions already answered or to which an answer has been refused. . . .

. . . The Government, in their desire not to interfere in the day to
day activities of the Boards of nationalised industries, have by what
might be termed a “self-denying ordinance” refused to answer many
Questions on subjects which, by a strict interpretation of the statutes,
might be held to fall within their responsibility. They are fully entitled
to do so — that is a matter for their discretion. But such a refusal brings
into action Rule 26 . . . and prevents the admission to the Question
Paper of all future Questions dealing with the class of matters dealt
with by the Question to which an answer was refused.

I have come to the conclusion that in the case of an entirely novel
branch of the administration, such as that relating to the nationalised
industries, the strict application of this Rule might operate more
harshly than either Ministers or Members generally would wish. I am,
therefore, prepared to make a suggestion which I hope will recommend
itself to the House, for the power of dispensing 'with its recognised
rules belongs to the House alongr and not to me.

Parliamentary Control of Nationalised Industries 191

I propose to leave the Rule which excludes Questions on matters
outside Ministerial responsibility unchanged. But I am prepared, if
it is generally approved, to exercise my discretion to direct the accept-
ance of Questions asking for a statement to be made on matters about
which information has been previously refused, provided that, in my
opinion, the matters are of sufficient public importance to justify this
concession. . . .

... of course, it by no means follows that Ministers will be bound
to answer any Question which I have allowed as being of “public
importance 55 ; that is their affair. . . .

(E)

House of Commons Debates , 25 October 1950; Official Report , cc. 2jgg sqq .

The Lord President of the Council (Mr. Herbert Morrison) :

I beg to move,

That this House notes the steps which have been taken to give effect to the
responsibility to the community (including consumers and workpeople) of
the socialised industries, and will welcome any further measures to increase
their public accountability, consistently with the duty of the Boards to manage
the industries with maximum efficiency in the public interest.

•

... In the first place, it is desirable that the House should try to
make up its mind as to the basis upon which it desires these com-
mercial undertakings to be run. It is a perfectly fair case for argument
whether a publicly-owned industry should b$ vested in a Minister
and allocated to ordinary State departmental management.

Mr. Oliver Lyttelton: Like the Post Office.

Mr. Morrison: Like the Post Office. . . . For example, it is arguable
whether gas and electricity could not have been adequately managed
directly by the Minister of Fuel and Power rather than being placed
under a public corporation, or what now amounts to a series of public
corporations because of the area boards. . . .

... it is often urged that when it comes to the sheer business of
commercial matters the machinery of a State Department necessarily
works slower than that of an ordinary commercial concern. There is
truth in that, not because of any inherent incompetence in the Civil
Service or of State administration, but precisely because Ministers are
absolutely responsible to Parliament for everything that happens in
their Departments. And that is right; that is as it should be.

But the consequence necessarily is that when civil servants arc doing
things, either with the specific authority of a Minister or in accordance
with the policy he is presumed to have approved, and probably ha 5 >*
or in ordinary day-to-day affairs where policy does not arise, there is
in the minds of the civil servants inevkably the consideration : Is there

Parliament

192

likely to be a Parliamentary argument about this? Is there likely to
be criticism in the Press? Is the Minister likely to find himself in
disagreement with his colleagues in the Government? Or is there
likely to be in any form bother and trouble about it ?

Consequently, the Civil Service machine, with minutes going to
and fro, must inevitably be cautious and careful because of the possi-
bility of Parliamentary trouble, trouble with the public, criticism in
the Press, and so on. One does not want to discourage this too much,
because a healthy respect for Parliament by the civil servants in the
State Departments is a good thing. ... It is an inevitable consequence
that because the State Department realises the responsibility of the
Minister to Parliament, and has the instinct that it must try to keep
its Minister out of trouble, we get caution, checking and counter-
checking in a way that is not in accordance with commercial practice
or with the speed of decision which is desirable in business under-
takings. *

. . . When we set up a public corporation, what are we trying to do ?
We are trying to get the best of both worlds. After all, that is half the
art of politics, of Parliament and of public administration. . . .

We are trying to do this: First, we have a public concern ... in
which is invested the public ownership of certain economic under-
takings, and there are channels of accountability, of Parliamentary
argument and of discussion. Secondly, we try to graft on to that basis
a commercial or business management capable of acting with speed,
capable of rapid decisions, and a business concern which is in a situation
whereby it can make mistakes from time to time without causing an
immediate Parliamentary crisis of furore, or great criticism or embar-
rassment for the Minister.

... if we have a public corporation, in order to get the advantages
of commercial management and in order to free it from other meticu-
lous Parliamentary and political control, the House must take it that,
in those circumstances, the details of Parliamentary questions and the
details of Ministerial management, supervision and control have to be
foregone. . . .

Suppose we accept the “whole-hog” doctrine that a Minister has to
be answerable to Parliament for everything a board does, and that
members of boards must be liable to be summoned before a Select
Committee for annual examinations at some length. The inevitable
consequence follows that there will develop in the minds of the members
of the boards, their officers and their commercial employees the same
sort of spirit as in the Civil Service — that they will look over their
shoulder and be exceedingly careful, because they may be pulled up
% a Parliamentary question or by a Select Committee of the House of
Commons. We shall have evolving within the management of these
boards the^same spirit that we have in the Civil Service, something;

Parliamentary Control of Nationalised Industries 193

that is quite good in its own sphere but that would not be good in the
case of these boards. . . .

I come now to the suggestion, which has been made in more than
one quarter, that a Select Committee or Select Committees should
be set up to examine the publicly-owned industries from year to year
and report to the House on their conduct. Members who have made
this suggestion have realised that it would be necessary to provide the
Select Committee with an official, who would presumably need a
staff, so that the Committee could get adequate and competent
advice, giving them the raw material on the basis of which appropriate
questions could be put.

The suggestion has been made for the appointment of an official,
something like the Comptroller and Auditor-General, but perhaps with
special commercial and business experience, to advise the Committee
in the same way as the Comptroller and Auditor-General advises the
Estimates Committee [sic] and the Public Accounts Committee. That
is an idea and a possibility, but we are rather against it for the reasons
I have already indicated. It would take-up a good deal of the time of
the chairman and the other members of the board and their principal
officers. It would take them away from their business and it would
tend to make them nervous throughout the year about appearing
before the S^ect Committee. . . .

That is not to say there should not be periodical reviews of these
great economic undertakings, which are of such great importance to
the nation. We are disposed to think that we might here follow — and
I have the agreement of the chairmen of the boards to this course —
the procedure which has been adopted in connection with the peri-
odical inquiry into the British Broadcasting Corporation. They are
inquiries by citizens wffio hear evidence from other people, pay visits,
and make a report, which, in due course, is available to Parliament
and the public.

... It must not be too often. I think that something in the nature
of a seven-year period would be about right for the public corpora-
tions. If they are held too often, there is the disadvantage that the
men running them would get nervous and be looking over their
shoulder. I think about seven years would be right. It would be right
to include a limited number of Members of Parliament as was done
in the case of the B.B.C. Inquiry. It would be a valuable element and
would give an association with the Parliamentary institution without
the disadvantages of the Select Committee.

We have discussed this with the chairmen of the boards and they
are agreeable in principle to this being done. I am happy to say there
is agreement about it. The object would be to conduct an examinatio 1 ;^
not so much of a technical character but broadly, and to make recom-
mendations on policy and structure? This is really a move forward

Parliament

194

in the matter of public accountability of a character that would not
interfere with the commercial efficiency of the boards. . . .

Sir Ralph Glyn : . . . The point of this Debate, surely, is whether
Parliament is willing to surrender its control over expenditure. . . .
[There] are certain public industries which are maintained by a
subsidy from Parliament. The air services are public, nationalised
bodies and are dependent on subsidies. Transport is not; it is to be
organised in such a way as to operate independently. All the nation-
alised bodies, however, if they want to raise funds, have power under
the Acts which were passed by this House to go to the Treasury and
get a guarantee before they make an issue — that is, public money. I
was rather distressed when the Lord President, of all people, seemed
to ignore the chief duty of the House of Commons as the guardian of
public expenditure. If we do not carry out that duty, we give up one
of our main functions. . . .

Mr. Oliver Lyttelton : . . . First of all, let us look at Parliamentary
control. The plain fact is that the structure of government, considering
the way it has arisen and the^duties and responsibilities of this House,
cannot be satisfactorily geared to a corporation engaged in day-to-day
business. . . .

Secondly, where a public monopoly is operated with all the force of
authority of this House and of Ministers who are responsible to this
House, there can be no satisfactory protection for the consumer. . . .
The third point is that when we come to administrative efficiency we
must find that decentralisation ... is entirely the opposite of the theory
of nationalisation. Decentralisation means giving autonomy, or very
nearly, to local bodies, whether local authorities or local boards. . . .

... I turn, first, to the matter of accountability. ... If the day-to-
day administrative details are to be the subject of day-to-day questioning
across the Floor of this House, then I give my opinion, for what it is
tvorth, that administration will become practically impossible. Apart
from the time that would be spent in answering questions upon
administrative detail, there is also the psychology which is built up.

All of us who have been Ministers, and many of us who have not,
are aware of the splash with which a Parliamentary Question falls
into the Ministerial pool, and how the Civil Service is engaged upon
trying to prevent the ripples from spreading. These Questions arrive
in a Government office rather as the broker’s man or a bailiff arrives
in the house of the debtor. . . . The whole technique of the Civil
Service is at the disposal of the Minister to try to prevent the hon.
Member who has put the Question on the Order Paper from finding
out what is really going on, covering up the mistakes. At long last, if

concession has to be made to an intrusive Member, the Civil Service
very rightly tries to localise the effect and to prevent the concession
from becoming a precedent. *

Parliamentary Control of Nationalised Industries 195

This psychology has many disadvantages in the ordinary administra-
tion of Acts of Parliament, but it would be quite fatal — and I think
the Lord President agrees with me on this — if it were applied to
national boards in day-to-day industry. It would act as a brake to
the whole effort. If hon. Members ask the Minister of Transport why
the cod on the 6.30 from Waterloo once again tastes like cold, damp
cotton-wool, the task of the right hon. Gentleman, which is clearly far
beyond his or anybody else’s powers already, would become quite
impossible. I think this is common ground, but, on the other hand,
and speaking more seriously, vast sums of public money have been
invested in these industries. The idea of a Minister disclaiming respon-
sibility for this investment is repugnant to the ideas of Parliamentary
control of expenditure and cuts across the control of the purse which,
both actually and historically, is the first sanction in the hands of this
House. . . .

F find the subject a difficult one and I can do no more than suggest
some steps towards a solution. I believe that Ministers have to accept
responsibility for much more questioning upon these national boards
and that they have to exercise the right, which they have, of not
answering the questions if, in their judgment, these apply to trivial
administrative details. The House of Commons will be an extremely
good judge of whether this refusal is being used in the public interest . . ,
or as a cloak to conceal administrative incompetence. . . .

Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries ( H.C . 332 of 1352)

2. Your Committee have decided to concentrate in their First
Report upon Questions to Ministers. . . .

6. In general, Questions must be confined to matters for which tfye
appropriate minister is responsible. In the case of the Nationalised
Industries, a large amount of responsibility has been vested in the
Board. The list of duties for which the Minister is still responsible, and
on which he may therefore by the practice of the House be questioned,
is usually set out in a definite Section in each Statute. The duties vary
slightly from one industry to another, but very roughly may be
classified as:

(a) giving to the Board directions of a general character as to the
exercise and performance by the Board of their functions in relation
to matters appearing to the Minister to affect the national interest;

(b) procuring information on any point from the Board;

(r) a number of specific duties in connexion with the appointments^*
salaries and conditions of service of members of Boards; pro-
grammes of research and development, and of education and

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196

training; borrowing by Boards; forms of accounts and audits;
annual reports; pensions schemes and compensation for displace-
ment; and the appointment of Consumers 5 Councils, their organi-
sation and operation. . . .

14. Your Committee are aware of a strong desire in some quarters
to make the Nationalised Industries as generally subject to Parlia-
mentary Questions as the Post Office and all the other Civil Depart-
ments. Certain points, however, must be borne in mind in considering
the advantages and disadvantages of such a policy.

15. The public corporations which control the Nationalised Indus-
tries were constituted on different lines from the usual civil depart-
ments. The public corporations were established as independent
entities, with statutory obligations to meet their expenditure by their
own revenue. Their activities involve commercial transactions on a
large scale, and it is desirable that they should not be unduly ham-
pered by external interference. On the other hand, it is urged that the
nation has become the owners of the enormous assets involved in those
industries, and it is widely feft that there should be means of enquiry
and criticism. . . .

17. The basic feature of the Parliamentary Question is that it is
answered by the Minister ultimately responsible for the decisions about
which he is questioned. Under their existing constitution^ the Nation-
alised Industries are not subject to any direct control by Ministers in
individual matters of detail. Your Committee therefore feel that without
altering the terms of the statutes under which the public corporations
are constituted, which tfiey are not empowered to recommend, Questions
on matters of detail in the Nationalised Industries are inappropriate.

18. On the other hand, Your Committee are convinced that the
present method of placing the onus of determining in the first place
whether a Question which is not obviously ruled out under paragraph
1 7 above should be placed upon the Order Paper should not rest upon
the Clerks at the Table. Where the identical Question, or the same
Question in slightly different terms, has been previously asked, the
Clerks at the Table are clearly obliged to refuse it. But in the case of
questions which are not obviously matters of repetition or matters of
detailed administration the questions should be allowed to appear on
the Order Paper and the Minister would have to answer or refuse to
answer on the floor of the House. . . .

(G)

^Pefiort from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries ( H.C , 255 of 1Q53)

2. Our terms of reference direct us to consider the present methods
by which the House of Commons is informed of the affairs of the

Parliamentary Control of Nationalised Industries 197

Nationalised Industries, and to report what changes, having regard
to the provisions laid down by Parliament in the relevant statutes,
might be desirable in those methods. The present methods ... of
obtaining information . . . comprise the following:

(1) Debate on Motions

(a) Motions specifically concerning one or more of the industries,
either moved by a Minister or by some other Member when the
Government have given time for the debate;

(b) “Ballot Motions 55 in Private Members 3 * 5 time;

( d ) The daily half-hour adjournment at the close of the sitting;

(e) Adjournment Motions moved by a Minister for the purpose of
debating a particular subject.

(A) Debate in Committee of Supply or on an amendment to the question
“That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair 55 (under Standing Order
No. 17 (2) for Committee of Supply).

(3) Debate on Bills whether Public or*Private dealing with one or
more of the industries.

(4) Debate on Motions to approve or annul Orders or other Statutory
Instruments made by Ministers under the various nationalisation Acts.

(5) The annual reports and accounts of the various Boards and Com-
missions, which are laid before Parliament.

(6) Questions to Ministers . . . .

3. There is, however, no doubt that there ?s a general desire for
information about the Nationalised Industries. The Nationalised

Industries publish voluminous reports, but these do not completely
meet the needs of Parliament or the public, partly owing to their
sheer volume and complexity, and partly because information is noj
necessarily available on the matters on which it is required or when
it is required. . . .

5. A matter which also weighed in our minds was that the Nation-
alised Industries had insufficient opportunity of presenting their case
to Parliament and the public, and were exposed to public pressure in
various ways and much irresponsible criticism. That there was this
difficulty was confirmed by Lord Hurcomb, 1 who said, “One of the
very greatest handicaps under which anyone in my position suffers is
that he gets no opportunity of stating his own case or of explaining
what are his difficulties direct to Members of Parliament. 55 ... “It
has been borne on me, if I may say so, without causing offence in
any quarter, . . . that a great many misapprehensions do exist, and.
perhaps decisions ar$ taken on some supposition of fact which is not
correct.” ...

1 Chairman^of the British Transport Commission.

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198

7. The arguments in favour of the proposal to set up a Committee
[to inform Parliament of the affairs of these industries] were briefly
summarised in the evidence given by Mr. Molson, speaking for
himself, ... in the following words :

In the past the House of Commons has always found it convenient, when
confronted with a special problem, to appoint a committee. I think the
reasons for this are threefold. First, in order that a few Members of Parliament
may give intensive study to the problem; secondly, that there may be inter-
rogation of witnesses and investigation of papers and maps ; thirdly, in order
that in the seclusion of a committee room there may be comparative freedom
from political prejudice. ... I believe that the committee which I am advocat-
ing should elucidate what I might call deep problems of policy. I am sure
it is important to avoid day-to-day interference with detail, but there is I
think a great need that from time to time Parliament should have an oppor-
tunity of taking stock.

8. The possibility of setting up a Committee was put to Lord
Hurcomb and Sir Edward Bridges, 1 and additional arguments for the
proposal were given by them. . . . Lord Hurcomb said :

The sort of Committee that it seems to me would do much to satisfy the
very legitimate demand of Parliament for a greater knowledge than can be
got in debate about the affairs of one of these* great corporations, would
be something in the nature of a standing committee, so thatfthere would be
continuity of personnel — a group of members who took a special and continuing
interest in a particular activity, not merely because it was nationalised, but
more from the actual interest that the Committee has in the subject.

He went on to say that —

A Committee of this sort would, or ought to mean, on that aspect, as these
matters get further away from the highly controversial, that a large number of
Members of Parliament would have an opportunity of satisfying themselves
f and conveying, not by way of attack and of public speech, but by way of
suggestion to the organisation, the points where they thought something might
be going wrong, or at any rate, would be worth looking into. That would be
of great value.

9. It was strongly represented to us that the proposal to set up a
permanent Committee of enquiry . . . was not only contrary to the
spirit and intention of the Acts under which the industries were nation-
alised, but an innovation in and hostile to the general pattern of the
British constitution. As Lord Reith 2 said:

I should have thought the appointment of a select committee, ad hoc , on a
Nationalised Industry was in effect a negation of what Parliament deliberately
sdid in setting it up. Parliament passed a sort of self-denying ordinance taking
from itself the right of direct interference, as with Government Departments.

1 Permanent Secretary^to the Treasury.

2 Chairman of the Colonial Development Corporation.

Parliamentary Control of Nationalised Industries 199

Unless there is to be a revision of attitude, I would have thought it was con-
trary to the principle of what was done that you should set up a committee
whether of one House or both. ... It would seem a sort of institutionalisation
of the Parliamentary Question, the very thing Parliament denied itself. . . .

10. The same argument was enlarged by Mr. Herbert Morrison.
Later ... he adduced a more fundamental objection. When he was
asked “Really, your objection to the Select Committee is not only to
its possible ineffectiveness, but also that it is not perhaps the function
of Parliament to intervene on the efficiency side to the extent which
is envisaged by a select committee going into it ? 55 he answered, “I
would die for Parliament — I have an enormous admiration for it —
but I do not think it is the kind of body to which you could entrust
this to the point of alteration of the actual management of a complex
industrial concern . 55

1 1 . Another argument against the proposal was that a Committee
would raise the whole question of the responsibility for managing and
directing the operations of the public corporations. If a Select Com-
mittee were constantly enquiring into th$ policy and operations of the
corporation, it would necessarily cause uncertainty in the industry as
to where the ultimate decisions lay; and this might possibly make
accountability less rather than more secure. As Lord Reith said, when
the proposal ^as put to him, “For whom would the public corporation
be working, putting it quite straightly ? 55 And he indicated that a
select committee which might start as a friendly communicative body
might end by investigating and controlling.

12. The main argument, however, which* has been advanced
against the proposal is that it would ifnpede the working of the Nation-
alised Industries and destroy initiative in them. . . . Witnesses were
apprehensive of a committee if its functions included enquiries into
wide decisions of policy. . . . Witnesses expressed themselves even more
strongly over the possibility that the Committee might investigate the
detailed management of the industries. Lord Reith even spoke of it
as a terrifying prospect. . . .

14 . The basic argument for the establishment of a Committee to be
a liaison between the nationalised industries and Parliament and elicit
such information as is necessary on behalf of the House of Commons
is that such a Committee is the only practical means of performing
those functions. Last session we investigated the possibility of extending
the sphere of the Parliamentary Question, and reported that it was
inadvisable. Apart from this the number of ways by which the House
of Commons can, on its own initiative, obtain information is lupited.
There is debate, the various forms of which we have already set out^
but which has not fully satisfied members and sometimes has not
occurred sufficiently frequently or sufficiently soon after the issue of
Reports; there is the procedure of moving for returns, wljich is not

200

Parliament

frequently used or altogether appropriate. There remains only the
Committee, a body appointed by the House to obtain information
for it.

15. We have therefore decided that we must either accept the

objections, and thus abandon all possibility of dealing with the present
situation; or, despite the difficulties make — with due safeguards — pro-
vision for such an enlargement of the field of parliamentary accounta-
bility as will provide the House of Commons with the information
which it rightly requires without, in obtaining that information, inter-
fering with or jeopardising the efficiency of the Nationalised Industries.
A Committee appears to be the most appropriate means by which this
can be done. It is essential that the Committee which we are recom-
mending will, when appointed, set up a tradition of conduct which
will result in its being regarded by the Board not as an enemy, or a
critic, but as a confidant, and a protection against irresponsible pres-
sure, as well as a guardian of the public interest. ... r

16. . . . The arguments in favour of a Joint Committee [of both
Houses of Parliament] . . . are that the House of Lords has a great
number of members with business and other experience available for
the work; that in general the peers are less encumbered with the
pressing distractions of everyday work; that the members of the other
House are less dedicated to party allegiance'; that thej^ membership
of their House would give the committee the element of continuity
which it would need ; and that if a Committee were appointed of one
House alone, the other House might possibly set up another Committee
with unfortunate results.

17. We feel, however, that some of the work of the proposed Com-
mittee must be of a financial nature, and would be more fittingly done
by a Committee of the House of Commons. Nationalisation arose as
an act of policy and, for certain industries and services, has been
harried into law on the initiative of the representatives of the people
in the House of Commons. It can be said that the general public are
now the owners of the Nationalised Industries. It seems entirely appro-
priate to us, therefore, that any Parliamentary Committee set up to
examine, and obtain information about, these industries at this stage
of their development should be an exclusively House of Commons
Committee. . . . On balance therefore we decided with some regrets
against the proposal of a Joint Committee.

18. . . . the proposed Committee . . . should, we considered, take
over the right which the Committee of Public Accounts at present has
to examine the accounts of the Nationalised Industries, and which that
Committee is unable at present fully to exercise. . . .

20. . . . the Committee should, in our opinion, be empowered to
extend its enquiries more widely than those which the Committee of
Public Accounts makes into tbfe Government Departments. It should

Parliamentary Control of Nationalised Industries 20 1

have a regard, not merely to present and past financial probity and
stability, but to future plans and programmes.

21. . . .we consider that the Committee should have power to get
information as to the policy of the corporations. It would have no
need to investigate any decision which is the result of a direction from
the responsible Minister, and for which he is accountable to Parlia-
ment. Again, any matters which are normally decided by collective
bargaining arrangements should be avoided. . . .

28. In considering a model for the organisation of the Committee,
we had in mind the Committee of Public Accounts. . . . That the
Committee of Public Accounts should . . . have proved more successful
than the Select Committee on Estimates is undoubtedly due to the
work of the Comptroller and Auditor-General and his staff. ... It
was clear to us that the proposed new Committee would need the
assistance of a similar permanent official. ... It was, however, realised
that* as the proposed Committee would have to deal more with con-
temporary and future matters than is the case of the work of the
Committee of Public Accounts, the permanent official would have a
different approach from the Comptroller and Auditor- General. . . .

33. It was . . . suggested that the permanent officer of the Committee

should be an officer from a central department of State, perhaps the
Treasury. After consideration, however, we feel that the permanent
officer of the Committee, once appointed, should be a servant of the
House of Commons, and not of the Government or any of the cor-
porations, and not removable except by an address from each House
of Parliament. •

34. We have come to the conclusion that the staff of the proposed
committee should be as follows : There would necessarily be a Clerk to
the Committee supplied from the staff of the Clerk of the House in the
normal way. Then there would be a permanent official of a status
roughly equivalent to the Comptroller and Auditor-General or Mr.
Speaker’s Counsel. He would work with the assistance of at least one
professional accountant, and such other staff as the Committee may
deem useful, and would examine the reports and accounts of the
Nationalised Industries in order to direct the Committee’s attention
to matters requiring examination. If the Committee so desired, the
Minister in charge of the Department responsible for the general
oversight of the industry whose affairs were under review should be
invited to send a senior official to assist the Committee in the examina-
tion of evidence. . . .

202

Parliament

THE WORKING OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1946

Third Report from the Select Committee on Procedure ( H.C . 189 of 1946)

I.— INTRODUCTION

1. When Your Committee were appointed in August, 1945, they
were instructed to report as soon as possible upon a scheme for the
acceleration of proceedings on public bills. ... In the course of this
inquiry, the Clerk of the House [Sir Gilbert Campion] was invited
and undertook to prepare a comprehensive scheme for the reform of
parliamentary procedure. . . .

3. The last comprehensive inquiry into the procedure of the House
was made in 1931-32 by a Select Committee under the chairmanship
of Mr. Ernest Brown. The problem facing that Committee was diow
to adapt procedure to the growing pressure of business, a problem
which, as they recognised, \yas by no means new and presents itself
“in almost every elective assembly in countries where modern views as
to the powers and duties of the State are finding expression. 55 The
problem facing Your Committee is fundamentally the same — in the
course of the intervening fifteen years it has only become more acute.
But the atmosphere in which Your Committee approach their task is
entirely different from that in which the former Committee found
themselves. The country was then undergoing a time of severe economic
stress, of industrial depression and widespread unemployment, and
there was a tendency to criticish all the institutions of government,
including Parliament itself. Correspondingly, many of the remedies
proposed to that Committee were of a kind which would have funda-
mentally changed the whole character and function of Parliament.
Your Committee have been appointed at a time when the country has
recently emerged from a war in which parliamentary activity was
maintained and contributed in large measure to its successful prosecu-
tion. Consequently there is not at the present time any strong or
widespread desire for changes in the essential character of the institu-
tion. Indeed, the prestige of Parliament has probably never stood
higher.

4. With these considerations in mind. Your Committee do not feel
that they are called upon to consider or recommend any proposal to
alter the essential character of the House of Commons. But past success
affords no ground for complacency about the present, still less about

future, and, as Sir Gilbert Campion remarks, parliamentary pro-
cedure tends always to be a little out of date. The danger to parlia-
mentary government in this country at the present time is less likely
to arise fyom lack of confidence in it than from the overwhelming

Working of the House of Commons , 1946 203

burden which the growth of Governmental activity places upon it.
This burden has become greater, not less, with the arrival of peace,
and it seems probable that it may increase. It is therefore a matter
for constant vigilance to ensure that the machinery is continuously
adapted and strengthened to bear the new burdens put upon it. . . .

5. The problem therefore is how to adapt the procedure of the
House to enable it to perform efficiently all its functions in relation to
present and prospective governmental activity. The Clerk of the
House accordingly devotes the first part of his memorandum to an
analysis of parliamentary time from the point of view of the various
functions which the House of Commons is called upon to perform. He
adopts a fourfold classification: representation of popular opinion,
control of finance, formulation and control of policy, and legislation.
Dismissing representation from his calculations, because it has no
special form of procedure allocated to it, he proceeds to analyse the
amount of time spent on these functions. . . . This analysis shows that
in the last 40 years (excluding the war years), the overall length of
the Session has not varied much, and that the distribution of time
between the various functions has remained remarkably steady. Legis-
lation, as might be expected, has occupied the largest amount of time,
slightly under half on an average. Control of policy and administra-
tion is found to occupy a relatively high proportion, roughly 40 per
cent., and is the most constant element of all. Control of finance
occupies the least time, about 10 per cent, of the session.

II. — LEGISLATION

6. . . . legislation takes up more of the time of the House than either
of the other two main functions. Over the last 40 years it has on the
average occupied not quite half the total time available, and the pro-*
portion has remained remarkably constant during the period. In
the first part of the period, 1906-13, when the average length of the
session was 149 days, 75*7 days were spent on legislation; in the
second part of the period, 1919-29, when sessions tended to be shorter
(139*9 days on the average) the amount of time spent on legislation
fell proportionally to 62*8 days; and in the last part of the period,

1 929-38, when sessions became longer again (157*7 days on the
average), the average time spent on legislation rose to 79*7 days.

7. Although th e proportion of the session spent on legislation remained
constant, . . . the volume of legislation per session rose steadily through-
out the whole period. In the first part of the period, the average
number of pages in the sessional volume of the statute book was 355
in the second part of ffie period, in spite of shorter sessions and fewer
days spent on legislation, an average cf 641*8 pages of statutes were

Parliament

204

passed per session; and in the last part of the period the average rose
to 995 pages. In other words, the speed of legislation has increased
from 4-9 pages per legislation day to 13*5 pages. Thus the volume of
legislation increased nearly 2f times, and this result was possible
without increasing the number of days spent on legislation because the
speed of legislating increased in the same proportion.

8. Various causes may have contributed to this result, but so far as
procedure is concerned the saving of time has been brought about by
extending the use of standing committees and by intensifying such
methods of curtailing debate as selection of amendments, the alloca-
tion of time (the 4 ‘guillotine”), and the closure, though the last-named
was used sparingly in the last part of the period.

9. . . . Sir Gilbert Campion infers that it is hardly possible to save

any more of the time of the House by any of the existing methods, and,
if more time is to be saved, some radical reform of procedure is
necessary. ... .

10. The solution Sir Gilbert Campion proposes is that the House
should delegate the detailed consideration of bills at the report stage
to committees. . . . Apart from the Scottish Standing Committee,
there would be two large standing committees consisting of 75 to 100
Members. Each of the three standing committees would be divided
into three sub-committees of 25 Members each. The committee stage
of bills referred to a standing committee would be taken, not by the
standing committee itself, but by one of its sub-committees, reinforced
by the addition of 15 Members in respect of each bill. The sub-
committee, having considered a bill in the usual way, would report
it, not to the House, but to its parent standing committee, which
would consider the bill in the same way as the House does at the report
stage. At this stage, any Member who had given notice of an amend-
ment to a bill committed to a standing committee, might, although
x not a member of that standing committee, attend and move such

amendment and take part in debate upon it, without, however, the
right to vote. The standing committee would then report the bill to
the House, which could, if it wished, recommit it to the standing com-
mittee, but could not amend the bill itself. The bill could, however,
be debated as a whole on the motion for its consideration, and when
this was agreed to, would stand for third reading. . . .

11. . . . The main objection in Your Committee’s view is to the
principle of the scheme. The removal of the report stage of bills from
the floor of the House would be, in the words of Mr. Speaker, “a
drastic interference with the rights of private Members”, and would
also adversely affect any smaller parties who could not receive adequate
representation on the committees and sub- commit tees; and the sug-
gestion . . . that a Member who was not a member of a standing com-
mittee could move amendments without the right to vote, is entirely

Working of the House of Commons , 1946 205

contrary to the traditional practice of the House. There would also be
the practical difficulty that a serious bottle-neck might occur in a
standing committee when a number of bills were coming forward for
consideration by the main committee at the same time as its members
were engaged upon the committee stage of other bills in the sub-
committees. For these reasons Your Committee are unable to recom-
mend the proposal to the House. . . .

III.— CONTROL OF POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION

24. Control of policy and administration occupies on an average
about 40 per cent, of the time of the House — an allocation which on
the face of it appears adequate. But the classification is misleading.
The line between policy and administration may be difficult to draw,
and it is not possible to distinguish forms of procedure which are used
for the specific control of one or the other. Nevertheless the control of
policy and the control of administration are two broadly distinct func-
tions, and if the several forms of procedure which together fall under
this head are examined, it will be seen that by far the greater part of
them is used for the discussion of questions of broad policy rather than
of administrative detail. Thus the Debate on the King’s speech
(5*8 days per session) is used to discuss the broad outlines of the Gov-
ernment programme. Adjournment motions (5-9 days) lend them-
selves to discussion of administrative points, but are often used for
raising questions of policy; and substantive nations (14-2 days) are
used to raise larger subjects. Above all, the business of Supply, which
accounts for the largest amount of time under this head (32*3 days),
has in recent years tended more and more to provide opportunities for
debates on policy. The debates on the various stages of the Consolidated
Fund Bills tend to be taken up with full-day discussions on general
policy rather than with details of administration. The Estimates them-
selves, which in theory provide the occasion par excellence for the raising
of grievances against administration, have of late years tended to be
used for the discussion of major issues of policy. An analysis of the
Departments selected for discussion on Supply days bears out this
impression. Out of 202 days allotted to Supply in ten sessions in the
period 1921 to 1937-38, 24 J were used for the discussion of the Defence
Services, 21 J for Scottish Departments, 20 for the Foreign Office and
1 6^- for the Ministry of Labour. If it be admitted that the debates on
the days spent on Scottish Departments may have been largely
administrative in character, it is fair to assume that the larger part of
the time ostensibly given to the discussion of the Fighting Services, the
Foreign Office and fhe Ministry of Labour, was actually used to dis-
cuss national issues of defence, foreign*policy and economij^problems.

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Parliament

In fine, the amount of time devoted to really administrative points, so
far from tending to increase with the growth of administrative activity,
has greatly diminished.

25. While the time spent on discussing administrative detail in the
House has decreased, the field of administration itself has steadily
increased. Much modern legislation is of an administrative character.
Moreover, an increasing number of statutes confer upon a Minister
or some other authority power to legislate upon matters of administra-
tive detail. How great this field of administrative activity has grown is
indicated by the fact that Statutory Rules and Orders . . . exceed in
volume the annual output of statutes. Leaving out of account the war
years as exceptional, the number of Statutory Rules and Orders
registered in 1937 w T as 1,231, in 1938, 1,661, and in 1945, 1,706.

26. The form of parliamentary control applicable to a Statutory
Instrument is laid dowm by the Act under which it is made. For the
great majority of Instruments, the governing Act provides no paidia-
mentary control at all. In the year 1944, 291 Instruments, out of a
total of 1,483 registered, were subject or liable to parliamentary
proceedings.

27. Parliamentary control, where it is provided, broadly stated, may
take one of two forms. Either the Instrument has to be confirmed by
a resolution of both Houses (sometimes by the House ^of Commons
alone) ; or the Instrument remains in force unless a motion to annul
it is carried by either House within a period prescribed by the Act.
In either case the proceedings are exempted business and are usually
taken at the end of th£ day.

28. Thus, apart from the relatively few Instruments which require

an affirmative resolution, only those in which a Member may discover
cause for objection are discussed in the House. Until 1944, there was
no provision for systematically scrutinising Instruments. In that year
die Select Committee on Statutory Rules and Orders, etc., was set
Up

29. . . . the opportunities for discussing delegated legislation in the
House are extremely limited and not altogether satisfactory. On an
average the actual time so spent has amounted to the equivalent of
1 *6 days per session. In view of this fact and in view of the impossibility
of finding much more time for the discussion of Statutory Instruments
in the House, Sir Gilbert Campion suggests that part of the task of
supervising this form of administrative activity might suitably be
entrusted to a select committee. He suggests that the existing Select
Committee on Statutory Rules and Orders, etc., might be empowered
to consider and report on any Statutory Instrument in force from the
{Joint of view of its efficiency as a means of carrying out the purposes
named by the governing Act. Such a Committee^would be precluded
by its terms of reference from oriticising the policy of the Act under

Working of the House of Commons, 1946 207

which the Instrument was made. Its task would be to inform itself of
the various practical considerations which the responsible Depart-
mental officers had in mind in framing the Instrument and on the
basis of this information to consider whether the Instrument was well
designed for its purpose and whether the method chosen was the least
injurious to the rights of the citizen. . . .

30. Sir Gilbert Campion’s proposal would go some way to supple-
ment the inadequate and unsatisfactory opportunities which the House
at present possesses for exercising its control over one aspect of adminis-
tration. Your Committee consider, however, that the delegation of
legislative power raises issues beyond the scope of the present
investigation. . . .

IV.— CONTROL OF FINANCE

31. Control of finance occupies on an average about 10 per cent, of
the time of the House. The explanation of this relatively small alloca-
tion of time to a subject of such magnitude and importance is that of
the two financial functions which fall under this head, the imposition
of taxation and the control of expenditure, the latter has to a large
account passed from the House itself to the Committee of Public
Accounts and the Select Committee on Estimates. Thus the fifteen
days a sessioif which on an average the House has devoted to financial
control represent only its taxing function and include nothing for
control of expenditure.

(1) Control of Taxation

32. The procedure of the House which is concerned with the authori-
sation of taxation consists of the various stages of the Finance Bill and
the Ways and Means resolutions upon which it is founded.

33. The suggestion was made by the representatives of the Govern-
ment that a small amount of time might be saved by shortening thS
proceedings on the Budget Resolutions and the Finance Bill. It was
said that the present procedure involves duplication at two points:
that the committee stage of the Budget Resolutions is duplicated in the
second reading of the Finance Bill, and the report stage of the Resolu-
tions in the committee stage of the Finance Bill. It was therefore pro-
posed that at the report stage of the Budget Resolutions the question
should be put without amendment or debate, points of detail being
left for discussion at the committee stage of the Finance Bill.

34. The duplication involved in the present procedure is more
apparent than real. The clauses of the Finance Bill do not any
means repeat the phraseology of the Budget Resolutions nor is the
debate necessarily similar in character. It is true that the same points
may be raised on the p committee stage of the Bill as on the report stage
of the resolutions, but the earlier stag # e is more suited, anjl is in fact

208

Parliament

largely used, for a more general financial discussion, while the later
stage is the appropriate stage for considering in detail the Chancellor’s
taxation proposals and, in particular, the 4 ‘machinery 5 5 clauses which
have no counterpart in the resolutions. Moreover, there is a certain
practical convenience in the present arrangement. The debate on the
resolutions follows closely on the Chancellor’s announcement of his
proposals and the House has only time to form general conclusions.
Moreover, they have all to be passed without prior notice in Committee
of W ays and Means on Budget Day, so that the report stage is the first
opportunity on which Members can express their opinion by vote on
each separate proposal. The interval between the debate on the
resolutions and the Committee stage of the Bill provides an oppor-
tunity alike for the Government and the House to consider in closer
detail the implications of the Chancellor’s proposals, before they are
finally embodied in the clauses of the Bill.

35. But perhaps the aspect of the matter which weighs most strongly
with Your Committee in examining this proposal is the broad question
of the amount of time devoted to control of taxation. Fifteen days,
approximately 10 per cent, of the session, does not seem to Your
Committee to be an excessive amont of time to devote to so important
a subject. It may be that some of this time is wasted on repetitive
arguments, but, if so, that is less a criticism of the procedi^re than of the
use made of it by the House. Curtailment of the time devoted to this
subject is not the remedy; it might be said with equal force that it
would also limit the opportunities for raising new points. Your Com-
mittee do not feel thaV they can recommend to the House a proposal
which, besides having certain practical inconveniences, would still
further curtail the opportunities of Members for taking part in one of
the most important debates of the year

(2) Control of Expenditure

36. The passing of Estimates in the Committee of Supply is the
formal procedure by which the expenditure of Departments is author-
ised, but, as is well known, this procedure has almost ceased to serve
the purpose of financial scrutiny, and is used almost exclusively for the
criticism of policy and administration. The origin of this development
is to be found in the ancient claim of the Commons to refuse grant of
supply until their grievances had been redressed, a right which has in
the course of time come to be exercised within the Committee of
Supply itself. But the consequent change in the function of the Com-
mitted of Supply is also a practical justification, which cannot be ex-
messed better than in the words of the Select Committee of 1931-32 :

The Committee of Supply is a Committee of 615 Members. They cannot,
therefore, effectively consider the details of finance. The time at their disposal

Working of the House of Commons , 1946 209

is strictly limited. They cannot examine witnesses; they have no information
before them but the bulky volumes of the Estimates, the answers of a Minister
to questions addressed to him in debate, and such casual facts as some inde-
fatigable private Members may be in a position to impart. A body so large,
so limited in its time, and so ill-equipped for inquiry would be a very imperfect
instrument for the control of expenditure even if the discussions were devoted
entirely to that end. But these discussions afford during twenty days practically
the only opportunity in the course of the year for the debate of grievances and
of many questions of policy. In the competition for time such matters usually
take precedence, and questions of finance, especially those affecting the whole
field, are crowded out.

37. As a consequence of this change in the predominant functions of
the Committee of Supply, the House of Commons has perforce devised
other means outside the House itself for the detailed examination of
expenditure. At the present time financial criticism and control are
exercised by two bodies, the Committee of Public Accounts and the
Select Committee on Estimates. It will perhaps assist the understanding
of the present position, if the origin of these two Committees is briefly
recalled.

The Committee of Public Accounts

38. In the^ighteenth century there was no uniform system of public
accounts, still less was there any method for bringing them regularly
under parliamentary scrutiny. It was not until 1831 that the first
4 ‘Appropriation Accounts, 55 showing the actual expenditure of the
Navy and Victualling Boards under each head* were introduced. This
system of Appropriation Accounts* was extended to the War and
Ordnance Offices in 1856. In 1857 a Select Committee recommended
that the system should be extended to the Civil and Revenue Depart-
ments and that the whole of the resulting accounts should be “annually
submitted to the revision of a Committee of the House of Commons
to be nominated by Mr. Speaker. 55 Four years later the Standing Order
(now No. 74) was passed, which instituted the Committee of Public
Accounts, but the remaining recommendations of the Committee were
not implemented until 1866, when the Exchequer and Audit Act was
passed. As a result of this Act a complete reorganisation of the system
of preparing accounts for audit was made, and in 1 869 the first com-
plete accounts of the whole public service were laid before Parliament.

39. The Exchequer and Audit Act also instituted the Office of
Comptroller and Auditor-General. This officer is appointed by Letters
Patent but is responsible to the House of Commons alone. His officers
conduct a continuous examination of the expenditure of Departmei^s
and his comments arising from this examination are embodied in
reports which are made annually to the House of Commons and con-
sidered, along with the Appropriation Accounts to which^ffiey relate.

210

Parliament

by the Committee of Public Accounts. In the light of these Reports
and their own investigations the Committee in turn report their
observations to the House. These reports are considered by the
Treasury, in order that effect may be given to the recommendations
which they contain, and the Treasury’s decisions are contained in a
Minute which is communicated to the Committee.

40. The establishment of the Committee of Public Accounts and the
institution of the office of Comptroller and Auditor General are thus
seen as parts of a great scheme of reform whereby the House of Com-
mons secured an effective machine for ensuring that the money which
it had voted was spent on the objects for which it was intended. This
system has remained unaltered to this day.

The Select Committee on Estimates

41. Select Committees on Estimates, and their war-time equivalent,
the Select Committees on National Expenditure, have only been
regularly appointed since 1912, but their prototypes are to be found
at a much earlier date. For die function which they perform, that of
controlling expenditure, was one which in the 1 9th century the House
of Commons frequently though sporadically entrusted to Select Com-
mittees under other names. Thus, for example? there were Select Com-
mittees on Army Expenditure, Navy Expenditure, Expenditure for
Miscellaneous Services, Expenditure and Management of Woods and
Forests (including the Department of Works and Buildings) in 1848,
and in both the years 1849 and 1850 Select Committees on Army and
Ordnance Expenditure were appointed. These Committees performed
functions precisely similar to those entrusted to the modern Estimates
Committees as their terms of reference indicate: “to inquire into the
Expenditure on . . . and to report their observations to the House.”
Their Reports also show that the basis of these inquiries were the
Estimates presented to Parliament. When therefore for the first time
in 1912 a Committee was appointed with the task of examining all the
Estimates (or rather such of them as it should think fit) the innovation
was one of name rather than of substance. The House had merely sub-
stituted a more systematic method for the control of expenditure for the
sporadic and piecemeal expedients of the 19th century.

Proposed Public Expenditure Committee

42. The foregoing account of the different origins of the Public
Accounts Committee and the Estimates Committee indicates the
difference in their functions. The Public Accounts Committee is
primarily an instrument to ensure financial regularity in the Accounts,
the function of the Estimates Committee is to criticise expenditure on
the basis nqf. of regularity but of Economy and sound business principle.

2 1 1

Working o f the House of Commons, ig^6

Sir Gilbert Campion suggests that these two functions could with
advantage be combined in the work of a single committee, to be called
the Public Expenditure Committee. On the face of it, the difference in
function would appear to be a strong objection to this course. But,
although in principle the functions of the two Committees are distinct,
their subject matter is in fact the same. The public Accounts Com-
mittee works on the Appropriation Accounts and the Estimates Com-
mittee works on the Estimates, but the sums which appear this year
as estimates of expenditure will eventually become items in the corres-
ponding Appropriation Accounts. The difference is one of time rather
than of subject matter or method. The actual practice of the two
Committees bears out this view. The Public Accounts Committee,
though it is formally charged only with the examination of expenditure
appearing in the Appropriation Accounts, frequently carries its inves-
tigations beyond the year of account into the immediately past finan-
cial year and even into the current year. This practice, though not
formally covered by the terms of reference of the Committee, is recog-
nised by the House as legitimate. TJie Comptroller and Auditor
General was explicit on this point. “It is very often the fact, 5 ’ he said,
“that the Public Accounts Committee is considering, in 1946, expendi-
ture which was almost a token sum in 1944, and did not really com-
mence effectively until 1945 or perhaps even until 1945 is some way
advanced. ...” Similarly, it would be easy to show that the Estimates
Committee frequently carries its investigations into expenditure back
into the last financial year and even into the year before that — the
year of account which is the primary responsibility of the Public
Accounts Committee. And indeed it^s inevitable that both Committees
should stray beyond the financial year with which they are primarily
concerned. Criticism of expenditure would be almost impossible if it
were strictly confined to the sums which happen to be brought to
account or to appear in the Estimates of a single year. This is specially
true of long-term schemes and projects involving expenditure over a
period of years. Common sense requires, and the House acknowledges
the necessity, that both Committees should carry their inquiries out-
side the financial year which the order of the House refers to them.

43. For these reasons Your Committee consider that the functions of
the Committee of Public Accounts and the Estimates Committee
would be better performed by a single Committee. Such a Committee
would have no powers beyond those possessed by the separate com-
mittees now, and there would be no change in the position or duties
of the Comptroller and Auditor General either in relation ^to the
Department or the Committee. The advantage of combining bq£h
functions in a single Committee working through sub-committees is
twofold. First, the knowledge and experience gained by examination
of the Accounts would be brought to bear upon the examination of

212

Parliament

current expenditure, and vice versa . Secondly, a single committee with
sub-committees provides a method for co-ordinating the whole work
of the examination of expenditure, for which neither overlapping
membership nor any other method of liaison is a satisfactory substitute.
The result would be a strengthening of parliamentary control of
expenditure and it might be that few^er Members would be needed for
this work. . . .

THE HOUSE OF LORDS IN SEPARATE SESSION, 1947

House of Lords Debates , 13 August 194J ; Official Report, , . 1996 sqq.

Lord Ammon: My Lords, I beg to move that this House do now
adjourn until Tuesday, October 14. . . . «

The Marquess of Salisbury: My Lords, I beg to move as an
Amendment to the Motion, to leave out the words 4 'Tuesday, October
14 35 and insert “Tuesday, September 9. 53 In moving this Amendment
I can assure the Government, if they need such an assurance, that we,
on this side of the House, are not acting in any Party spirit or with the
mere object of causing any embarrassment to the Government. We
have, I think it will be agreed in all parts of the House, taken a moder-
ate and, I hope, a statesmanlike attitude towards the Supplies and
Services (Extended Purposes) Act. Although we have protested against
the extent of the powers which are given to the Government,
especially under Section 1 (1) (<?), we have been at pains not to give
any legitimate grounds for any charge that we have made it impossible
for the Government to use what means they feel desirable to tackle
this crisis with which the country is faced.

' But there is no doubt that the introduction of this legislation, with
the very wide powers which it confers, and at a time when Parliament
is separating for the summer Recess for over two months, has exposed
what I may perhaps describe as rather a serious defect in the constitu-
tional machinery of this country, which I think it is for Parliament
as far as they can to try to remedy. In the old days, of course, practi-
cally all legislation was by Act of Parliament, and Parliament went
through every word of every clause of that legislation. In such circum-
stances there was fully effective protection for the community. But
within recent years (and I am not referring merely to the period
during which the present Government have been in power) there has
been a new development — namely the growth of delegated legislation.
As your Lordships know very well, blanket powers are given to Min-
isters to make Orders within the limitations of the main Acts and as
soon as the^. are made those Ofders come into active operation. It is

The House of Lords in Separate Session , ig^y 213

quite true that under the Constitution they must be laid before Par-
liament, and, as your Lordships know, either House can pray against
them.

That is, of course, some protection when Parliament is sitting, but if
Parliament is not sitting Orders may become operative weeks, or even
months, before Parliament can consider them. I should think it would
be generally agreed by noble Lords in every part of the House, what-
ever they may feel about this measure which we have so lately been
considering, that that is not an entirely satisfactory situation. Indeed,
it is a very unsatisfactory situation. It is to meet this new difficulty
that we are proposing that, if necessary, this House, at any rate, should
meet at convenient intervals during the Recess to examine such
Orders.

No doubt the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor,
would point out, if I did not, that in these circumstances this House
canaiot pray against Orders, because Orders have to be laid before
Parliament; and if only one House happens to be in Session they
clearly cannot be so laid. In those conditions all the House can do is
to examine and discuss them when they come out. That would be,
or it might be, a useful function for us to perform. An earlier meeting
of this kind, under the existing rather anxious conditions, might have
this additional advantage: It might well give opportunity, if such were'
required, for general discussion of developments in the economic
situation since the House last sat. . . .

The Lord Chancellor (Viscount Jowitt): My Lords, your
Lordships on these Benches are really becomirjg very revolutionary. I
and my Party are old-fashioned Constitutionalists in this matter and
I am bound to point out that, so far as I know, this has never been
done before. . . .

The constitutional position is quite plain. It is for each House . . .
to exercise its right to adjourn itself independently of the Crow£
(which means the Government of the day) and of the other House . . .
[On] August 10, 1914, . . . this House resolved that —

whenever during the present Session of Parliament this House stands adjourned
for more than two days and it appears to the satisfaction of the Lord Chan-
cellor that the public interest requires that the House should meet at any
earlier time during such adjournment, the Lord Chancellor may give notice
to the Peers that he is so satisfied and thereupon the House shall meet at the
time stated in such Notice and transact business as if it had been duly adjourned
to that time.

Since that date alterations have been made in that Motion. The
Chairman of Committees in the House of Lords is now frequently
included, together ^vith the Lord Chancellor, and since 1931 the
Motion has been so made that the Lc?rd Chancellor or tl^g Chairman

Parliament

214

of Committees cannot act save after consultation with the' Govern-
ment. In its more modern form, in practice I understand it means
that this is done with the approval of the Government. But I would
point out that under the 1914 Resolution it was left to the Lord
Chancellor to act independently and call your Lordships back if, and
only if, in his or their opinion there was some case for so doing. . . .
On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Motion, as amended, agreed to, and ordered accordingly.

House of Lords Debates , 9 September 1947 ; Official Report , cc. 1409 sqq.

The First Lord of the Admiralty (Viscount Hall) : . . . Now,
without any further preamble, I propose to tell the House that His
Majesty’s Government cannot agree that it is proper for the present
occasion to be used for a general debate upon the state of the nation
or, indeed, as an opportunity for eliciting any new statement of
Government policy. In our view, whatever may be the constitutional
right of your Lordships to paeet as and when you please, it would
certainly not be constitutional for His Majesty’s Government to
regard a meeting of this House alone, in the middle of the Parlia-
mentary Recess, as a meeting of Parliament for the making of an
important announcement of Government policy. Indeed, your Lord-
ships yourselves would object, and very rightly so, if His Majesty’s
Government summoned only members of another place for the same
purpose while they left your Lordships still inoperative and in adjourn-
ment. And yet, though I need hardly remind your Lordships that the
other place is the Chamber of th£ popularly-elected representatives of
the country, you are asking us to treat them as of no account

Noble Lords: No.

Viscount Hall: — and to give your Lordships information upon
tlovernment policy while we deny it to another place. Neither this
Government nor any other . . . can have one policy in regard to the
sittings of another place during the Recess and another policy for
your Lordships’ House. We could not refuse to meet another place
until October 20 and at the same time be willing to meet your Lord-
ships this afternoon for a general debate on the economic situation. . . .

I should say to your Lordships that it is not the Government’s
intention that any speech other than the speech I am making at the
present time shall be made from this Bench during to-day’s pro-
ceedings. . . .

Ths Marquess of Salisbury: ... it is clear that the Government
Sjfc unwilling to make a statement. . . . Nor does it appear that there
is anything important to be discussed arising from the Supplies and
Services Act, Many people will find this a little* surprising. The Bill
was hustledrthrough Parliament with feverish haste before the House

The House of Lords in Separate Session , igpy 215

rose in August. We were told that it was urgent and vital that the
Government should have the very widest powers immediately; and
there were fears raised that there would be very far-reaching action
indeed. But there is one thing, I think, that never occurred to any of
us, and that is that no important Orders at all would be made. That,
however, appears to be the position. All we can do is to take note
of it. . . .

PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE AND PARTY MEETINGS, 1947

Report from the Committee of Privileges (. H.C . 138 of IQ4.7)

[In April 1 947, at a time when several London newspapers were reporting,
in &>me detail, accounts of private meetings of the Parliamentary Labour
Party, Mr. Garry Allighan, M.P., wrote an article alleging that this news
“leaked” to the Press through Members of Parliament, who disclosed confi-
dential information for a fee, in unguarded talk when under the influence of
liquor, or in return for favourable publicity. In the course of the proceedings
of the Committee of Privileges, it was disclosed that Mr. Allighan had supplied
information about private* party meetings to an evening newspaper. The
Committee considered that he had been “guilty of an aggravated contempt,
of the House of which he is a Member and of a gross breach of privilege”;
he was later expelled from the House of Commons.]

14. On any view this is a case of great seriousness. It is also one of
much difficulty from the point of View of me law and custom of
Parliament. . . . Your Committee are very mindful of the fact that
Parliament has no right to extend its privileges beyond those to which
recognition has already been accorded and they believe that it would
be contrary to the interest both of Parliament and of the public so t <3
do. On the other hand, the absence of an exact precedent does not in
itself show that a particular matter does not come within some recog-
nised principle of Parliamentary privilege.

15. Moreover, it is to be remembered that the right to punish for
contempt is by no means restricted to the case where some actual
privilege has been infringed. The two matters are distinct.

16. Whether or not the matter has by analogy some relation to the
privilege that Members are entitled to be free from molestation, it has
long been recognised that the publication of imputations reflecting on
the dignity of the House or of any Member in his capacity as yich is
punishable as a contempt of Parliament. It is true that the imputatu^n
upon a Member to come within this principle must relate to something
which he has done a 5 such, that is to say incidentally to and as part of
his service to Parliament. Thus in ah extreme case concerning The

21 6

Parliament

Times in 1887, 1 an allegation that certain Members “draw their
living . . . from the steady perpetration of crimes for which civilisation
demands the gallows 5 ’ was held not to constitute a contempt in that
it did not refer to the action of the Members concerned in the discharge
of their duties as such. Reflections upon Members, however, even
where individuals are not named, may be so framed as to bring into
disrepute the body to which they belong, and such reflections have
therefore been treated as equivalent to reflections on the House itself.
It is for the House to decide whether any particular publication con-
stitutes such an affront to the dignity of the House or its Members in
that capacity as amounts to contempt of Parliament.

17. In modern times the practice of holding private meetings in the
precincts of the Palace of Westminster of different parties has become
well established and, in the view of Your Committee, it must now be
taken to form a normal and everyday incident of parliamentary pro-
cedure, without which the business of Parliament could not conveni-
ently be conducted. Thus, meetings held within the precincts of the
Palace of Westminster during the parliamentary session are normally
attended only by Members as such, and the information which is given
at such meetings is, in Your Committee’s view, given to those attend-
ing them in their capacity as Members. Your Committee therefore
conclude on this rpatter that attendance of Members at a#private party
meeting held in the precincts of the Palace of Westminster during the
parliamentary session, to discuss parliamentary matters connected
with the current or future proceedings of Parliament, is attendance in
their capacity of Members of Parliament. It does not, of course,
follow that this conclusion attracts to such meetings all the privileges
which are attached to the transactions of Parliament as a whole.

18. It follows that an unfounded imputation in regard to such meet-
ings involves an affront to the House as such. Your Committee con-
§ider that an unjustified allegation that Members regularly betray the
confidence of private party meetings either for payment or whilst
their discretion has been undermined by drink is a serious contempt.

19. Where, as here, the contempt alleged is the making of such a
charge against Members, proof that the charge was true would not,
in Your Committee’s view, of necessity provide a defence. If the
publication were intended to bring to fight matters that were true so
that an end might be put to them, then, however discreditable the
facts, Your Committee consider that such a publication, for such a
high purpose, would constitute a defence. It was not suggested the
article in question here was published with any such object.

r 20. Whether the actual betrayal of information about a private
meeting of Members held in a Committee Room of the House or its
publication in the Press constitutes a distinct breach of privilege is a
1 Pari. Deb . (1887), 31 1, c. 286.

Privilege and Party Meetings , ig^y 217

separate and more difficult matter. Although the publication of
reports of debates is technically a breach of privilege . . . this rule is
not now enforced in the case of bona-fide reports. It would, it is true,
be different if the House had resolved to sit in secret session; and if a
Committee had resolved to transact its proceedings behind closed
doors, this decision, although it does not exclude the right of other
Members of the House to attend, would no doubt result in any publica-
tion of what had taken place constituting a contempt. If the true basis
of this latter rule is not that the publication involves a breach of confi-
dence but that it involves a premature disclosure before the Committee
has reported to the House, it would be difficult to draw any analogy
with the private party meeting, since in the latter case no report to the
House is involved and no question of premature disclosure. On the
other hand, it appears to be clear that the orders against publication
of debates can be enforced where the publication is made in bad taste.
Wh^re a Member publishes confidential information to a newspaper
for reward, or where a newspaper pays a Member for betraying confi-
dential information which it proceeds to publish, it could hardly be
said that either publication had been made in good faith. It is argu-
able, therefore, that the publication of confidential information given
for or obtained by payment, about the transactions at a private party
meeting, cou^ by analogy be treated as a breach of the rule against
publication of Parliamentary proceedings. In Your Committee’s view,
however, this would be straining the rule, and this they are not
inclined to do. They content themselves with observing that publica-
tion of information about secret meetings of his party by a Member
clearly involves a gross breach of confidence but is not in itself a breach
of privilege.

21. This, however, does not dispose of the matter. It is clearly a
breach of privilege to offer a bribe or payment to a Member in order
to influence him in his conduct as a Member. An obvious case would*
be to vote in a particular way. It would be unobjectionable to persuade
a Member to exercise his vote in a particular way: it is the element
of payment which gives rise to the offence. Once it is conceded, as
Your Committee think it must be, that the information which Members
obtain at private party meetings held as aforesaid is obtained by them
in their capacity as such, it seems to Your Committee to follow that
if they sell such information, or others buy it, the transaction is still
with a Member as such and the payment relates to the Member’s con-
duct in his capacity as a Member. The information has come to him
confidentially as a Member; it is only as a Member that he can, part
with it. In Your Committee’s view, therefore, the making of a pay-
ment in order that a Member should specially note what took place
at the meeting and should disclose information about it, or the accept-
ance of such a payment, constitutes *a transaction in the nature of

2l8

Parliament

bribery of a Member in regard to what is part of his work in Parliament
and is a breach of the privileges of this House. . . .

26. Your Committee are glad to know that editors and journalists
generally share their view that, quite apart from any question of
privilege, transactions between newspapers and Members of the House
whereby the latter disclose confidential information in return for pay-
ment by the former are discreditable to both parties and quite out of
accord with the best standards of journalism.

POWERS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 1948

House of Lords Debates , 27 January 1948; Official Report , cc. 629 sqq.

Parliament Bill: Order of the Day for the Second Reading read

The Lord Privy Seal (Viscount Addison) : . . . The fact is that
under the Parliament Act as it stands, if your Lordships 5 House were
so minded, the last two years 5 work of a Government in the House
of Commons, supported by a Labour or a Liberal majority, as the case
may be, might be largely sterilised. ..." ^

Subject to certain adequate safeguards, however, there is nothing in
the function of delay which means that that power shall be so used
as to sterilise the last two years of the activities of an anti-Conservative
Government. There ^nothing in that which involves a claim that
this House shall decide whether *an act of the House of Commons is
or is not in accordance with the mandate of the people. There is
nothing in that function of delay which confers upon this House the
power to determine what shall be the issues at a General Election. I
fim now going to confess frankly some of the causes of uneasiness which
led to this Bill. Many a time in this House ... I have had to listen
to the question whether this or that proposal of the Government was
in accordance with the mandate of the people, or words to that effect.
I want to say a word on this “mandate 55 claim, with complete
frankness. . . .

The claim to decide whether a subject is or is not in accordance
with the mandate of the people contains this implication that, if this
House is of opinion that it is not in the mandate, this House is at
liberty to reject it; that is the deliberate and obvious implication. We
challqjige that implication from the very start. We claim that it is for
tp£ elected representatives of the people to decide wdiether an issue is
or is not to be the subject of Parliamentary activity. . . .

. . . There is the point of difference. We do n6t accept, and we do
not intend accept, that this House, entirely unrepresentative, shall

Powers of the House of Lords , 1948 219

be the final arbiter as to what is and what is not the opinion of the
people. There is the point of actual difference, and there can be no
compromise on that. In our view, it must be the elected Chamber that
has finally to decide these issues.

Let us examine this from another aspect. Of necessity in the life of
any Parliament, a large number of issues must arise which were not
foreseen or which were not in anybody’s mind at the time of the
Election. . . . But that does not in any way invalidate the claim or
right of the representative House to introduce measures on these
matters. There is no question of mandate at all. . . .

The Marquess of Salisbury: . . . The effect of this Bill is really
to truncate the powers of this House in such a way as to reduce it,
as a balancing factor in the Constitution, to a mere farce. Such a
truncation of powers . . . would quite definitely lay the country open
to all the dangers of single-Chamber Government. . . .

. , f . What is essential, if a Parliamentary democracy is to succeed,
is that both Parties should know that if a Government, either of the
Left or of the Right — because it applies equally to both — with a tem-
porary majority in the House of Commcfns, were to introduce really
extreme measures, there is in existence a Second Chamber able to
stop them. If that protection where to be removed, the defeated Party
— and, as I say, it applies equally to the Right and the Left — frantic
with anxiety, might well begin to flirt with 'unconstitutional
practices. . . .

. . . We on this side of the House ask no more than that issues
affecting the welfare of the electorate, where their judgment is un-
known or doubtful, should be referred for their consideration, or at
least deferred for a short time ro enable their views to be found out.
That is the whole reason for our stand for an effective Second
Chamber. ... If the present House of Lords is not the right body to
exercise this power, let it be amended ; but do not remove this essential •
safeguard against extreme action by the Right or by the Left. . . .

REFORM OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 1948

Agreed Statement on the Conclusion of the Conference of Party Leaders , February -
Aprils 1948 (1 Cmd . 7,5^0, 1948)

4. At the first Meeting, the Party representatives agreed that discus-
sion should embrace proposals relating to the reform of the Composi-
tion of the House of Lords, and proposals relating to the Power?
which should be vest«d in any reformed House. These two subjects,
though capable of separate consideration, were to be regarded as

220

Parliament

interdependent, and it was recognised that failure to agree either
on Composition or on Powers might result in general agreement on
the future of the House of Lords not being reached. . . .

7. On this question of Powers considerable discussion took place, but
the Conference failed to reach agreement. The views put forward by
the respective groups of Party Leaders are set out in the following
paragraphs 8 to 10.

8. The representatives of the Government expressed their willingness
to see a Second Chamber possessed of proper facilities for debating
public affairs and for revising legislation. The procedural arrange-
ments should secure to each House a proper time for the consideration
of amendments to Bills proposed by the other; but they should not be
such as to enable the Second Chamber to impose its will on the House
of Commons and to force the Government to seek a General Election
against its own inclination and that of the Commons. The principal
organ of democratic government is the House of Commons, which is
elected by the People. The danger in modern conditions is that the
machinery of democratic government may act too slowly rather than
too quickly. Under the Parliament Act, 1911, the procedure enables
a House of Lords hostile to the Government of the day to render the
legislative programme of the Government ineffective in the fourth and
fifth sessions of a quinquennial Parliament. Iri the result, jhe will of the
Government and of the Peoplfe could be thwarted by a Second Cham-
ber which, not being elected, is not directly responsible to the People.
The Government representatives agreed that it is important that
points of dispute between the two Houses should be appreciated by the
public, but they considered that- the proposals of the Parliament Bill
adequately safeguard constitutional rights in this respect, and afford
sufficient time for public opinion (which formulates more rapidly in
modern conditions than was the case thirty years ago) to understand
and pronounce upon a disputed issue.

The Government representatives recognised, however, that under
the Parliament Act procedure, as proposed to be amended by the Bill,
the Second Chamber might not have a sufficiently long period to con-
sider a disputed measure if, for any reason, the Bill took an exception-
ally long time in its passage through the House of Commons. As part
of a general agreement over the reform of the House of Lords, they
would have been prepared to suggest to the Labour Party that the
“period of delay” which, under the Parliament Bill, would be one
year from Second Reading in the Commons on the first occasion,
should be extended to nine months from Third Reading if, in the case
of a particular Bill, the latter period proved to be the longer. The Gov-
ernment representatives could not recommend any further extension
inasmuch as the effective legislative use of the fourth session of a
quinquennial Parliament would thereby be in jeopardy. It was further

221

Reform of the House of Lords, 1948

argued that the greater the powers given to a Second Chamber, the
more might be the necessity for the Prime Minister of the day to
attempt to redress an adverse political balance in that Chamber by
the creation of additional Peers, and the greater the danger that the
Second Chamber might in fact become a rival of the Commons.

9. The Leaders of the Official Opposition find themselves unable to
agree to what they regard as the virtual elimination of the suspensory
period. They feel that this would be in conflict 'with the whole inten-
tion of the Parliament Act of 191 1. They hold that the purpose of the
power of delay, which formed an integral part of the Parliament Act
procedure, has never been to enable the Second Chamber to thwart
the will of the People. It is an essential constitutional safeguard to
ensure that, in the event of serious controversy between the two
Houses of Parliament, on a measure on which the view of the electorate
is doubtful, such a measure shall not pass into law until sufficient time
has., elapsed to enable the electorate to be properly informed of the
issues involved and for public opinion to crystallise and express itself.
The “one year’s delay” from the Second Reading in the House of
Commons proposed in the Parliament Bill now before Parliament is
in fact largely illusory. For experience shows that it may take eight
months for a Bill to pass through the ordinary processes of Parliament.
Such a curtailment of the powers of the Second Chamber as is involved
in the Government proposals would, in the view of the Opposition,
represent a formidable step towards Single Chamber Government, with
all the risks entailed. And this is an especial danger in a country like

Great Britain -where there is an unwritten Constitution and funda-

mental constitutional changes can «be made by a simple Bill. The
Opposition Leaders regard the safeguard of some effective power of
delay by the Second Chamber as vital at all times and especially at
the present juncture when political instability is so evident throughout
the world. They believe that there is no danger that such a poweF
would be used frivolously. For the very existence of a Second Chamber
must depend on its acting with due responsibility. And this would
apply with redoubled force in the case of a Second Chamber com-
posed of men and women chosen for their individual wisdom and
experience, especially if steps were taken to ensure as far as possible
that there is no permanent majority for any one political Party. In
this case it could not be said that the procedure would operate differ-
ently in the cases of Governments of the Left and of the Right.

Notwithstanding this view, the Opposition Leaders considered that
if it had been possible to reach agreement over the whole field of
Composition and Powers of the Second Chamber, they might have
regarded as acceptable a period of eighteen months from Second
Reading in the Commons — halfway between the two years of the
Parliament Act and the one year proposed by the Parliament Bill.

222

Parliament

Indeed, in order to facilitate such agreement, they would have been
prepared to suggest for consideration by their supporters an even
shorter period of twelve months from the Third Reading in the
Commons. Any further reduction of the period would in their view
involve a breach in the spirit and purpose of the Parliament Act. No
doubt the time factor would vary with the complexity of a Bill, and the
time taken up by Parliamentary debate in both Houses. But a period
must be provided which covers all Bills. On the principle to be applied
in deciding what that period should be, there is really a fundamental
difference between the Government and the Opposition. In the view
of the official Opposition, the effect of the Government proposals
would be to allow a period sufficient to allow full Parliamentary con-
sideration by both Houses, but little or no more. The Opposition con-
tend that this is not enough; and that the time factor must be sufficient
to allow for reflection by the country after discussion in Parliament has
been concluded and the matters at issue between the two Houses have
been clearly defined.

Failure to provide this period for reflection by the electors would,
in the view of the Opposition, curtail the powers of the Second
Chamber to a point at which its value as a balancing factor in the
constitution would be largely nullified. To this they could not agree
in view of the danger to the liberties of the People that would be
involved.

10. The Liberal Leaders had originally criticised the Parliament Bill
on the ground that it did not provide a sufficient suspensory period.
Accordingly, they had suggested that the “period of delay 5 ’ should run,
not from the Second Reading, but from the Third Reading in the
Commons.

However, in their view, the alternative proposal made by the
Government during the course of the Meetings sufficiently met their
original objection, and the Liberal Leaders were prepared to suggest
the acceptance by their Party Members of the Government proposal.

Having regard to the measure of agreement in principle on pro-
posals for the revised composition of the Second Chamber, the Liberal
Leaders deplored the breaking off of further discussions by reason only
of a matter of three months in the suspensory period. This, in their
view, is a matter of minor importance, which should have been
capable of adjustment.

1 1 . The representatives of all three Parties were united in their
desire to see the House of Lords continue to play its proper part in the
Legislature; and in particular to exercise the valuable functions of
revising Bills sent up by the Commons, and initiating discussion on
public affairs. It was regarded as essential, moreover, that there should
be available to the country a legislative body composed of men of
mature judgment and experience gained in many spheres of public

Reform of the House of Lords , igp8 223

life. But the Government representatives and the representatives of
the Official Opposition considered that the difference between them
on the subject of Powers was fundamental, and not related only to the
length of the “period of delay.”

In these circumstances, the Party representatives concluded that
there did not exist between them that basis for further discussions
which would warrant carrying negotiations beyond their present stage.

THE FUNCTIONS OF PARLIAMENT, 1951

House of Commons Debates , 13 November iggi ; Official Report , c. 842
Mr. Harold Macmillan: Parliament has, of course, three main
purposes: first, to vote supplies; second, to deal with legislation,
maflhly that put forward by the Government of the day; but third,
and of equal importance, what Mr. Asquith [sic] used to call the
“Grand Inquest of the Nation.” ... I .think all of us know what it
means; it means chivvying the Ministers. . . .

SECTION III

The Executive

EXPERTS AND MINISTERS ON THE WAR COUNCIL, 1915

First Report of the Dardanelles Commission (Cd. 8,pgo, rgif)

14. From the commencement of the war until November 25th,
1914 . . . no change was made in the machinery for the superior con-
duct of naval and military operations. That machinery* consisted . . .
of the Cabinet, assisted by the Committee of Imperial Defence,
with the War Office and the Admiralty acting as its executive
agents. The Cabinet at that time consisted of twenty-two members.
It must have been obvious from the first that it was far too
numerous to control effectively the conduct of the war, more especially
by reason of the fact that many of the Ministers presided over Depart-
ments which, in some cases, were very slightly and, in others, were in
no degree concerned with warlike operations. Thus, for four months,
during which time events of the utmost importance were occurring,
the machinery employed for designing and controlling the higher
operations of the war was both clumsy and inefficient. Eventually
some improvement was effected. The War Council took the place of
the Committee of Imperial Defence. 1

15. The composition* and functions of the War Council did not
materially differ from those of the Committee of Imperial Defence. A
change of some importance was, however, made in the procedure. It
had been the practice to pass round the notes of the proceedings at the
meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defence to all the members
who had been present, and who were thus able co correct any inaccura-
cies that might occur in the representation of iheir views. Owing to the
great press of business, this practice was abandoned by the War
Council. Longhand notes were, indeed, kept by the Secretary, but
these, of course, cannot carry the same authority as corrected
minutes. . . .

16. The main change which was effected was, however, in connec-
tion with the powers of the Council as compared to those of the
Committee of Imperial Defence. Whilst the latter body was in exist-
ence, the responsibility for all important decisions remained, theore-
tically in all, and practically in most cases, with the united Cabinet.
The War Council remained, like the Committee of Imperial Defence,
a Committee of the Cabinet with some experts added. Theoretically,
the powers of the united Cabinet remained the same as before. Prac-
tically, they underwent a radical change. It was the Council, agffi not
the united Cabinet, which finajly decided the most important mattes,

1 From June, 1915, onwards, the “War Council” was termed the “Dardanelles
Committee.” After the Coalition Government was formed a “War Committee” was
instituted. Its functions did not differ from tho*se of the War Council, but its composi-
tion underwent some change.

228

The Executive

and gave effect to its decisions without necessarily waiting for any
expression of assent or dissent from the Cabinet. The Cabinet appear
to have been generally informed of any important decisions which may
have been taken by the Council, but not until after the necessary
executive steps had been taken to give whole or partial effect to those
decisions. , . .

17. It is obvious that the main questions which came under the
consideration of the War Council in connection with the Dardanelles
operations were of a highly technical nature on which the opinions
only of those who were possessed of naval or military knowledge or
experience would be of any real value. It is, therefore, essential to
ascertain, with as great a degree of accuracy as possible, what was the
precise position assigned to the expert members of the Council. . . .

19. . . . Expert naval advice was represented by Lord Fisher, the
First Sea Lord. . . . The view taken by Lord Fisher of his own position
at the War Council may be gathered from the following extract fyom
his evidence:

The Chairman: I should like yoi£ to explain why you thought that at the War
Council there were only two alternatives before you, one to yield your opinion
absolutely and the other to resign. You were on a consultative body. Is it
possible to carry on business with a consultative body on such a basis as that ?
— A. I can make it clear to you. The War Council only consisted the Cabinet
Ministers. We were not members of the War Council. ... We were the experts
there who were to open our mouths when told to.

Q,. Nothing else ? — A. Nothing else. . . .

Conclusions

(0) We are unable to concur in the view set forth by Lord Fisher
that it was his duty, if he differed from the Chief of his Department,
to maintain silence at the Council or to resign. We think that the
adoption of any such principle generally would impair the efficiency
of the public service.

[Mr. Andrew Fisher and Sir Thomas Mackenzie dissented from this conclu-
sion, Mr. Fisher writing: “I dissent in the strongest terms from any suggestion
that the Departmental Advisers of a Minister in his company at a Council
Meeting should express any views at all other than to the Minister and through
him, unless specifically invited to do so. I am of opinion it would seal the
fate of responsible government if servants of the State were to share the respon-
sibility of Ministers to Parliament and to the people on matters of public
policy. . . ,”]

The War Cabinet , igiy

229

THE WAR CABINET, 1917

Cd. 9,005, 1918

The most important constitutional development in the United
Kingdom during the last year has been the introduction of the War
Ca oinet system. This change was the direct outcome of the war itself.
As the magnitude of the war increased, it became evident that the
Cabinet system of peace days was inadequate to cope with the novel
conditions. The enlarged scope of Government activity and the conse-
quent creation of several new departments, made a Cabinet consisting
of all the Departmental Ministers meeting under the Chairmanship of
the Prime Minister, far too unwieldy for the practical conduct of the
war. It was extremely difficult for so large a body to give that resolute
central direction which became more imperative the more the popula-
tion and resources of the nation had to be organised for a single purpose
— the defeat of German militarism. Even the development of a com-
paratively small War Committee did not entirely meet the needs of
the case, as the final responsibility rested not with them but with the
Cabinet.

With the change of government, therefore, a new method of govern-
mental organisation was' introduced. The system of the War Cabinet
distinguishes between the body which is responsible for the supreme
direction of the war and the Ministers who have charge of the great
administrative departments of State. The general direction of the
policy of His Majesty’s Government during the war rests with the
War Cabinet, whose members, with«one exception, are relieved of the
day to day preoccupations of administrative work, and w hose time is,
therefore, entirely available for initiating policy and for the work of
co-ordinating the great Departments of State. The original members
of the War Cabinet were: the Prime Minister, the Right Hon. EaH
Curzon, the Right Hon. Viscount Milner, the Right Hon. A. Bonar
Law, and the Right Hon. Arthur Henderson. Since then the Right
Hon. Sir Edward Carson has been added to the War Cabinet, and
the Right Hon. G. N. Barnes has taken the place of Mr. Henderson.
In addition, in June, 1917, the War Cabinet invited General Smuts,
who had attended the meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet as the
Representative of the Union of South Africa, to attend the meetings
of the War Cabinet during his stay in the British Isles. The only
exception to the principle laid down above that the members of the
War Cabinet should be free from administrative duties was in the
case of Mr. Bonar Law, who filled the office of the Chancellor of tjre
Exchequer, and one of whose principal duties was to act as the chief
representative of the’GoverriSnent in the House of Commons.

The method of working the War*Cabinet is as follqws. At each

The Executive

230

meeting the Cabinet begins by hearing reports as to the progress of the
war since the previous day. Unless it wishes to confine its deliberations
to general questions of policy, it then proceeds to deal with questions
awaiting its decision. As these questions in the vast majority of cases
affect one or more of the administrative departments, almost all its
meetings are attended by the ministers and their chief departmental
officials concerned. The majority of the sessions of the War Cabinet
consist, therefore, of a series of meetings between members of the War
Cabinet and those responsible for executive action at which questions
of policy concerning those departments are discussed and settled.
Questions of overlapping or conflict between departments are deter-
mined and the general lines of policy throughout every branch of the
administration co-ordinated so as to form part of a consistent war plan.
Ministers have full discretion to bring with them any experts, either
from their own departments or from outside, whose advice they con-
sider would be useful. The extent to which this policy of inviting
expert assistance is carried may be judged from the fact that from
December 9th, 1916, to December, 1917, no less than 248 persons other
than members of the War Cabinet and the Secretariat have attended
its meetings. These include experts on Foreign, Dominion, Indian,
Colonial Affairs, Finance, Man-Power, Labour, Munitions and Indus-
try, Shipping and Shipbuilding, Agriculture', Food Control, Educa-
tion, Trade, Railways and Local Government, etc. The Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, and the
Chief of the Imperial General Staff attend at every meeting to com-
municate the latest intelligence in regard to the war and to consult
with the War Cabinet on questions that arise from day to day. Under
this system the War Cabinet has held more than 300 meetings in the
past year. This fact in itself indicates the great change which has taken
place in the work of the Cabinet.

" In practice a considerable number of less important, but often
highly complex, questions are referred to individual members of the
War Cabinet or to Committees of Ministers or others. In some cases
the Minister or Committee has power to decide, in others the instruc-
tion is to carry out a detailed investigation such as the War Cabinet
itself could not usefully undertake and submit a Report for final
decision to the Cabinet. By this means the War Cabinet is enabled to
carry out exhaustive investigations without the whole of its members
being overburdened with the details of every question.

Apart from the attendance of the Ministers in charge of the Depart-
ment concerned, certain other arrangements are made to ensure that
t]je Government Departments are kept ‘ m close touch with the policy
of the Cabinet, and, conversely, that the members of the War Cabinet
are kept in touch with the policy and action of the various Depart-
ments. Mir^ites are kept of fhe discussions of the War Cabinet.

The War Cabinet, igiy 231

Complete files of these minutes are sent to the Ministers most closely
concerned in the conduct of the war. In addition, copies of the War
Cabinet minutes affecting them are sent to all other Departments.
Besides this, the Secretariat of the War Cabinet are responsible for pre-
paring weekly reports by arrangement with the Secretaries of State for
Foreign Affairs, India and the Colonies on the matters with which
they are concerned. These reports are circulated widely to all Min-
isters. Conversely a number of the Government Departments render
weekly reports to the War Cabinet and also to other Ministers who
are concerned or interested.

The working of the War Cabinet cannot be fully understood without
some reference to the Secretariat which has come into existence in
order to enable it to do its work. The Secretariat consists of the Secre-
tary, Lieut.-Colonel Sir M. P. A. Hankey, and of ten Assistant Secre-
taries, with an office establishment located at 2, Whitehall Gardens,
linger instructions from the Prime Minister the principal duties of the
War Cabinet Secretariat are as follows:

(1) To record the proceedings of the War Cabinet.

(2) To transmit the decisions of the War Cabinet to those Depart-
ments which are concerned in giving effect to them or otherwise
interested.

(3) To prepare the agenda papers; to arrange for the attendance of
Ministers and other persons concerned; and to procure and circulate
the documents required for discussion.

(4) To attend to the correspondence connected with the work of the

War Cabinet. 9

(5) To prepare the Reports referred to in the previous section.

In addition to these primary duties the War Gabinet Secretariat
provides the British Section of the Secretariat of the Inter- Allied Con-
ferences, of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, the Secretariat of
the Imperial War Cabinet, and the Secretariat of the majority of the*
Sub -Committees working in connection with the War Cabinet. The
War Cabinet Secretariat is built up on the nucleus of the Secretariat of
the Committee of Imperial Defence, which provided a system of liaison
officers between the Committee and the Admiralty, War Office, India
Office, and Colonial Office. This system has now been extended.
Additional officers have been added, so that a liaison is now established
between the War Cabinet Secretariat and all the Departments of the
Government. This provides yet another means of securing touch
between the War Cabinet and the various Government Departments.
The Secretariat has also developed an organisation for the rapi^ dis-
tribution of documents dealing; with inter-departmental matters of^li
kinds, which is by no means the least important branch of its work.

In addition to thfe War Cabinet Secretariat there was created a
small Prime Minister’s Secretariat to ’assist the Prime Minister in the

232 The Executive

discharge of the heavy responsibilities which fall upon him under the
War Cabinet system.

The introduction of the War Cabinet system has resulted in con-
siderable modifications of the administrative system of the Govern-
ment. In the first place it has freed the various departmental Ministers
from the constant necessity which rested upon them under the old
Cabinet system of considering those wider aspects of public policy
which often had nothing to do with their departments, but for which
they were collectively responsible. They are, therefore, now able to
devote a far larger part of their time to those administrative duties,
which have become more exacting as the national activities have
expanded under the pressure of the war. Secondly, it has made pos-
sible an increase in the number of Ministerial officers so as to effect
a better distribution of functions. The new Ministries created since the
introduction of the War Cabinet are the Ministries of Labour, Ship-
ping, Food, Air, National Service, Pensions and Reconstruction. /The
method whereby the Ministers are kept in touch with one another and
with the War Cabinet has already been described. . . .

THE UNREFORMED CABINET *

House of Lords Debates , 19 June 1918; Official Report , cc. 269 sqq.

Earl Curzon of Kedleston: . . . Let me begin by asking, what
was the old Cabinet system which the present Government was
intended to replace? . . . My noble friends will bear me out when I
say that meetings of the Cabinet were most irregular; sometimes only
once, seldom more than twice a week. There was no agenda, there was
mo order of business. Any Minister requiring to bring up a matter
either of Departmental or of public importance had to seek the per-
mission of the Prime Minister to do so. No one else, broadly speaking,
was warned in advance. It was difficult for any Minister to secure an
interstice in the general discussion in which he could place his own
case. No record whatever was kept of our proceedings, except the
private and personal letter written by the Prime Minister to the
Sovereign, the contents of which, of course, are never seen by anybody
else. The Cabinet often had the very haziest notion as to what its
decisions were; and I appeal not only to my own experience but to the
experience of every Cabinet Minister who sits in this House, and to the
rtjpords contained in the memoirs of Iqalf a dozen Prime Ministers in
the past, that cases frequently arose when the matter was left so much
in doubt that a Minister went away and "acted upon what he thought
was a decision which subsequently turned out to be no decision at all,

The Unreformed Cabinet 233

or was repudiated by his colleagues. No one will deny that a system,
however embedded in the traditions of the past and consecrated by
constitutional custom, which was attended by these defects was a
system which was destined, immediately it came into contact with the
hard realities of war, to crumble into dust at once.

THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT, 1918

Report of the Machinery of Government Committee {of which Lord Haldane
was chairman) {Cd. 9,230, 1918)

2. We were appointed “To enquire into the responsibilities of the
various Departments of the central executive Government, and to
advice in what manner the exercise and distribution by the Government
of its functions should be improved. 55

3. We have endeavoured to define in the first place the general
principles which should govern the distribution of the responsibilities
in question. . . .

The Cabinet

5. But before dealing * . . with Departmental organisation, some
reference must be made to the functions and procedure of the Cabinet,
which is the mainspring of all the mechanism of Government. Its con-
stitution and the methods of its procedure must depend to a large
extent on the circumstances of the time, on {he personality of the
Prime Minister, and on the capacities of his principal colleagues. . . .

6. The main functions of the Cabinet may, we think, be described
as:

(а) the final determination of the policy to be submitted to Parliament; ,

(б) the supreme control of the national executive in accordance with
the policy prescribed by Parliament; and

7. For the due performance of these functions the following condi-
tions seem to be essential, or, at least, desirable:

(i) The Cabinet should be small in number — preferably ten or, at
the most, twelve; (ii) it should meet frequently; (iii) it should be
supplied in the most convenient form with all the information and
material necessary to enable it to arrive at expeditious decisions t^iv)
it should make a point of consulting personally all the Ministers whoip
work is likely to be affected Icjp its decisions; and (v) it should have a
systematic method of Securing that its decisions are effectually carried
out by the several Departments concerned.

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234

8. ... It is sufficient to point out that during the war an entirely
new type of Cabinet has been evolved, with new methods of pro-
cedure. . . .

Formulation of Policy

12. . . . We have come to the conclusion . . . that in the sphere of
civil government the duty of investigation and thought, as preliminary
to action, might with great advantage be more definitely recognised. . . .

14. . . . [We] urged strongly (a) that in all Departments better pro-
vision should be made for enquiry, research, and reflection before
policy is defined and put into operation; ( b ) that for some purposes
the necessary research and enquiry should be carried out or supervised
by a Department of Government specially charged with these duties,
but working in the closest collaboration with the administrative
Departments concerned with its activities. . . .

16. A Cabinet with such knowledge at its disposal would, we believe,
be in a position to devolve, with greater freedom and confidence than
is at present the case, the duties of administration, and even of
legislation. ...

Allocation of Functions between Departments

18. ... Upon what principle are the functions of Departments to
be determined and allocated ? There appear to be only r two alterna-
tives, which may be briefly described as distribution according to the
persons or classes to be dealt with, and distribution according to the
services to be performed. Under the former method each Minister
who presides over a Department would be responsible to Parliament
for those activities of the Government which affect the sectional
interests of particular classes of persons, and there might be, for
example, a Ministry for Paupers, a Ministry for Children, a Ministry
for Insured Persons, or a Ministry for the Unemployed. Now the
inevitable outcome of this method of organisation is a tendency to
Lilliputian administration. It is impossible that the specialised service
which each Department has to render to the community can be as
high a standard when its work is at the same time limited to a
particular class of persons and extended to every variety of provision
for them, as when the Department concentrates itself on the provision
of one particular service only, by whomsoever required, and looks
beyond the interests of comparatively small classes.

1 9. The other method, and the one which we recommend for adop-
tion, is that of defining the field of activity in the case of each Depart-
ment according to the particular service which it renders to the
cqmmunity as a whole. Thus a Ministry of Education would be con-
cerned predominantly with the provision of education wherever, and
by whomsoever, needed. Such a Ministry y/ouFd have to deal with
persons in s<* far only as they were to be educated, and not with

The Machinery of Government, igiS 235

particular classes of persons defined on other principles. This method
cannot of course, be applied with absolute rigidity. The work of the
Education Department, for example, may incidentally trench on the
sphere of Health, as in the arrangements of school houses and care for
the health of scholars. Such incidental overlapping is inevitable, and
any difficulties to which it may give rise must in our opinion be met
by systematic arrangements for the collaboration of Departments
jointly interested in particular spheres of work. But notwithstanding
such necessary qualifications, we think that much would be gained if
the distribution of departmental duties were guided by a general
principle, and we have come to the conclusion that distribution
according to the nature of the service to be rendered to the com-
munity as a whole is the principle which is likely to lead to the mini-
mum amount of confusion and overlapping. . . .

21. It will be noticed that in certain cases the two principles of dis-
tribution which we have contrasted . . . may lead to an identical con-
centration of functions. Thus, the great service of National Defence,
which (whether given to one, or to two or to three Ministries) is
essentially distinct from the function of the other Minis tries, is also
marked off by dealing, principally and specifically, with the large
number of persons employed by the Government in all the various
branches of t^e naval, military, and air services. In like manner, if the
railways and canals should be nationalised, it would be necessary to
make the administration of this great service of National Transport a
separate Department, whether we had regard to the nature of the
service thus rendered to the community, or to the dealings with so
extensive a staff as would have to be employed. In short, there are, in
relation to such nationalised services, two distinct forms of expert
capacity which it is essential that the organisation should develop.
One of these is ability in the recruitment, promotion, co-ordination,
and direction of a large body of persons of different grades and capa- *
cities, engaged in a common enterprise of a peculiar nature. . . . The
other form of special ability in such nationalised occupations, certainly
no less important, but of a different nature, is ability for the fulfilment
of the technical requirements of the service wf ' ch the Department has
to render to the community. . . .

22. We may conclude that where any great enterprise is nationalised
— in the sense of being carried out, in the main, by persons in direct
Government employment — as is the case with regard to National
Defence and the Postal and Telegraph service, and as may possibly be
the case with regard to railways and the coal supply, such an adminis-
tration must form the sphere of ^separate Ministry or Ministries. . .

29. Financial Control. . . . [We] think that all Departments should
include in their staff an officer of high grade specially charged with
financial duties, provided with a financial staff sufficiently strong to

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236

enable him to maintain a continuous survey of all proposals for
expenditure originating within the Department, and regularly con-
suited before any decision on a matter of financial importance is
arrived at by the Minister.

30. Intr a- Departmental Meetings. We would draw attention to the
arrangements adopted as part of the recent reorganisation of the
Board of Trade for holding regular meetings of the Minister, the
Parliamentary Secretaries, the permanent Heads of the Department,
and the principal officers concerned, for the purpose of dealing with
questions of policy which affect more than one section of the Board. . . .

31. Organisation and Ministerial Responsibility. We think that in
arrangements of this kind may be found one answer to the objections
which are sometimes raised to placing the sole responsibility for the
administration of great Departments in the hands of a single Minister.
Attempts have been made to distribute the burden of responsibility by
other means. In some cases, recourse has been had to the system of
administrative Boards. We draw attention to the findings of the Royal
Commission on the Civil Service 1 that this system is less effective in
securing responsibility for official action and advice than the system
followed in Departments where full responsibility is definitely laid
upon the Minister; and we think that where, as in the case of the
Insurance Commissioners, a Board is set up without explicit statutory
provision for a Minister responsible to Parliament for their work, the
position is obviously unsatisfactory.

32. But the doctrine of Ministerial responsibility has also been
criticised in another y/ay. It has been said that there are certain
functions of Government which* require for their exercise a judicial
temper and a position of independence that cannot be maintained by
a Minister who is constantly exposed to criticism in Parliament. . . .

33. We are so far from thinking that the importance of a service to
the community is prima facie a reason for making those who admin-
ister it immune from ordinary Parliamentary criticism, that we feel
that all such proposals should be most carefully scrutinised, and that
there should be no omission, in the case of any particular service, of
those safeguards which Ministerial responsibility to Parliament alone
provides.

34. Advisory Committees. But the preservation of the full responsibility
of Ministers for executive action will not, in our opinion, ensure that
the course of administration which they adopt will secure and retain
public confidence, unless it is recognised as an obligation upon Depart-
ments to avail themselves of the advice and assistance of advisory
bodies so constituted as to make available the knowledge and experi-
ence of all sections of the community affected by the activities of the
Department. ...

r 1 Fourth Report (1914), Ch. IX, paras. 68, 69, 72.

The Machinery of Government, igi8

237

Parliamentary Control

48. . . . Our terms of reference direct us to frame our recommenda-
tions with the primary object of promoting the efficient and econo-
mical working of the public service. But we have throughout our
deliberations borne in mind the fact that any action directed to this
end would fail to achieve its purpose if it were to have the effect of
disturbing the balance of authority between the Legislature and the
Executive.

It would, we think, be generally felt that any improvement in the
organisation of the Departments of State which was so marked as
substantially to increase their efficiency should have as its correlative
an increase in the power of the Legislature as the check upon the acts
and proposals of the Executive. . . .

52. We should hesitate to enter . . . upon questions of procedure
whiqh Parliament alone can examine or determine with authority,
were it not that it has been definitely suggested to us that the efficiency
of the public service would be improved if steps were taken to secure
the continuous and well-informed interest of a Parliamentary body in
the execution by each Department of the policy which Parliament has
laid down.

53. It has jjeen suggested that the appointment of a series of Standing
Committees, each charged with the consideration of the activities of
the Departments which cover the main divisions of the business of
Government, would be conducive to this end. Any such Committees
would require to be furnished with full information as to the course
of administration pursued by the * Departments with which they
were concerned; and for this purpose it would be requisite that
Ministers, as well as the officers of Departments, should appear
before them to explain and defend the acts for which they were
responsible. . . .

Conclusion

55. If the principle which we have suggested in this Part of the
Report, that the business of the various Departments of Government
should be distributed as far as possible according to the class of
service with which they are concerned, be accepted, the business
of Government would fall into one or other of the following main
divisions :

I. — Finance. II and III. — National Defence and External Affairs.
IV. — Research and Information. V. — Production (including Agri-
culture, Forestry, and Fisheries), Transport, and Commerce. VI. —
Employment. VK. — Supplies. VIII. — Education. IX. — Health.
X. — Justice.

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238

It does not follow that there would be only one Minister for each
of these branches. Some of them would undoubtedly require more than
one.

[Part II is concerned with the detailed application of the principles enunci-
ated above to the Departments.]

CO-ORDINATION OF DEFENCE FORCES, 1923

Recommendations of the National and Imperial Defence Committee ( Cmd .

i , 93 8 > *923)

The following decisions have been taken by His Majesty’s Govern-
ment on the recommendations of the National and Imperial Defence
Committee :

(1) It is undesirable and impracticable to supersede the Ministerial
heads of the three Fighting Services by making them subordinates of a
Minister of Defence; the alternative plan for an amalgamation of the
three Service Departments is equally impracticable.

(2) On the other hand, the existing system of co-ordination by the
Committee of Imperial Defence is not sufficient to secure full initiative
and responsibility' for defence as a whole and requires to be defined
and strengthened.

(3) Under the existing system the Committee of Imperial Defence,
an advisory and consultative body, enquires into and makes recommen-
dations in regard to the issues of defence policy and organisation which
are brought before it. The power of initiative lies with the Government
Departments and with the Prime Minister.

(4) This system, though invaluable up to a point, does not make
any authority, except the Prime Minister, who can only devote a small
part of his time and attention to defence questions, directly responsible
for the initiation of a consistent line of policy directing the common
action of the three or any two of the three Services, taking account of
the reactions of the three Services upon one another.

(5) While, therefore, the existing system of departmental initiative
will continue, the responsibility for the wider initiative referred to
above in Paragraph (4) w r ill also rest with the Chairman of the Com-
mittee of Imperial Defence acting under the general direction of the
Committee of Imperial Defence and with the assistance of the three
Chiefs of Staff.

J> 6 ) In accordance with the terms of^the Treasury Minute of 4 May
1904, constituting the Committee of Imperial Defence in its present
form, the Committee of Imperial Defence will coritinue to consist of the
Prime Minister as President, with such other members as, having

Co-ordination of Defence Forces, 1923 239

regard to the nature of the subject to be discussed, he may from time
to time summon to assist him. In pursuance of a decision by the Prime
Minister, the Committee places on record that the following should be
members :

The Chairman (Deputy to the Prime Minister); the Secretary of
State for War; the Secretary of State for Air; the First Lord of the
Admiralty; the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or the Financial Secre-
tary; the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; the Secretary of State
for the Colonies; the Secretary of State for India; the Chiefs of Staff
of the three Fighting Services; the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury
as head of the Civil Service. In addition to these, other British or
Dominion Ministers of the Crown and other officials, or persons having
special qualifications, will be summoned as members by the President
according to the nature of the business.

(7) The functions of the Chairman of the Committee of Imperial
Defence will be :

(i) To preside over the Committee of Imperial Defence in the
absence of the Prime Minister.

(ii) To report to the Prime Minister [when he himself has not pre-
sided) and to the Cabinet the recommendations of the Committee of
Imperial Defence.

(iii) In patters of detail, to interpret the decisions of the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet thereupon to the Departments concerned.

(iv) Assisted by the three Chiefs of Staff, as laid down in Paragraph

(5) above, to keep the defence situation as a whole constantly under
review so as to ensure that defence preparations and plans and the
expenditure thereupon, are co-ordi Anted and framed to meet policy,
that full information as to the changing naval, military and air
situation may always be available ro the Committee of Imperial
Defence and that resolutions as to the requisite action thereupon may
be submitted for its consideration. *

(8) In addition to the functions of the Chiefs of Staff as advisers on
questions of sea, land or air policy respectively, to their own Board or
Council, each of the three Chiefs of Staff will have an individual and
collective responsibility for advising on defence policy as a whole, the
three constituting, as it were, a Super- Chief of a War Staff in Com-
mission. In carrying out this function they will meet together for the
discussion of questions which affect their joint responsibilities.

(9) Questions relating to co-ordination of expenditure may be enter-
tained by the Committee of Imperial Defence when referred to it by
the Cabinet. The Committee (subject to any directions by the Cabinet)
will consider such questions ii* the light of the general defence policy
of the Government and of tl*e strategical plans drawn up to give effect
to that policy in tirrife of war.

(10) The Secretariat of the Committee of Imperial* Defence will

The Executive

240

continue to act as liaison officers between the Chairman of the Com-
mittee and the Service Departments. The staff of the Committee will
be strengthened by the addition of an Assistant Secretary to be nom-
inated by the Prime Minister on the recommendation of the Secretary
of State for Air, whose status will be identical with that of the three
existing Assistant Secretaries nominated by the Prime Minister on the
nomination of the Secretary of State for War, the Secretary of State
for India and the First Lord of the Admiralty.

(11) The Standing Defence Sub-Committee is suppressed and its
past proceedings will be merged into those of the Committee of
Imperial Defence.

THE PUBLIC CORPORATION, 1925

Report of the Broadcasting Committee , 1925 (Cmd. 2,999, T 9 2 ^)

3. Broadcasting has become so widespread, concerns so many
people, and is fraught with such far-reaching possibilities, that the
organisation laid down for the British Broadcasting Company no
longer corresponds to national requirements or responsibility. Not-
withstanding the progress which we readily acknowledge, and to the
credit of which the Company is largely entitled, we are impelled to the
conclusion that no company or body constituted on trade lines for the
profit, direct or indirect, of those composing it can be regarded as
adequate in view of the broads considerations now beginning to
emerge.

5. ... we do not recommend a prolongation of the licence of the
British Broadcasting Company, or the establishment of any similar
body composed of persons who represent particular interests. We
think a public corporation the most appropriate organisation. Such
an authority would enjoy a freedom and flexibility which a Minister
of State himself could scarcely exercise in arranging for performers
and programmes, and in studying the variable demands of public taste
and necessity. The authority can be set up by Statute or under the
Companies Acts. However established, it would hold the licence of
the Postmaster-General, and in view of the scale, significance and
potentialities of Broadcasting, the proposed corporation should be
invested with full authority. Its status and duties should correspond
withjjiose of a public service, and its directorate should be appointed
with the sole object of promoting the utmost utility and development
of the enterprise. We think the “British^ Broadcasting Commission 55
would be a suitable title for the^new authority. A .

x6. . . . Wediave framed our report . . . with the knowledge that the

The Public Corporation , 1925 241

State, through Parliament, must retain the right of ultimate control.
We assume that the Postmaster-General would be the Parliamentary
spokesman on broad questions of policy, though we think it essential
that the Commission should not be subject to the continuing Ministerial
guidance and direction which apply to Government Offices. The pro-
gress of science and the harmonies of art will be hampered by too
rigid rules and too constant a supervision by the State. Within well-
defined limits the Commission should enjoy the fullest liberty, wide
enough to mark the serious duties laid upon it, and elastic enough to
permit variation according to technical developments and changes in
public taste. It would discourage enterprise and initiative, both as
regards experiments and the intricate problem of programmes, were
the authority subjected to too much control. The aspirations and the
public obligations of Broadcasting can best be studied by a body
appointed ad hoc, endowed with adequate tenure, and concentrating
on ^this particular duty. The Commissioners should therefore be
invested with the maximum of freedom which Parliament is prepared
to concede.

THE flEPUTATION OF THE CIVIL SERVANT, 1928

(Quid, 3,0$;)

[In February, 1928, the Prime Minister appointed a Board of Enquiry' of
three senior Civil Servants, to examine statement? made during the case of
Ironmonger & Co. v. Dyne that three members of the Foreign Office had
been speculating in foreign currency.]

56. The first duty of a Civil Servant is to give his undivided allegi-
ance to the State at all times and on all occasions when the State has n
claim upon his services. With his private activities the State is in
general not concerned, so long as his conduct therein is not such as
to bring discredit upon the Service of which he is a member. But to
say that he is not to subordinate his duty to his private interests, nor
to make use of his official position to further those interests, is to say
no more than that he must behave with common honesty. The Service
exacts from itself a higher standard, because it recognises that the
State is entitled to demand that its servants shall not only be honest
in fact, but beyond the reach of suspicion of dishonesty. It was laid
down by one of His Majesty’s Judges in a case some few years ago
that it was not merely of |ome importance but of fundamental
importance that in a Cour^of Law justice should not only be done,
but should manifestly and^undoubtedly be seen to be done. . . . We
apply without hesitation an analogous rule to other branches of the

The Executive

242

public service. A Civil Servant is not to subordinate his duty to his
private interests; but neither is he to put himself in a position where
his duty and his interests conflict. He is not to make use of his official
position to further those interests; but neither is he so to order his
private affairs as to allow the suspicion to arise that a trust has been
abused or a confidence betrayed. These obligations are, we do not
doubt, universally recognised throughout the whole of the Service;
if it were otherwise, its public credit would be diminished and its
usefulness to the State impaired.

57. It follows that there are spheres of activity legitimately open to
the ordinary citizen in which the Civil Servant can play no part, or
only a limited part. He is not to indulge in political or party contro-
versy, lest by so doing he should appear no longer the disinterested
adviser of Ministers or able impartially to execute their policy. He is
bound to maintain a proper reticence in discussing public affairs and
more particularly those with which his own Department is concerned.
And lastly, his position clearly imposes upon him restrictions in matters
of commerce and business from which the ordinary citizen is free.

THE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL POWERS OF THE
EXECUTIVE, 1929-32

[The Committee on Ministers’ Powers was appointed by the Lord Chancellor
on 30 October 1929, “to consider the powers exercised by or under the direc-
tion of (or by persons or bodies appointed specially by) Ministers of the Crown
by way of (a) delegated legislation and ( b ) judicial or quasi-judicial decision,
and to report what safeguards are desirable or necessary to secure the con-
stitutional principles of the sovereignty of Parliament and the supremacy of
the law”.

The original members of the Committee were: the Earl of Donoughmore
(chairman). Sir John Anderson, the Duchess of Atholl, the Rev. James Barr,
Dr. E. L. Burgin, the Earl of Clarendon, Sir Warren Fisher, Sir Roger Gregory,
Professor H. J. Laski, Sir William S. Holdsworth, Sir W. Ellis Hume-Williams,
Sir Leslie Scott, Mr. Gavin Simmonds, Miss Ellen Wilkinson, and Sir John J.
Withers. The Countess of Iveagh was appointed as an additional member in
January 1930. The Earl of Donoughmore resigned the chairmanship on
grounds of health in April 1931, and was succeeded by Sir Leslie (later Lord
Justice) Scott. The Committee published its report in 1932.]

Legislative and Judicial Powers o f Executive, 1929-32 243

EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

(A) Sir Maurice L. Gwyer, H.M. Procurator-General and
Treasury Solicitor, Called and Examined:

( The Witness handed in the subjoined memorandum on .. . delegated
legislation .”)

3. . . . [Every] Departmental power, whether of delegated legislation
or of judicial functions, has been conferred by Parliament itself.
Criticism of the Departments either for possessing or for exercising
such powers (as distinct from the manner of their exercise) is in truth
a criticism of Parliament itself. It is, however, complained . . . that
Ministers on the instigation of their Departments force upon Parliament
legislative proposals which are undesirable in the public interest, and
that Parliament, faced with the choice either of accepting measures
of which it disapproves or of precipitating a political crisis, finds itself
compelled to choose what it presumably regards as the lesser evil, and
that the Departments take advantage for their own ends of this
dilemma. If the dilemma exists . . . the remedy lies with Parliament
itself. . . . m

4. In the second place, it is trite doctrine that for every official act
of his Department the Minister must accept responsibility in Parlia-
ment. A Civil Servant is not responsible to Parliament but only to the
Minister who presides over his Department, and the responsibility of
the Civil Servant is at an end whew the Minister has either accepted
or rejected the advice which the Civil Servant has tendered to him.
To impute responsibility to Civil Servants for legislative proposals
accepted by a Minister and enacted by Parliament is as illogical as it
is unjust. Those who do so must recognise that their criticism is
directed not merely, nor indeed primarily, against the Civil Service
but against the system of Cabinet and Parliamentary Government,
and is in fact destructive of the whole theory of ministerial responsi-
bility on which that system is based.

5. Thirdly, the popular portrait of the Civil Servant, avid of power

and unscrupulous in his manner of attaining it, is to those who know
the facts so remote from real life as to be almost laughable. ... A
bureaucracy in the true sense of the word does not and cannot exist
in England, or indeed under any system of parliamentary government;
for . . . the word is borrowed from Continental systems of the past,
where both Ministers and Civil Servants owed a duty to the Monarch
alone, and could not be hjlcl responsible by any popularly elected
body. 3 *

6 . Fourthly, it is probably realised only by a few l^ow vast is tjie

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244

mass of business at the present day transacted by Government Depart-
ments, and how small a part of it is represented by those powers and
duties which fall within the terms of reference of the Committee. . . .
Civil Servants have not the time/ even if they had the desire, to devote
their energies to the acquisition of power for the purpose of harassing
the King’s subjects. . . .

25. The Committee will, I hope, peraiit me in conclusion to suggest
that the subject matter of their investigation is not merely one of the
scope of Departmental powers at the present time. It goes far deeper
and involves the whole philosophy and technique of modern govern-
ment. The greater the complexity of our civilisation and the wider the
range of our legislation, the more difficult it is for a popularly elected
legislature to exercise complete control over administrative policy.
The utmost under present conditions that it can do in fact is to secure
that competent administrators are chosen and to enforce strictly the
principle of administrative responsibility; and fundamental change
would imply the adoption of a new theory of government. . . .

»Szr Leslie Scott

63. One question about the check afforded by putting the regulations
before Parliament. Do you think that that is in practice a check of
any real value? — .*. . [64] No, I do not think it is. That merely informs
Parliament of what is going on in the administrative sphere, but the
power of praying for annulment by address is a real check. . . .

68. Take the affirmative form, as distinguished from the negative,
requiring that the regulations should be confirmed by a Resolution of
each House? — With great respect, fhat does seem to me to be the wrong
method, because it is inviting Parliament to enter the administrative
sphere, because at any rate the making of the Regulations after Par-
liament has given the power to make them is an administrative act,
and I do not think that Parliament can share with the Executive the
functions of administration. You at once get a divided responsibility,
and the Minister could then throw the whole responsibility on to a
legislative and deliberative body of exercising functions which, with
the greatest respect to it, it really is not within its sphere to exercise. . . .

Sir John Withers

in. Does it not appear to you that there must be two alternative
modes [of exercising control after Regulations have been made] either
by setting up some Parliamentary Committee . . . [112] or to adopt
th^system of administrative law and form some sort of administrative
body which should act as a Court of Appeal . . . ? — The second sugges-
tion I could answer at once. ... To form' an administrative Gourt of
Appeal for tfge purpose of deciding whether a Minister’s Orders and

Legislative and Judicial Powers of Executive , ig2g~g2 045

Regulations were suitable or not seems to me to cut at the very root
of Parliamentary Government. It is transferring the functions of
Parliament to an outside tribunal. . . .

Sir Warren Fisher

165. Assuming that as individuals we do not want to be subject to
the arbitrary discretion of the Executive ... do you really think we
have at the present moment as individuals effective safeguards against
executive tyranny? — ... I do not think the control of Parliament
over the details of administrative action is always as effective as it
possibly ought to be in an ideal State, or possibly as effective as it was
50 years ago in this country, but what the remedy may be, I should
be sorry to say.

166. From a parliamentary point of view you would agree that the
existence of question time in terrorem is about the only safeguard we
havq? — That is as effective as anything. . . .

Sir Ellis Hume- Williams

399. Well, let me take your definition of quasi-judicial decision
(which I accept) as the power of giving a decision on questions or
differences of an administrative and non-justiciable character which
cannot be determined by reference to any fixed rule of law. . . . [400]
Do you think there should be always appeal as of rigfit [to a Court] ? —
No, certainly not. You would be referring things then to a Court with
which the Court has no concern at all. You would be appealing . . .
from the rock to the sand. m

401. I suppose you mean that tht decisions are so shifting? — No,
where you have a Court which is administering law, that is the rock.
But if you are going to transfer to the Court the duty of deciding
things according to discretion where "would you get? The appeal in a
case like that is to Parliament. It is for Parliament to challenge the*
Minister’s discretion in a matter like that, not the Court. . . . [404] . . .
Take . . . the power of the Minister to make an Order extending the
boundaries of a municipality. The decision there of the Minister was
necessarily a policy decision. There is no principle on which any Court
could decide whether the City of Leeds should absorb Morley and
Pudsey or not . . . Parliament is the only body that can tackle a matter
of that kind. . . .

408. . . . This is section 130 of the Local Government Act [of 1929] :

If any difficulty arises in connection with the application of this Act to any
exceptional area or in bringing into operation any of the provisions of th^Act
the Minister may make such Orcjer for removing the difficulty as he nftiy
judge to be necessary for the pv^tpose and any such Order may modify the
provisions of this Act 80 far ^ may appear to the Minister necessary for
carrying the Order into effect.

The Executive

246

Do you agree with this, that one result of that section is that there can
be no Orders that are ultra vires ? If an Order is ultra vires the Minister
simply modifies or changes the Act and it becomes intra vires? — For a
limited period. . . .

410. Do you think Parliament has gone too far? — No, not a bit.
May I tell you why? We had a similar section in the Insurance Act
of 1 91 1, and I drafted many Orders under that Section, and it is
literally true that the Act could never have started at all but for the
power reserved to the Insurance Commissioners by that Section. . . .

(B) Sir William Graham- Harrison, K.C., First Parliamentary
Counsel, Called and Examined:

( The Witness handed in the subjoined Memorandum .)

3. . . . speaking from a practical experience, which now extends to
a period of 27 years, of the work of getting legislation through Parlia-
ment I have no hesitation in saying that it would be impossible to
produce the amount and the kind of legislation which Parliament
desires to pass, and which the people of this country are supposed to
want, if it became necessary to insert in the Acts of Parliament them-
selves any considerable portion of what is now left to delegated legisla-
tion. As classical examples I would refer to th6 vast bulk ofthe National
Health Insurance’' Regulations and Special Orders, which run to more
than a thousand pages, and to the eight hundred pages of the Orders
setting up trade boards.

I should also like to ^emphasise a side of the question which appeals
to me particularly as one who has drafted, not only a large number of
Statutes, but also a very large number of Statutory Rules and Orders,
viz. the superiority in form which, as a result of the different circum-
stances and conditions under which they are respectively prepared and
r completed, delegated legislation has over Statutes. In most cases the
time available for drafting Bills is inadequate and their final form when
they have passed both Houses is generally unsatisfactory. On the other
hand, Statutory Rules can be prepared in comparative leisure and
their subject matter can be arranged in a logical and intelligible shape
uncontrolled by the exigencies of Parliamentary procedure and the
necessity for that compression which every Minister (however much in
debate he may use the draftsman as a whipping-boy) invariably
demands in the case of a Bill. . . .

4. ... In my opinion, one of the most important safeguards against
theHmproper use of delegated powers (though this applies much more
a*r respects Regulations of a general character than ... of a personal
or locally limited character) is the fact^that no Minister in his senses
with the fear of Parliament before his eye£ would ever think of making
Regulations ^without (where practicable) giving the persons who will

Legislative and Judicial Powers of Executive , ig 2 g -$2 247

be affected thereby (or their representatives) an opportunity of saying
what they think about the proposal. A large proportion of the Regula-
tions now made, e.g. regulations under the Factories Acts and the
Mines Acts, affect two sets of persons who have conflicting interests,
viz. the employers and the employed. In these cases the parties on
both sides are sufficiently organised to make their views known and
felt. It must, however, be admitted that on the other hand there are
cases where the persons affected are not sufficiently organised to bring
any pressure to bear on the Minister concerned and for them this
safeguard does not exist. . . .

5. In conclusion, there are one or two miscellaneous points which
deserve the Committee’s attention:

(i) At present there are extraordinary and quite indefensible differ-
ences in the period for which rules are required to lie before Parlia-
ment; in some cases the period is as much as 100 sitting days, in others
less than 20. . . .

(ii) The question of the moment at which Statutory Rules and
Orders are to take effect requires consideration. ... As the law stands,
there is nothing to secure that the persons affected shall have notice of
Rules before they come into operation. Rules may come into force
immediately they are made, and the rule-making authority having
made them jre not under' any obligation to publish them but may keep
them in a pigeon-hole for any length of time.

(iii) There is one practice which is very popular with some Depart-
ments which I think is objectionable, viz. the insertion in Rules of a
provision enabling the Minister by whom the Exiles are made to revoke
or vary some particular provision in* the Rules, e.g. a schedule, by a
mere direction given by him not in the form of a fresh Rule. I have
ahvays taken objection to such proposals and believe them to be
illegal; it will be seen that the effect of such a procedure is to withdraw
amendments to the Rules from the control of such safeguards as may*
apply to the making of Rules of the class in question. . . .

Professor Laski

562. Have you thought at all whether the suggestion that has been
made from time to time by Members of Parliament and others — con-
sideration of these rules by a Committee or a Joint Committee of the
two Houses — would be a valuable way of assuring that Parliamentary
attention was drawn to them, in the light of the fact that they are
made under powers given by Parliament ? — I have only considered the
question to this extent. It seems to me quite impossible for any Com-
mittee to get through the work # wi thin any reasonable limits of tim%

563. Supposing instead of#, single Committee, or a single Joint
Committee/ you grouped the*different Ministries in some way accord-
ing to their functions, and had Committees to deal wi*h groups of

The Executive

248

subjects. Do you think it would be possible then on the point of time?
— I am rather doubtful about it. But what I feel about any such sugges-
tion is that a large bulk of these rules are very small stuff indeed, and
I really think that Parliament has many more important things to
occupy the attention of its Members. I think the real remedy is that if
Parliament does not like something that a Minister does, it should tell
him so, and take care that he does not do it again. I think it would
really be a great waste of time for Members of Parliament to go
through a great deal of the stuff which appears in a year’s volume of
the Statutory Rules and Orders.

564. As an entire outsider, both to Parliament and Ministries, may
I put the kind of problem that a layman like myself feels when you
say that Parliament, when it objects to what the Minister has done,
should tell him so? Can, in fact, Parliament seriously tell a Minister
that it does object, in such a way that a Minister will always take care,
without turning the Government out? — You put a point that I^have
thought a great deal about lately. I say it with a good deal of hesitation,
but I think that there is more difficulty about doing that than, accord-
ing to the theory of the Constitution, there ought to be. I think it is
more difficult now than it was sixty years ago. . . .

Sir Claud Schuster

666. Do you think Departments are so indifferent to what Parlia-
ment says as has been suggested? — No.

667. I thought you rather lightly accepted the suggestion that I
understood had been*fnade that Ministers and their Departments
were an impregnable ironclad against which attacks were directed in
vain? — I do not think I meant to say that. . . .

668. The ordinary administrator is a timorous fowl. The one thing
r he wants more than anything else is to keep his Minister out of a row ?

—Yes.

669. As far as he can manage it? — Certainly.

670. He runs very fast directly a Member of Parliament raises his
voice.

Sir Warren Fisher : Is he not an enthusiast sometimes ? . . .

Sir Roger Gregory

695. Will you look at paragraph 5 (ii) of your memorandum. You
refer there to the power of making a rule and not publishing it. Would
it Jjg possible for a person to be prosecuted or penalised under a rule
wihich has never left the pigeon holes r of the Minister who has made
it?- — Technically, it would be possible, fapt I do not know that anybody
would ever be convicted. As soon as it is^made, is the law in force.

696. A Cmirt might have to convict if it was proved it was the law

Legislative and Judicial Powers of Executive, 1Q29-32 249

in force ? — There would be some way out of it. He would be a first
offender, I should think.

697. That is thfe fact, that a person can be prosecuted for the in-
fringement of a rule which has never left the office in which it was
made? — It might be. There were at one time various provisions that
a thing should not come into force until a certain time had elapsed.
It is a question worth considering whether there should not be some
form of publication. May I mention one case I know in which a
statutory rule consisted of nothing more than an interchange of letters
between two Departments, and in those letters there was contained a
statutory rule?

698. That is a pretty bad case. These things are pretty nearly as
bad as Mr. D. . . . , who used to write his rules in a dark place? — That
is only what may happen.

699. It is a thing we have to deal with? — I know another case where
a statutory rule was forgotten altogether for two years by the person
in charge of it. No one knew of it, but there it was, the rule in force. . . .

(G) Mr. C. T. Carr Called and Examined:

(The Witness handed in the subjoined Memorandum.)

. . . The ^vantages of'delegating legislative authority — economy of
Parliamentary time, availability of expert knowledge, promptness of
action and so on — are conspicuous. . . .

It is notorious that during the late war the scale of delegated legis-
lation was beyond all precedent. Indeed, even jhe figures in the table
below do not tell the full tale of D. 0 .R.A, But it is significant, and
perhaps surprising, to find that the tide has now ebbed back to a
pre-war mark. In the following table the first column contains the
annual totals of all statutory rules and orders registered under Section
3 of the Rules Publication Act since 1894. The second and third*
columns show these totals split (as prescribed by Treasury regulations)
into “general” and “local” rules and orders. The sharpest fluctuations
are visible in the “local” class owing to causes susceptible of explana-
tion.

Tear

Annual total

General

Local

1894

1,015

1895

950

246

704

1896

1,229

197

1,032

t 897

986

168

818

1898

I , I 5 I

200

95 i

j 899

1,000

223

111

1900

995

174

821

1901

1,042'

156

886

1902

•980

161

819

I 9°3

1,196

170

1^026

250

The Executive

Tear

Annual total

General

Local

1904

1,899

143

!,756

1905

1,379

162

1,217

1906

986

165

821

I 9°7

1,058

231

827

1908

r ,349

256

E 093

i, 5 28

205

^323

19 10

1,368

218

1 , 15 °

1911

i ,336

172

I,l 64

1912

i, 9 J 9

342

E 577

19*3

1,406

414

992

19 H

E 9 X 4

522

E 392

* 9 J 5

1,241

406

835

1916

94 1

508

433

* 9*7

1,383

753

630

1918

1,825

E204

621

* 9*9

2,241

1,091

1,150

1920

2,475

916

E 559

1921

2,1 10

727

1,383

1922

E 45 ^

430

1,020

1923

1,624

366

1,258

1924

1,601

426

Ei 75

1925

1,461

466

995

1926

E 745

. 448

V297

1927

E 349

445

904

1928

E132

4 i 5

717

1929

1,26s

39 i

871

If I may comment ibrst upon the local class, the substantial figures
from 1903 to 1905 are due to the Education Act of 1902; the increases
in 1908 and 1909 are due to numerous orders for the local application
of the Public Health Acts Amendment Act, 1907: similarly the Public
Health Act of 1925 swells the local total in 1926 and the following
years. Other transitory increases may be caused by epidemics of
measles, outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease, and so on, or, in the
post-war period, by floods of “increases of charges” and “extensions of
time” orders for public undertakings. The local rules and orders
largely consist of some adjustment of local government law or some
development of public health for which there has presumably been
a local demand, the local standard being often higher than the general.
The local Acts of Parliament are a vast uncharted sea. No draftsman
framing a measure of general application could confidently cover the
possible variations occasioned by local legislation in a matter, for
in^ftnce, like rating. Hence the need for adjusting general provisions
tcfp articular cases by some such machinery as the “removal of difficul-
ties” order. On the whole I doubt whether a student of local rules and
orders will discover in them a^ny serious* inroad upon liberty or any
cause for PsfHiament to be jealous. . . .

Legislative and Judicial Powers of Executive , ig2g~g2 251

With regard to the total of “general 55 orders in the second column of
the table, it is noticeable that for the first seventeen years the figures
fluctuate roughly between 150 and 250. Not till 1912 (the year after
the National Insurance Act) do they exceed 300. The total went over
500 in 1914, but the full force of war-time conditions was not felt till
1918. This impetus died away again till in 1922 there was a return to
the pre-war figure. After notably steady results from 1922 to 1928,
the total dropped last year below the 400 mark, though it is the
common opinion that post-war Parliaments are not less generous in
delegating legislative power than their predecessors.

The absence of violent fluctuations in the “general 55 list since 1922
may be evidence that the system is becoming stabilised. . . .

Rules and orders which modify Acts of Parliament are naturally
viewed with dislike or suspicion. The mere press-the-hutton proce-
dure for the operation of a statute on an “appointed day 55 is of con-
siderable antiquity and proved convenience; but it seems improper
that a statute — in the making of which all of us have in theory partici-
pated through our representatives — should be interfered with by a body
subordinate to Parliament. Two large classes of instances seem unob-
jectionable. First, there is the case where Parliament, instead of
delegating some matter of minor detail to be dealt ’with by depart-
mental rule ^r order front the. outset, inserts its ow r n ideas of the matter
in the text of the Act and then allows the department to modify them
from time to time. This matter appears hardly more sinister than if the
matter had been entrusted to departmental legislation from the
beginning. Subject to proper safeguards, it seems appropriate in such
instances as the list of poisons scheduled to the Poisons and Pharmacy
Act, 1908; untidy results can be periodically cleaned up by consolida-
tion. The second class contains those cases where Parliament, having
changed the law in general terms, allows the consequential modifica-
tions to be specifically worked out by rule or order. The use of “legis-*
lation by reference, 5 ’ -whereby enactments passed for one purpose are
applied to a quite different purpose, involves textual adaptations
frequently effected (if specified at all) by delegated legislation. Similar
adaptation is sometimes permitted when one central authority is
substituted for another. . . .

The machinery of registering Statutory Rules and Orders is governed
by section 3 of the Rules Publication Act, a provision inserted at the
last moment into the Bill which the Law Society had prepared for the
different purpose of ensuring prior notice of intention to make rules
of court.

Under section 3 the statutory rules must be sent to tfif . King s
Printer (who is the controllemof H.M. Stationery Office) “forthwith
after they are made, 5 il and nfust, in accordance with Treasury regula-
tions, be numbered, printed and put on sale. . . .

The Executive

252

A rule-making authority which hid its rules in a pigeon-hole would
be breaking the statutory direction. . . . When the 1893 Act first began
to operate, it is probable that all departments were not equally alert
in sending their rules and orders for -registration under section 3,
although in October, 1894, the Queen’s Printer issued a printed cir-
cular asking that copies should be sent him. Occasionally, omissions
are still detected, some serious, some trivial. . . .

If it were felt that some drastic step was necessary in order to prevent
the possible hushing up of departmental legislation, the Committee
might care to consider the suggestion that no rule or order should
have any validity until registered. . . .

There is nothing new in the principle of delegated legislation. Plato
makes his Athenian Stranger say that, though the lawgiver may write
out the laws as precisely as he can, the test of time wall show him that
he must leave some things over for someone else to put right. . . .

Nor is the principle wrong in itself. If may be a breach of Montes-
quieu’s theory of the separation of powers. If the executive, the legisla-
ture and the judiciary are pictured as three independent and self-
willed drivers of one vehicle, each of whom can and will apply a
powerful brake against the others, the vehicle may not run over any
pedestrians but on the other hand it may not move at all. The problem
would seem to be one not of right and wrong but of balance of public
advantage — is the administrative convenience of delegated legislation
outweighed by loss of individual liberty or other disadvantage . . . ?

There are two primary safeguards of individual liberty against the
possible menace of delegated legislation. First, in respect of policy and
administration, there are various well known methods of bringing
home any abuse to a minister responsible to Parliament. . . .

Secondly, in respect of legal validity, there is the judicial power (to
be strengthened if necessary) to pronounce upon questions of vires. . . .

Another valuable safeguard is preliminary consultation with the
interests affected. This course is often prescribed by statute. The
Advisory Committee under the London Traffic Act ... is a miniature
Parliament in itself. . . .

(D) Mr. W. A. Robson Called and Examined:

(The Witness handed in the subjoined memorandum.)

1. . . . The Separation of Powers is a legendary conception which
has at no period of English history accurately described the actual
dj^ion of authority between the various organs of government.

'Ther-Sh-ds no immutable necessity /or any particular division of
powers. Nor has any organ of government a vested right to exercise a
particular function. It is misleading and 7 unscientific to use language
which implies such a right. For example, it is common to speak of the

Legislative and Judicial Powers of Executive , i$ 2 g-g 2 253

c< ‘encroachment 5 5 of the Executive on the sphere of the Judiciary. As I
shall show, the fields of jurisdiction of which complaint is made con-
cern the newer functions of government. There can scarcely be
“encroachment” on territory which has not previously been settled. . . .

2. . . . An opposition exists in England between the ideas of “law”
and of “government.” . . . The struggle between King and Commons
has now become transformed into a conflict between the Executive on
the one hand and the Judiciary and the legal profession on the other.
The latter no doubt regard themselves as champions of the popular
cause; but the existence of a State providing social services on a vast
scale is due to the diffusion of voting power on a democratic basis
throughout the community.

3. . . . The scope and character of government have changed enor-
mously in the last 50 years. Formerly, government was chiefly regula-
tory and negative; its main task (apart from defence) was to keep the
ring and maintain fair play while private interests asserted themselves
freely. To-day, government is largely concerned with the administra-
tion of social services, and has become positive in a new sense. A
century ago, the State acted mainly as policeman, soldier and judge.
To-day, the State acts also as doctor, nurse, teacher, insurance organ-
iser, house-builder, sanitary engineer, chemist, railway controller, sup-
plier of ga^ water and electricity, town-planner, pensions distributor,
provider of transport, hospital organiser, road-maker, and in a large
number of other capacities.

The change from regulatory or control activities to service activities
on the part of Government necessitates new forms of administrative
authority. ...

4. . . . In enquiring into the exercise of judicial powers by Govern-
ment departments it should not be assumed that the mere existence of
legislative enactments conferring powers which preclude review by the
Courts of Ministerial determinations is evidence of executive tyranny'.
Clearly the manner in which the powers are used is more important
than the mere existence of statutory provisions.

Nor must we assume that access to the Courts is inevitably a guar-
antee against ministerial oppression. The most tyrannical department
of Government appears to be the Inland Revenue, which often
threatens the citizen with litigation in the Courts if he ventures to
disagree with an administrative decision. . . .

Again, another dangerous and unscientific assumption is the belief
that immunity from control by the Courts of Law involves an anar-
chical absence of all effective restraint whatsoever. New forms oflaw,
legal tissue in the making, always appear at first as manife$£atioFS of
extra-legal absolutism. . . . &

5. ... It is suggested that criticism directed on a priori grounds
against the exercise of judicial powers by Government^ departments,

Sbg

254 77 z£ Executive

etc., usually fails to take account of four important aspects of the
situation : —

(1) Limitation as to the suitability of the Courts to act as tribunals
of review for certain types of administrative decisions. These limita-
tions may arise from various causes such as ( a ) lack of special know-
ledge or experience of the subject matter, (b) absence of a body of case-
law appropriate to the circumstances. The result of this is either a mere
transfer of discretion from the Executive to a non-expert judicial body
unconcerned with functional ends, or a refusal by the Courts to dis-
turb the administrative determination. ( c ) Existence of a body of
hardened legal doctrine unsuited to the unforeseen circumstances
which may now have arisen. ( d ) Traditional lack of sympathy with the
positive aims of modern government, (e) Defects in the procedural
machinery and legal forms which must be used in order to obtain
access to the Courts. For example, such remedies as mandamus , prohibi-
tion , certiorari , and ultra vires are in many cases useless for the purpose
of getting a review of administrative determinations. (/) Expense and
difficulty of litigation, (g) The absence of a body of public law and the
concepts appropriate thereto In English jurisprudence, (k) Volume of
business which would press upon the Courts and produce congestion.

(2) The development of judicial habits of mind and a judicial out-
look by administrators and other persons who are called upon to
decide practical issues. . . .

(3) The existence of potential control, (a) by Ministers over civil
servants, ( b ) by Parliament over Ministers.

(4) The potential control exercised by public opinion over adminis-
trative officials. f

For these and other reasons I do not believe that it is desirable to
give in every case a right of appeal to the Courts from the decision of
the administrative body. . . .

" 6. ... I suggest it is impossible to be satisfied with the existing state
of affairs which embodies neither the institutional safeguards of droit
administratif nor the traditional guarantees of English judicial practice.

Very shortly, the advantages and disadvantages of Administrative
Tribunals may be summarised under the following heads:

Advantages of Administrative Tribunals . Cheapness. Rapidity. Condu-
cive to efficient administration. Introduction of special knowledge
and experience. Accumulated departmental information is made avail-
able for use. Flexibility. Ability to promote a policy of social improve-
ment. Development of new standards. Infusion of new moral ideas.

Dis advantages of Administrative Tribunals . Secrecy or lack of publicity.
Pogr qualify of investigation into questions of fact. Inability to compel
production of documents and attendar^e of witnesses. Anonymity.
Exclusion of lawyers. Failure to give reasons forr-decision. Absence of
report of case*. Refusal of oral hearing.

Legislative and Judicial Powers of Executive , ig2g~g2 255

7. . . . Suggested principles. An Administrative Tribunal is the appro-
priate body for deciding questions in dispute: (1) Where a new policy
of social improvement is being promoted. (2) Where it is desired to
create new standards rapidly in an unexplored field. (3) Where new
or existing standards are to be applied or extended throughout the
country, and consistency and co-ordination are required. (4) Where
special knowledge or experience, or departmental i n ^omation, are
necessary for a good decision. (5) Cheapness and sptB^Swiot suffi-
cient justification for an administrative tribunal. (6) Administrative
Jurisdiction should not extend to matters already dealt with by the
Courts of Law. It should normally be concerned with disputes in
which one or both parties are public authorities. (7) An Administra-
tive Tribunal should always have power to act as a Tribunal of first
instance. v{8) Judicial powers should invariably be exercised by a
definite Tribunal consisting of public servants specially nominated for
the Durpose by the responsible Minister. Jq) An aggrieved party
should always have a right to an oral hearing. ^10) Administrative
Tribunals should have power to call for documents and compel the
attendance of witnesses, *fi 1 ) The reasons for a decision and the prin-
ciples followed should invariably be given. Administrative Tribunals
should publish regular reports of their decisions. J 12) Great attention
should be«paid to the qualifications, training and experience of the
personelle of administrative tribunals. ^13) The representation of out-
side interests on the tribunal is desirable in certain circumstances. -(14)
The person or persons who enquire iffio the facts should in all cases
also decide the issue. ( 1 5) The Ministerial control over the work of an
Administrative Tribunal should be strictly confined to directions as to
principles to be followed contained in a Letter of Reference addressed
to the members. This document should invariably be open to the
public. J 1 6) In important questions an appeal should lie to a superior
Administrative Appeal Tribunal. (17) The members of Administrative
Tribunals should be liable in the ordinary course for malice, negli-
gence, corruption or fraud, committed in the course of their duties.
(18) Administrative Tribunals should in no circumstances have power
to decide questions involving the liberty of the subject.

(E) MEMORANDUM BY THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH:

PART IV

A. ENACTMENTS CONFERRING POWERS ON THE MINISTER OF HEALTH TO
MAKE RULES OR REGULATIONS TO WHICH SECTION I OF THE I^EeS
PUBLICATION AGT, 1 893 * # APPLIES.

1. Public Health (Regukftions as tqFood) Act, 1907.

2. Rag Flock Act, 1911. ♦

The Executive

256

3. Milk and Dairies (Consolidation) Act, 1915 (Section 1).

4. Census Act, 1920.

5. Local Authorities (Financial Provisions) Act, 1921.

6. Milk and Dairies Amendment Act, 1922.

7. Bread Acts Amendment Act, 1922.

8. National Health Insurance Act, 1922.

9. Housing (Financial Provisions) Act, 1924.

10. National Health Insurance Act, 1924.

11. Rating and Valuation Act, 1925.

12. Widows 5 , Orphans 5 and Old Age Contributory Pensions Act, 1925.

13. Town Planning Act, 1925 (except Sections 6 and 19).

14. Therapeutic Substances Act, 1925.

15. Economy (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1926 (Part I).

16. Poor Law Act, 1927.

17. Local Authorities (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1928.

18. National Health Insurance Act, 1928.

19. Rating and Valuation (Apportionment) Act, 1928.

20. Local Government Act, 1929 (except rules or regulations made
under Sections 22, 26 and*^).

21. Agricultural Rates Act, 1929.

22. Widows 5 , Orphans and Old Age Contributory Pensions Act, 1929.

B. ENACTMENTS CONFERRING POWERS ON THE MINISTER OF HEALTH TO
MAKE RULES OR REGULATIONS TO WHICH SECTION I OF THE RULES
PUBLICATION ACT, 1 893, DOES NOT APPLY.

1. Poor Law Amendment Act, 1844.

2. Burial Act, 1852.

3. Vaccination Act, 1867.

4. Gas and Water Works Facilities Act, 1870.

5. Vaccination Act, 1871.

6. Gas and Water Works Facilities Act, 1873.

7. Vaccination Act, 1874.

8. Public Health Act, 1875.

9. Canal Boats Act, 1877.

10. District Auditors Act, 1879.

11. Epidemic and other Diseases Prevention Act, 1882.

12. Public Health and Local Government Conferences Act, 1885.

13. Local Government Act, 1888.

14. Infectious Disease (Notification) Act, 1889.

1 5^ Pu blic Health Acts Amendment Act, 1890.
ibT^ubli^^Health (London) Act, 1891.

17. Local Government Act, 1894. \

18. London (Equalisation of Rates) Act, 1894.

19. Agricultural Rates Act, 1896.

Legislative and Judicial Powers of Executive , iQ 2 g-g 2 257

20. Vaccination Act, 1898.

21. Metropolis Water Act, 1902.

22. Midwives Act, 1902.

23. Borough Funds Act, 1903.

24. Public Health Act, 1904.

25. Unemployed Workmen Act, 1905.

26. Alkali, etc., Works Regulation Act, 1-906.

27. Public Health Acts Amendment Act, 1907.

28. Small Holdings and Allotments Act, 1908.

29. Housing, Town Planning, etc., Act, 1909.

30. Fishery Harbours Act, 1915.

31. Land Settlement (Facilities) Act, 1919.

32. Nurses Registration Act, 1919.

33. Blind Persons Act, 1920.

34. Unemployment Insurance Act, 1920 (Section 32).

35. \Vater Undertakings (Modification of Charges) Act, 1921.

36. Education Act, 1921 (Section 135).

37. Local Government and other Officers Superannuation Act, 1922.

38. Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Act, 1923.

39. Housing, etc., Act, ^1923.

40. Housing Act, 1925.

41. Town Planning Act, 1925 (Sections 6 and 19).

42. Public Health Act, 1925.

43. Housing (Rural Workers) Act, 1926.

44. Public Health (Smoke Abatement) Act, 01926.

45. Nursing Homes Registration Act, 1927.

46. Food and Drugs (Adulteration) Act. 1928.

47. Local Government Act, 1929 (Sections 22, 26 and 59).

Further Memorandum by the Ministry of Health:

3. Emphasis should at the outset be laid on the point . . . that the
matters with which regulations made by the Ministry deal (and the
same is no doubt true of other Departments) are almost without
exception under the continuous scrutiny of powerful associations and
bodies representing Local Authorities, manufacturing and trading
interests, officers of Local Authorities, and members of the public,
whether as owners of property, ratepayers, professional men, insured
persons and the like. This is a point of such fundamental importance
in connection with the consideration of any rule-making syste m th at
at the risk of stating what is^familiar it may be well to ase^ll t* the
Committee some of the more# prominent bodies with which to a greater
or less extent the D&par1m«nt is in communication, formal or informal,
in connection with the exercise of rule-making powers *

258

The Executive

Local Government (in-
cluding Poor Law
and Rating).

County Councils’ Association; Association of
Municipal Corporations; Urban and
Rural District Councils 5 Associations;
National Association of Local Govern-
ment Officers; Association of Poor Law
Officers.

Public Health,
Housing.

Town Planning.
Model Byelaws.

Royal Sanitary Institute; Surveyors’ Insti-
tution; Royal Institute of British Archi-
tects; Housing and Town Planning Asso-
ciation; Town Planning Institute.

National Health Insur- Approved Societies’ Consultative Council;
ance. National Association of Approved Soc-

ieties; National Association of Insurance
Committees; British Medical Association.

(F) Sir Arthur Robinson, Secretary to the Ministry of Health,
Called and Examined :

Sir Leslie Scott

2225. I should like to ask one question about the reports of persons
holding local inquiries. From the general tr£nd of your ^evidence I
gather that perhaps the strongest reason against publishing the
reports is, in your view, that the decision of the Minister is in fact
made not only on the report but on other considerations as well ? —
Certainly.

2226. As a matter of practice, does he, or some other person repre-
senting him in the Ministry, discuss with the Inspector orally the
report and what happened at the inquiry, and his views about it? —
Normally discussion of that sort would go on, I think. If there is any
point of difficulty or doubt in the report, the Inspector is asked for
further explanation of it, and so on, and those further explanations
become part of the material on which the decision is finally given.

2227. If the reasons are subsequently published, even in the form of

a letter or statement, the reasons given may be reasons which are not
specifically mentioned in the report? — Certainly. You have the case
where the decision differs from the Inspector’s recommendation. I do
not say that is a common case, but there are a number of such cases.
The Inspector, who I suppose is primarily a technical man acting
from a technical standpoint, goes so far, and then you have other
so rts of considerations that come in, and you have the final decision
w 05 £h, a^J-say, in a certain number of these cases differs from the
recommendation. &

2228. Do these cases often depend in tfoeir ultimate result upon a
hard fight on disputed facts? — ... You do get a certain number of

Legislative and Judicial Powers of Executive , 1920-32 259

cases where there is dispute on the facts, but in the normal case . . .
the issues do not turn upon that. . . . [2230] ... Of course the difficulty
always is, . . . what is a fact,

2231. Precisely. Is that difficulty one of the reasons that make you
say that it would not do to publish even the report of facts? — I do
have difficulty on that, for the reason that it is quite hard to say what
is fact and what is opinion. If you take a Slum Clearance Report, you
have to say something about a certain house, and what the man
finally says is that the house is insanitary for various reasons, a wall
may be bulging, or the drains may be all wrong, and so on, but
someone else who goes there may take a different view of what the
fact is. . . .

Sir John Withers

. . . 2266. Ex hypothesis on your evidence the Minister has before
him certain other facts that the Inspector does not report upon ? — Not
necessarily facts. ... [2267] .. . What I said was the Minister has to
take account of considerations other than those which the Inspector
has in his mind. *

2268. . . . Don’t you think it right that at some stage or another
the people interested should have the right to criticise that material ? —
I do not think so at alh This material is very often pure policy. . . .

n *

THE REPORT OF THE COI&VOTTEE

Cmd. 4sOSOs 1932 .

SECTION I.— INTRODUCTORY

5. . . We do not doubt that in the exercise of the judicial and quasi-
judicial powers of Ministers justice is as a general rule substantially
done; but . . . justice is not enough. What people want is security
for justice, and the only security for justice is Law, publicly
administered.

Great stress has been laid on this public need by the Lord Chief
Justice in The New Despotism. . . . We regard [this] as a warning
against possible dangers of great gravity towards which he discerns
an existing tendency to drift. We are very much alive both to the
presence of such dangers and to their gravity if not checked . . . But . . ,
we see nothing to justify any lowering of the country’s higJjj^iniotTof
its Civil Service or any refle^fton on its sense of justice, or any ground
for a belief that our constitutional machinery is developing in direc-
tions which are fundamentally wrong. Our Report dra^vs attention to

26 o

The Executive

certain parts of that machinery, which are capable of improvement,
and certain aspects of its working where specific safeguards are needed.
At the same time we say deliberately that there is no ground for public
fear, if the right precautions are taken. . . .

SECTION II.— DELEGATED LEGISLATION

2 . ... It is indeed difficult in theory and impossible in practice to
draw a precise dividing line between the legislative on the one hand
and the purely administrative on the other. . . .

, . . Indeed, to exclude “administrative” regulations from any
system of safeguards to be adopted in regard to delegated legislation
would be dangerous; for to do so might let in the very evils against
which safeguards are designed. Executive discretion, uncontrolled by
safeguards, may easily become a cloak for those very powers of arbi-
trary legislation or judicial decision feared by those critics who describe
our Civil Service as “the Bureaucracy” and think of it as “the new
despotism.” ...

4. . . .We doubt . . . whether Parliament itself has fully realised
how extensive the practice of delegation has become, or the extent to
which it has surrendered its own functions in the process, or how
easily the practice might be abused ... * ^

6. Delegated legislation by Ministers of the Crown invariably takes
one of two forms :

(a) the statutory Order in Council;

(b) the departmental regulations . . .

12. . . . [A] system of delegated legislation is indispensable. Indeed,
the critics of the system do not seek to deny its necessity in some form.
Their complaint lies rather against the volume and character of dele-
gated legislation than against the practice of delegation itself. . . .
We... think it may be convenient to summarise the main criticisms. . . .

(1) Acts of Parliament may be passed only in skeleton form and
[contain] only the barest general principles. Other matters of principle,
transcending procedure and the details of administration, matters
which closely affect the rights and property of the subject, may be
left to be worked out in the Departments, with the result that laws
are promulgated which have not been made by, and get little super-
vision from Parliament. . . .

(2) The facilities afforded to Parliament to scrutinise and control
the exercise of powers delegated to Ministers are inadequate. There
is < T3ftan ggrj fiat the servant may be transformed into the master.

(3) Delegated powers may be so wicK^as to deprive the citizen of
protection by the Courts against action ky the ^Executive which is
harsh, or unreasonable.

Legislative and Judicial Powers of Executive , ig2g-j2 261

(4) The delegated power may be s© loosely defined that the area it
is intended to cover cannot be clearly known, and it is said that uncer-
tainty of this kind is unfair to those affected.

(5) While provision is usually made (a) for reasonable public
notice, and (b) for consultation in advance with the interests affected
where they are organised, this is not always practicable, particularly
where the public affected is general andh^ot special and organised.

(6) The privileged position of the Grown as against the subject in
legal proceedings places the latter at a definite disadvantage in obtain-
ing redress in the Courts for illegal actions committed under the
authority of delegated legislation.

Each of these criticisms is important, but they do not destroy the
case for delegated legislation. . . . What the system lacks is coherence
and uniformity in operation. . . .

SECTION III.— JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISION

2. ... A 4 ‘quasi-judicial 5 5 decision is . . . one which has some of the
attributes of a judicial decision, but noffall. . . .

A true judicial decision presupposes an existing dispute between
two or more parties, and then involves four requisites :

(1) the presentation (not necessarily orally) of their case by the
parties to the dispute; (2) if the dispute between th£m is a question of
fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of evidence . . .; (3) if
the dispute between them is a question 6f law. the submission of legal
argument by the parties; and (4) a decision^ which disposes of the
whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and an application
of the law of the land to the facts so found, including where required
a ruling upon any disputed question of law.

A quasi-judicial decision equally presupposes an existing dispute
between two or more parties and involves 'Y< and (2), but does nof
necessarily involve (3), and never involves (4). The place of (4) is in
fact taken by administrative action, the character of which is deter-
mined by the Minister’s free choice. . . .

3. . . . [Although] “natural justice” does not fall within those
definite and well-recognised rules of law which English Courts of
Law enforce, we think it is beyond doubt that there are certain canons
of judicial conduct to which all tribunals and persons who have to
give judicial or quasi-judicial, decisions ought to conform. The prin-
ciples on which they rest are we think implicit in the rule of law. . . .

(i) The first and most fundamental principle of natural justice js
that a man may not be a judge in his own cause. . . . m

... It goes without saying tfa # at in no case in which a Minister has a
pecuniary or any otl^sr similar interest in a decision, . . . should he
exercise either judicial or quasi-judicial functions. . . . •

262

The Executive

But disqualifying interest is not confined to pecuniary interest. . . .
Indeed, we think it is clear that bias from strong and sincere conviction
as to public policy may operate as a more serious disqualification than
pecuniary interest. . . . [The] bias to which a public-spirited man is
subjected if he adjudicates in any case in which he is interested on
public grounds is more subtle and less easy for him to detect and
resist. ... /

. . .We think that in any case in which the Minister’s Department
would naturally approach the issue to be determined with a desire
that the decision should go one way rather than another, . . . Parlia-
ment would do well ... to provide that the Minister himself should
not be the judge, but that the case should be decided by an independent
tribunal. . . .

The application of the principle which we have just enunciated as
to quasi-judicial decision is not so easy, since a quasi-judicial decision
ultimately turns upon administrative policy for which an executive
Minister should normally be responsible. ... *

(ii) The second principle of natural justice is one which has two
aspects . . . No party ought to be condemned unheard; and if his right
to be heard is to be a reality, he must know in good time the case
which he has to meet. But on neither branch of this principle can any
particular procedure ... be regarded as furfdamental. r

(iii) It may well be argued that there is a third principle of natural
justice, namely, that a party is entitled to know the reason for the
decision, be it judicial or quasi-judicial. . . .

(iv) Some judges ha^e discerned a fourth principle of natural jus-
tice . . . : that when Parliament has provided for what amounts to an
oral hearing by the method of a “public inquiry,” local or otherwise,
held before an inspector appointed for the purpose by the Minister,
as a means of guidance to the Minister in his decision ... it is contrary
'to natural justice that the inspector’s report upon the inquiry should
not be made available to the parties so heard. . . .

4. Decisions which are purely administrative stand on a wholly
different footing from quasi-judicial as well as from judicial decisions
and must be distinguished accordingly. . . . [There] is no legal obliga-
tion ... to consider and weigh submissions and arguments, or to
collate any evidence, or to solve any issue. The grounds upon which
[the person deciding] acts, and the means which he takes to inform
himself before acting, are left entirely to his discretion. . . .

But even a large number of administrative decisions may and do
involve, in greater or less degree, at some stage in the procedure which
eventuate* in executive action, certain of the attributes of a judicial
decision. Indeed generally speaking a quasi-judicial decision is only an
administrative decision, some si^ge or sorfe element of which possesses
judicial characteristics. . . .

Legislative and Judicial Powers of Executive , ig2g-g>2 263

9. It is obvious that the separation *of powers is prima facie the guid-
ing principle by which Parliament when legislating should allocate
the executive and judicial tasks involved in its legislative plan. If the
statute is in general concerned with administration, an executive
Department should be entrusted with its execution; but if the measure
is one in which justiciable issues will be Raised in the course of carrying
the Act into effect, . . . then prima facie that part of the task should be
separated from the rest, and reserved for decision by a Court of Law —
whether ordinary or specialised, as in the circumstances Parliament
may think right.

It is only on special grounds that judicial functions should be
assigned by Parliament to Ministers or Ministerial Tribunals. . . .

But quasi-judicial decisions stand on a different footing. The pre-
sumption as to the correct legislative course is the other way; for a
decision which ultimately turns on administrative policy should
normally be taken by the executive Minister. . . .

m.HVe do not think that any will dispute that the jurisdiction of the
High Court of Justice to quash the proceedings of inferior courts is
important, and that its . . . jurisdiction should be no less vigilantly
exercised in the case of a Minister or Ministerial Tribunal. . . .

The scope of the High Court’s supervision is well established by law.
If a properly constituted inferior tribunal has exercised the jurisdiction
entrusted to it in good faith, not influenced by extraneous or irrelevant
considerations, and not arbitrarily or illegally, the High Court cannot
interfere. When exercising its supervisory powers the High Court is
not sitting as a Court of Appeal from the Tribunal, but it has power to
prevent the usurpation or mistaken Assumption by the Tribunal of a
jurisdiction beyond that given to it by law, and to ensure that its
decisions are judicial in character by compelling it to avoid extraneous
considerations in arriving at its conclusion, and to confine itself to
decision of the points which are in issue before it. Likewise a Minister
or Ministerial Tribunal is not autocratic but is an inferior tribunal sub-
ject to the jurisdiction which the Court of King’s Bench for centuries,
and the High Court since the Judicature Acts, has exercised over such
tribunals. That the jurisdiction extends to quasi-judicial, as well as
to judicial functions, was expressly decided by the House of Lords in
Minister of Health v. The King {on the Prosecution of Taffe ) .

We regard as essential the maintenance of this jurisdiction, and a
simple and cheap access to the High Court in order to invoke it. . . .

19. Mr. W. A Robson has put before us detailed proposals for the
establishment of a system of administrative Courts and administrate
Law independent of Ministers.^. . . We have considered thc^exp^ii-
ency, but interesting as they arfc, we cannot recommend their adoption ;
in our view they are irtconsisffent with the sovereignty of Parliament and
the supremacy of the Law. . . .

The Executive

264

A regularised system of administrative Courts and administrative
Law, such as Mr. Robson proposes, would involve the abolition of both
the supervisory and the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court in
matters pertaining to administration; and we believe that it would
result in the withdrawal to a great extent of those judicial activities,
which are inseparable from/ administration, from the influence of
public opinion. /

We, therefore, without hesitation advise against its adoption.

The Lord Chief Justice has himself expressed the opinion in Ch. Ill
of The New Despotism that “droit odministratif ” is completely opposed
to the first principles of our Constitution.

The truth of this observation is clearly illustrated by the history of
the system of administrative Law existing in modern France. . . .

ANNEX V

NOTE BY PROFESSOR LASKI ON THE JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

I wholly concur . . . that it is undesirable to transfer the interpretation of
statutes which define and control the administrative process ^ . to special

Courts. . . . But thfs is not to say that the methods of interpretation now used
by the Courts are satisfactory. . . .

. . . The canons of the historic method now operative seem to me defective
in a number of particulars ; (1) they exaggerate the degree to which the inten-
tion of Parliament may fee discovered from the words of a statute; (2) they
underestimate the degree to which/* the personality of the judge, what Mr.
Justice Holmes has called his 4 inarticulate major premiss”, plays a part in
determining the intention he attributes to Parliament; (3) they exaggerate
both the certainty and the universality of the Common Law as a body of
^principles applicable, in the absence of statute, to all possible cases ; (4) they
minimise the possibility that the judge can, in his work of interpretation, fully
operate the principle of Heydorts case [1584] and consider the evil the statute
was intended to remedy so that their construction may suppress the mischief
and advance the remedy. They thus make the task of considering the relation-
ship of statutes, especially in the realm of great social experiments, to the social
welfare they are intended to promote one in which the end involved may
easily become unduly narrowed either by reason of the unconscious assump-
tions of the judge, or because he is observing principles of interpretation
devised to suit interests we are no longer concerned to protect in the same
degree as formerly. . . .

. . . Legislation construed by the historic canons of analysis which our Courts
TSippt is too often so interpreted as to defeat the real intention of the legisla-
tor . . rrSuggest that the method of interpretation should be less analytical
and more functional in character; it shoula seek to discover the effect of the
legislative precept in action so asrto give ful? weighf to the social value it is
intended to sdfure. . . .

265

Treasury Control and the Civil Service, igji

ANNEX VI

NOTE BY MISS ELLEN WILKINSON ON DELEGATED
LEGISLATION

While agreeing generally with this report I would like to add a note regard-
ing the tone of certain passages which rather give the impression that the
delegating of legislation is a necessary evil, inevitable in the present state of
pressure on parliamentary time, but nevertheless a tendency to be watched
with misgiving and carefully safeguarded.

I feel that in the conditions of the modern state, which not only has to
undertake immense new social services, but which before long may be respon-
sible for the greater part of the industrial and commercial activities of the
country, the practice of Parliament delegating legislation and the power to
make regulations, instead of being grudgingly conceded, ought to be widely
extended, and new ways devised to facilitate the process. . . .

TREASURY CONTROL AND THE CIVIL SERVICE, 1931

Report of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service ( Cmd . j } 909. 1931)

18. The control exercised by the Treasury over the Service depends
on and has <^&veloped out 'of the power of the purse, and in particular
out of the responsibility for the presentation to Parliament of the
Estimates for the Civil and Revenue Departments. Several other
factors have assisted the tendency to centralise in the Treasury a general
supervision over the personnel of the Service. J^yaiong these factors are
the extension of classes common to the Service whose conditions of
service must be regulated by some central body, the need for improved
organisation in Departments called upon to carry out business of
increasing volume and complexity, and the greater attention paid to
staff questions generally. Since 1919, staff matters have been dealt with
by a special branch of the Treasury, known as the Establishments
Department, whose consent is required to the numbers, grading,
remuneration and conditions of service of all Civil Service staffs..

19. Further, as a result of its special constitutional position, it has
for many years been the practice for the Treasury, of which the Prime
Minister as First Lord is the titular head, to deal with matters affecting
the Civil Service as a wdiole. Under the Orders in Council of 22nd
July, 1920, power was expressly conferred on the ireasury to make
regulations for controlling the conduct of Y our Majesty s civil estab-
lishments, and providing for the classification, remuneration and othe^
conditions of service of all persons employed therein. . . . Within 'She
limits of such regulations macJe by the Treasury, Heads of Depart-
ments remain free to issue detailed rules for the administration of their
own Departments.

266

The Executive

20. Another important change was made in 1920, when the Govern-
ment of the day affirmed the principle of requiring the consent of the
Prime Minister to the appointment of permanent Heads of Depart-
ments, their deputies, principal financial officers, and principal estab-
lishment officers. It is now the duty of the Permanent Secretary to the
Treasury, when a vacancy arises in any of these posts, to submit advice
for the consideration of the Prime and of the Minister of the Depart-
ment in which the vacancy occurs.

587. The Staff side of the National Council made the following
criticisms of the existing system: that Treasury control in staff matters
was severe; that the control was exercised not only at the stage when
departmental and ministerial proposals involving expenditure were
considered prior to submission to the Cabinet or Parliament, but sub-
sequently in regard to the detailed expenditure of the money; that the
Treasury’s scrutiny of expenditure was unimaginative and destructive
and gave rise to friction between the Treasury and Departments and
that this friction militated against efficiency.

589. The criticisms of Treasury control made by the Staff side were
not borne out by the official evidence. We were told by permanent
Heads of Departments and other official witnesses that, while their
proposals were not always agreed to by the Treasury, in general they
were satisfied that their proposals received full and fair consideration.
We were informed that, whereas not many years ago it was the prac-
tice for negotiations between Departments to be carried out mainly in
writing, to-day the establishment officers of Departments met and
consulted at frequent ^intervals with their opposite numbers in the
Establishments Department of thfe Treasury. In his evidence before us,
the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury claimed that, while in the
past there had been a good deal of friction between the Treasury and
Departments, matters now worked far more smoothly. He also referred
to the close contact between permanent Heads of Departments on all
major issues.

590. Our conclusion is that the system of Treasury control in staff
matters is, in the main, satisfactory, and that there is no justification
for any general relaxation of the present system of control, or for any
proposal to remove the control of staff matters from the Treasury to
some other Department. . . .

267

Local Government Expenditure , 1332

LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE, 1932

Report of the Committee on Local Expenditure (. England and Wales) ( Cmd „

4,200, 1932) ” *

7. The following table shows the total revenue expenditure of Local
Authorities in England and Wales on all services, except trading
undertakings, falling on rates and grants. ... o

Expenditure falling on rates and grants

Tear ending

Rates

Grants

Total

31 March

1920

1 13,089,416

47,912,453

161,001,869

1921

61,922,356

2I 3> 829, 074

1922

160,163,899

73,709,956

233^73,855

1923

151,078,001

72,791,346

223,869,347

1^24

140,006,325

75,197,868

215,204,193

1925

I 43 » 95 I >377

77=473,905

221,425,282

1926

x 5 °» 583.323

80,032,595

230,615,918

1927

i 63 . 3 ° 7.732

82,7^4,444

246,066,176

1928

160,413,911

85,860,680

246,274,591

1929

163,601, {96

89,022,042

252,623,238

193° •

154,888,952

107,463,251

* 262,352,203

8. It will be seen . . . that the principal heads of expenditure falling

on rates and grants in the year 1929-30 were as follows:

1. Education 79,685,166

2. Highways and Bridges 48,470,092

3. Public Health (including the sanitary services, lunacy and

mental deficiency) 42,678,884

4. Relief of the Poor 31,457,884"*

5* Pokce 20,899,587

6. Housing 13,927,407

10. . . . The figures . . . show a growth in Local Government expendi-
ture and in Local Government commitments which must call for very
serious thought and indicate that a very heavy burden has been placed
on the private citizen.

We recognise that both the Central Government and the Local
Authorities have to bear responsibility for what has taken place and,
if economy is to be effected, it will be necessary not only that th^
Central Government should refrain from placing fresh burdens ! »on'^cie
country but that the Local Authorities themselves should review the
whole field of their activities and tighten up their administration.

Since the War there has been a steady stream of legislation giving

268

The Executive

Local Authorities fresh powers 'and imposing fresh duties and obliga-
tions upon them. There have been Acts, Orders, or Regulations deal-
ing with Housing, Education, Agriculture, Public Health, Mental
Deficiency, Roads, and almost every subject affecting Local Govern-
ment.

When a new duty is imposed on or a new function assigned to Local
Authorities by Parliament under the general jurisdiction of a Govern-
ment Department, that Department is expected to give effect to the
wishes of Parliament, and proceeds to persuade and at times to apply
pressure to Local Authorities to take action. In this process there is
sometimes a tendency to aim at perfection and uniformity and inade-
quate allowance is made for local needs and circumstances.

We feel strongly that the time has come when a halt should be
called to legislation involving Local Authorities in fresh expenditure.
They already have more than enough to do in perfecting their organisa-
tion to carry out the many new duties assigned to them in recent
years.

Before expenditure can be reduced it is necessary to arrest its growth
and this, we are satisfied, is one of the most effective ways to arrest it.

1 1 . The encouragement of increased local expenditure has been

most marked in those services where the system of percentage grants
prevails, indeed it has been an avowed defence of the system that it
does and is designed to induce Local Authorities to develop the services
or carry out the works for which the grants are offered. The operation
of the unemployment grants illustrates the principle in its extreme
form. T

It is not suggested that Local Authorities enter upon reckless expen-
diture merely because a large percentage will be borne by the Exche-
quer, but they have been encouraged to embark on expenditure they
would otherwise have been willing to postpone by the consideration
That there are Government grants available which, if not taken, will
go to someone else.

A further consequence of the system is that Local Authorities raise
loans for expenditure which might with advantage have been defrayed
from revenue. This is due to the natural reluctance of the Central
Government to increase its demands on the public purse by meeting
its due share of the expenditure in one sum instead of spreading it over
a period of years. . . .

12 . We desire to refer specially to one feature of the percentage
grant system, namely, the control exercised by Government Depart-
ments over Local Authorities. Here it is not limited to general policy,

btff extends to matters of lesser moment and even to trivialities.

We recognise that the responsible Ministers must be in a position
to satisfy themselves that Local Authorises, are-' doing their work and
that the money provided by the Exchequer is being properly expended ;

Local Government Expenditure , 1932 269

and if the money is being provided or! a pound for pound basis — or in
extreme cases on a three pound for one pound basis — it may be
argued that the scrutiny must be detailed.

However that may be, a substantial expenditure of time and labour
is incurred by Local Authorities in preparing detailed particulars of
proposals for submission to the Government Departments, dealing
with demands for information and statistics or in consultation with
reference to matters which might safely be left to the discretion of the
Local Authorities. . . .

13. . . . [We are led] to the conclusion that the precedent established
in the Local Government Act, 1929, should be followed, and the prin-
ciple of equitable block grants extended to as many as possible of those
services which are at present aided by percentage grants.

This would make for economy, would get rid of much meticulous
irritating and wasteful supervision, and would leave Local Authorities
free to administer their services in the manner best suited to the par-
ticular needs of their area and to their financial resources, subject to
general review by the Central Departments of the efficiency and
economy of their arrangements. . . .

THE HEADSHIP OF THE CIVIL SERVICE, 1942

House of Lords Debates , 23 and 26 November 1^42; Official Report , cc.
223 sgg. sqq. *

The Earl of Perth: ... I think it would simplify matters if I
remind your Lordships of a question which I put to His Majesty’s
Government about the title and functions of Head of the Civil Ser-
vice, and of the reply which I received from the noble and learned*
Viscount on the Woolsack on 4 August last. The question w r as to ask
His Majesty’s Government

when and by what instrument the title of “Head of the Civil Service 5 * was first
bestowed on the Permanent Secretary to His Majesty’s Treasury; whether
Parliamentary sanction was or has subsequently been obtained to the bestowal
of the title and what are the powers conferred on and the functions performed
by the holder of the title.

The answer given was as follows:

The supreme Head of all the Services of the Crown is the Sovereign. The?
Ministerial Head of His Majesty 5 # Civil Service is the Prime Minister and
First Lord of the Treasury. The 'principal officer of that Service is the Per-
manent Secretary to thd» Treasury; that titte was introduced in 1867 and the
post has since carried with it the official headship of the Service. No formal

Tbg

The Executive

270

instrument recording the fact appears then to have been issued, but the posi-
tion was explicitly reaffirmed in 1919 by the Government of the day in con-
nexion with the reorganisation of the Treasury after the last war. Appointment
as “Permanent Secretary to the Treasury and official Head of H.M. Civil
Service 55 is made by the Prime Minister with the approval of His Majesty.
The sanction of Parliament to appointments and titles in the Crown Services
is not required. The function of the holder of this post is to direct, subject to
Ministerial authority, the work of the Treasury, including that part of the
Treasury’s work which is concerned with the general supervision of the Civil
Service and the central oversight of the official machinery of government; his
duties in this regard include that of advising the Prime Minister and First Lord,
after consultation with any other Minister concerned, on appointments to
certain senior posts in the Service which require the Prime Minister’s approval,
namely: Permanent Heads of Departments, their Deputies, Principal Finance
Officers and Principal Establishment Officers. The holder of this post is, of
course, in the exercise of his functions, subject to the authority of the Govern-
ment of the day and he has no powers independent of the Minister to whom
he tenders advice and to whom he is responsible.

. . . The Tomlin Report on the Civil Service states that in 1920 the
Government of the day affirmed the principle of requiring the consent
of the Prime Minister to certain important appointments — namely,
Permanent Under-Secretary, Deputy Permanent Under-Secretary,
Principal Establishment Officer and Principal Finance "Officer. But
there was no question here of reaffirmation, and it would appear that
these functions were first bestowed on the Permanent Secretary of the
Treasury in 1920. Some of us . . . believe that the post of Head of the
Civil Service was created only in 1919. . . .

[The Earl of Perth then referred to the duties of the Secretary of
the Treasury to advise the Prime Minister on appointments.]

How does this duty, as defined, apply particularly as regards the
^authority of responsible Ministers of the Crown? If a permanent
Secretaryship or Deputy Permanent Secretaryship becomes vacant it
is no longer the responsible Minister who will propose to the Prime
Minister the names of those whom he regards as best fitted to fill the
vacancy. The responsible Minister has, according to the answer, no
direct access to the Prime Minister in a matter of such vital concern to
his Department. It is true that he is to be consulted by the Head of
the Civil Service, but there is no assurance that his advice will be
taken, and the appointment might be made contrary to his desires.
He has then to accept it or to resign his high office. This seems to
me an intolerable position for a Minister of the Crown, and I have
<grave doubts whether it is in accordance with our constitutional
principles. ...

The Lord Chancellor (Viscount "Simon) : . . . The permanent
heads of great Departments do mot changO nearly as frequently as their
political heads; it may even be that in some great Departments the

The Headship of the Civil Service , 1942 271

same Permanent Secretary has seen quite a number of “embarrassed
phantoms 55 come and go. But what happens when ... it is necessary
to choose a new Permanent Secretary for a Major Department . . . ?

The first thing to realise is this. . . . The appointment is made by
the Minister at the head of the Department. It is he, and nobody but
he, who appoints the new Permanent Secretary. . . .

Now we come to the next point. Is it really suggested that the
Minister who is at the head of the Department will appoint his Civil
Service head at his own will and pleasure without consulting anyone
else ? . . . [The] Ministerial Head of His Majesty’s Civil Service is the
Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Treasury. He has got the
constitutional responsibility, and that is why it is formally provided —
and has been for over 20 years — that the consent of the Prime Minister
to these particular appointments must be obtained. . . . Nobody
would think of disputing, I imagine, that it is proper that, while the
Minister at the head of the Department appoints and announces the
appointment, the Prime Minister’s approval has to be obtained to
it. . . .

Nothing in my previous answer, I would assure my noble friend, was
intended to suggest that the Minister cannot discuss the matter with
the Prime Minister. . . .

The nexrffstep is this. ‘If, then, the Prime Minister has to be con-
sulted, and if his approval has to be given, and in many cases expressed,
to the appointment which his colleague makes, is the Prime Minister
to be debarred from any advice except the advice of his political
colleague? . . . Of course, he is entitled to ta^e advice from anybody,
but the natural person to advis£ him is the Secretary to the
Treasury. . . .

I think, if I may say so to my noble friend, that there is a tendency
to fall into error here, because it is easily assumed that in matters of
public administration in this country we follow a precise formal pro-
tocol. There is nothing ires protocolaire in our methods here. All the
better. I should imagine that in some cases the first step that is taken
is that the Minister who has to appoint the head of a Department
communicates with the Secretary of the Treasury. ... It is a wise
thing if you are going to put a proposal up to the Prime Minister, to
take steps, if you can, to see that those who may be called in to advise
the Prime Minister know what it is all about beforehand. . . .

... I most entirely agree . . . that 1919 or 1920 is the date when
these things were put on a perfectly firm and exact basis. What hap-
pened was this. After the last war the future constitution of the Treasury
was discussed among Cabinet Ministers. They arrived at certain views
and the matter was brought^before the Finance Committee of the
Cabinet. At this distance. oiftime I do*[not] think it can be objection-
able to speak of this. In 1919 there was a Committee cff the Cabinet,

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272

consisting of Mr. Lloyd George/ Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. Austen Cham-
berlain, Lord Milner and Sir Auckland Geddes. . . . The main points
that were then decided were these: That the Treasury should be
reorganised in three main sections dealing respectively with finance,
with supply and with establishments, each under an official of the
status and with the pay of the head of a First Class Department of
State; that the activities of all three Departments of the Treasury were
to be co-ordinated and controlled by a Permanent Secretary to the
Treasury with a salary superior to that of the head of a first-class
Department of State. This last-mentioned individual was to be
recognised as Head of the Civil Service. . . .

My noble friend asked two questions. . . . First of all, he wanted to
know whether the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury could inter-
vene in questions of policy relating to Departments other than the
Treasury. The answer is really this, that questions of policy are not
for civil servants at all, either for the Permanent Secretary of the
Treasury or for anyone else; they are for Ministers, and especially for
Cabinet Ministers, and for tlqe Cabinet. The Prime Minister and the
Chancellor of the Exchequer both have a good deal of say in the policy
of the Government as a whole. On many matters the Chancellor of the
Exchequer exercises, in the nature of things, a considerable and
perhaps a preponderating influence; that is r why there a*e so many
Ministerial conferences at the Treasury. The Chancellor of the
Exchequer’s responsibilities in this regard are, or may be, delegated
by him within certain limits to his permanent officials ; for instance, it
is quite common to pu*t a Treasury man on a Committee which is
being organised by another Department. These officials, in their
different spheres, carry out duties on his behalf and under his general
direction; but, if my noble friend is suggesting that the status or title
of official Head of the Civil Service confers on the Permanent Secre-
tary some right or power not inherent in his position as Secretary to
the Treasury, then I can give him the most explicit assurance on that
point. . . . This gentleman enjoys no form of independent authority
inconsistent with the constitutional responsibility of Ministers who
direct him. . . .

Lord Hankey : . . . I think it should be understood that the position
of the Head of the Civil Service is consultative rather than advisory.

That brings us back to the question whether the Head of the Civil
Service should be the same person as the Secretary of the Treasury.
There is a strong argument for that because the Treasury, owing to its
elose financial association with the Departments on all levels, does get
a- tremendous lot of information about* the personnel of Government
Departments, and whatever is done in me way of reorganisation it is
important that that source of ffiformatiorT should be available to the
Head of the Civil Service. But I doubt if that advantage overrides the

The Headship of the Civil Service , ig 42 273

disadvantages of his being the Head of the Treasury. The first and
obvious disadvantage is that the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury 7
is supposed, in principle, to help the Chancellor of the Exchequer to
run the finances of the country. I do not believe that that was the case
after the last war because the occupant of the post became so tremen-
dously absorbed in his duties as Head of the Civil Service. . . .

The second objection, even more important, is that it is unsound
from a psychological point of view that the civil servants of all the
Departments should feel that their future is almost entirely dependent
on the Permanent Head of the Financial Department of the Govern-
ment. Civil servants of all ranks must always be free to support the
policy of their Minister — if necessary to “fight his corner 55 even
against the Treasury — without any lurking doubt in their minds as to
any effect this might have on their careers. I used to wonder sometimes
whether this was not one of the factors that affected the extraordinary
and almost dangerous grip wffiich the financial authorities obtained
before the war in at least one of the Fighting Services and to a certain
extent in others, and which I believe wa$ a factor in the backwardness
of our war preparations. . . .

Lord Kennet : . . . Nothing surely could be more remote from facts
than to suppose that the Treasury is only a Ministry of Finance. It
is a great deal more; it i*s in truth three Ministries in one, with only a
very slight bond between them. It is a Ministry of Finance in the first
place — the financial side. It is, secondly, a Ministry of Supply —
watching over the expenditure of the (government Departments, con-
cerned characteristically for the Estimates. T^kat is another Ministry.
But there is a third, very little related to these two. the Establishment
side of the Treasury, and that is the side which is the central co-
ordinating Department of the whole of the Civil Service. ... It is as
head of that Department that the Head of the Civil Service acts, and
not as head of the Financial Department; and though the difference
may w r ell seem to have a subtlety, it is nevertheless a practical one and
well recognised by all concerned. . . .

I fear that the practical conclusion must be that nobody can dis-
charge the functions of the Head of the Civil Service in the more
important aspect unless he is at the same time the responsible official *
chief of the Establishment Department of the Treasury, and thus has
the knowledge, experience, and authority to keep him in touch with
the qualifications necessary for the office which he discharges. . . .

Lord Geddes: ... It so happened that early in 1919, Sir Albert
Stanley, as he then was — Lord Ashfield — was President of the Boar 4
of Trade. He fell ill, and I was sent to that office as acting President
just at the time when that ^ery great and very distinguished civil
servant, Sir Hubert Bfewellfn Smith, was reaching the end of his time.
In the ordinary course I went to the Prime Minister and^told him what

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274

I thought would be a good arrangement to make with regard to a
successor. He said to me, “Well, I think we should get Lord Milner
and Mr. Bonar Law in on this. 55 It was out of that that originated the
Committee of which . . . the Lord Chancellor told us. . . . The idea
in Lord Milner’s mind was that we should get a powerful, strong,
central Department to be the Department of the Civil Service, and
that is the Establishment Division of the Treasury as it was created.
But it became necessary to realise the Civil Service which, when we
speak of it here in the area of Westminster, we are apt to regard as a
small collection of senior civil servants, is a very big organisation with
great problems throughout the country.

In 1 9 1 9 no one who knew the facts would have maintained that the
Government was really a good employer. There were many things
lacking. . . . There was a great lack in many parts of the Civil Service,
we were told, of real esprit de corps. In fact, there was great discon-
tent. . . . Lord Milner worked out the scheme which was finally
embodied in the Minute [of 4 September 1919]... and in the Circular
of 15 September 1919. . . . When it was approved by the Committee
and communicated to and accepted by the Cabinet, the purpose of
that organisation was to provide a definite central figure who would,
if I may put it this way, impersonate the Government as the employer
in the vast extents pf the Civil Service which are not immediately under
observation in Whitehall. The work done by Sir Warren Fisher in the
years between 1919 and 1939— because, after all, he was there for 20
years — in building up the employer’s side, the modern employer’s
outlook, on behalf of tifcfl? Government in relation to the civil servants
employed, is a marvellous bit of work for which he has not received
anything like the credit he deserves. . . .

There was in my mind, and I have no doubt there was in the minds
of every other member of that Committee, the thought that we were
making a very definite change in the relations of the Head of the
Civil Service to the Service as a whole. We were giving him new
responsibilities and giving him new powers. It so happened that
immediately after the war . . . there was pressure on the Government
from the country and from the Press in the direction of economy. . . .
Your Lordships will also remember that there came a period of great
financial pressure and strain due to the colossal attempt that we made
to pay the American Debt. Then came the return to the gold standard,
the coming of the economic blizzard, and all the rest of it.

All that had a profound effect upon the position of the Head of the
Treasury as the Head of the Civil Service. During this long period of
years all the pressure from the Government was towards cutting down
expenditure. . . . [Every] Minister tc^whom I spoke, other than
Chancellors of the Exchequer, ^always h£d -a grievance that he was
not allowed to carry out his policy, while the Chancellors of the

The Headship of the Civil Service , 1Q4.2 275

Exchequer . . . always had a grievance' that everybody else was spending
far too much, or at least trying to do so. That had the effect of putting
the head of the Treasury into the position of continually having to bring
his influence to bear upon Departments to get them to moderate their
demands, not only through Ministers but through those inter-depart-
mental discussions which so often precede the deliberations of Ministers
in the preparations of Estimates and so on. That pressure from the
Treasury, very often exercised, I am told, by Sir Warren Fisher in
interview and discussion, undoubtedly had the effect at times of
making certain members of the Civil Service, who were keen to carry
out the policy of their Ministers, get a little hot under the collar, and a
superstition arose — it would be difficult to find much evidence for it,
but that the superstition did exist there is no doubt — that if people
made too strong a fight with the Treasury for the policy of their
Departments they would not perhaps be quite so lucky in the next
turn for promotion. That is inevitable where you have struggle and
pressure and where one man is occupying two positions, and having
to apply the pressure not necessarily himself directly but through the
appropriate controller or possibly at a lower level, that same man
being in a position, as would appear to other civil servants ... to
influence their promotion and their reward. . . .

THE CIVIL SERVICE, 1943

House of Commons Debates , 28 January 1943; Official Report , cc. 66 7 sqq.

Mr. William Brown: . . . How far do the defects of the [Civil]
Service arise from the character of the relationship between itself,
Parliament, and the public; that is to say, how far are they the ines-
capable consequences of our democratic system of government (in
which case we may have to endure them), or how far are they remedi-
able by changes in organisation and control? . . .

Because Civil Service defects are bound to figure largely in the
Debate, I hope the House will bear with me if I pay a word of tribute^
to the Service. I affirm that in three respects the public service of
Britain is far and away the best in the world. The first respect is its
tradition of probity and incorruptibility. . . .

The second respect is its non-political character. . . .

The third respect — it is time someone paid this tribute — is in th£
tradition of public service, which it renews from generation to«geflera-
tion. There is a sense in whj/fti the Civil Service is a vocation. If its
members do not take the ^w of chastity, at least they take the vows
of poverty and obedience. . . .

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276

Nevertheless, having paid that tribute, I admit that, particularly
in this war, more so than in the last, the Service has not shown itself
to the advantage which I and its other admirers would like to have
seen, and preceding speakers are right when they say there is a good
deal of public criticism of the Service to-day, more than I have been
aware of at any earlier time in my connexion with it. What are the
charges that are made against it? . . . Substantially, there are four
charges. The first is that civil servants run to paper — that there are
all sorts of transactions which in an ordinary commercial office would
be the subject of oral or telephonic decision, but which in the Civil
Service become the subject of meticulous, elaborate, detailed, paper
record.

Criticism No. 2 is that in our accountancy arrangements we carry
checking and cross-checking auditing processes to a quite unnecessary
degree of elaboration. The third charge is that the Civil Service has
developed to a fine art the technique of avoiding individual responsi-
bility or, in popular language, the technique known as “passing the
buck. 55 Fourthly, that as the r result of those things, the pace of the
whole machine is slowed up, and we have a static and negative Civil
Service at a time when war conditions demand that we should have
every ounce of possible drive and energy. ... I am not going to deny
those charges, but I ask . . . how far those defects lie iri «the nature
of things.

Let me put it another way. If I am a private capitalist, . . . running
a business, it is within my unlettered discretion as to how far I carry
the process of recording and minuting. I am only answerable, at the
end of the year, to a meeting of shareholders, many of whom probably
will not attend. . . . But suppose I had a shareholders 5 protection com-
mittee of 6 1 5 members, meeting three days a week, with every member
free to interrogate me on every aspect of my policy and every detail
of any transaction within my control, obviously I should find myself
compelled to maintain records in the same degree of detail that the
Civil Service does, burdensome as that responsibility may be and
costly as it is, and slowing us down as it does. I affirm that democracy
in Britain is never better than it is at Question time in the House of
Commons. And it would be a poor exchange to sacrifice the right of
individual Members to interrogate Ministers in the utmost detail for
the sake of a few hundreds of thousands of pounds which you might
save by taking away that right.

Again, the civil servant when he does a financial transaction, has
»ot only to think of the accounts section of his own Ministry. He has
to tnink of the Exchequer and Audit Department, he has to think of
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he has*\> think of the Public Accounts
Committee, and he has to think of the Select Committee on National
Expenditure. *And if that lot has not bowled him out, there is the

The Civil Service , 1943 277

House of Commons as a whole in reserve. Inevitably under those
conditions you are bound to have a degree of detail in accountancy
which goes much beyond what you might expect to see in pi'ivate
enterprise.

The third criticism, that we “pass the buck,” again illustrates this
difference between democratic and autocratic government. In a dic-
tatorship you are not obliged to treat all citizens as equal before the
law. In a democracy you are. And it follows that the civil servant must
not give to one member of the public one sort of treatment and to
another different treatment. He has to treat all alike, and he has to
consider, in deciding each case, whether he is not creating a precedent
which will subsequently be acted on in other cases. In those circum-
stances there is bound to be a degree of cross-referencing which is much
greater than needs to be the case with a private concern. But I notice
that, simultaneously with being charged with dodging responsibility,
there is a school in Britain, of which Lord Hewart was a very able
spokesman, which conceives of the civil servant as being so thirsty for
responsibility that he is continually grabbing powers that do not
belong to him, and separating and subtracting them from the powers
of Parliament. I do not mind which charge we have to face — but they
cannot both be true. . . . With regard to the last point, that we are
slowed doyh, I agree. But I hope that what I have said will indicate
that to a degree those things are inherent in the democratic structure
of government. They are part of the price we have to pay for being
able to call Ministers and civil servant* to account. . . .

CIVIL SERVICE ORGANISATION AND METHODS

Fifth Report from the Select Committee on Estimates , 1946-47
SURVEY OF EVIDENCE

3. . . . From the history of previous recommendations on the sub-
ject .. . the following brief summary can be made: *

1914. The Royal Commission on the Civil Service (the “MacDonnell
Commission”) recommended the creation with the Treasury of “a
special Section for the general supervision and control of the Civil
Service” ; this Section was, amongst other duties, “to carry out inquiries
and investigations into any matters connected with departmental
administration and methods of working.” * ^

1918. The Haldane Commit#? on the Machinery of Government urged that
the Treasury shoukRunderjake more frequent inquiries into the general
administration of Departments. . . .

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278

1931. The Royal Commission on the Civil Service (the “Tomlin Commis-
sion 5 J ) recommended that provision should be made for the continuous
overhaul of the machinery of Government by a small staff, recruited
from the Civil Service and specially trained to deal with problems of
efficiency and economy in departmental organisation.

1942. The National Expenditure Committee stated that in the period
between the two wars the response of the Treasury to the demand
that expert knowledge and study should be brought to bear on the
problems of departmental organisation had been meagre in the
extreme. The control of Establishments remained in the hands of Civil
Servants whose experience was for the most part limited to the proce-
dure of the Departments in which they served. The only definite action
which had been taken to make use of the experience of the outside
world was the introduction into the Treasury, in 1919, of a few “Trea-
sury Investigating Officers/ 5 versed in the use of office machines and
appliances, to control the supply of such equipment to Government
Departments. The concern of these officers with organisation sddom
rose above the efficient use of the machines which they supplied. . . .
In the opinion of the National Expenditure Committee, the period
from 1919 to 1939 was marked by an almost complete failure by the
Treasury to foster the systematic study of organisation as applied to
Government Departments. - '

4. On the outbreak of war the spread of Government activity was
followed by corresponding, but gradual, adjustments in departmental
machinery. By July 1940, ther Chief Investigating Officer’s staff had
risen to 22, of whom 16 had been brought in from outside and 6 were
Civil Servants. By the r end of July 1941, the total strength of the
Investigating Section had increased to 35, and by the beginning of
June 1942, to 46. The Section was also renamed the “Organisation
and Methods Division 55 in order to give a more accurate description of
ks enlarged scope.

5. About the middle of 1941 the Treasury decided that the time had
come to take stock of the work achieved by their investigating teams,
and in order to secure an authoritative and unprejudiced opinion they
invited Mr. Reid Young to survey results and advise on future develop-

^ments. He confirmed the tentative view of the Treasury that, whatever
help from outside might be given, it must not lead Departments to
think that they were in any way relieved of responsibility for the
efficiency of their own organisation. It was therefore decided that the
larger Departments should be encouraged to set up O. and M. sections
of their own in order to ensure the continuous oversight of their own
machinery. But Treasury help was not to be eliminated, and one of
the functions of the Treasury O. and M^taff was to be the co-ordina-
ting of the results of investigations carried r put imthe various Depart-
ments, so that^gxperience might be pooled.'

Civil Service Organisation 279

6. A further consequence of Mr. Reid Young’s inquiries was the
creation early in 1942 of a panel of business men on a part-time basis
to supervise the work of the O. and M. Division of the Treasury and
O. and M. in Departments. This panel was reconstituted as an advisory
body in 1943. . . .

9. The purpose of O. and M. in the Civil Service is to secure maxi-
mum efficiency in the operation of the Government’s executive
machinery; and, by the expert application of scientific methods to
organisation, to achieve economies in cost and labour. The operations
of the O. and M. service, although not directed primarily to securing
reductions in staff, almost invariably result in the more economical
use of staff. O. and M. is an advisory service; recommendations result-
ing from a review are a matter for consideration by the Head of a
Department and for adoption at his discretion. . . .

11. Of approximately 100 Government Departments, 19 have
established their own O. and M. Branches, each under the administra-
tive cferection of the Principal Establishments Officer. The remaining
Departments, which include the Foreign Office and the Ministry of
Health, have so far decided to rely upon the Treasury O. and M. staff
for advice on specific problems, for periodical reviews of departmental
machinery and, in particular, for the planning of new work under-
taken by a "Department* At 1 April 1946, the aggregate O. and M.
staff (other than clerical) of the Departments, including the Treasury,
was 179. By 1 April 1947, the numbers had increased to 224J. . . .

12. On 8 January 1945, the Treasury O. and M. Division issued a
memorandum setting out the status and functions of departmental O.
and M. Branches and their relations* with the Division. This document
has become known as “The O. and M. Charter.” It states that a
Department is to have untrammelled control in O. and M. matters
within its own field, and that the creation of an O. and M. Branch is
not to relieve departmental officers of their primary responsibility fcfc
efficient organisation : the O. and M. Branch is to be responsible to the
Establishment Officer, who, it is suggested, should have the word
“Organisation” incorporated in the name of his office and of his
division. Advice on O. and M. in general, with particular reference to
the planning of new work, is specified as the chief function o&
the Branch, and it is emphasised that advice and not instruction is
to be the method of approach. . . . The Charter outlines the functions
of the Treasury O. and M. Division as consisting, among other things
of working on assignments in those Departments having no O. and M.
Branches of their own; and, by the provision of staff, assisting, qp.
request, those Departments ^possessing O. and M. Branches. 1 * The
Division should, in addition maintain contact with departmental O.
and M. Branches enc</iraging the joint examination of common
problems, by conducting courses of training and study groups, and also

280 The Executive

by acting as a centre to which ‘departmental O. and M. officers can
refer.

13. The Treasury’ O. and M. Division is now fully incorporated in
the Treasury system, and it constitutes the headquarters for O. and
M. development throughout the Civil Service. . . .

14. The work of the Division falls, broadly, into two classes; first,
service to other Government Departments, and, secondly, general
investigations and studies. . . .

18. The Advisory Panel of business men- . . . maintain an active
interest in the O. and M. service and meet at the Treasury once a
month for consultation with the Third Secretary (Establishments and
Machinery of Government), the Director and Deputy Director of the
O. and M. Division. With their intimate knowledge of the O. and M.
service, they are able to supply a valuable contact with important
business organisations and to offer advice at the highest level of the
Civil Service.

19. In each Department where there is an O. and M. Brancfi, this
has been placed under the authority of the officer in charge of Estab-
lishments as a separate unit of his organisation. . . .

21. . . . the status of O. and M. Branches varied considerably in
different Departments. Of the 19 departmental O. and M. Branches,
10 were in the charge of Assistant Secretaries, the renaming nine
being directed by '’officers of junior rank. Two of the Assistant Secre-
taries had had no previous experience of O. and M. work either within
or outside the Civil Service, in the greater number of Departments,
the O. and M. service, is directed to methods of work at the lower
levels, or to the investigations of 'problems as they arise, rather than
to the consideration of organisation at the higher levels of administra-
tion. This limitation was said to result from the comparatively small
numbers of O. and M. staff, whose time is fully occupied with ad hoc
inquiries. . . .

24. The Treasury undertake the training of officers who are selected
for O. and M. work, whether they are on the staff of the Treasury or
other Departments. . . .

28. It is the responsibility of the Treasury Division to co-ordinate
~ffie activities of departmental O. and M. Branches and to secure that
new ideas and experience are made available throughout the
Service. . . .

32. The following figures taken from published statements showing
the civil staffs in Government Departments in 1939, 1945, 1946 and
are given as an indication of the effect of war and subsequent
legist tiyn upon the numbers employed :

1 st April 1st July 1st April \ 1 st January 1 st April

*939 1945 * 1946 % . 1947 1947

374,3°i 666,981 695,950 722,294 716,953

Civil Service Organisation 281

The total figures of Non-Industrial Civil Servants at rst April , 1947, are
analysed by staff groups in the table below :

Whole-time Part-time

1st April , 1947

Men

Women

Men

Women

Total

Administrative .

3,600

595

4,216

Executive

40,479

10,079

255

50,727

Clerical and
Sub-Clerical

132,291

128,230

207

8,071

264,660

Professional, Technical
and Scientific

34,242

3= *87

48 1

37,697

Minor and
Manipulative

133,030

62,072

24,900

20,288

217,996

Technical Ancillary .

46,829

7,791

164

146

54,775

Inspectorate

4=877

720

133

5, 66 5

Messengerial, etc

32,157

13,419

1,018

8,132

50,1s 1

Total

427,609

256,35!

27,194

38,792

716,953

These % figures indicate that approximately 80 per cent, of those em-
ployed in the Civil Service are engaged on work where the applica-
tion of improved organisation and methods should lead to staff
economies. . . .

36. ... It was suggested by one witness that the re-distribution of

the businese # of Government at the higher levels was a field not yet
covered by the O. and M. service, and that improvements could be
made if the problem was approached with a view to designing the
most effective Government machine insfead of applying expedients to
a structure designed for a different purpose. In*his view, the principles
which guided the Civil Service were adequate when Government
activities were mainly of a quasi-judicial nature. They were inadequate,
however, for the ever-increasing Government activities of a quasi-
opera tional nature; these raise intricate problems when the co-
ordination of several Ministries is involved in the achievement of a
specific object. The witness considered that such problems had not
been satisfactorily solved and that the machinery of Government could
be re-designed to operate more efficiently from the top to the bottom

37. The Permanent Secretary of the Treasury stated in evidence that
during the last year or so, the Permanent Secretaries of all the White- -
hall Departments had been much concerned with questions of efficiency
generally, and there had been a small group at high official level
working on some of the problems. That Group had heard evidence
from outside business people of great experience, including many who,
as a result of some years of war service in Government Departments^
not only knew the Government machine from inside, but also Htd a
detached point of view. Suggestions which emerged from that inquiry
have led to the setting up ^)f a small committee, consisting chiefly of
Permanent Secretaries, of which the Head of the Treasury himself is

282

The Executive

likely to be chairman. One of 'the ways in which this committee is
expected to be of most use is to see that accepted recommendations
from O. and M. are put into effect.

38. . . . He pointed out that there had been a growth in recent years
of machinery for collecting information from all Departments about
the economic life and needs of the country; this information finds its
way to Ministers and the Cabinet by means of, for example, the
Economic Section of the Cabinet Office, the Central Statistical Office
and, now, the Inter-department Planning Staff. . . .

CONCLUSIONS

56. Finally, if industry is to be urged to become more efficient, it
seems essential that the Government should put its own administra-
tion in order. It is clear that insufficient thought has been given to
adapting the machinery of Government to its new tasks, and that, as
the Prime Minister himself has stated, the administration is stfained
almost to breaking point. The problem that has to be considered
to-day is not identical with ftiat considered by . . . earlier inquiries.
The extent of the Government’s interest in industry has been perman-
ently widened, and the Civil Service has increasingly been required to
take a more direct part in the economic life t>f the countfy New and
great responsibilities have been placed upon it, more particularly in
regard to the nationalised industries. With this increase in its duties an
increase of staff is inevitable. Furthermore, although some new
Ministries have been fprmed and much of the responsibility for the
actual conduct of industrial and -trading activities is being placed in
the hands of quasi-governmental boards, the size of the major Depart-
ments of State has of necessity been greatly enlarged. The obvious
danger is that those may have become too large and cumbrous to work
rapidly and efficiently as single administrative units. It has been
argued that a redistribution of functions between existing Departments
would not be likely to effect any striking economy in manpower. This
may be so; but a reconsideration of the whole pattern of the Govern-
ment machine in the light of modern conditions might well suggest a

^re-organisation that would increase the rapidity and efficiency with
which the ever growing volume of work is discharged. This might not
reduce staff, but it might obviate further increases and should result
in economy in the true meaning of that word.

57. The problem is not confined to questions of establishments and
machinery for interdepartmental liaison. A pattern has to be worked
out fey ^hich the new National Boards and other extra-governmental
bodies, which nevertheless have responsibilities to the State, can be
incorporated in, or satisfactorily linke$ to, * the administrative
machinery. . . ,

Civil Service Organisation 283

58. . . . Your Committee wish to emphasise their conclusion that
little is to be gained by tinkering with a problem of such fundamental
importance — a problem which lies at the root of good government, a
problem which demands the highest priority among the many tasks
now waiting to be done.

WEAKNESSES IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT, 1947

Report of the Local Government Boundary Commission for 1 9 4J ( H.C . 86 of

1947-48)

r. . . . Our experience amply confirms the statement made recently
in Parliament by the Minister of Health: “ . . . Everyone who
knows about local government feels that it is nonsense to talk
about* functions and boundaries separately. They have to be taken
together. . .

3. ... In this part of the Report we . mention some of the main
factors which, in our view, impede local government and give rise to
a sense of frustration.

4. Disparity in Size anf Resources . — A major defect of the present
organisation is the disparity between individual counties and individual
county boroughs in the matter of population and resources. This dis-
parity is due in part to historical causey, but mainly to the fact that
adjustments of the local government structure have not kept pace with
changes of population or with changes in functions.

Under the Local Government Act, 1888, the boundaries of admin-
istrative counties . . . were based on the ancient county boundaries.
These had behind them a wealth of history, tradition and sentiment.
Some of them were by no means ideal for local administration of the
services of that day and the addition of a large range of new services
has added considerably to the number of unsuitable areas. Since 1888
there has been no general review of the area of counties.

By the same Act the status of county borough was granted to certain
boroughs, either because they were then “counties of towns, 55 or
because they had a population of 50,000 or upwards. In introducing*^
the Bill for the Act of 1 888 the Government of the day proposed that
only the ten largest cities, all having populations at that date of more
than 100,000, should be independent of county government, but this
intention was abandoned, not without reluctance, during the passage
of the Bill, and 63 towns became county boroughs. In 1926^ tb^
minimum population for county borough status was raised from
50,000 to 75,000 and in 194^ it was in effect raised to 100,000 by the
Act, but since 1 888* no -cfunty or county borough has ever lost its

284 The Executive

status, and the gulf between the greater and smaller authorities in
each class has widened.

We set out some significant figures for England and Wales: . . .

Population range

Counties 1

County be

Less than 50,000

50,000-75,000

75,000-100,000

100,000-150,000

150,000-200,000

1 1

200,000-500,000

500,000-1,000,000

Over 1,000,000

The largest county in population is Middlesex (2,270,000) and the
smallest Rutland (18,000). #

The largest county borough is Birmingham (1,085,000), and the
smallest Canterbury (25,000)-. . . .

The aggregate population of the 50 smallest counties and county
boroughs is approximately equal to the aggregate of the two largest
(Middlesex and Birmingham).

Five million persons live in Lancashire and 4^ million in^Yorkshire,
together nearly a quarter of the population of England and Wales.

Forty-one out of 80 county boroughs (excluding three in Greater
London) are in Cheshire, Lancashire, Staffordshire and Yorkshire.

County districts present a similar spectacle of disparity in population
and in resources. For example, the largest urban district has a popula-
tion of 200,000 and the smallest of 700, with id. rate products of
£8, 600 and £ 16 respectively.

A systematic allocation of functions between the different types of
authorities is plainly impossible if units of each type vary within such
wide limits. The weakness of the smaller counties and county boroughs
has unquestionably been one of the causes of the transfer of functions
from local to central government or to other authorities, just as the
weakness of the smaller county districts has led to a transfer of func-
tions to the counties. Unless this defect in the system is remedied,
Parliament may well hesitate to entrust to local authorities in the
future new functions which are in themselves entirely apt for local
administration.

5. Concentrations of Population . — The failure of the local government
system to keep pace with the changing pattern of modern industrial
England is seen most strikingly in the huge concentrations of popula-
tion living in neighbouring towns, whiclT are closely knit as economic

1 Excluding the County of London.

Weaknesses in Local Government , 1947 285

and industrial units but have little or no connection or cohesion as
local government units. Most of these concentrations have grown up
without regard to ancient boundaries or to those fixed subsequently.
In 1888 Parliament recognised the existence of this problem in the
Metropolis and boldly solved it by creating a new county council area
— the County of London. . . . No similar action has since been taken
elsewhere. There are at least five other areas where large concentra-
tions of population exist — the Black Country, Manchester and District,
Merseyside, Tyneside and the West Riding. In smaller degree Tees-
side, the Potteries and the areas in and near Brighton and Bourne-
mouth present a similar problem.

6. Central Control . — Another result due, at least in part, to the weak-
ness of the smaller units in all types of authorities has been the increased
central control of local administration which, if carried much further,
would cut at the root of local government. In the second half of the
nineteenth century public health and local government legislation was
content to leave local authorities with a wide measure of discretion in
the exercise of their functions. Approval of capital expenditure,
periodic audits and the disclosure of defects and abuses by public
inquiry formed the main control in the hands of the central Govern-
ment. Since the close of the century a sharp reversal of this policy has
been apparent. This may be seen by comparing the language of the
Statute Book in the two periods. In the earlier Acte a local authority
was empowered ( <c may”) or directed (“shall”) to provide a particular
service. The later pattern of legislation directs it to prepare and submit
to the appropriate Minister a scheme of arrangements for making the
service available and empowers the \Ihiister t6 accept, modify or reject
the scheme as he thinks fit. Moreover, in addition to war and post-war
controls, there is now a much more extensive system of supervision
over day-to-day operations of local authorities. There are, no doubt,
other factors making for this change of policy — the increasing tendency
of Parliament to hold Ministers and their Departments responsible for
every act or omission on the part of a local authority (a tendency which
has contributed to the creation by Departments of large regional
staffs) , and the increasing share of the taxpayer in the financial burden
of local services.

7. Haphazard Allocation of Functions . — A development which has
tended to distort the shape of local government is the multiplication
of Departments charged with the oversight of specialised local govern-
ment services. Education, health, highways, town and country plan-
ning, agriculture and police are six local government services under
the supervision of separate Ministers. The result is that no one Depart-
ment can view local government as a whole. ... As a consequence the
allocation of functions to different types of authorities has been unsys-
tematic and the process ha's gone on without much rqf$rence to local

Ubg

286

The Executive

government as a balanced organism. Much of this legislation was
passed in the pressure of wars or of the aftermath of wars. Piecemeal
decisions had to be taken on the course of Parliamentary debates and
often as the outcome of Parliamentary bargaining ; and the fact that
each new arrangement has emerged after a struggle between the various
types of local authorities has not conduced to fruitful co-operation
between them. Another result has been to create a mass of joint boards,
joint committees and other combinations for particular purposes.

8. Conflicts over Boundaries . Ever since 1888 conflict between counties
and county boroughs over boundary extensions and the creation of
county boroughs has been a constant feature of local government. . . .
The existence of autonomous and ever-growing county boroughs made
conflict inevitable. . . .

From 1888 until 1923 ... 33 proposals for the creation of county
boroughs were made, and 23 were ultimately successful. . . . Similarly
165 proposals were made for county borough extensions, of which no
were successful in full or in part. These creations and extensions trans-
ferred from the counties to county boroughs about 3,000,000 popula-
tion and £14,500,000 rateable value. . . . Other substantial extensions
and one creation took place between 1923 and 1939, usually after
lengthy and expensive Parliamentary contests.

Since the establishment of this Commission 4n 1945 we haye received
applications for the creation and extension of county boroughs which
would have removed substantial areas and resources from counties
and involved the disappearance of 66 non-county boroughs, 1 30 urban
districts and 1 1 rural districts, as well as the absorption of parts of 1 74
other county districts. Tile attitude of county councils to these demands
is normally one of unqualified resistance, and has culminated in
counterclaims for the removal of county borough status from most of
the existing county boroughs. . . .

* It is, in our view, a matter of first importance to the future of local
government that this very natural antagonism should cease. . . .

THE MACHINERY OF PLANNING, 1947

House of Commons Debates , 10 March igpj ; Official Report , cc . g 6 p sqq.
The President of the Board of Trade (Sir Stafford Cripps) : I
beg to move,

Thrt this House welcomes the laying before Parliament of a survey of the
nation’s requirements and resources for 1947. . . .

. . . Let me turn to the first section of the^ White Paper, dealing with
economic planping. . . . There is a wide diherence between what may

The Machinery of Planning, 194J 287

be termed totalitarian planning, &nd democratic planning. The
essence of the former is that the individual must be completely sub-
ordinated to the needs of the State, even to the extent of depriving the
individual of free choice of occupation. Democratic planning, on the
other hand, aims at preserving maximum freedom of choice for the
individual while yet bringing order into the industrial production of
the country, so that it may render the maximum service to the nation
as a whole. We are attempting to make a success of democratic plan-
ning, and ... we have decided . . . not to employ, as a normal matter,
methods of direction or compulsion of manpower outside the necessities
of defence.

We must, therefore, adapt our methods of planning to our means of
control and enforcement. ... We must . . . attempt to guide production
. . . not by direct control of manpower, as with the Services, but with
other regulatory controls which are available, such as those of raw
materials, capital, investment, machinery allocation, taxation, and
so on? But, apart from those various controls, we must also rely upon
the individual co-operation of both sides of industry. . . .

There are two important changes wffiich we are making, on the
basis of our experience up to date, in connection with the reorganisa-
tion of economic planning. . . . First is the strengthening of the staff
for econoiigit planning, a*nd the second is the arrangement for ensuring
the co-operation of industry in the planning organisation. The founda-
tion of this economic planning work must, of course, be done in the
departments concerned with trade, industry and economic affairs. In
recent months these Departments have been constituting their plan-
ning staff. In future, it will be the recognised practice that each
Department will have a whole-time planning staff under a senior
officer, charged with special responsibilities in this held.

The most important development on which His Majesty’s Govern-
ment have decided is the strengthening of the inter-departmental
planning arrangements. They propose, therefore, to appoint a joint
planning staff, somewhat on the lines of the procedure that was so
successfully developed in the war, as, for example, in the joint war
production staff. The main strength of this staff will be departmental
planning officers. But it is essential that the staff should work undent
effective direction from the centre, and it has been decided to make a
new appointment of a full-time executive head of the interdepart-
mental planning staff. . . . Each of the departmental planning officers
will have on his staff at least one officer whose duties are arranged so
that, while he does not lose contact with his own Department, he ca^
devote a considerable part of his time on the central work of jh^joint
staff. It is contemplated that these assistants will frequently meet
together to work as special groups und^r the staff. Under these arrange-
ments, the head of the organisation will not himself require to have

288

The Executive

any large staff of his own, but he will need a small, picked staff of
persons with programming experience and a small secretariat.

The function of this inter-departmental staff will cover the whole
field of forward planning . . . [and] will, of course, work in the closest
relation with the other central organisations, in particular the Econo-
mic Section of the Cabinet office and the Central Statistical Office,
both of which have important contributions to make towards economic
planning. . . .

THE CIVIL SERVICE AND POLITICS, 1949

Report of the [ Masierman ] Committee on the Political Activities of Civil
Servants ( Cmd . 7,71$)

II. PRESENT POSITION

(i) Parliamentary Candidature and Service

7. Civil servants are generally disqualified by statute from sitting in
the House of Commons. . . . The law on thfc subject of ^placemen”
and “offices of profit 55 is complicated and in many respects obscure.
It is, however, clear that Parliament’s consistent policy has been to
prevent members of the House r ' of Commons from holding posts of the
kind usually filled by civil servants. This policy has long been accepted
as a fundamental feature of the British constitution.

8. Apart from the rules which Parliament has laid down regarding
its own composition, the Civil Service also has its disciplinary regula-
tions prohibiting Parliamentary candidature without prior resigna-
tion. ... In 1924 the Chancellor of the Exchequer appointed a com-
mittee under the chairmanship of Lord Blanesburgh to inquire into
the position. The Blanesburgh Committee unanimously recommended
that the existing ban on Parliamentary candidature without prior
resignation should be maintained for the whole of the non-industrial
*@ivil Service. . . .

9. The Government adopted those recommendations of the Blanes-
burgh Report which, were unanimous, and to give effect to them the
Servants of the Crown (Parliamentary Candidature) Order, 1927, was
made, providing that “No person employed by or under the Crown to
whom this Order applies shall issue an address to electors or in any
other' - ' manner publicly announce himself, or allow himself to be
publicly announced as a candidate or* 3 prospective candidate for
election to Parliament until ho has retired ^ or resigned from such
employment. 55

289

The Civil Service and Politics , 1949

(ii) Other Political Activities

15. The main forms of political activity in the national field, other
than Parliamentary candidature, which we have had in mind . . .
are: (a) holding office in party political organisations, whether national
or local; (b) speaking on public platforms on party political matters;
(c) writing letters to the press or publishing books or leaflets on party
political matters ; (d) canvassing.

16. There exists no universal regulation governing these matters
comparable with that for Parliamentary candidature. Civil servants
may vote and belong to political parties, but the only all-Service rule
on the extent to which they may engage in general political activities
— apart from the overriding limitations imposed by the Official
Secrets Acts — is a general exhortation of long standing that “civil
servants are expected to maintain at all times a reserve in political
matters and not put themselves forward prominently on one side or
the other.” This rule applies only to non-industrial staff. . . .

(iii) Local Government Activities

20. The only general instruction on the subject of participation in
local government by civil servants refers to candidature and service on
local councils and is contained in a Treasury Circular of 1909 which
left it to tie Head of each Department to determine “whether, and,
if so, upon what conditions, an officer of his Department may become
a candidate for, or serve on, any local council provided that the
duties involved . . . shall not conflict with the personal performance
of the officer’s duties to his Department.” 'J«he Blanesburgh Report
recommended that the matter remain one for departmental regulation,
pointing out that, whilst the objections to Parliamentary candidature
did not necessarily apply to local government candidature, it would
clearly be wrong to allow candidature in the Departments whose
duties consisted largely in the regulation of local authorities. . . .

21. All industrial civil servants are allowed to take part in local
government activities without any restrictions. . . .

V. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

37. . . . There are two such principles which we think vital, the first
of which tells in favour of the removal of restrictions on civil servants’
political activities, the second in favour of their retention. In framing
our recommendations we have constantly tried to find a balanoi
between these two conflicting principles: # *

(i) In a democratic society*it is desirable for all citizens to have a
voice in the affairs of the Srate and for as many as possible to play an
active part in public life. *

The Executive

290

(ii) The public interest demands the maintenance of political impar-
tiality in the Civil Service and of confidence in that impartiality as an
essential part of the structure of Government in this country.

38. . . . For the purposes of our enquiry . . . we have been obliged
to distinguish between (a) the free expression of a man’s party-political
views in private or through the ballot-box, and (b) their expression in
public for the purpose of propagating the ideas of a political party.

. . . The second is also a right for the ordinary citizen, but it is in
practice relinquished by many. It is not in our view a right which
cannot justifiably be limited or withheld in certain circumstances by
other considerations if these are sufficiently important to the public
interest as a whole. . . . The public interest demands, at least amongst
those employees of the State who correspond with the common con-
ception of the Civil Service, a manner of behaviour which is incom-
patible with the overt declaration of party political allegiance.

39. This incompatibility is obvious in the case of the Administrative
Class who are the advisers of Ministers and assist in the making of
policy. . . . The Administrative civil servant voluntarily enters a pro-
fession in which his service to the public will take a non-political form.
It w r ill consist in the wise and accurate estimation of the reasons for
and against a particular course of action, formulated not for the pur-
pose of influencing the public mind, but for ‘the benefit df^hose who
actually have to take decisions. ... It is very unlikely that a civil servant
formed by years of training and the exercise of administrative functions
would hold clear-cut party views in the sense of being a consistent
supporter of the entire programme of one party, even if on the whole
his sympathies lay with it. . . .

41. Only a very small proportion of the Service is, however, in close
contact with Ministers. . . . The whole Administrative Class numbers
only about 3,500 men and women, most of whom are stationed in
Headquarters Departments in the Whitehall area. The Departments
in which these Administrative staffs work are, however, composed of
civil servants organised in divisions or branches, and made up of
members of the various classes — Professional, Executive, Clerical and
Typing — who work together as teams. All of them are, in differing

•srays appropriate to the responsibilities of their rank, engaged at
different stages on the same blocks of work, and each contributes in
varying degree according to this status towards the decisions made by
the Administrative officers or towards the submissions made to Minis-
ters. The requirements of the work demand this grouping, and a real
Sense of unity exists among the members of these different grades who
workTogether as part of a single organisation ; we are satisfied that the
same basic principles apply to all of thern^ alike.

42. Outside the Whitehall Ministries the Civil Service is a very large
and widely spread body of men and women who are engaged not in

The Civil Service and Politics , 1949 291

advising Ministers but in the condu’ct of practical business. ... In
these cases, the essential factor is the relation of civil servants with the
public rather than their relations with the Minister. First the work
of these civil servants must in fact be completely impartial. Secondly,
the public as a whole and the Press must be satisfied in their own
minds that no suggestion of political bias enters into their treatment
of individuals. . . . The importance of these considerations can hardly
be exaggerated to-day when vital decisions* on claims for social benefits,
assessment to tax, liability to various forms of national service,
entitlement to certain rationed commodities, and many other aspects
of daily life are being taken by officials often of humble rank. . . .

43. There is finally to be considered the harmful effect upon the
Service itself if the political allegiance of individual civil servants
became generally known to their superior officers and colleagues. . . .

44. It follows, in our opinion, that the principle hitherto observed in
the Civil Service, that a civil servant maintains a certain reserve in
political matters and does not put himself forward prominently on one
side or the other, is plainly right for that part of the Service popularly
associated with the phrase ‘Svhite-collab workers. 55 . . .

48. Our general conclusion is that to preserve the attitude of detach-
ment in all civil servants in whom its absence might adversely affect the
public seiyite is so important as easily to outweigh any hardship felt
by individuals who are deprived of the freedom to* propagate political
views among their fellow citizens. It will certainly justify maintaining
the deprivation in some cases in which the risk is only slight. The public
service should, in our view, consistently be given the benefit of any
doubt. Any weakening of the existing tradiudh of political impartiality
would be the first step towards the creation of a Apolitical 55 Civil
Service. . . .

VI. APPLICATION OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES

53. . . . We have come to the conclusion that it is both possible and
necessary to draw a horizontal line of demarcation through the whole
Service, putting above the line those who, because of the nature of
their work, must be excluded from party-political activity, arfTT
putting below it those to whom freedom to engage in political activities
could be granted without prejudicial consequences. . . .

(e) participation in local government

82. There has been a substantial change in the character of local
government since the issue ofThe Treasury Circular of 1909. . . . Thus
local government tends nowadays more and more to be organised on
party political lines corresponding to. those of national government,

The Executive

292

and, if this trend continues, it seems likely that within a few years, all
local government may be run on a purely party basis. . . .We doubt,
however, whether this position has yet been reached. . . .

86. . . . We feel it impossible in present circumstances to make a
recommendation of a permanent nature. ... We have reached the
conclusion that the existing arrangements should continue, for an
experimental period of five years, subject to the substitution of a
general rule for the whole Service in place of departmental rules. . . .

VIII. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

3. We . . . recommend that a line of demarcation be drawn below
the Administrative, Professional, Scientific, Technical, Executive,
Clerical and Typing grades and, apart from certain exceptions, above
the Minor and Manipulative and the Industrial grades. Those
below the line would be permitted greater liberty than those '&bove
it. . . .

5. All members of the gracfes “below the line 55 should be permitted
to stand for Parliament without resignation unless they are elected. . . .

The existing ban upon Parliamentary candidature should continue
to apply to civil servants “above the line. 55 The rule under which civil
servants who are p'eers of Parliament may attend in their place when
their official duties permit but may not vote or take part in debate
should also be maintained.

6 . All grades of the Civil Service “below the line 55 should be com-
pletely free to engage in all other forms of political activity, both
national and local, subject only to the maintenance of overriding con-
siderations such as the Official Secrets Acts and the ban on political
activities while on duty or in official premises.

0 7. All the grades “above the line 55 should continue to maintain a
reserve in political matters. In national politics they should abstain
from any public manifestation of their views which might associate
them prominently with a political party. They should not ( a ) hold
office in any party political association; (b) speak in public on matters
"■sf party political controversy; ( c ) write letters to the Press, publish
books or articles, or circulate leaflets setting forth their views on party
political matters; (d) canvass in support of political candidatures. . . .

10. Despite the growing tendency of local government to be run on
party political lines w r e are averse from treating it at present in the
^me way as national politics. . . . Civil servants “above the line 55 wish-
ing to stand for local office should seek the permission of their Depart-
ment. Permission should be granted wherever possible, subject to the
applicant being able to comply with tije # convention requiring a
reserve in political matters and avoid becoming involved in national

The Civil Service and Politics , 1949 293

party political controversy; this does not, however, preclude him from
speaking in public, writing to the Press, or circulating leaflets setting
forth his views, so long as he confines himself to local issues and acts
with moderation. . . .

THE POWER OF THE CABINET, 1950

House of Lords Debates , 17 May 1990 ; Official Report , cc. 297 sqq .

Viscount Cecil of Chelwood rose to move to resolve, That the
growing power of the Cabinet is a danger to the democratic constitu-
tion of the country. The noble Viscount said : It seems to me that

if this state of things goes on, we are bound to have an increasing con-
centration of power in the hands of the Administration — that is to
say, the Cabinet — which will tend more and more to be an oligarchy
consisting of individuals who, by political docility, have earned the
approval of those who have control of the Party organisation. I know
that any argument of the kind I have tried to present to your Lord-
ships is always answered by saying that, after all, the Members of the
House of Commons represent the electorate, and if the electorate dis-
approve of them and of their subservience to the Government they can
be rejected. But is that proposition true? In practice, the electorate
cannot just choose anyone; they must choose a candidate put forward
by some organisation. Moreover, if they dislil^ the behaviour of their
Member, they can do nothing until *there is another General Election.
The truth is that, under our present Constitution, when the Cabinet
is once in power there is no way of effectively controlling it. . . .

So the posidon really is this. The Cabinet, appointed by the Prime
Minister, have dictatorial powers over the whole administrative func-
tions of the Government, and the Prime Minister is answerable only
to the majority of the House of Commons. Further, the membership
of that majority owe their position to the political organisation of the
Party of which the Prime Minister is the chief. If they show any dis-
position to take an independent line, intimation is conveyed to then*
that they will not be the Party candidates at the next Election. Even
if any of them is supported by the local organisation which originally
chose him, experience shows that that support will disappear under
pressure from London. . . .

The Lord Chancellor (Viscount Jowitt) : ... As I conceive i^
a democracy must provide the most adequate opportunities foi* dis-
cussion and for criticism, unlike an autocracy under which laws are
imposed without the peojb^ being given a chance to discuss them.
But if a democracy is going to mean mere discussion^f this House or

The Executive

294

the other place is to become a ihere talking shop, then that would be
one of the greatest dangers with which we could be confronted. . . .

The complexity of modern life demands inevitably that more and
more must the Government of the day interfere with the individual. . . .
In every country this has gone on, and in the complexity of life as it
exists to-day it is inevitable that it should go on. The Cabinet is not
cut off from contact with current opinion. Indeed, it is of the essence
of the whole conception that the Cabinet should listen to what the
House of Commons and the Members of the House of Commons are
thinking and saying, and should listen to what the electorate are
thinking and saying. It listens and it learns. In very truth, I may
apply to such a body Carlyle’s witty saying: “I am the leader, therefore
I must follow.”

Consider what control Parliament has in making its opinion felt. It
has the admirable system of Parliamentary Questions. I am told that
there are something like 15,000 to 16,000 Questions every year. There
is the Adjournment debate, and there is the possibility of Motions on
the Adjournment. It is quite unreal to suppose that the Cabinet shut
themselves off from the current or prevalent opinions of the day. I
suppose it is common knowledge that one of the most frequent visitors
to the Cabinet in this and in all other Governments has been the Chief
Whip, in order of course that the Cabinet and the House "of Commons
may be closely enmeshed. Sir David Maxwell Fyfe wrote an interesting
and thoughtful article in the New English Review in March of last year,
and on this topic of the extenf of control which the House of Commons
exercises, he points 01# that although at that date the Government
had lost only one by-election, twenty-three Ministers had come and
gone. . . .

I believe that the real danger to our system of democracy and
freedom lies to-day in the possibility that it may not be prompt and
Swift in action. By all means let us provide in every way we can the
fullest and most adequate discussion but ... if we find that we have
developed a system which is all talk and no action, then the minds
of men will turn to some other system which does give them prompt
action. The problem before democracy is to combine these two
"things. I believe that the secret of the successful working of our Con-
stitution . . . consists in the steady confidence which is reposed by
Parliament in the Cabinet. If that confidence were withdrawn, we
should have a series of short and unstable Governments until we might
find that we had prepared the ground for some sort of despotism. . . .
r Viscount Simon: ... To my mind, the question is not one of Cabinet
solidarity, or of the necessity of unity of decision in a Cabinet; it is a
question of the extent to which in recent times a Cabinet once in
office has felt sure that it can do wh^t it likes without effective
challenge; anchrit is a question as to whether there is not increased

The Power of the Cabinet , 1950 295

submissiveness in the ordinary Member of Parliament to those who
are his leaders, with the result that in fact Ministers possess a greatly
increased power compared with what they used to have. . . .

... I wonder whether there is not a development — in my view, an
exaggerated and distorted development — of the doctrine of electoral
mandate. There is nothing we hear so frequently nowadays as: “You
may not like this, but the Government have a mandate from the
electors to do it. 55 Subject to those who know more about our electoral
history than I do, ... I do not think the practice into which we have
fallen of having at the beginning of every General Election an elaborate
electoral programme, covering all sorts of topical subjects designed to
attract the votes of different sections of the electorate — town and
country, service people, officials, the poor voter, everybody — is of very
ancient date. It is a comparative novelty. . . .

The doctrine is now current . . . that once a Government is installed
in power after a General Election, the Government has an absolute
unquestioned authority in all circumstances to carry out by legislation
every item in that listed programme, how T ever casually it may appear
in the manifesto. ... I think it is a mistake to treat the electorate, the
sovereign power in this country, as though they acted on the day of a
General Election in putting a particular Government into power, and
that they ^hen went to sleep until there is another General Election,
when they suddenly wake up and, as often as not, reverse the decision
they gave before.

I submit . . . that that is not a proper analysis of our constitutional
arrangements. I submit that the true view i$ that the electorate is
sovereign all the time and, like other people, influenced in its judg-
ment by experience, reflection and argument, and. it may be, greater
wisdom. . . . [It] is not the case that, on the true view, the electorate
has put into power a Government which is authorised beyond all
question to operate as it pleases until the next General Election comae
along. That, to my mind, is the real question which is involved in
what w r e are discussing. . . .

It is not that anyone challenges the constitutional proposition of
Cabinet unity. It is not that anybody seeks to deny the essential rule
that the Cabinet must act together and stand together. That is elemer^-
tary. The question is: To what extent can this united body act without
any serious consideration of what critics may say, because they think:
“We are dead safe; we have enough people here to vote for us” ? Their
supporters may not have heard a word of the argument; they may not
themselves think the Cabinet is right, but, after all, “They vote for us^
every vote counts, and that is all that matters.” ... ^ *

... Is there not something in the proposition that, if you really
embrace the theory*of Socialism, it leads not to democracy but dan-
gerously near to a form 01' dictatorship ? . . . [The] ^>oint is, are we

The Executive

296

not in fact drifting into a position in which the Cabinet not only is a
solid Cabinet of people who act together, as of course they always
must do, but can count on a mechanical majority which in no circum-
stances will desert them whatever be the extravagance to which they
propose to go ? ... I cannot help feeling that in earlier days the private
Member in fact had much more influence behind the scenes, as well
as in the voting Lobby, than the private Member has to-day. ... I
do not at all deny that we must see developments, and it may be that
in some ways the developments are good and necessary. There are a
great many things which must, because of their nature, be governed
by regulation, and which cannot be made the subject of express
statutory enactment and amendment. The real question is: Have we
not tended to drift into a situation in which the increasing subservience
of the private Members of the House of Commons in effect threatens
to turn our constitutional system into a system in which the Govern-
ment feel no restraint at all upon what they propose to do ? . - -

CABINET PAPERS, 1951

House of Commons Debates , 5 December iggi ; Official Report , c. 2,gg6.

Mr. Frederick c Peart asked the Prime Minister what 'restrictions
are placed on the use of Cabinet papers and Ministerial documents for
the purpose of authorship anci publication.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Winston Churchill) : Former Ministers
may at any time have Access to Cabinet papers issued to them while
they were in office, but no disclosure of the proceedings of the Cabinet
may be made without the permission of the King. In view of the provi-
sions of the copyright and the official secrets Acts, no disclosure of other
official documents must be made without prior consultation with the
Government of the day. . . .

TREASURY CONTROL, 1951

Fourth Report of the Committee of Public Accounts , iggo-gi
The Committee of Public Accounts have made further progress in
the matters to them referred, and have agreed to the following Fourth
Report : —

GENERAL

TREASURY COICTROL

i. Your Committee have devoted considerable attention during
the course of *he Session to the question of Treasury control of

Treasury 'Control, igyi 297

expenditure. . . . Instances of apparent extravagance and waste of
public funds have been brought to their notice . . . and they felt it was
their duty to ascertain whether Treasury control is now as effective
as it used to be.

2. The field of public expenditure has grown enormously since 1914,
both in size and in scope, and the changes which have taken place,
especially since 1939, could not fail to have produced some changes in
the relations between the Treasury and the spending Departments.
Moreover, the Treasury have now assumed responsibility in the sphere
of economic planning, and their duties are no longer confined to those
of “prudent housekeeping. 55 The Treasury submitted a memorandum
in which they explained the changes which were effected in the early
I920 5 s with the full concurrence of the Committee of Public Accounts
at that time and set out the scope of Departmental and Treasury
responsibility, with particular reference to the responsibilities of
Accounting Officers of Government Departments. Since then these
appoirftments have been held by the Permanent Heads of Departments.

3. The Treasury memorandum explains that three separate stages in
the expenditure of public moneys by a Department may be recognised.
The first is the formulation and submission of a proposal, its approval
and the granting of the financial authority. The second is the execution
or administration of the *project. Though this stage is primarily the
responsibility of the Departments and their Accounting Officers, the
Treasury have a general responsibility for se^ng that any Department
is so organised and staffed that it can adequately fulfil this responsi-
bility. They moreover require to be kept in tou^h with the progress of
the expenditure, so that they may keep a wafch on the total govern-
ment spending, both current and prospective: on major schemes,
formal periodical reports are rendered to them. The Treasury exercise
complete control over all Departments in the salaries and numbers of
their staff. The third and final stage is the audit stage, at which tho
outcome of the expenditure is examined, and both the Accounting
Officer and the Treasury appear as witnesses before the Public
Accounts Committee.

4. Your Committee enquired as to the detailed means by which the
Treasury satisfy themselves that the amount of an estimate is reason*,
able and as to who in fact carries out the cross-examinations of experts
to ensure that any proposal is sound. They were informed that the
work is carried out by the whole range of the administrative staff of the
Treasury, recruited through open competition and by promotion from
lower grades; that officers are in their early years moved about as^
much as possible from one division to another so as to gain^ varied
experience, which is considerea preferable to expert knowledge; and
that, in the opinion *p£ the treasury, control is as effectively main-
tained now as in the past and, on occasions, Heads ^f Departments

298 The Executive

complain that it is so meticulous and so detailed that work cannot
proceed as quickly as it ought. Your Committee give full weight to
these facts and contentions.

5. In short, the Treasury accept full responsibility for examining
and approving proposals for expenditure, but responsibility for execu-
tion and administration is placed primarily on the Accounting Officers.
The Treasury claim that, by placing responsibility where it now rests,
they have achieved a better understanding with Departments and that
control of expenditure is in fact more effective than under the former
system. Nevertheless, the Treasury would not claim that control could
not be made still more effective by learning from experience how to
keep Departments up to the mark without bringing under direct
Treasury control a very large mass of relatively small and detailed
matters. In particular, the Treasury are developing a system under
which their officers keep in constant touch with their £ Opposite
numbers 55 in the spending Departments on all broad issues of policy
which affect finance and seek to influence that policy so as to 'secure
economical expenditure and administration.

6. Your Committee see no reason to differ from the general conten-
tion of the Treasury that the present division of responsibility between
that Department and the Accounting Officers of other Government
Departments is broadly on sound lines, int6nded to create a proper
sense of economy throughout the Civil Service. There are, however,
certain observations on the operation of the present method of control
which they think might usefully be recorded and considered.

(i) Position of Public Accounts Committee

7. In their memorandum the Treasury referred more than once to
the position of the Public Accounts Committee and to the duty of each
Accounting Officer to be answerable to that Committee. This is an
accepted and valuable factor in Parliamentary control of expenditure,
but Your Committee wish to make it clear that the procedure of
accounting to the Legislature for past expenditure should not be
invoked as lessening the need for the fullest control by the Executive
of prospective and current expenditure.

gr-
ill) Position of Accounting Officers

8. Accounting Officers are appointed by the Treasury, but the
Treasury memorandum explained that as Permanent Secretaries they
remain responsible to their Ministers for economy and to the Public
Accounts Committee for justifying the management of their Depart-
ments. The Treasury agreed in evidence that Accounting Officers,
though not servants of the Treasury, had a certain responsibility to
that Department but that their constitutional ^responsibility was to
their own Ministers. Your Committee recommend that consideration

299

Treasurj'Control , igyi

should be given to the question whether the link between Accounting
Officers and the Treasury should not be further defined and strength-
ened in practice.

(Hi) Position of Principal Finance Officers

9. In their memorandum the Treasury laid some stress on the fact
that normally within each Department there is, under the Permanent
Secretary and Accounting Officer, a Principal Finance Officer, whose
appointment or removal is, like that of the Permanent Secretary, him-
self, reserved for the consent of the Prime Minister. This fact, the
Treasury stated, greatly strengthens the hand and position of these
officers. While the officer holding this position should no doubt remain
on the staff of the Accounting Officer, Your Committee are glad to
note the importance attached by the Treasury to Iris special position;
they take the view that officers holding this post should be graded as
among the most important officers of Departments and should be
encouraged to put forward their view T s on all matters of finance to
Ministers and Accounting Officers before decisions are reached. It is
important, in Your Committee’s view*, that all Ministers should be
aware of the special conditions relating to this post and they were glad
to learn that the Treasury felt certain that this was the case. Much of
the value of <he procedure must depend on general knowledge of its
existence.

(■ iv ) Disciplinary Action when Losses occur *

10. In their memorandum the Treasury referred to the financial
liability of Accounting Officers for making gdbd deficits which might
be disallowed, and Your Committee enquired whether similar disci-
plinary action was ever taken in the Civil Service against officers
responsible by their neglect for losses of public funds. The Treasury
were of the opinion that, where responsibility could be brought homt?u.
for real mismanagement and obvious errors, an undue tolerance was
not shown, though it might be that in rather minor matters the public
service does not always demand dismissal where an outside employer
would. There were other ways of making disapproval known. There
are noted in the Appropriation Accounts numerous cases of prosecu^
tion of officers for dishonesty, and Your Committee think that some
lessons might usefully be drawn from an examination of the practice
of other large organisations in dealing with incompetence as well as
with fraud.

(v) Treasurf s Exercise of Virement ^

11. The Treasury have the Sble right to approve virement, that is,
the transfer of a savir^g on on£ subhead of a Vote to meet excess expen-
diture on another subhead, ‘and have informed Departments that it is

3 00

The Executive

not to be assumed that authority for this procedure will be automa-
tically forthcoming. Whenever it appears probable that a subhead may
be exceeded, Treasury authority should forthwith be sought for the
excess. They have, moreover, told Departments that savings on sub-
heads which are largely unrelated to the general run of the Vote will
not be regarded as available for use to meet excesses elsewhere on the
Vote. Cases occur in which the Treasury refuse to sanction virement,
but they were unable to give the number of such cases in recent years.

12. Your Committee regard this as an important duty of the Trea-
sury in the field of financial control. Though Parliament appropriates
money by Votes which often cover all a Department’s activities, the
Estimates are presented under numerous subheads and Parliament
might w r ell feel that a larger sub-division of Votes would be required
if they could not rely on strict Treasury control in this matter. Your
Committee trust, therefore, that the Treasury will limit their sanctions,
for virement to cases which they feel quite certain that Parliament
would approve and will insist on Supplementary Estimates rather than
approve virement between subheads providing for services of a
different nature.

(vi) Treasury Nominees

13. In recent years an increasing volume, of governmental activity
has been entrusted, not to Government Departments with* their own
Accounting Officers, answerable directly to the Committee of Public
Accounts, but to independent or semi-independent bodies, generally
appointed by Ministers and financed from public moneys, but not
directly responsible to ‘Parliament. Your Committee have therefore
looked into the question of Treasury control over the expenditure of
such bodies, and in particular have enquired whether the Treasury
normally appoint a nominee on the governing board of the organisa-
tion, as they formerly did on the Boards of the Special Area Trading
Estates Companies. The Treasury said that in their experience such
appointments were of doubtful value; bankers did not put a bank
director on the Board of every company to which they lent money,
and the Treasury would regret any general rule that they themselves
should do so.

14. It has unfortunately been the experience of Your Committee
that there has been some laxity of control of public expenditure in a
number of bodies of this type and, while they appreciate the reasons
which make the normal departmental system of control inappropriate,
they think that some tighter degree of control is called for over the
"Ynancial transactions of some of these bodies, particularly where the
whole df their income is derived from the Exchequer. They suggest
therefore that, with this end in view, Treasury nominees should be
appointed to some of these bodies, either as-full members or as assessors

Treasury .Control^ igyi 301

— not with any power of veto over expenditure but with the duty of
advising their colleagues in financial matters and of reporting from
time to time to the Treasury on the financial policy and prospects of
the body. . . .

(yii) Grants in Aid

15. Many of the bodies referred to in the last paragraph are financed
by grants in aid, and the Treasury in their Memorandum said that such
bodies naturally tend to have considerably greater liberty of action
than ordinary Government Departments. The Treasury approve the
estimate for the grant in aid, but once the amount of it has been
settled no attempt will normally be made to exercise a very detailed
control over the organisation’s activities. The bodies in receipt of
grants in aid differ widely in character and in the degree of Depart-
mental control. They are not generally required to relinquish at the
end of the financial year any surplus left unspent, and in many instances
the Cqjmptroller and Auditor General has no access to their books and
accounts.

16. Your Committee are fully alive to the important functions com-
petently carried out by many of these bodies. They are, however, of
the opinion that a too rapid increase of expenditure in this direction
is unhealthy^ that new bodies should receive grants only after most
careful scrutiny and enquiry by the Departments concerned; and that
the books and accounts of all bodies which receive the greater part of
their income from public funds should -be open to inspection by the
Comptroller and Auditor General so that he may, if necessary, report
on them to Parliament, ...

(yiii) Conclusion

18. . . . Your Committee . . . are aware that the Treasury staff is
much larger than it used to be, but they also have in mind that in the.
last forty-five years Government expenditure has increased nearly
forty-fold. The fact that a far larger proportion of the national income
is spent by Government Departments obviously makes it desirable that
the control of expenditure should be as exact as ever. But the broaden-
ing of the functions of the Treasury from those of a Department com;
cerned principally with good housekeeping to one seeking to guide the
whole economic trend of the country must mean that it directs propor-
tionately less of its attention to ensuring efficiency and economy in
Departmental spending. The question that presents itself is whether
this development has been allowed to go too far.

19. Your Committee are impressed by the keen interest shown by
senior officers of the Treasury $n these problems and are satisfied that
the Treasury are as # anxiou# as they are themselves to maintain the
traditional authority* of ‘Parliament over all expenditure of public

The Executive

3°2

money. Nevertheless, they are hot sure that Treasury control is, as
that Department claim, more effective than it was thirty years ago. In
view of the paramount need for economy, they trust that the Treasury
will not only discharge to the full the duties entrusted to them by
Parliament of scrutinising and controlling public expenditure, particu-
larly by bodies which are not directly accountable to Parliament, but
will also give serious consideration to any changes in organisation
which may be called for in the light of modem developments.

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF CIVIL SERVANTS, 1953

White Paper presented by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury to Parliament ,
March ig$3 ( Cmd . 8,783)

6. On November 1st, 1949, it was announced that the Government
would give immediate effect to that part of the [Masterman] Report
which proposed to free some 450,000 civil servants from existing
restrictions, but for the rest of the Civil Service the practice which pre-
vailed before the Report was received would be maintained in force
while further consideration was given to the matter.

7. ... In coming to the decisions they have now made/ the Govern-
ment have had th^ benefit of advice from a Committee of the National
Whitley Council specially appointed to consider the possibility of
extending the area of freedom beyond that recommended in the
Masterman Report.

8. This Whitley Committee suggested that it would be reasonable,
practicable and consistent with the general principles underlying the
Masterman Committee’s recommendations, to modify the Masterman
scheme by dividing the non-industrial Civil Service, not into the two
-categories of the completely free and the restricted, as recommended
by the Masterman Committee, but into three categories. The third
category would be intermediate between the two proposed by the
Masterman Committee and would be formed by dividing the Master-
man restricted category into two parts : those restricted . . . ; and those
^ho, while not completely free like those below “the Masterman line,”
would be eligible for very considerable freedom to be granted or with-
held by Departments according to the closeness or otherwise of the
individual’s contact with the public. This freedom, where granted, was
to be subject to certain understandings about reserve in public utter-
jances on party political matters. . . .

10; Iq considering the extent to which civil servants should be free
to take part in political activities the Government have had constantly
in mind the two conflicting principles w'iiich are at the heart of this
question. On the one hand — to quote the words of the Masterman

Political Activities' of Civil Servants, 1953 303

Committee — it is desirable in a democratic society “for all citizens to
have a voice in the affairs of the State and for as many as possible to
play an active part in public life.” On the other, “the public interest
demands the maintenance of political impartiality in the Civil Service
and confidence in that impartiality as an essential part of the structure
of Government in this country.”

Having considered the Whitley Committee’s proposal, the Govern-
ment have concluded that the creation of an intermediate class
between the two classes proposed by the Masterman Committee repre-
sents a fair and reasonable balance between the two fundamental but
conflicting principles set out above, and that its introduction would
not damage the interests of the State or the reputation of the Civil
Service for political impartiality.

The Government have therefore decided to introduce this scheme
and it will be brought into force as soon as possible.

11. . . . The Government have decided that the line should be
drawn’as described in paragraph 18 of the [Whitley] Report and that
the junior executive officer and analogous grades should be in the area
of restriction.

12. . . . canvassing will be barred to civil servants restricted in their
poli deal activities and will be open to those in the intermediate group
only by pe^nlission. >

The Government agree however that rhe existing Post Office rule
permitting canvassing by Post Office staff except where “'obviously
incompatible with their official position’ * should be maintained.

13. The practical effect of these decisions is substantially to increase
the number of civil servants free to take part in political activities. . . .

When these present decisions are put into effect the position will
be that, out of a Civil Sendee of some 1,000,000 individuals, about
62 per cent, will be completely free; something like another 22 per
cent, will, subject to the acceptance of the need for discretion, be'
free to take part in all activities except Parliamentary candidature;
while only some 16 per cent, will be barred from taking part in national
political activities — and of these as many as possible of those who seek
it will be given permission to take part in local government and political
activities in the local field. ...

15. The Government are satisfied that the scheme . . . imposes
restrictions on civil servants only where they are necessary if the confi-
dence of the public in the political impartiality of the Civil Service is
not to be impaired. To preserve this confidence political reserve must
be maintained not only by those civil servants who work in the spheres^
where policy is determined: but also by those who work jp local
offices and deal directly with l 3 ie individual citizen in relation to his
personal circumstances. It i^the latter who are “the Civil Service” to
the individual citizen. . . .

3°4

The Executive

APPENDIX

CML SERVICE NATIONAL WHITLEY COUNCIL

Report of a Joint Committee . . .

The Intermediate Class

11. Civil Servants of the intermediate class would be eligible for
permission to engage in all national political activities except Parlia-
mentary candidature.

12. The granting of permission would depend on the acceptance
of a code of discretion , putting certain limitations on the extent to
which, and the manner in which, the civil servant could express views
on Governmental policy and national political issues generally. (Hence
the exclusion of Parliamentary candidature from permissible activity :
it would be impractical to demand discretion of this sort from a
would-be Member of Parliament.) ...

13. In deciding which of their intermediate class staff should be
allowed this degree of freedom Departments would be influenced
mainly by the criterion of remoteness of contact with the public and
anonymity.

14. The grades^to be included in the intermediate clasrs would be
settled centrally. This having been done, each Department would
divide its intermediate o*ass staff as follows: —

(a) those to be covered by what might be called an open general
licence to take part irr^all the national political activities open to the
intermediate class, this open general licence being given to cover
whole blocks of staff, so far as possible ;

(b) those who must individually seek permission, which would be
granted on the merits of the individual case according to the criterion

'Indicated in paragraph 13 above.

The detailed arrangements would be discussed with the depart-
mental staff representatives, but within the machinery centrally laid
down the decision would rest with the Department.

15. Subject to certain special rules for those Departments (e.g. the
Ministries of Housing and Local Government, Education, Health and

Transport) in close official contact with local authorities, intermediate
class staff with an open general licence for national political activities
would be allowed to take part in local government and in political activities
in the local field . , . subject to: —

~ (4) the observance of the code of discretion referred to in paragraph

12 abo*re;

(b) the notification to their Department of election to a local
authority. . r f

Intermediate class staff not covered by open general licence could

Political Activities* of Civil Servants, 1953 305

seek permission to take part in local government activities and in
political activities in the local field. Generally speaking, those to whom
permission would be given to take part in national political activities
would be given permission to take part in local government, etc.,
activities subject to the code of discretion. . . . Those not allowed to
take part in national political activities would nevertheless, in as many
cases as possible, be given permission to take part in local government
and in political activities in the local field. This permission, which
would be subject to a code of discretion requiring them to act with
moderation, particularly in matters affecting their own Department
— see Annex 2 — would cover freedom to hold local party political
office, such as Ward Secretary, impinging only or primarily on local
government activity, but not any office impinging only or primarily on
party politics in the national field.

16. Staff who were neither in the intermediate class nor in the area
of complete freedom would not be allowed to take overt part in national
political activities. But (subject to what is said in Paragraph 15 about
the special position of certain Departments) they would be eligible to
seek permission to take part in local government activities and in
political activities in the local field. This permission would be given to
the maximum extent which the circumstances permitted, subject to
the observance of the code of discretion (Annex 2).

17. Apart from a difference of opinion on the Staff Side’s proposition

that canvassing, in a Parliamentary or a local election, is not such a
public manifestation of party political views that it need be forbidden
to anyone . . . the tw r o Sides are in agreement on this conception of
the intermediate class. , *

18. The question then is, what grades should be included in this
class? The two Sides are agreed that it should include the following: —

(a) typists, clerical assistants, clerical officers, and their analogues —
general Service and departmental;

(b) grades parallel to those in ( a ), i.e. grades of roughly the same
status, whether general Service or departmental, e.g. scientific assistant;

(d) grades parallel to the general Service grade of junior executi^p
officer, i.e. grades which, not being in an executive class, either general
Service or departmental, or in a class analogous thereto (e.g. the
information officer class) are of roughly the same status, e.g. draughts-
men, leading draughtsmen, assistant experimental officer, experimental
officer, technical grades 2 and 3;

(e) Post Office manipulative supervising officers who, not *>eing
within the area of freedom as recommended in the MastermamReport,
have salary scales v^hose maximum is not higher than, or not much
higher than the maximum of the junior executive officer scale.

The Executive

3°6

ig. So constituted, the intermediate class would include about
290,000 staff. Of these it is estimated that some 185,000 would be
given an open general licence (see paragraph 14). Of the 100,000 or
so who would have individually to seek permission to take part in
national political activities, probably about 45,000 would get it. The
great majority of those who would not get it would be in local offices
of the Ministry of Labour and National Service, the Ministry of
National Insurance, the Inland Revenue, and the National Assistance
Board. Those not allowed to take part in national political activities
would be given permission to take part in local government activities
to the maximum extent which the circumstances of the particular case
permitted. . . .

ANNEX I

Code of Discretion for those who, though not completely free politically,
are allowed to take part in both national political activities and local
government and political activities in the local field. *

A certain discretion is required of those civil servants who, not being
within the area of complete political freedom, are nevertheless given
permission to take part in national political activities (other than
Parliamentary candidature) and in local, government and local
political ac tivi ties . r All such staff should bear in mind th£t they are
servants of the public, working under the direction of Her Majesty’s
Ministers forming the Gbverjiment of the day. While they are not
debarred from advocating or criticising the policy of any political
party, comment shoula he expressed with moderation (particularly in
relation to matters for which their own Minister is responsible) and
should avoid personal attacks. They should use every care to avoid the
embarrassment to Ministers or to their Department which could result,
whether by inadvertence or not, from the actions of a person known to be
a civil servant who brings himself prominently to public notice in party
political controversy.

ANNEX II

Code of Discretion for those who, though not allowed to take part in
^ national political activities, are allowed to participate in local
government and political activities in the local field.

The permission to participate in local government and in political
activities in the local field granted to civil servants not free to partici-
pate in national political activities is subject to the condition that they
act witfy moderation and discretion, particularly in matters affecting
their own Department and that they take care not to invoice themselves
in matters of political controversy which'" are of national rather than
local significance.

SECTION IV

Judicial Proceeding

LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD v. ARLIDGE, 1914

House of Lords , A.C. , [rpij]

Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal, reversing a decision
of the Divisional Court.

Viscount Haldane, L.C.: My Lords, the question which has to be
decided in this case is whether the appellants, the Local Government
Board, have validly dealt with an appeal brought before them under
the provisions of s. 17 of the Housing and Town Planning Act, 1909.
The respondent is the assignee of a lease of a dwelling house, No. 83,
Palmerston Road, in the metropolitan borough of Hampstead. On
12 January 1911, the borough council made an order under s. 17,
sub-s. 2, of the Act to which I have referred, prohibiting the use of the
house for habitation until in their judgement it had been rendered fit
for that purpose. On 7 March 1911, the respondent gave notice of
appeal to the Local Government Board. That Board intimated, in
accordance with s. 39 of the Act and with the rules which it had made
thereunder, that it would not decide the appeal without having held
a local inquiry. A public inquiry was, as the result, held on 24 May
1 91 1 bef^re'Mr. Edward Leonard, one of the housing inspectors of the
Board designated for that purpose, who also made A personal inspection
of the house on 2 June following. The respondent had furnished the
Board with copies of reports of certain experts whom he had consulted,
such reports being to the effect that the houses was perfectly habitable,
and that there was no justification* for the closing order. The respon-
dent had intimated that he should decline to attend the inquiry, and
he did not appear or tender evidence. On 6 June the inspector sub-
mitted to the Board his report of the inspection, and on 29 July 19 1 1
the Board, after considering the report and the other documents
before them, confirmed the closing order. On 1 1 August, the respondent
applied to the Board to state a special case under s. 39, sub-s. 1 (a),
of the Act for the opinion of the High Court, raising the point that the
order of 29 July was invalid, because (a) the report of the inspector
had been treated as a confidential document and had not been dis-
closed to the respondent, and (b) because the Board had declined to
give the respondent an opportunity of being heard orally by the
person or persons by whom the appeal was finally decided, in addition
to the opportunity which he had had of stating and arguing his case
before the inspector. The Board declined to state a case, and t 3 \e
respondent did not, as he could have done under the Act, apjphT to the
High Court for an order calling on the Board to state it.

My Lords, in thgymeanfeie the respondent applied to the borough
council to determine the closing order having regard to repairs which

2 io Judicial Proceedings

he had effected, and on 5 October igu the council refused on the
ground that the premises had not been rendered by such repairs fit
for habitation. On 19 October the respondent appealed again to the
Board, this time against the refusal to determine the closing order. I
pass over certain communications and proceedings relating to the
technical points taken by the respondent, inasmuch as these have
ceased to be of importance, and I come to 25 November 1911. On this
date the Board gave notice to the respondent of their intention to hold
a second public local inquiry with respect to his appeal against the
refusal of the borough council to determine the closing order. The
inquiry was held on 8 December before the same inspector. The
respondent was present with his solicitor and witnesses, and the
borough council and the London County Council were also repre-
sented. The respondent’s solicitor argued his case, and the respondent
and his witnesses gave evidence. On 13 December the inspector sub-
mitted to the Board his report, together with a shorthand note of the
evidence and speeches. On 8 January 1912 the Board intimated#to the
respondent that it would be willing to consider any further statement
in writing which he desired to submit to it. The respondent did not
avail himself of this opportunity, but applied for writ of certiorari to
remove the order of the Board into the King’s Bench Division to be
quashed, on the ground that the appeal hadr not been determined in
the manner provided by the law. The points taken were that the
appeal had been decide d neither by the Board nor by any one law-
fully authorised to act for them, and that the procedure adopted by
the Board was contrary r to natural justice in that the respondent had
not been afforded an opportunity of being heard orally before the
Board. I assume further, what appears to have been the case, that the
point was also taken that the report of the inspector on the second
inquiry was not disclosed to the respondent. This point was certainly
afterwards argued in the Court of Appeal.

The case was heard before Ridley, Coleridge, and Bankes, JJ.
Among the affidavits which they had before them was one by Sir
Horace Monro, the Permanent Secretary of the Board, who stated that
the decision was come to after full and careful consideration of the
reports made by the inspector, and of the evidence and documents,
including the observations and objections put forward in the corre-
spondence by the respondent’s solicitors. He referred to the invitation
already mentioned, addressed by the Board to the respondent’s
solicitors, to place before it in writing any further statement the
respondent might desire it to consider. He said that the appeal had
been determined judicially on the report of the inspector, and the
evidence taken by him (although witnout any oral hearing of the
respondent beyond that of the inquiry), »*n the game manner in all
respects as it h&d been customary as regards other appeals to the

Local Government' Board v, Arlidge, 1914 311

Board. He referred to a formal order of the Board, signed by the
President, and by the assistant secretary, dismissing the appeal.

On these facts the learned judges of the King’s Bench Division
declined to hold that the appeal had not been properly disposed of,
both in form and in substance. . . .

The Court of Appeal, consisting of Vaughan Williams, Buckley, and
Hamilton, L .JJ., by a majority took a different view and reversed the
decision. Vaughan Williams, L.J., held that the appeal was one inter
partes, the respondent and the Hampstead Local Board being the
opposing parties. He thought that the duty of the Board was to hear
both sides, and to disclose all the evidence of fact placed before them,
and the conclusions of law adopted by them as the basis of their
decision. He held that the non-production to the respondent of the
inspector’s reports was contrary to the principles of natural justice,
and that, in the absence of a plain direction in the statute abrogating
the necessity of observing these principles in dealing with the reports,
the principles of English justice had been violated. He appeared
further to think that the absence of any statement by or on behalf of
the Board as to which of its members* considered the appeal was a
further objection to the validity of the Board’s order.

Buckley, L.J., thought the importance of the general question which
was raised very great. It* was increasingly common for statutes to em-
power Government departments to decide questiorfs affecting rights of
property , and it was of the first importance thg.t their proceedings should
be so conducted as to command the confidence Gf the public, and that
the principles applicable in their conduct shqjild be well understood.
A mere power to make rules determining the procedure in such appeals
did not obviate the necessity of such rules being in accordance with
natural justice. It was essential that each of the parties should know
the case the other made and should be heard in the other’s presence.
Assuming that it could be validly provided that the original hearing
should assume the form of a statement in writing, it was not clear
that a party who subsequently desired to be heard orally could be
debarred from claiming to be so heard.

The learned Lord Justice thought that as the local authority was the
authority against which the appeal to the Board was brought, it was
in one sense not a party litigant, but, as it could be ordered to make
a counter-statement and to pay or receive costs , for all material pur-
poses it was not to be distinguished from a party litigant, and there-
fore the other party ought to know the case it made. Having regard to
the terms of s. 5 of 34 & 35 Viet., c. 70, which constituted the Boar$
and provided that anything to be done on its behalf might b^done by
the President or any member? or by a secretary or assistant secretary
authorised by its General ^Order, the inspector was not within the
class of persons who could decide anything. If he n^ade a report on

3 1 2 Judicial Proceedings

a public inquiry held by him it should be made public. A case could
not be argued before one man and decided by another. The respondent
had therefore no real opportunity of presenting his case when he was
invited by the letter of 8 January 1912 to do so, for he was not permitted
to see the report.

Hamilton, L.J., was of a different opinion. The practice, he said,
of the Board, like that of its predecessor the Poor Law Board, had
always been to dispose by correspondence of appeals even in important
matters such as an auditor’s disallowance of items, and in treating the
inspector’s report as confidential it was only following an old and well-
known practice. The question was whether, if the statute itself did not
in terms authorise the practice, it was contrary to natural justice, “an
expression sadly lacking in precision.” He referred to several prece-
dents, and came to the conclusion that it was a sound inference, to be
drawn as matter of construction, that the Legislature, aware, as he
took it to have been, of the practice as to these inquiries and its inci-
dents, intended that the local inquiry which it prescribed should be
the usual local inquiry, and that the usual incidents should attach in
default of any special enactment, including the incident that the
Board should treat the report as confidential. He was of opinion that
what had been done was in accordance with the Act of 1909.

My Lords, I have thought it important to set out with .some fulness
the conflicting view's in the Court of Appeal. It is obvious that two of
the judges there based their conclusions on the principle that in the
absence of a direction to the contrary, which they could not find in the
statute, the analogy of the procedure in a Court of justice must guide
them. Hamilton, L.J., ofi the contrary, thought that he found in the
statute a scheme of procedure that excluded this analogy. Which of
these opinions was right can only be determined by referring to the
language of the Legislature. Here, as in other cases, we have simply
to-construe that language and to abstain from guessing w r hat Parlia-
ment had in its mind, excepting so far as the language enables us to
do so. There is no doubt that the question is one affecting property and
the liberty of a man to do what he chooses with what is his own. Such
rights are not to be affected unless Parliament has said so. But Parlia-
ment, in what it considers higher interests than those of the individual,
has so often interfered with such rights on other occasions, that it is
dangerous for judges to lay much stress on what a hundred years ago
would have been a presumption considerably stronger than it is
to-day. . . .

_ The closing of dwelling-houses as being dangerous or injurious
to health, or unfit for habitation, is no new jurisdiction. The Housing
of the Working Classes Act, 1890, gave to the local authority the
pow r er to take proceedings to enforce penalties ^and closing orders
before Courts of summary jurisdiction, to *be hollowed, in certain

Local Government' Board v. Arlidge , 1314 313

circumstances, by demolition orders. Under that Act the owner of the
house had an appeal to quarter sessions. The power of closing was
somewhat extended by the Housing of the Working Classes Act, 1903,
but the principle of the application being to a Court of justice remained
the same. A change of this principle was introduced in the Housing
and Town Planning Act, 1909. The local authority was empowered
itself to make the closing order, certain gonditions having been com-
plied with, and it was given power to determine the closing order if
satisfied that the house in respect of which the order had been made
had subsequently been rendered fit for habitation. In respect of both
a closing order and a determining order the owner w r as given a right
of appeal. But the appeal was to be, not as before to quarter sessions,
but to the Local Government Board. Stringent powers of inspection
were given to both the local authority and the Local Government
Board. In the case of an appeal, the procedure as to everything, includ-
ing costs, was to be such as the Board might by rules determine. The
Board was to have power to make such order on any appeal as it should
think equitable. It could state a case, but only on a question of law,
for the opinion of the High Court, and could be compelled by the High
Court to do so. The rules w T ere to provide that the Board should not
dismiss any appeal without having first held a public local inquiry. . . .

My Lord?, it is obviohs that the Act of 1909 introduced a change
of policy. The jurisdiction, both as regards original applications and
as regards appeals, was in England transferred from Courts of justice
to the local authority and the Local G6vernment Board, both of them
administrative bodies, and it is necessary to consider what consequences
this change of policy imported. •

My Lords, when the duty of deciding an appeal is imposed, those
whose duty it is to decide it must act judicially. They must deal with
the question referred to them without bias, and they must give to each
of the parties the opportunity of adequately presenting the case made.
The decision must be come to in the spirit and with the sense of
responsibility of a tribunal whose duty it is to mete out justice. But
it does not follow that the procedure of every tribunal must be the
same. In the case of a Court of law, tradition in this country has pre-
scribed certain principles to which in the main the procedure must
conform. But what that procedure is to be in detail must depend on
the nature of the tribunal. In modern times it has been increasingly
common for Parliament to give an appeal in matters which really
pertain to administration, rather than to the exercise of the judicial
functions of an ordinary Court, to authorities whose functions acp
administrative and not in th^ ordinary sense judicial. Such**, body as
the Local Government Board has the duty of enforcing obligations on
the individual whic{i age ftnposed in the interests of the community.
Its character is that of an organisation with executive functions. In

314 Judicial Proceedings

this it resembles other great departments of the State. When, there-
fore, Parliament entrusts it with judicial duties, Parliament must be
taken, in the absence of any declaration to the contrary, to have
intended it to follow the procedure which is its own, and is necessary
if it is to be capable of doing its work efficiently. I agree with the view
expressed in an analogous case by . . . Lord Loreburn. In Board of
Education v. Rice 1 he laid down that, in disposing of a question which
was the subject of an appeal to it, the Board of Education was under a
duty to act in good faith, and to listen fairly to both sides, inasmuch
as that was a duty which lay on every one who decided anything. But
he went on to say that he did not think it was bound to treat such a
question as though it were a trial. The Board had no power to admin-
ister an oath, and need not examine witnesses. It could, he thought,
obtain information in any way it thought best, always giving a fair
opportunity to those who were parties in the controversy to correct or
contradict any relevant statement prejudicial to their view. If the
Board failed in this duty, its order might be the subject of certiorari
and it must itself be the subject of mandamus.

My Lords, I concur in this Mew of the position of an administrative
body to which the decision of a question in dispute between parties
has been entrusted. The result of its inquiry must, as I have said, be
taken, in the absence of directions in the statute to the contrary, to be
intended to be reached by its ordinary procedure. In the case of the
Local Government Board jX is not doubtful what this procedure is. The
Minister at the head of the Board is directly responsible to Parliament
like other Ministers. is responsible not only for what he himself
does but for all that is cfone in his department. The volume of work
entrusted to him is very great and he cannot do the great bulk of it
himself. He is expected to obtain his materials vicariously through his
officials, and he has discharged his duty if he sees that they obtain
tbs^e materials for him properly. To try to extend his duty beyond this
and to insist that he and other members of the Board should do every-
thing personally would be to impair his efficiency. Unlike a judge in a
Court he is not only at liberty but is compelled to rely on the assistance
of his staff. When, therefore, the Board is directed to dispose of an
appeal, that does not mean that any particular official of the Board
is to dispose of it. This point is not, in my opinion, touched by s. 5 of
33 & 34 Viet., c. 70, the Act constituting the Local Government Board
to which I have already referred. Provided the work is done judicially
and fairly in the sense indicated by Lord Loreburn, the only authority
l^iat can review what has been done is the Parliament to which the
Minister jn charge is responsible. The practice of the department in the
present case was, I think, sufficiently sfiown by Sir Horace Monro’s
affidavit to have been followed. In accordance with that practice the

1 A.C., [1911] 179.

Local Government 'Board, \\ Arlidge , 1914 3x5

Board, in order to obtain materials with which to decide, appointed
one of its health inspectors to hold a public inquiry. This was in
accordance with the rules it had made under the section of the statute
which I have quoted and with its usual practice. It is said that the
report of the inspector should have been disclosed. It might or might
not have been useful to disclose this report, but I do not think that the
Board was bound to do so, any more than it would have been bound
to disclose all the minutes made on the papers in the office before a
decision was come to. It is plain from Sir Horace Monro’s affidavit
that the order made was the order of the Board, and so long as the
Board followed a procedure which was usual, and not calculated to
violate the tests to which I have already referred, I think that the
Board was discharging the duty imposed on it in the fashion Parlia-
ment must be taken to have contemplated when it deliberately trans-
ferred the jurisdiction, first, from a Court of summary jurisdiction to
the local authority, and then, for the purposes of all appeals, from
quarter sessions to an administrative department of the State. What
appears to me to have been the fallacy of the judgement of the majority
in the Court of Appeal is that it begs thS question at the beginning by
setting up the test of the procedure of a Court of Justice, instead of the
other standard which was laid down for such cases in Board of Education
v. Rice. I^Io* not think the Board was bound to hear the respondent
orally, provided it gave him the opportunities he actually had. More-
over, I doubt whether it is correct to speak of the case as a lis- inter
partes. The Hampstead Borough Council was itself acting adminis-
tratively, although it had the right to appear, *and did appear, before
the inspector and on the appeal, and might have to pay or receive
costs.

For the reasons I have given, I have arrived at the conclusion that
the judgements of the Divisional Court and of Hamilton, L.J., in the
Court of Appeal were right, and that this appeal should be allo*«ad
with costs here and in the Court of Appeal, and that the order of the
Divisional Court should be restored.

Lords Shaw of Dunfermline, Parmoor and Moulton concurred.

Order of the Court of Appeal reversed and order of the King’s Bench Division
restored.

ROBERTS y. HOPWOOD AND OTHERS, 1924

House of Lords, [1925] A.C. $j 8

Appeal from an order of the Court of Appeal reversing an^ order of
the Divisional Court.

Lord Buckmasti^r : My^Lords, the appellant in this case is the
district auditor originally appointed by the Local Government Board

3 1 6 Judicial Proceedings

(now represented by the Minister of Health) for the purpose of auditing
year by year the accounts of the metropolitan borough councils. In the
performance of this duty he has surcharged the respondents, who are
certain aldermen and councillors of the Poplar Borough Council, with
the sum of £5,000 for the year between April i, 1921, and April 1,

1922. The question on this Appeal is whether that surcharge has been
lawfully made.

Before considering the facts it would be well to examine the powers
with which the district auditor is invested. These are to be found in
s. 247 of the Public Health Act of 1875, a section rendered applicable
to the accounts of the metropolitan borough councils by s. 14 of the
London Government Act of 1899 and s. 71 of the Local Government
Act of 1888. Sub-sect. 7 of s. 247 contains the directions imposing
upon the auditor the duty of making disallowances and surcharges . . . :
“Any auditor acting in pursuance of this section shall disallow every
item of account contrary to law, and surcharge the same on the person
making or authorising the making of the illegal payment, an$ shall
charge against any person accounting the amount of any deficiency
or loss incurred by the negligence or misconduct of that person, or of
any sum which ought to have been but is not brought into account
by that person, and shall in every such case certify the amount due
from such person, and on application by any party aggrieved shall
state in wridng the: reasons for his decision in respect of such disallow-
ance or surcharge, and also of any allowance which he may have
made.” It is to be observed that this sub-section consists of two
branches; the first deals with the disallowance of every item contrary
to law and surcharging *che sum as therein provided, and the second
with the deficiency or loss incurred by negligence or misconduct which
is to be charged against the person who is accounting. It is suggested
that this latter provision is really applicable to the officers or assistants
ofe^ny local authority whose accounts, by s. 250 of the Public Health
Act, are also to be audited by the auditors. It is quite possible that this
is the true explanation of the different branches of the sub-section, but
its determination is unnecessary in the present case, because it is not
alleged that there has been negligence or misconduct in any person.
I t^is said that the amounts disallowed are contrary to law, and that
the making of them constituted the making of an illegal payment, so
that it is the first branch of the section alone with which this Appeal is
concerned. . . . The power of revising the decision of the auditor is to
be found in sub-s. 8, which enables a person aggrieved to apply for a
writ of certiorari to remove the disallowance to the King’s Bench
Division,^ where the whole matter is subject to revision. This is the
course that has been adopted. An ordef nisi was obtained on June 26,

1923, calling upon the district auditor to shpw cause why a writ should
not issue against him, and upon the rule being "heard the Divisional

Roberts v. Hopwood and Others , 1924 317

Court, on November 21, 1923, dismissed the order calling upon the
district auditor to show cause, and this decision was reversed by the
Court of Appeal, Bankes, L .J., dissenting from the other members of
the Court.

The relevant facts which induced the district auditor to make the
surcharges in question are as follows: —

During the years 1920 and 1921 the ordinary rates of wages, whether
measured by taking as a standard wages for the same work paid
immediately before the war and adding thereto the percentage repre-
senting the increased cost of living, or by taking the amounts fixed by
the Joint Industrial Councils’ award as the proper sum to be added
to the pre-war wage, showed violent oscillations. . . . The three
classes of wages in respect of which the surcharges have been made
were women (Grade A), general labourers, and men to whom the
trade union scale for masons and paviors applied. So far as the women
were concerned they were paid throughout from April 1, 1920, to
April ^ 1923, at a level weekly wage of 805., the pre-war wage being
23^. 6d., brought up by considering the added increased cost of living
to 54^. 6d. on April 1, 1921, and descending to 43s. on April 1, 1922.
The Joint Industrial Councils’ award gave for the month of April,
1921, 69s. 6d.; for May, June and July, 62^. 6<L; for August, September
and October ^7^. 6d ., from which level it descended bv steps to 51s. 6d.
on April 1, 1922 and continued to descend to April *1923.

. . . The district auditor, in determining the line above which he
regards the payments as illegal, has taken the" pre-war rate, increased
it by the cost of living and added to that a sum of 20 s. a week by way
of margin. ... If the powers of the district council are limited to the
payment of fair and even full wages, measured not actually in but by
reference to the terms of standard rates fixed either by trade unions
or by joint councils, there could, I think, be little objection to what
the auditor has done, but the real difficulty in the present case liosj^i
determining what is the limit of discretionary power given to the
district council with regard to payment of wages. Now these powers
are to be found in s. 62 of the Metropolis Management Act of 1855,
which runs as follows: 4 ‘The Metropolitan Board of Works, and (sub-
ject to the provisions herein contained) the board of works for eve^y
district under this Act, and the vestry of every parish mentioned in
Schedule (A) to this Act, shall respectively appoint or employ, or
continue for the purposes of this Act, and may remove at pleasure,
such clerks, treasurers, and surveyors, and such other officers and ser-
vants as may be necessary, and may allow to such clerks, treasurers^
surveyors, officers, and servants respectively such salaries and wa'ges as
the board or vestry may think f fit. 53 . . .

. . . The discretion thus kgposed is a very wide one, and I agree with
the principle enunciated by Lord Russell in the £ase of Kruse v.

3 1 8 Judicial Proceedings

Johnson ,1 that when such a discretion is conferred upon a local authority
the Court ought to show great reluctance before they attempt to
determine how T , in their opinion, the discretion ought to be exercised.

Turning now to what the borough council have done, the reason for
their action is to be found in the affidavit sworn by Mr. Scurr, Mr.
Key, Mr. Lansbury and Mr. Sumner. In para. 6 of that affidavit they
make the following statement: “The council and its predecessors the
district board of works have always paid such a minimum wage to its
employees as they have believed to be fair and reasonable without
being bound by any particular external method of fixing wages,
whether ascertainable by Trade Union rate, cost of living, payments
by other local or national authorities or otherwise. 5 5 And if the matter
ended there it would be my opinion that a decision so reached could
not be impeached until it were shown that it was not hona fide , and
absence of bona fides is not alleged in the present proceedings. Para. 9,
however, of the same affidavit puts the matter in a different form. It
is there said: “9 . . . The Council did not and does not take the view
that wages paid should be exclusively related to the cost of living. They
have from time to time carefully considered the question of the wages
and are of the opinion, as a matter of policy, that a public authority
should be a model employer and that a minimum rate of £4 is the
least w r age which ought to be paid to an adult having regard to the
efficiency of their workpeople, the duty of a public authority both to
the ratepayers and to itsjemployees, the purchasing power of the wages
and other considerations which are relevant to their decisions as to
wages. 55

Now it appears that oh August-31, 1921, a resolution was passed by
the borough council to the effect that no reduction of wage or bonus
should be made during the ensuing four months, and this was acted
upon for the following twelve months. It was, I think, well within their
pss^er to fix wages for a reasonable time in advance, and there are
cogent reasons why this should be done, but that decision should be
made in relation to existing facts, which they appear to have ignored.
In August, 1921, the cost of living had been continuously falling since
November of the previous year, and it continued to fall, so that it is
difficult to understand how, if the cost of living was taken into account
in fixing the wages for adult workers at a minimum basis of £4, the
sharp decline in this important factor should have been wholly dis-
regarded by the borough council. But the affidavit contains another
statement, which I think is most serious for the council’s case. It states
<$hat £4 a week was to be the minimum wages for adult labour, that
is without the least regard to what that labour might be. It standardised
men and women not according to the duties they performed, but
according to the fact that they were adults. It is^ phis that leads me to
1 [1898] 2 Q.B. 91, 99.

Roberts v. Hopwood and Others , 319

think that their action cannot be supported, and that in fact they have
not determined the payment as wages, for they have eliminated the
consideration both of the work to be done and of the purchasing power
of the sums paid, which they themselves appear to regard as a relevant
though not the dominant factor. Had they stated that they were
determined as a borough council to pay the same wage for the same
work without regard to the sex or condition of the person who per-
formed it, I should have found it difficult to say that that was not a
proper exercise of their discretion. It was indeed argued that this is
what they did, but I find it impossible to extract that from the state-
ment contained in the affidavit. It appears to me, from the reasons
I have given, that they cannot have brought into account the con-
siderations which they say influenced them, and that they did not base
their decision upon the ground that the reward for work is the value
of the work reasonably and even generously measured, but that they
took an arbitrary principle and fixed an arbitrary sum, which was not
a real exercise of the discretion imposed upon them by the statute.

It is for these reasons that I think the Appeal should succeed. . . .

Lord Sumner: . . . Passing now to s. 62 of the Metropolis Manage-
ment Act, 1855, the respondents found themselves upon its final words,
“such salaries and wages as the board or vestry may think fit,” and
contend tjjat* in effect, they remove the amount of wages paid beyond
the scope of effective criticism. The council may ‘pay in good faith
what wages they please. It is not said that th<jv can pay, if they please,
unreasonable wages, but that, for all purposes, what they please is
what is reasonable. Their reason is substitute^ as the test of reason-
ableness for that of the auditor or of the Courts of law. Ail the same
the result is that expenditure, which is in fact wholly unreasonable, is
on this view not contrary to law, if the council bona fide choose to
incur it. This is a pure paradox. . . .

The purpose, however, of the whole audit is to ensure wise
prudent administration and to recover for the council's funds money
that should not have been taken out of them. . . . [The auditor] has
to restrain expenditure within proper limits. His mission is to inquire
if there is any excess over what is reasonable. I do not find any words
limiting his functions merely to the case of bad faith, or obliging him
to leave the ratepayers unprotected from the effects on their pockets
of honest stupidity or unpractical idealism. . . .

Much was said at the Bar about the wide discretion conferred by
the Local Government Acts on local authorities. In a sense this is
true, but the meaning of the term needs careful examination. What,
has been said in cases, which lie outside the provisions as # to audit
altogether, is not necessarily applicable to matters, which are con-
cerned with the expjnditur©of public money. There are many matters,
which the Courts are indisposed to question. Though they are the

320 Judicial Proceedings

ultimate judges of what is lawful and what is unlawful to borough
councils, they often accept the decisions of the local authority simply
because they are themselves ill equipped to weigh the merits of one
solution of a practical question as against another. This, however, is
not a recognition of the absolute character of the local authority’s
discretion, but of the limits within which it is practicable to question
it. There is nothing about a borough council that corresponds to
autonomy. It has great responsibilities, but the limits of its powers and
of its independence are such as the law, mostly statutory, may have
laid down, and there is no presumption against the accountability of
the authority. Everything depends on the construction of the sections
applicable. . . .

Order of the Court of Appeal reversed and order of the King's Bench Division
restored .

THE KING v. MINISTER OF HEALTH, EX PARTE YAFFE, 1930

[1930] 2 K.B. g8 '

Swift, J. : This tase raises an important point of constitutional law,
which so far as I know h&s never yet been decided, although there are
dicta to be quoted on one sideror the other. . . .

The question raised .may I think be stated thus : When Parliament
delegates its powers of legislation to a Minister of the Crown, and
enacts that in certain circumstances he may make “an Order, 55 and
that his Order “when made 55 shall have effect as if enacted in the Act,
is it open to the Judiciary, if that alleged Order be challenged, to
cer^ider whether in fact “an Order 55 has been made?

By s. 40, sub-s. 3, of the Housing Act, 1925, it is provided that the
Minister of Health in certain circumstances “may by Order 55 confirm
a scheme. The Minister in this case alleges that he has made “an
Order. 55 That fact is challenged, and it is said that he could not have
made and did not make the alleged Order — Can the Courts of law
interfere ?

The question arises in this way: Part II of the Housing Act, 1925,
imposes upon local authorities the duty of making schemes for the
improvement of unhealthy areas in their district. Such schemes
^recognised by the Act are either “improvement 55 or “reconstruction 55
schemes,.

By s. 40, sub-s. 3, the Minister of Health may by order confirm
those schemes, and by sub-s. 5 “the ordei^of the Minister when made
shall have effects as if enacted in this Act. 55

R. v. Minister of Health, ex parte Taffe , 32 X

This case comes before the Court on a rule nisi calling upon the
Minister of Health to show cause why a writ of certiorari should not
issue to remove into this Court an alleged Order made by the said
Minister and dated on or about November 23, 1928, purporting to
confirm a scheme known as “The Liverpool (Queen Anne Street)
Improvement Scheme, 1928.”

The answer of the Minister is that this Court has no power to
canvass his Order, as under s. 40, sub-s. 5, it is of statutory effect; and
he also contends that if there is power in the Court to discuss it the
Order is intra vires ; and he further contends that in the circumstances
of this case the discretionary writ ought not to go in favour of the
applicant.

Where an Order has been made by the Minister of Health in pur-
suance of s. 40, sub-s. 3 of the Act of 1925, it clearly has effect by virtue
of sub-s. 5 as if in fact it were in the Act, and it may be that it is not
competent for any Court to inquire into its validity or to question its
propriety; but it seems to me that whether an Order has been made
by the Minister so as to become a statutory enactment must be a
question of fact; it cannot be enough tfiat it should be said that the
Minister has made an Order under the Act and therefore the jurisdic-
tion of the Courts is ousted; there must always arise the question
whether fact the Minister has in fact made an Order, which must
depend upon the antecedent question whether he Vas in fact ever in
a position to make the Order which he puqjorts to have made. . . .

Before ... a local authority approaches theM inis ter of Health with
regard to an improvement scheme it is necessary: (1) that an official
representation shall have been mack to the local authority: (2) that
the local authority shall pass a resolution to the effect that the area is
an unhealthy area and that an improvement scheme ought to be made
in respect of the area; (3) that after passing such a resolution they shall
forthwith proceed to make a scheme for the improvement of the a trcu;
(4) that maps, particulars and estimates shall accompany such scheme:
s. 38, sub-s. 1 ; and (5) that as soon as an improvement or reconstruc-
tion scheme has been prepared the local authority shall publish and
serve the notices prescribed by s. 39.

Until these things have all been done the local authority cannot
approach the Minister, and there is no pow*er in him to make an Order
on the local authority. His power is limited to confirming with or
without conditions or modifications the scheme which the local
authority has prepared. . . .

The words of sub-s. 5 of s. 40 of the Act are: “The Order of th*
Minister when made shall have effect as if enacted in this Agtd

I think that the words “when made” must be given effect to, and
that they mean in tfiis Acta“when made in sequence with the events
which the Act prescribes shall lead up to them,” a*id if any of the

322 Judicial Proceedings

steps required by the Act are omitted, in my view, the Minister has
not made an Order within the meaning of sub-s. 3 of 3. 40 (although
indeed he may have purported to do so), and sub-s. 5 of 3. 40 does
not apply. . . .

It appears that on January 18, 1928, the medical officer for the City
of Liverpool made an official representation to the local authority, the
result of which was that on March 7 at a council meeting the Common
Seal . . . was affixed to what was alleged to be a scheme . . . and that
the alleged scheme was on April 4 sent ... to the Minister of Health.

The Minister thereupon directed a local inquiry to be held . . .
and that inquiry took place on May 1, 2 and 3, 1928. On November
23, 1928, the Minister purported to make an Order.

Now it is quite clear that the scheme embodied in the Order of
November 23 is not the scheme which was forwarded ... to the
Minister on April 4, and it is equally clear that what was forwarded . . .
was not a scheme at all. And it is equally clear that when the local
inquiry was held on May 1 , 2 and 3 no valid scheme was in existence
or was inquired into, and it is further quite plain that after the scheme
which is embodied in the OrSer of the Minister of November 23 came
into existence no local inquiry was held.

It is admitted by the Attorney-General on behalf of the Minister
of Health that the scheme sent to him on Aj 5 ril 4 was a gthc^me which
was void and of no effect. ... It has been quite recently held in the
Court of Appeal, affirming the decision of this Court, that a scheme in
these terms is not an improvement scheme at all: Rex v. Minister of
Health , ex parte Davis . 1 ♦The Attorney-General admitted that if a writ
of prohibition had been applied Tor before the Minister made what
purports to be an Order on November 23 there would have been no
answer.

It seems to me therefore that as a matter of fact certain essential
steps before the Minister could make an Order were lacking. There
was no “scheme,” there was no “local inquiry” after a scheme had
been prepared, and I do not think the time ever came when as a
matter of fact he could make an Order.

Having come to the conclusion that the Minister in this case did not
make an Order and never was in a position in which he could make
an Order I am faced by the argument that he has purported to make
an Order and that this Court cannot inquire into the validity of what
he has done. . . .

. . . We are bound, I think as part of the common law of England,
<*o tregtt the Order of the Minister made under sub-s. 5 “when made”
as statutory — but does that justify us ^in accepting or compel us to
accept his mere ipse dixit that he has made “an order” ? In my opinion,
No. If we know, as in this case on the evidence, we clearly do know,

1 [1929] 1 K.B. 619.

R- v. Minister of Health, ex parte Taffe , iggo 323

that he could not have made the Order, I believe that it is my duty
to say he has not made the Order. . . .

If once an Order is made it becomes part of the Act of Parliament.
It has all the strength and virtue of the Act, it is incorporated in it
and nobody can question it, but in my view it is open to any citizen
adversely affected to inquire “Is this in truth an Order made under
the Act or is it something which has without justification obtained the
semblance of such an Order?” And if upon investigation this Court
is satisfied that the “thing” which is purporting to be an Order of the
Minister is not, and cannot in fact be, an Order within the meaning
of s. 40, sub-s. 3, of the Act, ought it not to say so ?

For these reasons I think the purported Order should be removed
into this Court to be quashed. . . .

Talbot, J. : I regret I am not able to take the same view of this
case as my brother. . . .

... We were asked to make this rule for certiorari absolute on the
ground that inasmuch as the Minister might have been prohibited
from considering the scheme because he had no jurisdiction under the
Housing Act, 1925, to confirm it, the Order confirming it is not an
Order made under the Act, and is therefore ultra vires. In fact the
Order very materially altered the scheme submitted to the Minister,
and it is jiot* suggested that as the scheme now stands it is not one
which might have been lawfully submitted and confirmed. We are
asked therefore in effect to annul a scheme which, if it had been
originally drawn in the shape in which «it nowhs, could not have been
complained of in a Court of law. ... 9

Lord Hewart, C.J.: I have come to the* conclusion, not without
doubt and reluctance, that this rule ought to be discharged. ... [It]
seems to me that the words ofs. 40. sub-s. 5, of the Act, . . . are sufficient
to cover the irregularities which preceded the making of the Order. . . .

Rule discharged .

The applicants appealed. On x\pril 10 the following judgments
were read:

Scrutton, L.J. : . . . Before the Court of Appeal, the Attorney-
General, having reconsidered the matter, did not admit that the pro-
posed scheme and Order were ultra vires, and it is therefore necessary
to consider this point, as to which are bound by the principles laid
down in this Court in Davis's case. . . . Shortly, the Act provides that
where a housing area is in a condition dangerous to health, it may be
cleared, and rebuilt or rearranged, that is, improved, by a schem%
submitted to the Minister of Health and, after a public inquiry; after
advertisement of the proposals* adopted with or without mocJifications
and promulgated in an Oilier by the Minister of Health. In Davis's
case the Corporation of Derby submitted a schem|; which did not

324 Judicial Proceedings

include any specific plans for improvement or reconstruction but
authorised the Corporation, having cleared the whole area, to “sell,
lease or otherwise dispose of it, as the Council may think fit, or to
appropriate or use it for any purpose approved by the Minister of
Health. 5 ’ Lord Hanworth, M.R., states the problem thus in Davis's
case: “Do these proposals embody a good improvement scheme within
Part II of the Housing Act* 1925? . . and he answers the question
thus: “After carefully surveying and examining the sections of Part II
of the Act, I can find no warrant for holding that a scheme for mere
demolition without any proposal for replacement or reconstruction, or
for substitution, is within the Act, 55 and: “For these reasons I have
come to the conclusion that an ‘improvement scheme 5 or ‘scheme for the
improvement of the area 5 must contain provisions for the user of the
land where it has been acquired, and that a proposal to acquire sites
in an area, leaving open the question as to its subsequent user till
after the Minister has given expression to the purpose for which it
shall be used, is not a scheme that complies with the Act. 55 .

In my opinion, on the principles laid down in Davis's case, such a
scheme [as that made in Liverpool] does not comply with the provi-
sions of the Housing Act, and the Corporation and the Minister before
the Order was made could have been prohibited from proceeding
with it, as a scheme ultra vires his powders as conferred by the
Act. One venture! to hope that local authorities and the Ministry
will note and comply w£th the views of the Courts as to these limita-
tions of their powers under the existing Act. . . .

The Parliamentary * history on this particular subject begins in
1890 . . . [and] shows a gradual increase in the powers of the Ministry,
and greater freedom from the control of Parliament. The’ strongest
clause is that repeated in Schedule III, s. 2, of the Housing Act, 1925,
from Schedule I, s. 2, of the Housing Act, 1909. That clause runs:
“Sfeall, save as otherwise expressly provided by this schedule, become
final and have effect as if enacted in this Act; and the confirmation by
the Minister shall be conclusive evidence that the requirements of this
Act have been complied with, and that the Order has been duly made
and is within the powers of this Act. 55 This apparently is intended to
prevent any question of ultra vires being raised however flagrantly the
Order in question may exceed the powers of the Act. . . .

The present Act enables a Minister to take away the property of
individuals without compensation on certain defined conditions. In my
view those conditions must be strictly complied with, and only the
r yery clearest words can give final validity to an Order which does not
comply ^vith the prescribed statutory conditions. . . . [An] order
which goes beyond the statutory conditions under which alone it can
be made, an Order which for that reason, the Minister could be pro-
hibited from making, if he announced his intention of making it, is

R. v. Minister of Health, ex parte Yaffe , iggo 325

not an Order which when made can by reason of s. 40, sub-s. 5, have
statutory effect. . . .

I have considered the authorities cited. . . . The case which has
given me most anxiety is Institute of Patent Agents v. Lockwood 1 . ... It
was [there] unnecessary for the House of Lords to determine what
would be the position if the rules had been ultra vires . . .

. . . But as a matter of constitutional importance, I hope that
Members of Parliament and Ministers and Parliamentary draftsmen
will consider whether this form of legislation is really satisfactory. It
may be convenient for Ministers not to have to consider carefully
whether the powers they are purporting to exercise are within their
statutory authority and the powers delegated to them by statute.
Parliamentary draftsmen may have got into the habit of inserting this
kind of Star Chamber clause either on the instructions of a Minister
or as a matter of habit without his instructions. Members of Parlia-
ment may not trouble to consider what the sections to which they are
giving! legislative authority really mean, but simply follow the authority
of the Minister and the Government Whip. But I cannot think it
desirable that when Parliament delegates authority to affect property
and persons only if certain statutory conditions are observed, it should
then pass clauses which, it may be contended, allow their delegates to
contrav^ie $hese conditions, and make ultra vires orders which cannot
be controlled by the Courts which have to admirrister the laws of the
land.

Greer, L.J., and Slesser. L.J., concurred 7 ^

Appeal allowed.

Appeal to the House of Lords. March £3. ioy*, dLC. 494

Viscount Dunedin: . . . The first question, and it is a very important
and far-reaching one, is, therefore, as to the effect of s. 40, sub-s. 5.
Has it the effect of preventing any inquiry by way of certiorari pro-
ceeding of a scheme confirmed by the Minister? It is evident that it is
inconceivable that the protection should extend without limit. If the
Minister went out of his province altogether, if, for example, he pro-
posed to confirm a scheme which said that all the proprietors jfi a
scheduled area should make a per capita contribution of £5 to the
municipal authority to be applied by them for the building of a hall,
it is repugnant to common sense that the order would be protected,
although, if there were an Act of Parliament to that effect, it could
not be touched. Now the high water mark of inviolability of a con-
firmed order is to be found in . . . the case of the Institute of Patertt Agents
v. Lockwood. That case arose* under the Patents, Designs, and Trade
Marks Act. By that Act t&e Board of Trade was empowered to pass

1 [1894] A.C. 347.

326 Judicial Proceedings

such general rules as they thought expedient for the purposes of the
Act. Such rules were, “subject as hereinafter prescribed, 5 5 to be of the
same effect as if they were contained in the Act, and were to be
judicially noted. The “as hereinafter prescribed 55 was that the rules
were to be laid before Parliament for forty days, and if, within forty
days, either House disapproved of any rule, it was to be of no effect. . . .
The House of Lords held that the provision as to the rules being of like
effect as if they had been enacted in the Act, precluded inquiry as to
whether the rules were ultra vires or not.

Now, there is an obvious distinction between that case and this,
because there Parliament itself was in control of the rules for forty
days after they were passed, and could have annulled them if motion
were made to that effect, whereas here there is no Parliamentary
manner of dealing with the confirmation of the scheme by the Minister
of Health. Yet I do not think that that distinction, obvious as it is,
would avail to prevent the sanction given being an untouchable sanc-
tion. I think the real clue to the solution of the problem is to be^found
in the opinion of Herschell, L.G., who says this: “No doubt there
might be some conflict between a rule and a provision of the Act.
Well, there is a conflict sometimes between two sections to be found
in the same Act. You have to try and reconcile them as best you may.
If you cannot, you have to determine which* is the leading provision
and which the subordinate provision, and which must give way to the
other. That would be so with regard to the enactment, and with
regard to rules which artT to b$ treated as if within the enactment. In
that case, probably the enactment itself would be treated as the
governing consideration Ctnd the £ule as subordinate to it.”i

What that comes to is this: The confirmation makes the scheme
speak as if it was contained in an Act of Parliament, but the Act of
Parliament in which it is contained is the Act which provides for the
framing of the scheme, not a subsequent Act. If therefore the scheme
as made, conflicts with the Act, it will have to give way to the Act.
The mere confirmation will not save it. It would be otherwise if the
scheme had been, per se, embodied in a subsequent Act, for then the
maxim to be applied would have been “Posteriora derogant prioribus.”
But^ as it is, if one can find that the scheme is inconsistent with the
provisions of the Act which authorises the scheme, the scheme will be
bad, and that only can be gone into by way of proceedings in certiorari.

I doubt if prohibition will ever be found to be an appropriate
remedy. ... In the meantime, I only wish to say that I think the
Court of Appeal, was right in refusing to decide the case on the ground
taken by the Divisional Court.

Now there arises the second question, *knd it must be apparent that,
in accordance with the opinion which I haye just expressed, the limits

1 [1894] A.C. 360. ' ' *

R- v. Minister of Healthy ex parte Yqffe , 195° 327

are narrow within which objections may be found. The respondent . . .
can only object with success if he can show that the scheme is a scheme
which is not such a scheme as is contemplated and provided for by
the Act. . . .

To turn now to the objections urged. They are really two in number.
'The first is that the scheme, as submitted to the Minister, did not
include a lay-out plan, and the second is that in clause 5 of the scheme,
as originally presented, the Council was given untrammelled powers,
a defect which the Minister had no right to cure. ...

My view of the matter is that there is no cut and dried form in
which a scheme must be propounded. The essentials are that it
should clearly show the area which, in its present condition, is treated
as the unhealthy area, and that, further, it should show that the
municipality have bona fide proposals in sight, but that all particulars,
and the precise form that reconstruction may take, are left over for the
decision of the Minister, who can impose such conditions as he desires.

No\>, when I apply this view to the facts in the present case, so far
from finding something which resembles Davis's case, I find a very
definite proposal. . . . It is clear therefore that the Minister was fully
aware of the general scheme as to how the cleared area was to be
dealt with, when he granted the confirmation. . . .

As comfirrhed, the scheme seems to be unassailable. . . . [It] is
clearly my opinion that, if the Minister finds a good scheme, bur dis-
figured by a blot upon it which would mcjce it possible to call the
legality of the scheme in question, lie fs absolutely entitled to remove
that blot. . . .

Order of the Court of Appeal reversed ora judgment of the King's Bench
Division restored .

DUNCAN v. JONES, 1935
{1936} I K.B. Si8

[Mrs. Katherine Duncan was one of four speakers who, it was announced,
would address a meeting outside an unemployment training centre in Deptford
on 30 July 1934. She was told by the chief constable of the district that the
meeting might not take place there, but might be held in another street
175 yards away. Nevertheless, Mrs. Duncan began her speech, and was at
once arrested by Inspector Jones. She was convicted at Tower Bridge Police
Court of obstructing the inspector when in the execution of his duty,
under the Prevention of Crimes Acts, 1871 and 1885, and fined 405<*Durin£
the hearing of her appeal to Lc*idon Quarter Sessions, it was shewn that a
disturbance had followed a previous meeting, in May 1933, which Mrs.
Duncan had addres^s^J oi#si&e the training centre. The deputy-chairman of
quarter sessions, in dismissing the appeal, held that the p#lice had reasonable

328 Judicial Proceedings

cause to believe that a breach of the peace would follow the meeting called in
July, and that it was therefore their duty to prevent the meeting from being
held.]

Lord Hewart, C. J. : There have been moments during the argu-
ment in this case when it appeared to be suggested that the Court had
to do with a grave case involving what is called the right of public
meeting. I say “called,” because English law does not recognise any
special right of public meeting for political or other purposes. The
right of assembly, as Professor Dicey puts it, is nothing more than a
view taken by the Court of the individual liberty of the subject. If I
thought that the present case raised a question which has been held
in suspense by more than one writer on constitutional law — namely,
whether an assembly can properly be held to be unlawful merely
because the holding of it is expected to give rise to a breach of the
peace on the part of persons opposed to those who are holding the
meeting — I should wish to hear much more argument before I ex-
pressed an opinion. This case, however, does not even touch that
important question.

Our attention has been directed to the somewhat unsatisfactory
case of Beatty v. Gillbanks. 1 ... In my view, Beatty v. Gillbanks is apart
from the present case. . . .

The present case reminds one rather of the observationsof IJramwell,
B., in Reg. v. Prebbte , 2 where, in holding that a constable, in clearing
certain licensed premises of the persons thereon, was not acting in the
execution of his duty, lie said". “It would have been otherwise had
there been a nuisance^ or disturbance of the public peace, or any
danger of a breach of thS peace.”-

The case stated which we have before us indicates clearly a causal
connection between the meeting of May 1933, and the disturbance
which occurred after it — that the disturbance was not only post the
meeting but was also propter the meeting. In my view, the deputy-
chairman was entitled to come to the conclusion to which he came
on the facts which he found and to hold that the conviction of the
appellant for wilfully obstructing the respondent when in the execution
of his duty was right. . . .

Humphreys, J. : I agree. I regard this as a plain case. It has nothing
to do with the law of unlawful assembly. No charge of that sort was
even suggested against the appellant. The sole question raised by the
case is whether the respondent, who was admittedly obstructed, was
so obstructed when in the execution of his duty.

0 It does not require authority to emphasise the statement that it is
the duly of a police officer to prevent apprehended breaches of the
peace. Here it is found as a fact that the^fespondent reasonably appre-
hended a breach of the peace. It then, as is rightly expressed in this
1 [iSfrti 9 Q/B.D. 308. 2 [1858] I. F. & F. 325.

Duncan y. Jones , igjj 329

case, became his duty to prevent anything which in his view would
cause that breach of the peace. While he was taking steps to do so he
was wilfully obstructed by the appellant. I can conceive no clearer
case within the statutes than that.

Singleton, J., concurred.

Appeal dismissed .

LIVERSIDGE v. SIR JOHN ANDERSON AND ANOTHER, 1941

House of Lords , [1942] A.C . 206

[Regulation 18 B of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939 stated: “If
the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe any person to be of
hostile origin or associations or to have been recently concerned in acts pre-
judicial to the public safety or the defence of the realm or in the preparation
or instigation of such acts and that by reason thereof it is necessary to exercise
control over him, he may make an order against that person directing that he
be detained.” In May 1940, the Home Secretary, Sir John Anderson, made an
order for the detention of Robert Liversidge. Liversidge applied for particulars
of the grounds on which the Home Secretary had reasonable cause to believe
him to he a*person of hostile associations over whom control should be
exercised.]

Appeal from the Court of Appeal aiirmin^ an order of the King’s
Bench Division refusing the appellant’s application for particulars of
defence in an action by him against the Home Secretary for false
imprisonment.

Viscount Maugham: ... I propose, first, to deal with the important
question of the construction of the words in the regulation, “If the
Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe, etc.,” that i£, the
question whether, as the appellant contends, the words require that
there must be an external fact as to reasonable cause for the belief,
and one, therefore, capable of being challenged in a court of law, or
whether, as the respondents contend, the words, in the context in
which they are found, point simply to the belief of the Secretary of
State founded on his view of there being reasonable cause for the
belief which he entertains. . . .

. . . The appellant’s counsel truly say that the liberty of the subject
is involved. They refer in emphatic terms to Magna Carta and the
Bill of Rights, and they contend that legislation dealing with the
liberty of the subject must be construed, if possible, in favour 5 of the
subject and against the Crown. Adopting the language of Lord
Finlay, L.C., . . . in the cgse of Rex v. Holliday , I hold that the sug-
gested rule has “no ‘relevance in dealing with an executive measure

330 Judicial Proceedings

bv way of preventing a public danger 55 when the safety of the state is
involved. . . .

. . . My Lords, I am not disposed to deny that, in the absence of a
context, the prima facie meaning of such a phrase as C£ if A. B. has
reasonable cause to believe 55 a certain circumstance or thing, it
should be construed as meaning “if there is in fact reasonable cause
for believing 55 that thing and if A. B. believes it. But I am quite unable
to take the view that the words can only have that meaning. It seems
to me reasonably clear that, if the thing to be believed is something
which is essentially one within the knowledge of A. B. or one for the
exercise of his exclusive discretion, the words might well mean if A. B.
acting on what he thinks is reasonable cause (and, of course, acting in
good faith) believes the thing in question.

In the present case there are a number of circumstances which tend
to support the latter conclusion. . . .

... I am of the opinion that the arguments ... in favour of the con-
struction for which the Attorney-General contends must greasy out-
weigh any arguments ... on the other side and that his construction
must prevail. The result is that there is no preliminary question of fact
which can be submitted to the courts and that in effect there is no
appeal from ,the decision of the Secretary of State in these matters
provided only that he acts in good faith. . . *

In my opinion, the present appeal should be dismissed. . . .

Lord Atkin: . . . It is surely incapable of dispute that the words
“if A has X 55 constitute zf condition the essence of which is the existence
of X and the having of it by A. If it is a condition to a right (including
a power) granted to A, f whenevej the right comes into dispute the
tribunal whatever it may be that is charged with determining the dis-
pute must ascertain whether the condition is fulfilled. In some cases
the issue is one of fact, in others of both fact and law, but in all cases
the words indicate an existing something the having of which can be
ascertained. And the words do not mean and cannot mean “if A
thinks that he has. 55 “If A has a broken ankle 55 does not mean and
cannot mean “if A thinks that he has a broken ankle. 55 “If A has a
right of way 55 does not mean and cannot mean “if A thinks that he has
a right of way. 55 “Reasonable cause 55 for an action or a belief is just
as much a positive fact capable of determination by a third party as is
a broken ankle or a legal right. If its meaning is the subject of dispute
as to legal rights, then ordinarily the reasonableness of the cause, and
even the existence of any cause is in our law to be determined by the
judge and not by the tribunal of fact if the functions deciding law and
tact a& divided. Thus, having established, as I hope, that the plain
and natural meaning of the words “has Seasonable cause 55 imports the
existence of a fact or state of facts and $pt the mere belief by the
person challenged that the fact or state of facts Existed, I proceed to

Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson and Another , /py/ 331

show that this meaning of the words has been accepted in innumerable
legal decisions for many generations, that “reasonable cause” for a
belief when the subject of legal dispute has been always treated as an
objective fact to be proved by one or other party and to be determined
by the appropriate tribunal. I will go further and show that until
June or July of this year in connection with this reg. 18B, there never
has been any other construction even submitted to the courts in
whatever context the words are found. . . .

. . . [The] original form of the regulation issued in September, 19.39,
gave the Secretary of State the complete discretion now contended for:
“The Secretary of State if satisfied, etc.” But it was withdrawn and
republished in November, 1939, in its present form. It is not com-
petent to us to investigate what political reasons necessitated this
change, but it is at least probable that it was made because objection
had been taken to the arbitrary power and it was seen that Parliament
might intervene. What is certain is that the legislators intentionally
introduced the well known safeguard by the changed form of words.

. . . No one doubts that the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939,
empowers His Majesty in Council to ve£t any minister with unlimited
power over the person and property of the subject. The only question
is whether in this regulation His Majesty has done so.

. . . It*is s«id that it could never have been intended to substitute
the decision of judges for the decision of the minister, or, as has been
said, to give an appeal from the minister to the courts. But no one
proposes either a substitution cr an appeal. A judge’s decision is not
substituted for the constable’s on the question*of unlawful arrest, nor
does he sit on appeal from the constable. He*has to bear in mind that
the constable’s authority is limited and mat he can only arrest on
reasonable suspicion, and the judge has the duty to say whether the
conditions of the power are fulfilled. It there are reasonable grounds,
the judge has no further duty of deciding whether he would Jiave
formed the same belief any more than, if there is reasonable evidence
to go before a jury, the judge is concerned with whether he would
have come to the same verdict. . . .

I view with apprehension the attitude of judges who on a mere
question of construction when face to face with claims involving -$he
liberty of the subject show themselves more executive minded than the
executive. Their function is to give words their natural meaning, not,
perhaps in war time leaning towards liberty, but following the dictum
of Pollock, C.G., in Bowditch v. Batching cited with approval by my
noble and learned friend Lord Wright in Barnard v. Gorham'* “In a
case in which the liberty of the subject is concerned, we cannot go
beyond the natural construction of the statute.” In this country, amid
the clash of arms, the laws*are not silent. They may be changed, but
1 [1850]^ Ex. 378. 2 [194T A.C. 37^ 393-

332 Judicial Proceedings

they speak the same language in war as in peace. It has always been
one of the pillars of freedom, one of the principles of liberty for which
on recent authority we are now fighting, that the judges are no respec-
ters of persons and stand between the subject and any attempted
encroachments on his liberty by the executive, alert to see that any
coercive action is justified in law. In this case I have listened to argu-
ments which might have been addressed acceptably to the Court of
Kang’s Bench in the time of Charles I. . . .

Lord Macmillan: ... In the first place, it is important to have
in mind that the regulation in question is a war measure. This is not
to say that the courts ought to adopt in wartime canons of construction
different from those which they follow in peace time. . . . But in a time
of emergency when the life of the whole nation is at stake it may well
be that a regulation for the defence of the realm may quite properly
have a meaning which because of its drastic invasion of the liberty of
the subject the courts would be slow to attribute to a peace time
measure. The purpose of the regulation is to ensure public safety, and
it is right so to interpret emergency legislation as to promote rather
than to defeat its efficacy for the defence of the realm. . . .

In the next place, it is relevant to consider to whom the emergency
power of detention is confided. The statute has- authorised it to be
conferred on a Secretary of State, one of the high officers -of State who,
by reason of his position, is entitled to public confidence in his capacity
and integrity, who is answerable to Parliament for his conduct in
office and who has access to -exclusive sources of information. In a
question of interpreting the scope of a power it is obvious that a wide
discretionary power may more xeadily be inferred to have been
confided to one who has high authority and grave responsibility. . . .

Lord Wright : . . . Ail the courts to-day, and not least this House,
are as jealous as they have ever been in upholding the liberty of the
subject. But that fiber ty is a liberty confined and controlled by law,
whether common law or statute. It is, in Burke’s words, a regulated
freedom. It is not an abstract or absolute freedom. Parliament is
supreme. ... I have ventured on these elementary and obvious
observations because it seems to have been suggested on behalf of the
appellant that this House was being asked to countenance arbitrary,
despotic or tyrannous conduct. But in the constitution of this country
there are no guaranteed or absolute rights. The safeguard of British
liberty is in the good sense of the people and in the system of repre-
sentative and responsible government which has been evolved. If extra-
ordinary powers are here given, they are given because the emergency
is extraordinary and are limited to the period of the emergency. . . .

Lord Romer: ... It is also to be noticed that the words of para, i
are not “if there is reasonable cause to believe,” but, “if the Secretary
of State has reasonable cause to believe.” It is, of bourse, true, as has

Liver sidge v. Sir John Anderson and Another , 1941 333

been said by my noble and learned friend Lord Atkin, that the words
“if a man has a broken ankle” do not and cannot mean “if he thinks
he has a broken ankle,” but the regulation is not dealing with the
state of a man’s body. It is dealing with the state of man’s belief, in
other words with the state of his thoughts. The words “if a man has a
belief that a certain thing exists” necessarily mean “if he thinks that
the thing exists,” and the word “has” may well have been used in the
regulation to indicate that it is throughout concerned with the impres-
sion that is created on the mind of the Secretary of State and not with
the impression they may produce on a court of law'. Not only is the
belief to be his. The estimate of the reasonableness of the causes that
have induced such belief is also to be his and his alone. . . .

Appeal dismissed .

POINT OF AYR COLLIERIES, LTD. v. LLOYD GEORGE, 1943

Court of Appeal , [1943] 2 All E.R. 346

Lord Greene, M.R. : The object of the action out of which this
appeal arises was to impugn the validity of an Order made on Feb. 5,
1943, entitled: “The Point of Ayr Collieries Limited Control Order,
1943.” That Order was made by the Minister of Fuel and Power
under the Defence (General) Regulations, reg.^5 (4). That paragraph,
the relevant parts of which I will quote, is as follows :

If it appears to a competent authority that in the interests of the public
safety, the defence of the realm, or the eificicnt prosecution of the war, or for
maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, it is
necessary to take control on behalf of His Majesty of the whole or any part
of an existing undertaking, and that, for the purpose ot exercising such control,
it is expedient that the undertaking or part should be carried on in pursuance
of an order made under this paragraph, the competent authority may by
order authorise any person ... to exercise, with respect to the undertaking or
any part thereof specified in the order, such functions of control on behalf of
His Majesty as may be provided by the order. . . .

... I11 the present case the appellants have led a quantity of
evidence. ... It may be summed up by saying that the appellants’
case is that there were no adequate grounds upon which the Minister
could find as he says he found, namely, that it appeared to him that
it was necessary to take control.

If one thing is settled beyond the possibility of dispute, it i2 that,
in construing regulations of tffis character expressed in this particular
form of language, it is for tjjie competent authority, whatever Ministry
that may be, to detide as to whether or not a case for the exercise of

334 Judicial Proceedings

the powers has arisen. It is for the competent authority to judge of the
adequacy of the evidence before it. It is for the competent authority
to judge of the credibility of that evidence. It is for the competent
authority to judge whether or not it is desirable or necessary to make
further investigations before taking action. It is for the competent
authority to decide whether the situation requires an immediate step,
or whether some delay mayybe allowed for further investigation and
perhaps negotiation. All those matters are placed by Parliament in the
hajjds of the Minister in the belief that the Minister will exercise his
powers properly, and in the knowledge that, if he does not so do, he
is liable to the criticism of Parliament. One thing is certain, and that
is that those matters are not within the competence of this court. It is
the competent authority that is selected by Parliament to come to the
decision, and, if that decision is come to in good faith, this court has
no power to interfere, provided, of course, that the action is one which
is within the four corners of the authority delegated to the Minister.

In the present case let me assume that every statement A in the
appellants 5 evidence is correct, and that there is nothing to be said on
the other side, in other word's that there are no additional facts out-
side those set out in the appellants 5 evidence. In my opinion, the
appellants 5 evidence does not establish any circumstances which give
this court power to interfere with what is- admittedly ~thc^bona fide
decision of the Minister. We cannot investigate the adequacy of his
reasons. We cannot investigate the rapidity or the lack of investigation,
if it existed, with which* he acted. We cannot investigate any of those
things because Parliament in its decision has withdrawn those matters
from the courts and ha^ entrusted them to the Ministers concerned,
the constitutional safeguard being, as I have said, the supervision of
Ministers exercised by Parliament. That being so, that is an end of the
case. The Minister put in no evidence. He was not bound to put in
any evidence, because his case rested on the basis that, even accepting
the evidence put in by the appellants, there w^as no case for him to
answer. In my opinion, that view was perfectly correct. . . .

Lords Goddard and du Parcq agreed.

Appeal dismissed.

RE HURLE-HOBBS, 1944

i All E.R . , [ 1944] 249

r Tucker, J. : . . . In the spring of 1940, the Lambeth Borough Council
had a contract with two years still to run . . . for the collection and
disposal of house, street and trade refuse in the Borough of Lam-
beth. . , . The contract had originally been entered into in 1932, and
had been renewed for a further five years from *1937.

Re Hurl^Hobbs , 1944 335

... In February 1940 [the contractor] applied to the Lambeth
Borough Council for additional remuneration on the ground of
increased prices due to the war. His application was referred to a
sub-committee who, after considering a report from the borough
engineer, recommended the payment of £7,000 in each of the two
remaining years of the contract. This recommendation was adopted
by the council on 25 April, 1940, and the sums in question were sub-
sequently paid to the contractor. At an audit held by the district
auditor in the autumn of 1942 these items were disallowed as being
contrary to law, and 48 councillors who took part in the decision to
make the payments were surcharged in respect thereof. From this
decision of the district auditor the 48 councillors appeal to this court
under the Local Government Act, 1933, s. 229.

Before referring further to the circumstances of this case it is, I
think, essential to endeavour to ascertain the guiding principles to be
applied in order to decide whether or not the payments impugned
were unlawful. In this connection most assistance is, I think, afforded
by a study of Roberts v. Hopwood. 1 It must however be remembered
that that was a decision under the Metropolis Management Act,
1855, s - 62, dealing with wages. ... It must also be kept in mind that
the payments in question had been made in pursuance jof a decision
to pay ^ minimum wage of £4 a week for all adult labour, young
and old, male and female, skilled and unskilled, «it not having been
shown, to use the words of Lord Sumner, that the women’s work was
the same or comparable with the mervs, or 'iiat the women inter se 3
or the men inter se, were engaged in equivalent^ tasks. It was a decision
held to have been made on social and political grounds rather than
economic considerations. This being the position, much consideration
was given to the question whether the word ; "reasonable, 9 9 which did
not appear in the section, was to be introduced for the purposes of
construction. . . . [The House of Lords] made it clear that it is not for
the district auditor, or the court, to substitute their discretion for that
of the council if there are any grounds upon which the council could
reasonably have exercised their discretion as they did. . . .

In the result, their Lordships were of opinion on the facts of that
case that the council had given what amounted to gratuities to tjjeir
servants without any compensatory benefits to the ratepayers and
accordingly had not reasonably exercised their discretion but acted
arbitrarily. . . .

In the present case we have to consider two payments made to a
contractor who was already bound to perform the necessary services
for the council for the collection and disposal of refuse until fMarch
1942. It is not suggested that there was any consideration In law for

these payments, and they # were, therefore, in a sense gratuities and

* * •

1 See above, p. 315.

336 Judicial Proceedings

voluntary payments. None the less, counsel for the district auditor does
not contend that such lack of legal consideration will of itself render
the payments “contrary to law.” He says the payments were unlawful
because the council considered extraneous matters, ignored much
relevant matter, acted without real evidence of hardship on the part
of the contractor or probability that the service would suffer, and
failed to investigate his claipi with proper care. In considering such
contentions as these it is desirable to formulate with precision the
test to be applied, and it is for this reason that I have set out in
some detail the observations of their Lordships in Roberts v. Hopwood .

It appears to me that that case, although dealing with wages and a
different section of the governing Act, indicates the broad principles
which should be applied in the present case. It appears to me that the
proper test to be applied in the circumstances of this case is contained in
the following questions: (i) Did the councillors who have been sur-
charged apply their minds to the relevant considerations in deciding
to make these payments? (ii) Was there material upon which they
could reasonably come to the conclusion that there was a danger that
without the payments the services might be impaired ? (iii) W as there
material upon which they could reasonably fix the amount at £7,000?
Their bona jidss is not in question, so I omit what would otherwise be a
material matter for consideration. These questions may perhaps be
put more shortly thus: Was their decision arrived at solely in the
interests of the ratepayers upon reasonable materials, or was it a mere
arbitrary decision to pAy away the moneys of the ratepayers as a
gratuity to the contractor so that he should suffer no diminution of
his profits? € *

Judged by this test I find that the propriety of the original contract
and its price has never been questioned; that prices had admittedly
risen to the extent of the percentages shown in the borough engineer’s
report upon which the council acted ; that it was a time of war when
it is more than usually difficult to foresee the probable course of events ;
that the council had received a letter from the contractor . . . which,
I think, contains an implication that failing any increase he may no
longer be able to maintain his services . . . ; that the contractor occupied
a unique position, and that failing him the only alternative would
have been for the council hastily to improvise some system of their own
at a time of labour shortage and rising prices; that the council had
received a favourable recommendation from their experienced borough
engineer; that they had received an undertaking from the contractor
that he would ask for no further increase (including increases due to
rises in w^ges) for the remainder of the^contract period; and that the
town clerk had advised them that such payments were lawful.

Taking all these matters into consideration and having regard to
[various affidavits^, all of which go to show that fhese gentlemen were

Hurl^-Hobbs, 194.4

337

applying their minds to the proper question, namely, the interests of
the ratepayers and the likelihood of the services being impaired, I
think there was material upon which the councillors could reasonably
come to the conclusion that the services might suffer, and that they
did in fact apply their minds solely to this consideration.

... I pass to consider the district auditor’s reasons as set out in his
report, to all of which I have given j^reful consideration before
arriving at my decision already indicated. His reasons may be sum-
marised as follows: (i) There was no consideration in law for the pay-
ments. (ii) The contract had not been frustrated, (iii) The contractor
had not made out a prima facie case for increase, (iv) No evidence was
provided as to the contractor’s costs, (v) The council neglected to
refer to their own records which would have shown that by March
1940 the services were diminishing in volume, (vi) Failure to consult
other borough councils with wffiom the contractor had contracts, (vii)
Failure to ask for expert advice from the borough treasurer, (viii) The
council never in fact apprehended any danger of the service breaking
down, and were never in real doubt as to the contractor’s financial
stability. »

As to those, (i) and (ii) were not relied upon by counsel for the
district auditor as sufficient per se to justify the disallowance. This is
import^it, because it appears as if the district auditor took the view
that these matters would of themselves have justified his decision apart
from the other circumstances upon which he relied, (iii) to (vii)
inclusive, deal with matters which are* all relevant to the issue, but I
do not think it necessary to deal with them sgiath?i in detail, because
after giving them due weight as against ihe*considerations previously
set out, I have come to the conclusion that they do not turn the scale
in favour of the disallowance. As to (iii), I ought perhaps to say that
I am not in agreement with the district auditor’s conclusion, (v) I
reject. The figures show that by March 1940 there had been a^slight
drop in refuse collected, but the curve shown in the graph put in
evidence was quite in accordance with seasonal fluctuations in previous
years. ... I can see no reason at all why the council should have
anticipated any appreciable variation in the volume of the services to
be rendered in the future, and I think this argument was borj of
wisdom acquired from after events.

The lack of evidence as to costs, and the failure to consult other
borough councils, are in my view much the most serious objections.
The absence of information as to costs, persisting until the present
time, I have already referred to. The failure to consult the other
boroughs was, I think, an unfortunate mistake, but if bona jide\ annot,
in my view, be considered as Tata! to the contentions of the applicants.
The borough treasurer, although not actually consulted, was throughout
conversant with wlia’t was taking place, and never raised any objection.

338 Judicial Proceedings

With regard to (viii) , I do not think it necessary that the councillors
should actually anticipate a complete breakdown in the services or the
bankruptcy of the contractor before sanctioning any increase. If the
district auditor took this view, I think he was applying too severe a
test. If he did not take such a narrow view, but is intending merely to
say that the councillors had no material before them upon which they
could reasonably anticipate ^.ny likelihood of some impairment in the
services, then I take a different view on the evidence before us.

in the result, I am of opinion that this appeal succeeds, and that the
disallowances and surcharges should be quashed.

Viscount Caldecote, L.G.J., and Atkinson, J., concurred.

Appeal allowed.

BLACKPOOL CORPORATION v. LOCKER, 1947

Court of Appeal , [ 1948 ] / K.B. gdg

[The Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, reg. 51, provided: “(1) A com-
petent authority, if it appears ... to be necessary or expedient to do so [for
any purpose specified in s. 1 (1) of the Supplies and Services (Transitional
Powers) Act, 1945] may take possession of any 5 land, and may £ive such
directions as appear . to be necessary or expedient in connection with the
taking of possession. ... (5) A competent authority may, to such extent and
subject to such restriction^ as it thinks proper, delegate all or any of its func-
tions under paras. (1) to ($) of the regulation to any specified persons or class
of persons.” ' r

The Minister of Health delegated his power to take possession of houses to
local authorities by means of 4 ‘circulars,” which contained conditions, among
others, that (i) no chattel might be requisitioned, and the requisition notice
should give direction as to the disposal of chattels; and (ii) where the owner,
withirf 14 days, notified his intention of occupying his house, the authority
should not proceed further in the matter unless it were satisfied that this
would result in serious under-occupation.

A prospective buyer of the defendant’s house in Blackpool paid a deposit on
18 June 1946. Two days later, a requisition notice was served on the defendant
under reg. 51 (1), stating that the town clerk of Blackpool had taken posses-
sion of the premises. This notice contained no direction as to the disposal of
the defendant’s furniture. The prospective buyer withdrew his offer; and on
26th June the defendant occupied the house himself, notifying the town clerk
that he intended to live there. On 29th July, in the course of correspondence,
the town clerk stated that the Minister of Health wished him to emphasise
that tho* defendant had committed an offence under the Defence Regulations,
that he war* a trespasser, and that the premies must be vacated at once. On
20 August, the Minister purported to confirm the town clerk’s decision, and
on 28 November the Minister purported to ratify gill thq, town clerk’s actions
in the matter.]

Blackpool Corporation v. Locker , igpy 339

Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Blackpool County
Court, granting the plaintiffs an injunction restraining the defendant
from continuing to occupy his house, and awarding nominal damages
for trespass. The county court judge held that, while the original
requisitioning of the house was unauthorised, subsequent letters from
the Minister had validated the town clerk’s excess of authority.

Scott, L.J. : This appeal raises several., important questions about
the delegated legislation enacted by the Ministry of Health. . . .
There is one quite general question affecting all such sub-delegated
legislation and of supreme importance to the continuance of the*rule
of law under the British constitution, namely the right of the public
affected to know what that law is. That right was denied to the
defendant in the present case. . . .

The delegation of powers, both executive and legislative, was
effected by what the Minister of Health styled “circulars.” The
instruments of delegation were justly entitled to that name as they
were gn their face addressed to all councils with powers of local
government above the level of parish councils. . . .

Before I approach the history of theuvays in which in the present
case the corporation, on the one hand, and the Ministry on the other,
sought to use or misuse the provisions of the circulars, jt is necessary
to consoler their true leg&i effect. . . . The startling feature of the whole
story before the court is that both the corporation and the officers of
the Ministry of Health, when writing the letters in the correspondence
and taking the views and actions therein appearing, radically mis-
understood their own legal rights and duties, and appear to have been
oblivious of the rights of the private householder. That the Minister’s
“circulars” were nor mere executive directions but delegated legisla-
tion with statutory force, conferring powers on the corporation which
they would not otherwise have possessed and imposing on them duties
for the reasonable protection of the individual house-owner, does not
seem to have entered the minds of either the corporation or the Minis-
try of Health. ... I cannot help thinking that much of the legal mis-
conceptions in the minds both of the Ministry of Health and of the
corporation about the extent and scope of powers remaining vested in
the Minister after he had delegated almost all of them to the corpora-
tion was due to the mistaken belief that he was, under para. (1), still
retaining a general power of supervision. . . .

The Rules Publication Act, 1893, and the Statutory Instruments
Act, 1946, which repealed the former and re-enacted an amended
edition of it, had publicity as well as control by Parliament as a main
object; but both have what seems to me the grave defect of n< 9 t being
applicable to any but primar^ delegated legislation. They are both ex-
pressly limited to such delegated legislation as is made under powers
conferred by Act of ^Parliament, whether on His Majesty in Council or

34 °

Judicial Proceedings

on a Minister of the Crown. Such primary delegated legislation has . . .
to be printed forthwith by the King’s Printer and published as a
statutory rule or order, etc. : but for delegated legislation made under
powers conferred by a regulation or other legislative instrument not being
itself an Act of Parliament , there is no general statutory requirement of
publicity in force to-day. Of such secondary or “sub-delegated”
legislation as I call it for clarity, neither the general public . . . nor
the legal adviser of an affected member of the public, however directly
he^jnay be affected, has any source of information about his rights, to
which he can turn as of right and automatically. The modern extent
of sub-delegated legislation is almost boundless; and it seems to me
vital to the whole English theory of the liberty of the subject, that the
affected person should be able at any time to ascertain what legislation
affecting his rights has been passed under sub-delegated powers. So
far as I know, this is the first case where that aspect of delegated
legislation has come before the courts for direct consideration.

. . . The defendant’s solicitor had the greatest difficulty in ascertain-
ing from either the corporation or the Ministry what his client’s rights
were. . . . [In] order to bring c 5 ut clearly the really monstrous character
of some of the contentions and allegations of both corporation and
Ministry, I want to analyse a little the legal relationships created by
the circulars as sub-delegated legislation . .«• . ; because *it is,«Dnly on
understanding wha<: those legal relations were that one realises the
full gravity of this almost incredible case . . .

. . . [The] circular? contained . . . ministerial legislation with
statutory force, transferring to the local authorities concerned the
Minister’s legal power to Override the common law rights of individual
members of the public, for the purposes defined in the circulars, and
limited by their conditions. In any area of local government, where the
Minister had by his legislation transferred such powers to the local
authority, he, for the time being, divested himself of those powers,
and/ out of the extremely wide executive powers, which the primary
delegated legislation contained in reg. 51, para. 1 had conferred on
him to be exercised at his discretion, retained only those powers
which in his sub-delegated legislation he had expressly or impliedly
reserved for himself. The constitutional justification for the delegation
permitted by para. 5 was obviously that local needs and opportunities
relevant to the housing problem would necessarily be infinitely more
within the local knowledge of the local authorities than in the Ministry
whether central or regional. The letter of 28 November presumably
s^nt upon direction from London was, in my opinion, ultra vires the
Minister, and legally a nullity.

My conclusions on the whole case are as follows: (1) The original
attempt at requisition on 20 June was inoperative for these reasons:
(a) because the $otice purported to requisition the house and its

Blackpool Corporation v. Locker 5 1947 341

contents, whereas the corporation was by the terms of the sub-delegated
legislation forbidden to requisition furniture . . (b) because a similar

illegal usurpation of power was attempted in the corporation’s omission
to have the furniture contents put into a separate room at the time of
requisition, or immediately after it. Thus, the notice, combined with
the taking of the keys colore officii , involved an actual taking possession
of both house and furniture, which in lav.' was a trespass by the cor-
poration. (2) On the notification by the defendant on 22 June and
again on 27 June, of his intention himself to occupy, the corporation
ought to have taken their hands right off (“shall not proceed further
in the matter”). The house was never in fact “occupied” by the cor-
poration and when the defendant entered, he entered an unoccupied
house, of which the corporation never had any such possession in law
as would make him then or thereafter a trespasser. . . .

Appeal allowed .

FRANKLIN AND OTHERS v. MINISTER OF TOWN AND
COUNTRY PLANNING, 1947

House of Lords , [49^#] A.C. 8 y #

[The Minister of Town and Country Planning, after a public local inquiry
had been held, made an order under the New Towns Act, 1946. The appellants
applied to the High Court to have the order quashed, on the grounds: u (i)
That the said order is not within the powers of the New Towns Act, 1946, or
alternatively that the requirements of the said Act have not been complied
with and the interests of the (appellants) have been thereby substantially pre-
judiced in that — (A) before considering the objections of the (appellants) the
Minister stated that he would make the said order, and was thereby Jdased
in any consideration of the said objections; and (B) the Minister did not before
making the said order cause a public local inquiry to be held with respect
thereto; and (2) that the New Towns Act, 1946, impliedly requires that the
objections of the (appellants) should be fairly and properly considered by the
Minister and that the Minister should give fair and proper effect to the result
of such consideration in deciding whether the said order should be made find
that such implied requirements were not complied with.” Henn Collins, J.,
quashed the order, holding that, though the Minister had not acted ultra
vires, he had not fulfilled his duty to act judically in considering the objections.
The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that the appellants had
not discharged the onus of proving that the Minister was biased when he

made the order.l *

• •

Lord Thankerton : My Lords, the appellants, who are the owners
and occupiers of dwelling-houses and land situate at Stevenage, chal-
lenge the validity of the Stevenage New Town (De#ignation) Order,

342 Judicial Proceedings

1946, made on November n, by the respondent, under the New
Towns Act, 1946, which had received the Royal Assent on August 1,
1946. This challenge is made under s. 16 of the Town and Country
Planning Act, 1944, which provides by sub-s. X (b) that the court “if
satisfied that the order or any provision therein ... is not within the
powers of this Act or that the interests of the applicant have been
substantially prejudiced by any requirement of this Act or of any
regulation made thereunder not having been complied with, may
quash the order or any provision contained therein . . . either generally
or in so far as it affects any property of the applicant. 55 The relevant
provisions of the New Towns Act, 1946, are as follows: “1. (1) If the
Minister is satisfied, after consultation with any local authorities who
appear to him to be concerned, that it is expedient in the national
interest that any area of land should be developed as a new town by a
corporation established under this Act, he may make an order desig-
nating that area as the site of the proposed new town. (2) The provi-
sions of sch. I to this Act shall have effect with respect to the procedure
to be followed in connexion with the making of orders under this
section; and ss. 16 and 17 of the Town and Country Planning Act,
1 944, . . . shall apply to an order made under this section as they apply
to an order made under s. 1 of that Act. 55 The relevant provisions of
sch. I as to orders under s. 1 are as follows?- “1 : Where* the ^Minister
proposes to make order under s. 1 of this Act, he shall prepare a
draft of the order describing the area to be designated as the site of the
proposed new town. . . r . 3. If*any objection is duly made to the pro-
posed order and is not>withdrawn, the Minister shall, before making
the order, cause a public local inquiry to be held with respect thereto,
and shall consider the report of the person by whom the inquiry was
held. 4. Subject to the provisions of the last foregoing paragraph the
Minister may make the order either in terms of the draft or subject to
such modifications as he thinks fit: Provided that, except with the
consent of all persons interested, the Minister shall not make the order
subject to a modification including in the area designated as the site
of the proposed new town any land not so designated in the draft
order. 55 . . .

There does not appear to be much dispute as to the facts, but a great
deal rests on the proper inference to be drawn from these facts. . . . On
January 21, 1946, a committee appointed by the respondent, . . . and
the Secretary of State for Scotland, known as the “Reith Committee 55
. . . recommended: “Arrangements should be made for setting up
immediately a public corporation for the development of a new town
at Stevenage to proceed with the necessary work in advance of legisla-
tion. 55 The New Towns Bill was introduced by the respondent in the
House of Commons on April 17, 1946^ and was ordered to be
printed. . . . OnrMay 6, 1946, the respondent attended and spoke at

Franklin and Others v. Minister of T.C.P . , 1947 343

a public meeting in Stevenage Town Hail, called to consider a pro-
posal for designating an area of land in the neighbourhood of Stevenage
as the site of a new town. The appellants base their case mainly on the
statements made in an advance press notice issued by the respondent
prior to the meeting, and statements made by the respondent in the
course of his speech, as evidence that the respondent had by that time
completely made up his mind that the* designation of Stevenage as
a new town would be carried through, whatever was said at the
meeting or subsequently.

The New Towns Bill received a second reading in the House of
Commons on May 8, 1946, and received the Royal Assent on August
1, 1946. The statutory duty of carrying out the designation of new
towns thus became imposed on the respondent as Minister of Town
and Country Planning. Under para. 1 of sch. I to the Act, the respon-
dent prepared, on August 3, 1946, a draft order for the designation of
the Stevenage area. . . . Objections were thereafter received, and, on
the instructions of the respondent, a public local inquiry was held by
Mr. Morris on October 7 and 8, 1946, and Mr. Morris made a report
to the respondent on October 25, 1946! . , , On November 8, 1946,
the respondent caused a letter to be sent to the objectors, in which,
after stating that he had considered Mr. Morris’s repcfrt, and that,
after giving c*areful consideration to the various submissions made to
him on behalf of interested local authorities and statutory under-
takers and by private individuals affected by the proposals, he had
decided to make the order. The respondent, in fourteen paragraphs,
dealt in turn with the main objections raisedNMie appellants sought to
maintain that, in para. 13, the respondent had not effectively dealt
with the objections raised by the Metropolitan Water Board, the Lee
Conservancy Board and the Lee Conservancy Catchment Board as to
water supply and sewage disposal, which the appellants contended
were vital to the practicability of the whole proposal, but only stated^that
he had appointed a consultant to examine the possibilities of a scheme
which will apply to a much wider area than that of the immediate
vicinity of Stevenage. In my opinion this contention . . . was correcdy
disposed of by Lord Oaksey, L.J., [in the Court of Appeal], who
pointed out that none of these authorities had ever suggested thas it
was an entirely unpracticable scheme, and that it really raised a ques-
tion of expense. ... It appears to me that the respondent’s letter of
November 8 not only does not support the appellants’ contention, but
that it is evidence that the Minister had properly considered the
objections. * *

. . . Henn Collins, J., upheld the first contention of the present
appellants on the ground that the respondent’s functions in con-
sidering the report 0 of.Mr. Morris’s inquiry were quasi-judicial,
that he did not consider the objections with an open mind, and that

344

Judicial Proceedings

“he did not consider or decide the question aye or no should the order
be confirmed with an open mind, but that he meant to confirm it
whatever the force of the objections might be, trusting that some
solution would be found. 5 ’ The learned judge based his view on the
respondent’s speech of May 6, 1946, and on para. 13 of the respon-
dent’s letter of November 8. As regards the former, he says: “If I
am to judge by what he said at the public meeting which was held very
shortly before the Bill, then published, became an Act of Parliament,
I eould have no doubt but that any issue raised by objectors was fore-
judged. . . . But when he made that speech ... he had no administra-
tive functions in relation to the Act in question, for the Act had not
then been passed. Though that was his attitude two days before the
Bill received the second reading, it is upon the objectors to prove that
the Minister was in a like mind, or at least had not an open mind,
from and after, at latest, the inception of the public inquiry, which
was held in October, 1946.” As regards the letter of November 8,
1946, the learned judge says: “In this case . . . the Minister h^s dealt,
in writing, with the substance of the objections — with one exception,
namely, that directed to the' difficulties of water supply and sewage
disposal. It is obvious that those difficulties must be met before the
scheme can r go through. The Minister acknowledges that they have
not been met, and that he is taking advice as to how it# can Jae done.
Non constat that arfy way will be found. And yet, with that fundamental
problem still outstanding, the Minister confirms his order. How can it
be said that he weighed the objection with an open mind when he
acknowledges that he# did not and does not know the force of it?
When, therefore, I ask myself whether the objectors have satisfied me
that from and after the inception of the inquiry up to and including
the moment at which the Minister decided to confirm his order, he
had not an open mind, my answer is that they have.” It is clear that
had the learned: judge appreciated, as was pointed out in the Court
of Appeal, that no witness had suggested that the scheme could not
go through, unless the suggested difficulties of water supply and
sewage disposal had been met, and had he realised that he had put a
wrong construction on para. 13 of the letter of November 8, he would
no t only have been left without any evidence that from and after the
inception of the inquiry up to and including the confirmation of the
order the respondent had not an open mind, but he would have had
the evidence of the letter . . . that the respondent had so considered
the report, and he should also have taken account of the unchallenged
offidayit of the respondent on January 21, 1947, referred to by the
Court of^Appeal that “before causing ^the said order to be made, I
personally carefully considered all the objections made by the objec-
tors including the present applicants, together with the submissions
made and evidence given on their behalf as appearing in the said

Franklin and Others v. Minister of T.C.P., 345

transcript. I also carefully considered the report of the said Arnold
Morris. 55 ... In that aspect of the evidence it appears that the learned
judge in view of his reasoning, as above quoted, would not have
quashed the order. The Court of Appeal accepted this view of the
reasoning of the learned judge, and, while assuming that his inference
from the respondent’s speech of May 6, that the respondent had not
then an open mind and that any issue raised by the objectors was fore-
judged was well-founded, held that the learned judge’s statement of the
evidence of the objectors as to water supply and sewage disposals was
incorrect, it not having been suggested that the scheme was entirely
impracticable, and on his erroneous construction of the letter of
November 8, set aside the decision of Henn Collins, J., and restored
the Stevenage New Town (Designation) Order of the present
respondent.

My Lords, I agree with the decision of the Court of Appeal, but I
am of opinion that an incorrect view of the law applicable in this case
was taken by the learned judge, and I feel bound, despite the assump-
tion of its correctness by the Court of Appeal, to examine the correct-
ness of the learned judge’s view as to the proper inference from the
respondent’s speech of May 6. . . . In my opinion, no judicial, or
quasi-judicial, duty was imposed on the respondent, and any reference
to judicial duty, or bias, is irrelevant in the present case. The respon-
dent’s duties under s. 1 of the Act and sch. I thereto*are, in my opinion,
purely administrative, but the Act prescribes certain methods of, or
steps in, discharge of that duty. It is devious that, before making the
draft order, which must contain a definite proposal to designate the
area concerned as the site of a new 7 * town, the respondent must have
made elaborate inquiry into the matter and have consulted any local
authorities who appear to him to be concerned, and obviously other
departments of the Government, such as the Ministry of Health, would
naturally require to be consulted. It would seem, accordingly, that the
respondent was required to satisfy himself that it was a sound scheme
before he took the serious step of issuing a draft order. It seems clear
also, that the purpose of inviting objections, and, where they are not
withdrawn, of having a public inquiry, to be held by someone other
than the respondent, to whom that person reports, was for the further
information of the respondent, in order to the final consideration of the
soundness of the scheme of the designation; and it is important to note
that the development of the site, after the order is made, is primarily
the duty of the development corporation established under s. 2 of the
Act. I am of opinion that no judicial duty is laid on the respondent ins
discharge of these statutory duties, and that the only question is
whether he has complied with the statutory directions to appoint a
person to hold the public jm^uiry, and to consider that person’s report.
On this contention of the appellants no suggestion ts made that the

gq6 Judicial ■ Proceedings

public inquiry was not properly conducted, nor is there any criticism
of the report by Mr. Morris. In such a case the only ground of chal-
lenge must be either that the respondent did not in fact consider the
report and the objections, of which there is here no evidence, or that
his mind was so foreclosed that he gave no genuine consideration to
them, which is the case made by the appellants. Although I am unable
to agree exactly with the view of the respondent’s duty expressed by the
learned judge, or with some of the expressions used by the Court of
Appeal in regard to that matter, it does appear to me that the issue
was treated in both courts as being whether the respondent had gen-
uinely considered the objections and the report, as directed by the Act.

My Lords, I could wish that the use of the word “bias” should be
confined to its proper sphere. Its proper significance, in my opinion,
is to denote a departure from the standard of even-handed justice
which the law requires from those who occupy judicial office, or those
who are commonly regarded as holding a quasi-judicial office, such as
an arbitrator. . . . But, in the present case, the respondent having no
judicial duty, the only question is what the respondent actually did,
that is, whether in fact he did genuinely consider the report and the
objections.

Coming n6w to the inference of the learned judge from the respon-
dent’s speech on May 6, that he had not then a mind open tc^convic-
tion, . . . [it] seems'' probable that the learned judge’s mind was influ-
enced by his having already held that the respondent’s function was
quasi-judicial, which ^ould i^,ise the question of bias, but, in any
view, I am clearly of opinion that nothing said by the respondent was
inconsistent with the discharge of his statutory duty, when subsequently
objections were lodged, and the local public inquiry took place, fol-
lowed by the report of that inquiry, genuinely to consider the report
and the objections. The only passages in the speech quoted in the
appellants’ case are contained in the third quotation I have made
“I want to carry out in Stevenage a daring exercise in town planning.
[Jeers.) It is no good your jeering: it is going to be done. . . . After
all this new town is to be built in order to provide for the happiness
of sixty thousand men, women and children. . . . The project will go
forward, because it must go forward. . . The only two additional
passages . . . were . . . “In anticipation of the passage of the Bill —
and I have no doubt that it will go through,” and . . . “But we have
a duty 7 to perform, and I am not going to be deterred from that duty.
While I will consult as far as possible all the local authorities, at the
end, if people become fractious and unreasonable, I shall have to

carry out-my duty (Voice: Gestapo!)” My Lords, these passages

in a speech, which was of a political nature, and of the kind familiar
in a speech on second reading, demonstrate (i)_the speaker’s view
that the Bill woidd become law, that Stevenage was a most suitable

Franklin and Others v. Minister of T.C.P., 1947 347

site and should be the first scheme in the operation, and that the
Stevenage project would go forward, and (2) the speaker’s reaction to
the hostile interruptions of a section of the audience. In my opinion,
these passages are not inconsistent with an intention to carry out any
statutory duty imposed on him by Parliament, although he intended
to press for the enactment of the Bill, and thereafter to carry out the
duties thereby involved, including the. Consideration of objections
which were neither fractious nor unreasonable. I am, therefore, of
opinion that the first contention of the appellants fails, in that j* hey
have not established either that in the respondent’s speech he had fore-
judged any genuine consideration of the objections or that he had not
genuinely considered the objections at the later stage when they were
submitted to him.

The remaining contention of the appellants is that the inquiry held
by Mr. Morris did not comply with the statutory requirements for such
a local public inquiry, in respect that no evidence in support of the
draft oj^er was led on behalf of the respondent. ... As I have already
pointed out, the object of the inquiry is further to inform the mind of
the Minister, and not to consider any is§ue between the Minister and
the objectors; that is for the Minister thereafter to consider and decide.
Accordingly, I am of opinion that this contention of the appellants
also failfc • •

In my opinion, the appeal should be dismissed sftid the judgment of
the Court of Appeal should be affirmed . . .

Lords Porter, Uthwatt, du Parcq and Norirfend, concurred.

Appeal dismissed .

R. v, TRONOH MINES, LTD., AND OTHERS, 1952 *

Central Criminal Courts [7952] 1 An E.R. 697
[After writs had been issued for the General Election of 1951, a company
published in a national newspaper an advertisement headed “Tronoh-
Malayan Tin Group of Companies. Interim statement on dividend limita-
tion”, which contained criticisms of the Labour Party’s financial policy and
included these words: “The coming general election will give us all the
opportunity of saving the country from being reduced, through the policies of
the Socialist government, to a bankrupt ‘Welfare State’. We need a new and
strong government with Ministers who may be relied upon to encourage
business enterprise and initiative. . . .” The company, the secretary, ?jnd the 5
proprietors of The Times newspaper were jointly charged with ^unlawfully
incurring expenses with a view to promoting or procuring the election of a
candidate other than the I^at^ur candidate at the parliamentary election to
be held in the constituency in which the company had* its office and the

348 Judicial Proceedings

newspaper was published, contrary to s. 63 (1) (b) and s. 63 (5) of the Repre-
sentation of the People Act, 1949. On a second count, it was alleged that the
expenses were incurred with a view to promoting or procuring the election
of the Conservative candidate in this constituency.]

McNair, J.: On the view I take of the construction of s. 63 (1) of
the Representation of the People Act, 1949, this is not a case which I
can properly leave to jury. s .

... So far as is material, s. 63 (1) provides:

-u _

“No expenses shall, with a view to promoting or procuring the election of a
candidate at an election, be incurred by any person other than the candidate,
his election agent and persons authorised in writing by the election agent on
account — -{a) of holding public meetings or organising any public display; or
(b) of issuing advertisements, circulars or publications; or (c) of otherwise
presenting to the electors the candidate or his views or the extent or nature
of his backing or disparaging another candidate. . . .”

... It seems to me that (c) necessarily imports that the particular
items specified in ( a ) and ( b ) must also, if they are to be caught by
the prohibition, be items which have the effect of “presenting to the
electors the candidate or his views or the extent or nature of his back-
ing or disparaging another candidate,” If this result had not been
intended, it seems to me that para. ( c ) would have run : “of presenting
to the electors, whether by means specified in para, (a) or para. ( b ) 9
or in any other way, the candidate or his views ...” Furthermore,
the Interpretation Actr 1889, 35. 1 (1), provides that, unless the con-
text otherwise require^, words importing the singular include the
plural, and I think that 'the context here does necessarily require that
references to the election of a candidate at an election means a can-
didate at a particular election and not candidates at elections
generally. . . .

I h|tve reached the decision that on the evidence no reasonable jury
could find that the advertisement in question was presenting to the
electors of any constituency any particular candidate, still less pre-
senting to the electors of the cities of London and Westminster either
the Conservative candidate or any candidate other than a Socialist
candidate or his views.

... If expenses incurred on account of the items specified in (a), ( b )
and ( c ), being supported in writing by the election agent, are per-
missible and authorised by the election agent, then, by virtue of
sub-s. (2) the person who incurs them has to make a return to the
Returning officer of the amount of those expenses, stating the election
at which and the candidate in whose support they were incurred. . . .
[It] is clear that [the prescribed] formas inappropriate for making a
return of expenses of the kind with which we are here concerned.
There is no way^in which the expenditure, bn the hypothesis I have

R. v. Tronoh Mines , 1992 349

stated, incurred in relation to all elections can be apportioned for the
purpose of any particular return for a particular election. That con-
sideration alone seems to me to lend strong support to the view that
the section is not intended to prohibit expenditure incurred on adver-
tisements designed to support, or having the effect of supporting, the
interest of a particular party generally in all constituencies, at any
rate at the time of a general election, and not supporting a particular
candidate in a particular constituency. * . .

Verdict: “ Not Guilty 55 on both counts .

Zbg

SECTION V

The Parties and the Electorate

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE LABOUR PARTY, 1918

i.— NAME

The Labour Party.

2. — MEMBERSHIP

The Labour Party shall consist of all its affiliated organisations, 1
together with those men and women who are individual members of
a Local Labour Party and who subscribe to the Constitution and
Programme of the Party.

3.— PARTY OBJECTS

NATIONAL

(a) To organise and maintain in Parliament and in the country a
Political Labour Party, and t® ensure the establishment of a Local
Labour Party in every County Constituency and every Parliamentary
Borough, with suitable divisional organisation in the separate consti-
tuencies of Divided Boroughs;

(b) Wo co-operate with the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades

Union Congress, or other Kindred Organisations* in joint political or
other action in harmony with the Party Constitution and Standing
Orders; * *

(d) To secure for the producers by hand or by brain the full fruits of
their industry, and the most equitable distribution thereof that may
be possible, upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of
production and the best obtainable system of popular administration
and control of each industry or service;

(e) Generally to promote the Political, Social, and Economic
Emancipation of the People, and more particularly of those who
depend directly upon their own exertions by hand or by brain for the
means of life.

INTER-DOMINION

(/) To co-operate with the Labour and Socialist organisations in the
Dominions and the Dependencies with a view to promoting the pur-
poses of the Party and to take common action for the promotion of^t
higher standard of social and # economic life for the working^population
of the respective countries.

1 Trade Unions, Sc^iajist «Sd%ieties, Co-operative Societies, Trades Councils, and
Local Labour Parties.

354

The Parties and the Electorate

INTERNATIONAL

(g) To co-operate with the Labour and Socialist organisations in other
countries and to assist in organising a Federation of Nations for the
maintenance of Freedom and Peace, for the establishment of suitable
machinery for the adjustment and settlement of International Disputes
by Conciliation or Judicial Arbitration, and for such International
Legislation as may be practicable.

4. — PARTY PROGRAMME

(a) It shall be the duty of the Party Conference to decide, from time
to time, what specific proposals of legislative, financial, or administra-
tive reform shall receive the general support of the Party, and be pro-
moted, as occasion may present itself, by the National Executive and
the Parliamentary Labour Party, provided that no such proposal shall
be made definitely part of the General Programme of the Party unless
it has been adopted by the Cpnferenct by a majority of not less than
two-thirds of the votes recorded on a card vote.

(b) It shall be the duty of the National Executive and the Parlia-
mentary Labour Party, prior to every General Election, to define the
principal issues forjhat Election which in their judgment should be
made the Special Party Programme for that particular Election Cam-
paign, which shall be issued as a manifesto by the Executive to all
constituencies where a *Labour Candidate is standing.

(c) It shall be the du't^ of every Parliamentary representative of the
Party to be guided by the decision of the meetings of such Parlia-
mentary representatives, with a view to giving effect to the decisions
of the Party Conference as to the General Programme of the Party.

5.— THE PARTY CONFERENCE

1. The work of the Party shall be under the direction and control
of the Party Conference, which shall itself be subject to the Constitu-
tion and Standing Orders of the Party. The Party Conference shall
meet regularly once in each year, and also at such other times as it
may be convened by the National Executive.

2. The Party Conference shall be constituted as follows: —

~ (a) Trade Unions and other societies affiliated to the Party may
send one delegate for each thousand members on which fees are paid.

(b) Local Labour Party delegates may be either men or women
resident or having a place of business in the constituency they represent,
and shall be appointed as follows : —

The Constitution of the Labour Party , igi 8 355

In Borough and County Constituencies returning one Member to
Parliament, the Local Labour Party may appoint one delegate.

In undivided Boroughs returning two Members two delegates may
be appointed.

In divided Boroughs one delegate may be appointed for each
separate constituency within the area. The Local Labour Party within
the constituency shall nominate and the Central Labour Party of the
Divided Borough shall appoint the delegates. In addition to such
delegates, the Central Labour Party in each Divided Borough may
appoint one delegate. *

An additional woman delegate may be appointed for each constitu-
ency in which the number of affiliated and individual women members
exceeds 500.

(< d ) The members of the National Executive, including the Treasurer,
the members of the Parliamentary Labour Party, and the duly-
sanctioned Parliamentary Candidates shall be ex officio members of the
Party Conference, but shall, unless delegates, have no right to vote.

, 6. — THE, NATIONAL EXECUTIVE *

♦

(a) There shall be a National Executive of the Party consisting of
twenty-three members (including the "JTreasur^r) elected by the Party
Conference at its regular Annual Meeting, in such proportion and
under such conditions as may be set out in the Standing Orders for the
time being in force, and this National Executive shall, subject to the
control and directions of the Part}’ Conference, be the Administrative
Authority of the Party.

(, b ) The National Executive shall be responsible for the conduct of
the general work of the Part}'. The National Executive shall ta£e -steps
to ensure that the Party is represented by a properly constituted
organisation in each constituency in which this is found practicable;
it shall give effect to the decisions of the Party Conference ; and it shall
interpret the Constitution and Standing Orders and Rules of the Party
in all cases of dispute subject to an appeal to the next regular Annual
Meeting of the Party Conference by the organisation or person
concerned.

(c) The National Executive shall confer with the Parliamentary
Labour Party at the opening of each Parliamentary Session, and also at
any other time when the National Executive or the Parliamentary
Party may desire such conferSnce, on any matters relating to the work
and progress of the Party, or to the efforts necessary to give effect to
the General ProgrtimmS of the Party.

The Parties and the Electorate

356

7.— PARLIAMENTARY CANDIDATURES

(a) The National Executive shall co-operate with the Local Labour
Party in any constituency with a view to nominating a Labour Candi-
date at any Parliamentary General or Bye-Election. Before any Parlia-
mentary Candidate can be regarded as finally adopted for a constitu-
ency as a Candidate of the Labour Party, his candidature must be
sanctioned by the National Executive.

Jb\ Candidates approved by the National Executive shall appear
before their constituencies under the designation of “Labour Candi-
date 55 only. At any General Election they shall include in their Election
Addresses and give prominence in their campaigns to the issues for
that Election as defined by the National Executive from the General
Party Programme. If they are elected they shall act in harmony with
the Constitution and Standing Orders of the Party in seeking to
discharge the responsibilities established by Parliamentary practice.

(i c ) Party Candidates shall receive financial assistance for Section
expenditure from the Party funds on the following basis: —

Borough Constituencies, £Tper 1,000 electors.

County Divisions, £1 15 s. per 1,000 electors.

c 8.— AFFILIATION FEES

1. Trade Unions, Socialist Societies, Co-operative Societies, and
other organisations directly affiliated to the Party (but not being
affiliated Local Labour* Parties or Trades Councils) shall pay 2 d. per
member per annum to the Central £arty Funds with a minimum of 30s.

The membership of a Trade Union for the purpose of this clause
shall be those members contributing to the political fund of the Union
established under the Trade Union Act, 1913.

2. .The affiliation of Trades Councils will be subject to the following
conditions : —

(a) Where Local Labour Parties and Trades Councils at present
exist in the same area, every effort must be made to amalgamate these
bodies, retaining in one organisation the industrial and political func-
tions, and incorporating the constitution and rules for Local Labour
Parties in the rules of the amalgamated body.

(b) Where no Local Labour Party is in existence and the Trades
Council is discharging the political functions, such Trades Council
sjjall be eligible for affiliation as a Local Labour Party, providing that
its rules aij$ title be extended so as to include Local Labour Party
functions.

(c) Where a Local Labour Party and a Trades Council exist in the
same area, the Trades Council shall be eligible to Be affiliated to the

The Constitution of the Labour Party , igi 8 357

Local Labour Party, but not to the National Party, except in such
cases where the Trades Council was affiliated to the National Party
prior to November 1st, 1917. In these cases the Executive Committee
shall have power to continue national affiliation on such conditions as
may be deemed necessary.

[d) Trades Councils included under Section (c) shall pay an annual
affiliation fee of 30J. ^ *

Local Labour Parties must charge individual enrolled members,
male a minimum of is. per annum, female 6d. per annum; and of.
per member so collected must be remitted to the Central Office*with
a minimum of 30^., as the affiliation fee of such Local Labour Party.

In addition to these payments, a delegation fee of 5 jt. to the Party
Conference or any Special Conference may be charged.

[Constitution as adopted by the Party Conference held in London on February
26th , igi8.)

THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY AND THE COALITION, 1922

Report of a meeting of Conservative Members of the House of Commons at the
** % Carlton Club on 19 October , ig22.

The Chairman (Mr. Austen Chamberlain): ... I do not think
it is necessary to read any of the letters of apology [for absence],
except one which I have received from Lord Cfurzon . . . : —

My dear Chamberlain, , *

I have been a good deal concerned at the idea of members of the
House of Lords, and particularly myself, as leader, being present, and very
likely being called upon to speak, at the meeting of the members of the House
of Commons at the Carlton Club tomorrow. As you may have learned, con-
siderable feeling has been aroused at the limitation of the meeting to members
of one House of Parliament alone, and although the situation is quite clear
as it affects yourself and your leadership of the party in your House, since you
are appealing to the body by which you were elected, it is different as regards
myself and my House.

I have received several protests from peers against my taking part, as leader
of the House of Lords, in a meeting from which peers are excluded, and seeking
to influence by anything that I may say the members of the House of Lords,
and I think in the circumstances that it will be better that I should abstain.

I am,

Yours very sincerely,

CuRZON OF KjEDLE^TONE. *

My lords and gentlemen: T have asked you and my friends in the
Cabinet to meet me because it was you who elected me as your leader
in the House of C commons, # and in so doing practically appointed me to

The Parties and the Electorate

358

my present position. I have asked you to meet at this moment because
it is a moment fraught with grave issues for our party and for our
country. . . .

For months past the task of Government has been increasingly
difficult, and the strain placed upon your leaders has been almost
indefinitely increased by the failure of unanimity of support from the
party behind them. ... * >P

It is not only in foreign policy that criticism has become increasingly
frgquent and increasingly difficult. Whatever might have happened,
you all know that an election could not be long postponed; and instead
of occupying our energies in healing our differences and trying to unite
as firmly and as closely as possible our ranks in view of the coming
fight, the party has been discussing in groups and sections what course
it will pursue, what support it will give to its leaders, what notice it
shall give to its allies.

No Government can be conducted with credit to itself or with
security for the country in the continuation of circumstances such as
those. There often comes a moment in the lives of parties and of
Governments when they mu»t take a critical decision. Either they
must hang on and go steadily downhill more and more discredited to
eventual disaster, or they take the bolder resolve and they seek from
those who put them in their position a rene # wal of the jnanda^e that
they hold. We are at one of those moments now, and for my friends
and myself I say we have come to the conclusion that it is impossible
to continue as we are £nd th^t we must seek the earliest appeal to
those who are our masters.

I want to ask you to Consider under what condition and in what
form that appeal is to be made. What are the forces and the policies
which stand face to fane with one another upon which the country
must give its verdict ? . . . The old party issues are dead ; new problems,
new phases, new issues confront us, to-day, new issues, new problems
of a 'different character. They are not the old political questions so
often fought out in our long political history; they are social and
economic questions. There is, for the first time, by quite the second
largest party in the State, a direct challenge to all these fundamental
principles of society which hitherto both the great parties in the State
have encouraged. . . .

That is the real issue that has to be fought out at the next election.
The real issue is not between Liberals and Conservatives. It is not
between the old Liberal policy and the old Conservative policy. It is
between those who stand for individual freedom and those who are
for the* socialisation of the State; those who stand for free industry
and those who stand for nationalisation* with all its controls and all
its inefficiencies. And it is at this moment ... I am bidden to give
notice to quit to the allies with whom I have wosktfd.

The Conservative Party and the Coalition , 1922 359

My friends and I have carefully . . . considered this situation. . . .
To us it appears that this is not a moment to break with old friends,
and scatter the forces which can be united in the defence of a cause
which is common to us all. . . .

Under the circumstances, my friends and I have come to the con-
clusion that the advice which, on the eve of an election, we ought to
tender to you is that we should maintain the closest, most cordial
co-operation in the constituencies and throughout the fight, and after
the fight, with the men who have stood by us in the difficult years. \^e
think, we hope, that every Unionist and Conservative, every LiSeral-
Coalitionist, should stand under his own party name and should
retain his party loyalty unimpaired. . . .

... If the result of such co-operation gives to the two parties so
co-operating the victory, a reconstruction of the Government as the
result of the changes of the election wall, of course, be necessary ; but I
submit to you . . . that what the nature of that reconstruction is to be
cannot^nd ought not to be determined until the result of the election
is known. ...

... It is you, deriving your authority from the electors, who con-
ferred my authority upon me and made me what I am, and in such a
matter as this I can accept no appeal from you to any ofcher authority
than-dpat of die electors* who are the masters of us all.

Mr. Stanley Baldwin: ... it is my duty at-this moment to put
before you . . . the views of the minority in the Cabinet — that is, of
myself and of Sir Arthur Boscawen. . . **

. . . The Prime Minister ... is a dynamic fierce, and it is from that
very fact that our troubles, in my, opinion, hrise. A dynamic force is
a very terrible thing ; it may crush you. but it is not necessarily right.

It is owing to that dynamic force, and that remarkable personality,
that the Liberal Party, to which he formerly belonged, has been
smashed to pieces; and it is my firm conviction that, in time, the same
thing will happen to our party. . . . We have already seen, during our
association with him in the last four years, a section of our party hope-
lessly alienated. I think that if the present association is continued, . . .
the process must go on inevitably until the old Conservative Party is
smashed to atoms and lost in ruins. ... 0

Captain Pretyman: ... I propose to move a resolution . . . :

That this meeting of Conservative Members of the House of Commons
declares its opinion that the Conservative party, whilst willing to co-operate
with Coalition-Liberals, fights the election as an independent party, with its
own leader and its own programme. ^ ~

Mr. Bonar Law: . . . This is a question in regard to which our
system . . . has hitherto^ gone on this principle: that the party elects a
leader, and that ftieTeader chooses the policy, an^ if the party does

The Parties and the Electorate

360

not like it, they have to get another leader. The question that has to
be decided at this meeting is not something that affects the House of
Commons alone. It is something which affects every Unionist in every
constituency. If it were possible, even at this last moment (I am afraid
it is not), I would say: “Let Mr. Chamberlain and those who think
with him, and those who disagree with him, submit to the party the
question: 4 Shall we or shall we not continue the Coalition ? 5 and let
us abide by their decision . 55 If that is possible, I would gladly adopt
that. But if it is not possible, then what is the position ? I am, I suppose,
more of a party man than some people. I was leader of our party for
a number of years. During the war I really did not think much of the
party, but I did always have at the back of my mind, the earnest desire
to keep it as a united party, whatever happened. . . . Now we are
faced with, I am sorry to say, an inevitable split, and I am afraid the
suggestion I have put forward cannot be adopted. I confess frankly
that in the immediate crisis in front of us I do personally attach more
importance to keeping our party a united body than to winding the
next election. I would not say that if,I thought there were a danger,
as the result of that election; of a Labour Government coming into
power. . . .

Now, what is the position ? ... If Mr. Chamberlain’s view is carried
at this meeting, what happens? It is very wr-ong that th^ partyrehould
be driven by the minority, but this is certain : that the feeling against
the continuance of the Coalition is so strong that our party will be
broken — that a new party will be formed; and, not the worst of the
evils of that is this, that on account of those who have gone, who are
supposed to be more moderate men, what is left of the Conservative
Party will become more reactionary; and I for one say that though
what you call the reactionary element in our party has always been
there, and must always be there, if it is the sole element, our party
is absolutely lost. Therefore, if you agree with Mr. Chamberlain in
this 'crisis, I will tell you what I think will be the result. It will be a
repetition of what happened after Peel passed the Corn Bill. The body
that is cast off will slowly become the Conservative Party, but it will
take a generation before it gets back to the influence which the party
ought to have . . .

... For these reasons, very reluctantly, I shall vote in favour of no
Coalition. . . .

The resolution was put to the meeting , and the votes were as follows;

Ayes 187

Noes 87

Conference on Electoral Reform , ig 29-30 361

CONFERENCE ON ELECTORAL REFORM, 1929-30

Letter from Viscount Ullswater to the Prime Minister ( Cmd . 3,636, 1930)
Dear Prime Minister,

The Conference over which you invited me to preside was
formed . . . from three panels of names submitted to me by the Labour,
the Conservative and the Liberal parties. . . . Three peers were also
added, one from each party. ... :

No terms of reference were given, but it was arranged that the Con-
ference should itself determine the subjects which it would consider,
in the light of the suggestions made by the parties, and the order in
which they would be taken. . . .

The Conference held its first meeting on 4 December 1929, when it
was decided that the first matter to consider was the suggestion of the
Liberal section that some system should be adopted with a view to
“securing that the composition of the House of Commons shall pro-
perly reflect the views expressed *by the electorate. 5 ’ It appeared to the
Conference that not only